

Documents of
RUSSIAN HISTORY
1914-1917

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PREFACE

In a collection of documents one has always to explain why he has selected this and not that. The only explanation usually is that this document seemed more pertinent than that. One has to begin and end somewhere.

The material for this book is taken from various places, but largely from two newspapers, the "Riech" and the "Izvestiia." These two papers contain most of the official documents of the period and give opposing points of view. In the time of the Tsar the "Riech," organ of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), was regarded as a radical sheet but, in the days of the revolution, was looked upon as a tool of the reactionaries. The "Izvestiia" came into life with the Petrograd Soviet and represented the advanced socialistic thought until the Bolsheviks came on the scene. Their paper, "Pravda," made the "Izvestiia" look as old fashioned as the "Riech" appeared to the "Izvestiia."

About half or more of the material in this book has been translated by Mr. Emanuel Aronsberg. He has done it with the same painstaking care with which he does all his work. Unfortunately he had not the time to translate all the documents and other persons had to be called in to help out. For the sake of uniformity it has been necessary to revise the whole translation and I assume responsibility for it as it stands. Many of the documents were penned off on the spur of the moment by men not accustomed to such work, who were careless in the use of terms and were often carried away by fine sounding phrases. It has not always been easy to translate these documents and I have aimed at brevity and clarity rather than literality.

In transliterating names I have, as a rule, followed the system in use at the Library of Congress and Harvard University; but I have not always been consistent. Wherever the spelling of a Russian name has become established in English I did not dis-

turb it. For example, I kept Tsar "Nicholas" and Grand Duke "Nicholas" instead of "Nikolai" as I did in the case of Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich. I have written Alexander, Michael and not Aleksandr, Mikhail.

The dates in this book are everywhere in the new style, but wherever certain events in Russian history, like the Manifesto of October, have become associated with certain dates of the old style, both the old and new are given (October 17-30).

Mrs. H. H. Fisher, Miss Virginia Fox and, in particular, Mrs. L. N. Litoshenko have assisted me in various ways in the preparation of the manuscript and I take this opportunity of acknowledging their help and expressing my gratitude.

F. A. GOLDER.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
JULY 1, 1927.

INTRODUCTION

The World War and the Russian Revolution are the two great events of recent times and it is as yet difficult to say which of the two will exert the greater influence on the world. Much time is given to the study of the one and comparatively little to the other and yet we know so much more of the one than of the other. We talk a good deal of Bolshevism, but what do we really know about it? What is it aiming to do, what has it actually done, what is it likely to do? These are questions which we should ask ourselves in all seriousness. In 1925 I put such a question to a Russian economist of the old régime. This is what he replied: "What they said they would do, they did not do, what we said they could not do, they did." In other words, though the Bolsheviks had not worked out their theories they had demonstrated certain other ideas which the orthodox economist had denied. The Bolsheviks have failed along certain lines but have succeeded along others.

The world at large should know what is taking place in Russia. If the Bolsheviks are succeeding let us follow in their footsteps; if they are failing let us avoid their mistakes. In either case let us study it objectively as we would any other social experiment. A system that has been in operation for ten years and has made the States of the world anxious for their future cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand.

Some of us who were in Russia at the time of the famine and had an opportunity to observe conditions returned to America convinced that Bolshevism had a contribution to make to civilization and that it should be investigated openmindedly. We laid our ideas before a number of American statesmen and educators and they agreed with our point of view. Secretary Herbert Hoover and President Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University were particularly encouraging. One offered the resources of the Hoover War Library and the other found the necessary money to under-

take the research. We next approached the Soviet Government, which was equally glad to coöperate with us.

Thus encouraged we went to work on a modest scale in 1925. This book of documents is the first result of our effort; the next will be a study of Russian agriculture. Other studies, dealing with political, social and economic problems, will follow from time to time. We have no hide-bound plans; we are feeling our way, and we are open to suggestions.

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DOCUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

PART I

WAR AND PEACE

CHAPTER I

THE REACTIONARIES AND THE WAR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Did Russia desire a war with Germany? Much has been written to prove that the Izvolskis and Sazonovs were active in promoting it, but little has been said about the men who tried to prevent it. We give here the views of three men, influential in the Court and in the Government. Durnovo had been Minister of the Interior and was in 1914 a prominent leader in the State Council. Markov the Second was a noted reactionary, organizer of reactionary societies and publisher of reactionary papers. Rasputin held a position, though not official, and was the power behind the throne.

Of the three documents the one written by Durnovo is the most noteworthy. Durnovo's analysis of the world situation, in 1914, his realization of Russia's unpreparedness and the possible collapse of the Monarchies of Europe, show him to be a careful student of European politics and a far-sighted statesman.

I. DURNOVO'S MEMORANDUM¹

A FUTURE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR WILL BECOME AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

The central factor of the period of world history through which we are now passing is the rivalry between England and Germany.

¹ Krasnaia Nov, VI; Nov-Dec., 1922. Presented to Nicholas II in February, 1914, by P. N. Durnovo, Member of the State Council and Minister of the Interior in Witte's cabinet.

This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the issue of which will, in all probability, prove fatal to the vanquished side. The interests of these two powers are far too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as world powers will sooner or later prove impossible. On the one hand, there is an insular State, whose world importance rests upon its domination of the sea, its world trade, and its innumerable colonies. On the other, there is a powerful continental empire, whose limited territory is insufficient for an increased population. It has therefore openly and candidly declared that its future is on the seas. It has, with fabulous speed, developed an enormous world commerce, built for its protection a formidable navy, and, with its famous trademark, "Made in Germany," created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic prosperity of its rival. Naturally, England cannot yield without a fight, and between her and Germany a struggle for life or death is inevitable.

The armed conflict impending as a result of this rivalry cannot be confined to a duel between England and Germany alone. Their resources are far too unequal, and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany could provoke rebellion in India, in South America,² and, especially, a dangerous rebellion in Ireland, and paralyze English sea trade by means of privateering and, perhaps, submarine warfare, thereby creating for Great Britain difficulties in her food supply; but, in spite of all the daring of the German military leaders, they would scarcely risk a landing in England, unless a fortunate accident helped them to destroy or appreciably to weaken the English navy. As for England, she will find Germany absolutely invulnerable. All that she may achieve is to seize the German colonies, stop German sea trade, and, in the most favorable event, annihilate the German navy, but nothing more. This, however, would not force the enemy to sue for peace. There is no doubt, therefore, that England will attempt the means she has more than once used with success, and will risk armed action only after securing participation in the war, on her own side, of powers stronger in a strategical sense. But since Germany, for her own part, will not be found isolated, the future Anglo-German war will undoubtedly be transformed into an armed conflict between two groups of powers, one with a German, the other with an English orientation.

. ² Probably intended for "South Africa."

IT IS HARD TO DISCOVER ANY REAL ADVANTAGES TO RUSSIA IN RAP-
PROCHMENT WITH ENGLAND

Until the Russo-Japanese War, Russian policy had neither orientation. From the time of the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Russia had a defensive alliance with France, so firm as to assure common action by both powers in the event of attack upon either, but, at the same time, not so close as to obligate either to support unflinchingly, with armed force, all political actions and claims of the ally. At the same time, the Russian Court maintained the traditional friendly relations, based upon ties of blood, with the Court of Berlin. Owing precisely to this conjuncture, peace among the great powers was not disturbed in the course of a great many years, in spite of the presence of abundant combustible material in Europe. France, by her alliance with Russia, was guaranteed against attack by Germany; the latter was safe, thanks to the tried pacifism and friendship of Russia, from *revanche* ambitions on the part of France; and Russia was secured, thanks to Germany's need of maintaining amicable relations with her, against excessive intrigues by Austria-Hungary in the Balkan peninsula. Lastly, England, isolated and held in check by her rivalry with Russia in Persia, by her diplomats' traditional fear of our advance on India, and by strained relations with France, especially notable at the time of the well-known Fashoda incident, viewed with alarm the increase of Germany's naval power, without, however, risking an active step.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relations among the great powers and brought England out of her isolation. As we know, all through the Russo-Japanese War, England and America observed benevolent neutrality toward Japan, while we enjoyed a similar benevolent neutrality from France and Germany. Here, it would seem, should have been the inception of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy faced abruptly about and definitely entered upon the road toward rapprochement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of British policy; there was formed a group of powers of the Triple Entente, with England playing the dominant part; and a clash, sooner or later, with the powers grouping themselves around Germany became inevitable.

Now, what advantages did the renunciation of our traditional policy of distrust of England and the rupture of neighborly, if not friendly, relations with Germany promise us then and at present?

Considering with any degree of care the events which have taken place since the Treaty of Portsmouth, we find it difficult to perceive any practical advantages gained by us in rapprochement with England. The only benefit—improved relations with Japan—is scarcely a result of the Russo-English rapprochement. There is no reason why Russia and Japan should not live in peace; there seems to be nothing over which they need quarrel. All Russia's objectives in the Far East, if correctly understood, are entirely compatible with Japan's interests. These objectives, in their essentials, are very modest. The too broad sweep of the imagination of overzealous executive officials, without basis in genuine national interests, on the one hand, and the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, on the other, which erroneously regarded these dreams as a consistently executed policy—these were the things that provoked a clash which a more capable diplomacy would have managed to avoid.

Russia needs neither Korea nor even Port Arthur. An outlet to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea in itself is, after all, not a market, but merely a road to a more advantageous delivery of goods at the consuming markets. As a matter of fact, we do not possess, and shall not for a long time possess any goods in the Far East that promise any considerable profits in exportation abroad. Nor are there any markets for the export of our products. We cannot expect a great supply of our export commodities to go to industrially and agriculturally developed America, to poor, but likewise industrial, Japan, or even to the maritime sections of China and remoter markets, where our exports would inevitably meet the competition of goods from the industrially stronger rival powers. There remains the interior of China, with which our trade is carried on, chiefly overland. Consequently, an open port would aid the import of foreign merchandise more than the export of our own products.

Japan, on her part, no matter what is said, has no desire for our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese are by nature a southern people, and the harsh environment of our Far Eastern borderland cannot attract them. We know that even within Japan itself northern Yezo is sparsely populated, while apparently Japanese colonization is making little headway even in the southern part of Sakhalin Island, ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth. After taking possession of Korea and Formosa, Japan will hardly go farther north, and her ambitions, it may be assumed, will turn rather in the direction of the Philippine Islands, Indo-China, Java, Sumatra, and Borneo. The most she might desire would be the acquisition, for

purely commercial reasons, of a few more sections of the Manchurian railway.

In a word, peaceable coexistence, nay, more, a close rapprochement, between Russia and Japan in the Far East is perfectly natural, regardless of any mediation by England. The grounds for agreement are self-evident. Japan is not a rich country, and the simultaneous upkeep of a strong army and a powerful navy is hard for her. Her insular situation drives her to strengthen her naval power, and alliance with Russia would allow her to devote all her attention to her navy, especially vital in view of her imminent rivalry with America, leaving the protection of her interests on the continent to Russia. On our part, we, having the Japanese navy to protect our Pacific coast, could give up once for all the dream, impossible to us, of creating a navy in the Far East.

Thus, so far as our relations with Japan are concerned, the rapprochement with England has yielded us no real advantage. And it has gained us nothing in the sense of strengthening our position in Manchuria, Mongolia, or even the Ulianghai territory, where the uncertainty of our position bears witness that the agreement with England has certainly not freed the hands of our diplomats. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with sharp opposition from England.

In Persia, also, our position has been no better since the conclusion of this agreement. Every one recalls our predominant influence in that country under the Shah Nasr-Eddin,^a that is, exactly at a time when our relations with England were most strained. From the moment of our accord with the latter, we have found ourselves drawn into a number of strange attempts to impose upon the Persian people an entirely needless constitution, with the result that we ourselves contributed to the overthrow, for the benefit of our inveterate enemies, of a monarch who was devoted to Russia. That is, not only have we gained nothing, but we have suffered a loss all along the line, ruining our prestige and wasting many millions of rubles, even the precious blood of Russian soldiers, who were treacherously slain and, to please England, not even avenged.

The worst results, however, of the accord with England—and of the consequent discord with Germany—have been felt in the Near East. As we know, it was Bismarck who coined that winged phrase about the Balkan problem not being worth to Germany the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. Later the Balkan complications

^a 1829-1896.

began to attract much more attention from German diplomacy, which had taken the "Sick Man" under its protection, but even then Germany, for a long time, failed to show any inclination to endanger relations with Russia in the interests of Balkan affairs. The proofs are patent. During the period of the Russo-Japanese War and the ensuing turmoil in our country, it would have been very easy for Austria to realize her cherished ambitions in the Balkan peninsula. But at that time Russia had not yet linked her destinies with England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to lose an opportunity most auspicious for her purposes.

No sooner had we taken the road to closer accord with England, however, than there immediately followed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a step which might have been taken so easily and painlessly in 1905 or 1906. Next came the Albanian question and the combination with the Prince of Wied. Russian diplomacy attempted to answer Austrian intrigue by forming a Balkan league, but this combination, as might have been expected, proved to be quite unworkable. Intended to be directed against Austria, it immediately turned on Turkey and fell apart in the process of dividing the spoils taken from the latter. The final result was merely the definite attachment of Turkey to Germany, in whom, not without good reason, she sees her sole protector. In short, the Russo-British rapprochement evidently seems to Turkey as tantamount to England's renouncing her traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles to us, while the creation of the Balkan league, under the auspices of Russia, appeared as a direct threat to the continued existence of Turkey as a European power.

To sum up, the Anglo-Russian accord has brought us nothing of practical value up to this time, while for the future, it threatens us with an inevitable armed clash with Germany.

FUNDAMENTAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE COMING WAR

Under what conditions will this clash occur and what will be its probable consequences? The fundamental groupings in a future war are self-evident: Russia, France, and England, on the one side, with Germany, Austria, and Turkey, on the other. It is more than likely that other powers, too, will participate in that war, depending upon circumstances as they may exist at the war's outbreak. But, whether the immediate cause for the war is furnished by another clash of conflicting interests in the Balkans, or by a colonial incident, such

as that of Algeciras, the fundamental alignment will remain unchanged.

Italy, if she has any conception of her real interests, will not join the German side. For political as well as economic reasons, she undoubtedly hopes to expand her present territory. Such an expansion may be achieved only at the expense of Austria, on one hand, and Turkey, on the other. It is, therefore, natural for Italy not to join that party which would safeguard the territorial integrity of the countries at whose expense she hopes to realize her aspirations. Furthermore, it is not out of the question that Italy would join the anti-German coalition, if the scales of war should incline in its favor, in order to secure for herself the most favorable conditions in sharing the subsequent division of spoils.

In this respect, the position of Italy is similar to the probable position of Rumania, which, it may be assumed, will remain neutral until the scales of fortune favor one or another side. Then, animated by normal political self-interest, she will attach herself to the victors, to be rewarded at the expense of either Russia or Austria. Of the other Balkan States, Serbia and Montenegro will unquestionably join the side opposing Austria, while Bulgaria and Albania (if by that time they have not yet formed at least the embryo of a State) will take their stand against the Serbian side. Greece will in all probability remain neutral or make common cause with the side opposing Turkey, but that only after the issue has been more or less determined. The participation of other powers will be incidental, and Sweden ought to be feared, of course, in the ranks of our foes.

Under such circumstances, a struggle with Germany presents to us enormous difficulties, and will require countless sacrifices. War will not find the enemy unprepared, and the degree of his preparedness will probably exceed our most exaggerated calculations. It should not be thought that this readiness is due to Germany's own desire for war. She needs no war, so long as she can attain her object,—the end of exclusive domination of the seas. But, once this vital object is opposed by the coalition, Germany will not shrink from war, and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most auspicious moment.

THE MAIN BURDEN OF THE WAR WILL FALL ON RUSSIA

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on us, since England is hardly capable of taking a considerable part in a continental war, while France, poor in man power, will probably adhere

to strictly defensive tactics, in view of the enormous losses by which war will be attended under present conditions of military technique. The part of a battering-ram, making a breach in the very thick of the German defense, will be ours, with many factors against us to which we shall have to devote great effort and attention.

From the sum of these unfavorable factors we should deduct the Far East. Both America and Japan—the former fundamentally, and the latter by virtue of her present political orientation—are hostile to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on the German side. Furthermore, the war, regardless of its issue, will weaken Russia and divert her attention to the West, a fact which, of course, serves both Japanese and American interests. Thus, our rear will be sufficiently secure in the Far East, and the most that can happen there will be the extortion from us of some concessions of an economic nature in return for benevolent neutrality. Indeed, it is possible that America or Japan may join the anti-German side, but, of course, merely as usurpers of one or the other of the unprotected German colonies.

There can be no doubt, however, as to an outburst of hatred for us in Persia, and a probable unrest among the Moslems of the Caucasus and Turkestan; it is possible that Afghanistan, as a result of that unrest, may act against us; and, finally, we must foresee very unpleasant complications in Poland and Finland. In the latter, a rebellion will undoubtedly break out if Sweden is found in the ranks of our enemies. As for Poland, it is not to be expected that we can hold her against our enemy during the war. And after she is in his power, he will undoubtedly endeavor to provoke an insurrection which, while not in reality very dangerous, must be considered, nevertheless, as one of the factors unfavorable to us, especially since the influence of our allies may induce us to take such measures in our relations with Poland as will prove more dangerous to us than any open revolt.

Are we prepared for so stubborn a war as the future war of the European nations will undoubtedly become? This question we must answer, without evasion, in the negative. That much has been done for our defense since the Japanese war, I am the last person to deny, but even so, it is quite inadequate considering the unprecedented scale on which a future war will inevitably be fought. The fault lies, in a considerable measure, in our young legislative institutions, which have taken a dilettante interest in our defenses, but are far from grasping the seriousness of the political situation arising

from the new orientation which, with the sympathy of the public, has been followed in recent years by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The enormous number of still unconsidered legislative bills of the war and navy departments may serve as proof of this: for example, the plan of the organization of our national defense proposed to the Duma as early as the days of Secretary of State Stolypin.⁴ It cannot be denied that, in the matter of military instruction, according to the reports of specialists, we have achieved substantial improvements, as compared with the time before the Japanese War. According to the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired; the gun is entirely satisfactory, and the equipment convenient and practical. Yet, it must be admitted that there are substantial shortcomings in the organization of our defenses.

In this regard we must note, first of all, the insufficiency of our war supplies, which, certainly, cannot be blamed upon the war department, since the supply schedules are still far from being executed, owing to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of munitions is the more significant since, in the embryonic condition of our industries, we shall, during the war, have no opportunity to make up the revealed shortage by our own efforts, and the closing of the Baltic as well as the Black Sea will prevent the importation from abroad of the defense materials which we lack.

Another circumstance unfavorable to our defense is its far too great dependence, generally speaking, upon foreign industry, a fact which, in connection with the above noted interruption of more or less convenient communications with abroad, will create a series of obstacles difficult to overcome. The quantity of our heavy artillery, the importance of which was demonstrated in the Japanese War, is far too inadequate, and there are few machine guns. The organization of our fortress defenses has scarcely been started, and even the fortress of Reval, which is to defend the road to the capital, is not yet finished.

The network of strategic railways is inadequate. The railways possess a rolling stock sufficient, perhaps, for normal traffic, but not commensurate with the colossal demands which will be made upon them in the event of a European war. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that the impending war will be fought among the most civilized and technically most advanced nations. Every previous war has invariably been followed by something new in the realm of military technique, but the technical backwardness of our industries

⁴ 1906-1911.

does not create favorable conditions for our adoption of the new inventions.

THE VITAL INTERESTS OF GERMANY AND RUSSIA DO NOT CONFLICT

All these factors are hardly given proper thought by our diplomats, whose behavior toward Germany is, in some respects, even aggressive, and may unduly hasten the moment of armed conflict, a moment which, of course, is really inevitable in view of our British orientation.

The question is whether this orientation is correct, and whether even a favorable issue of the war promises us such advantages as would compensate us for all the hardships and sacrifices which must attend a war unparalleled in its probable strain.

The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict. There are fundamental grounds for a peaceable existence of these two States. Germany's future lies on the sea, that is, in a realm where Russia, essentially the most continental of the great powers, has no interests whatever. We have no overseas colonies, and shall probably never have them, and communication between the various parts of our empire is easier overland than by water. No surplus population demanding territorial expansion is visible, but, even from the viewpoint of new conquests, what can we gain from a victory over Germany? Posen, or East Prussia? But why do we need these regions, densely populated as they are by Poles, when we find it difficult enough to manage our own Russian Poles? Why encourage centripetal tendencies, that have not ceased even to this day in the Vistula territory, by incorporating in the Russian State the restless Posnanian and East Prussian Poles, whose national demands even the German Government, which is more firm than the Russian, cannot stifle?

Exactly the same thing applies to Galicia. It is obviously disadvantageous to us to annex, in the interests of national sentimentalism, a territory that has lost every vital connection with our fatherland. For, together with a negligible handful of Galicians, Russian in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainized Uniates we would receive! The so-called Ukrainian, or Mazeppist, movement is not a menace to us at present, but we should not enable it to expand by increasing the number of turbulent Ukrainian elements, for in this movement there undoubtedly lies the seed of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism which, under favorable conditions, may assume quite unexpected proportions.

The obvious aim of our diplomacy in the rapprochement with England has been to open the Straits. But a war with Germany seems hardly necessary for the attainment of this object, for it was England, and not Germany at all, that closed our outlet from the Black Sea. Was it not because we made sure of the coöperation of the latter power, that we freed ourselves in 1871 from the humiliating restrictions imposed upon us by England under the Treaty of Paris?

Also, there is reason to believe that the Germans would agree sooner than the English to let us have the Straits, in which they have only a slight interest, and at the price of which they would gladly purchase our alliance.

Moreover, we should not cherish any exaggerated hopes from our occupation of the Straits. Their acquisition would be advantageous to us only as they served to close the Black Sea to others, making it an inland sea for us, safe from enemy attack.

The Straits would not give us an outlet to the open sea, however, since on the other side of them there lies a sea consisting almost wholly of territorial waters, a sea dotted with numerous islands where the British navy, for instance, would have no trouble whatever in closing to us every inlet and outlet, irrespective of the Straits. Therefore, Russia might safely welcome an arrangement which, while not turning the Straits over to our direct control, would safeguard us against a penetration of the Black Sea by an enemy fleet. Such an arrangement, attainable under favorable circumstances without any war, has the additional advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan States, which would not regard our seizure of the Straits without alarm and quite natural jealousy.

In Trans-Caucasia we could, as a result of war, expand territorially only at the expense of regions inhabited by Armenians, a move which is hardly desirable in view of the revolutionary character of present Armenian sentiment, and of its dream of a greater Armenia; and in this region, Germany, were we allied to her, would certainly place even fewer obstacles in our way than England. Those territorial and economic acquisitions which might really prove useful to us are available only in places where our ambitions may meet opposition from England, but by no means from Germany. Persia, the Pamir, Kuldja, Kashgar, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Ulianghai territory—all these are regions where the interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict, whereas the interests of Russia and England have clashed there repeatedly.

And Germany is in exactly the same situation with respect to Russia. She could seize from us, in case of a successful war, only such territories as would be of slight value to her, and because of their population, would prove of little use for colonization; the Vistula territory, with a Polish-Lithuanian population, and the Baltic provinces, with a Lettish-Esthonian population, are all equally turbulent and anti-German.

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES AND NEEDS DO NOT CONFLICT
WITH GERMANY'S

It may be argued, however, that, under modern conditions in the various nations, territorial acquisitions are of secondary importance, while economic interests take first rank. But in this field, again, Russia's advantages and needs do not conflict with Germany's as much as is believed. It is, of course, undeniable that the existing Russo-German trade agreements are disadvantageous to our agriculture and advantageous to Germany's, but it would be hardly fair to ascribe this circumstance to the treachery and unfriendliness of Germany.

It should not be forgotten that these agreements are in many of their sections advantageous to us. The Russian delegates who concluded these agreements were confirmed protagonists of a development of Russian industry at any cost, and they undoubtedly made a deliberate sacrifice, at least to some extent, of the interests of Russian agriculture to the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore, we ought not to forget that Germany is far from being the direct consumer of the greater share of our agricultural exports abroad. For the greater share of our agricultural produce, Germany acts merely as middleman, and so it is for us and the consuming markets to establish direct relations and thus avoid the expensive German mediation. Lastly, we should keep in mind that the commercial relations of States depend on their political understandings, for no country finds advantage in the economic weakening of an ally but, conversely, profits by the ruin of a political foe. In short, even though it be obvious that the existing Russo-German commercial treaties are not to our advantage, and that Germany, in concluding them, availed herself of a situation that happened to be in her favor^a—in other words, forced us to the wall—this action should have been expected from Germany and thought of. It should not, however, be looked upon as a mark of hostility toward us, but rather as an

^a Commercial treaty of 1904, the time of the Japanese War.

expression of healthy national self-interest, worthy of our emulation. Aside from that, we observe, in the case of Austria-Hungary, an agricultural country that is in a far greater economic dependence upon Germany than ours, but nevertheless, is not prevented from attaining an agricultural development such as we may only dream of.

In view of what has been said, it would seem that the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Germany, entirely acceptable to Russia, by no means requires that Germany first be crushed. It will be quite sufficient to maintain neighborly relations with her, to make a careful estimate of our real interests in the various branches of national economy, and to engage in long, insistent bargaining with German delegates, who may be expected to protect the interests of their own fatherland and not ours.

But I would go still further and say that the ruin of Germany, from the viewpoint of our trade with her, would be disadvantageous to us. Her defeat would unquestionably end in a peace dictated from the viewpoint of England's economic interests. The latter will exploit to the farthest limit any success that falls to her lot, and we will only lose, in a ruined Germany without sea routes, a market which, after all, is valuable to us for our otherwise unmarketable products.

In respect to Germany's economic future, the interests of Russia and England are diametrically opposed. For England, it is profitable to kill Germany's maritime trade and industry, turning her into a poor and, if possible, agricultural country. For us, it is of advantage for Germany to develop her sea-going commerce and the industry which serves it, so as to supply the remotest world markets, and at the same time open her domestic market to our agricultural products, to supply her large working population.

But, aside from the commercial treaties, it has been customary to point out the oppressive character of German domination in Russian economic life, and the systematic penetration of German colonization into our country, as representing a manifest peril to the Russian State. We believe, however, that fears on these grounds are considerably exaggerated. The famous "Drang nach Osten" was in its own time natural and understandable, since Germany's land could not accommodate her increased population, and the surplus was driven in the direction of the least resistance, *i e.*, into a less densely populated neighboring country. The German Government was compelled to recognize the inevitability of this movement, but could hardly look upon it as to its own interests. For, after all, it was Germans who were being lost to the influence of the German State, thus reduc-

ing the man power of their own country. Indeed, the German Government made such strenuous efforts to preserve the connection between its emigrants and their old fatherland that it adopted even the unusual method of tolerating dual citizenship. It is certain, however, that a considerable proportion of German emigrants definitely and irrevocably settled in their new homes, and slowly broke their ties with the old country. This fact, obviously incompatible with Germany's State interests, seems to have been one of the incentives which started her upon a colonial policy and maritime commerce, previously so alien to her. And at present, as the German colonies increase and there is an attendant growth of German industry and naval commerce, the German colonization movement decreases, in a measure, and the day is not remote when the "Drang nach Osten" will become nothing more than a subject for history.

In any case, the German colonization, which undoubtedly conflicts with our State interests, must be stopped, and here, again, friendly relations with Germany cannot harm us. To express a preference for a German orientation does not imply the advocacy of Russian vassalage to Germany, and, while maintaining friendly and neighborly intercourse with her, we must not sacrifice our State interests to this object. But Germany herself will not object to measures against the continued flow of German colonists into Russia. To her, it is of greater benefit to turn the wave of emigration toward her own colonies. Moreover, even before Germany had colonies, when her industry was not yet sufficiently developed to employ the entire population, the German Government did not feel justified in protesting against the restrictive measures that were adopted against foreign colonization during the reign of Alexander III.

As regards the German domination in the field of our economic life, this phenomenon hardly justifies the complaints usually voiced against it. Russia is far too poor, both in capital and in industrial enterprise, to get along without a large import of foreign capital. A certain amount of dependence upon some kind of foreign capital is, therefore, unavoidable, until such time as the industrial enterprise and material resources of our population develop to a point where we may entirely forego the services of foreign investors and their money. But as long as we do require them, German capital is more advantageous to us than any other.

First and foremost, this capital is cheaper than any other, being satisfied with the lowest margin of profit. This, to a large extent, explains the relative cheapness of German products, and their gradual

displacement of British products in the markets of the world. The lower demands of German capital, as regards returns, have for their consequence Germany's readiness to invest in enterprises which, because of their relatively small returns, are shunned by other foreign investors. Also, as a result of that relative cheapness of German capital, its influx into Russia is attended by a smaller outflow of investors' profits from Russia, as compared with French and English investments, and so a larger amount of rubles remain in Russia. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the profits made on German investments in Russian industry do not leave our country at all, but are spent in Russia.

Unlike the English or French, the German capitalists, in most cases, come to stay in Russia, themselves, with their money. It is this very German characteristic which explains in a considerable degree the amazing number of German industrialists, manufacturers, and mill owners in our midst, as compared with the British and French.

The latter live in their own countries, removing from Russia the profits produced by their enterprises, down to the last kopek. The German investors, on the contrary, live in Russia for long periods, and not infrequently settle down permanently. Whatever may be said to the contrary, the fact is that the Germans, unlike other foreigners, soon feel at home in Russia and rapidly become Russianized. Who has not seen Frenchmen and Englishmen, for example, who have spent almost their whole lives in Russia and yet do not speak a word of Russian? On the other hand, are there many Germans here who cannot make themselves understood in Russian, even though it be with a strong accent and in broken speech? Nay, more—who has not seen genuine Russians, orthodox, loyal with all their hearts dedicated to the principles of the Russian State, and yet only one or two generations removed from their German emigrant ancestry? Lastly, we must not forget that Germany herself is, to a certain extent, interested in our economic well-being. In this regard, Germany differs, to our advantage, from other countries, which are interested exclusively in obtaining the largest possible returns from capital invested in Russia, even at the cost of the economic ruin of this country. Germany, however, in her capacity of permanent—although, of course, not unselfish—middleman for our foreign trade, has an interest in preserving the productive resources of our country, as a source of profitable intermediary operations for her.

EVEN A VICTORY OVER GERMANY PROMISES RUSSIA AN EXCEEDINGLY
UNFAVORABLE PROSPECT

In any case, even if we were to admit the necessity for eradicating German domination in the field of our economic life, even at the price of a total banishment of German capital from Russian industry, appropriate measures could be taken, it would seem, without war against Germany. Such a war will demand such enormous expenditures that they will many times exceed the more than doubtful advantages to us in the abolition of the German [economic] domination. More than that, the result of such a war will be an economic situation compared with which the yoke of German capital will seem easy.

For there can be no doubt that the war will necessitate expenditures which are beyond Russia's limited financial means. We shall have to obtain credit from allied and neutral countries, but this will not be granted gratuitously. As to what will happen if the war should end disastrously for us, I do not wish to discuss now. The financial and economic consequences of defeat can be neither calculated nor foreseen, and will undoubtedly spell the total ruin of our entire national economy.

But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial prospects; a totally ruined Germany will not be in a position to compensate us for the cost involved. Dictated in the interest of England, the peace treaty will not afford Germany opportunity for sufficient economic recuperation to cover our war expenditures, even at a distant time. The little which we may perhaps succeed in extorting from her will have to be shared with our allies, and to our share there will fall but negligible crumbs, compared with the war cost. Meantime, we shall have to pay our war loans, not without pressure by the allies. For, after the destruction of German power, we shall no longer be necessary to them. Nay, more, our political might, enhanced by our victory, will induce them to weaken us, at least economically. And so it is inevitable that, even after a victorious conclusion of the war, we shall fall into the same sort of financial and economic dependence upon our creditors, compared with which our present dependence upon German capital will seem ideal.

However, no matter how sad may be the economic prospects which face us as a result of union with England, and, by that token, of war with Germany, they are still of secondary importance when

we think of the political consequences of this fundamentally unnatural alliance.

A STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY IS PROFOUNDLY
UNDESIRABLE TO BOTH SIDES, AS IT AMOUNTS TO A
WEAKENING OF THE MONARCHIST PRINCIPLE

It should not be forgotten that Russia and Germany are the representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, as opposed to the democratic principle, incarnated in England and, to an infinitely lesser degree, in France. Strange as it may seem, England, monarchistic and conservative to the marrow at home, has in her foreign relations always acted as the protector of the most demagogical tendencies, invariably encouraging all popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarchical principle.

From this point of view, a struggle between Germany and Russia, regardless of its issue, is profoundly undesirable to both sides, as undoubtedly involving the weakening of the conservative principle in the world of which the above-named two great powers are the only reliable bulwarks. More than that, one must realize that under the exceptional conditions which exist, a general European war is mortally dangerous both for Russia and Germany, no matter who wins. It is our firm conviction, based upon a long and careful study of all contemporary subversive tendencies, that there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution which, by the very nature of things, will spread to the country of the victor.

During the many years of peaceable neighborly existence, the two countries have become united by many ties, and a social upheaval in one is bound to affect the other. That these troubles will be of a social, and not a political, nature cannot be doubted, and this will hold true, not only as regards Russia, but for Germany as well. An especially favorable soil for social upheavals is found in Russia, where the masses undoubtedly profess, unconsciously, the principles of Socialism. In spite of the spirit of antagonism to the Government in Russian society, as unconscious as the Socialism of the broad masses of the people, a political revolution is not possible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement inevitably must degenerate into a Socialist movement. The opponents of the Government have no popular support. The people see no difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian masses, whether workmen or peasants, are not looking for political rights, which they neither want nor comprehend.

The peasant dreams of obtaining a gratuitous share of somebody else's land; the workman, of getting hold of the entire capital and profits of the manufacturer. Beyond this, they have no aspirations. If these slogans are scattered far and wide among the populace, and the Government permits agitation along these lines, Russia will be flung into anarchy, such as she suffered in the ever-memorable period of troubles in 1905-1906. War with Germany would create exceptionally favorable conditions for such agitation. As already stated, this war is pregnant with enormous difficulties for us, and cannot turn out to be a mere triumphal march to Berlin. Both military disasters—partial ones, let us hope—and all kinds of shortcomings in our supply are inevitable. In the excessive nervousness and spirit of opposition of our society, these events will be given an exaggerated importance, and all the blame will be laid on the Government.

It will be well if the Government does not yield, but declares directly that in time of war no criticism of the governmental authority is to be tolerated, and resolutely suppresses all opposition. In the absence of any really strong hold on the people by the opposition, this would settle the affair. The people did not heed the writers of the *Wiborg Manifesto*,⁶ in its time, and they will not follow them now.

But a worse thing may happen: the government authority may make concessions, may try to come to an agreement with the opposition, and thereby weaken itself just when the Socialist elements are ready for action. Even though it may sound like a paradox, the fact is that agreement with the opposition in Russia positively weakens the Government. The trouble is that our opposition refuses to reckon with the fact that it represents no real force. The Russian opposition is intellectual throughout, and this is its weakness, because between the intelligentsia and the people there is a profound gulf of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. We need an artificial election law, indeed, we require the direct influence of the governmental authority, to assure the election to the State Duma of even the most zealous champions of popular rights. Let the Government refuse to support the elections, leaving them to their natural course, and the legislative institutions would not see within their walls a single intellectual, outside of a few demagogic agitators. However insistent the members of our legislative institutions may be that the people confide in them, the peasant would rather believe the landless government official than the Octobrist⁷ landlord in the Duma, while the workingman

⁶ Protest made by members of the Duma in July, 1906, at Wiborg, Finland.

⁷ The name of a political party.

treats the wage-earning factory inspector with more confidence than the legislating manufacturer, even though the latter professes every principle of the Cadet party.

It is more than strange, under these circumstances, that the governmental authority should be asked to reckon seriously with the opposition, that it should for this purpose renounce the rôle of impartial regulator of social relationships, and come out before the broad masses of the people as the obedient organ of the class aspirations of the intellectual and propertied minority of the population. The opposition demands that the Government should be responsible to it, representative of a class, and should obey the parliament which it artificially created. (Let us recall that famous expression of V. Nabokov: "Let the executive power submit to the legislative power!") In other words, the opposition demands that the Government should adopt the psychology of a savage, and worship the idol which he himself made.

RUSSIA WILL BE FLUNG INTO HOPELESS ANARCHY, THE ISSUE OF
WHICH WILL BE HARD TO FORESEE

If the war ends in victory, the putting down of the Socialist movement will not offer any insurmountable obstacles. There will be agrarian troubles, as a result of agitation for compensating the soldiers with additional land allotments; there will be labor troubles during the transition from the probably increased wages of war time to normal schedules; and this, it is to be hoped, will be all, so long as the wave of the German social revolution has not reached us. But in the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable.

As has already been said, the trouble will start with the blaming of the Government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a bitter campaign against the Government will begin, followed by revolutionary agitations throughout the country, with Socialist slogans, capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men, and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land, will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and the intellectual opposition parties, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless to stem the popular tide, aroused by themselves, and Russia

will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the issue of which cannot be foreseen.

GERMANY, IN CASE OF DEFEAT, IS DESTINED TO SUFFER SOCIAL
UPHEAVALS NO LESS THAN THOSE OF RUSSIA

No matter how strange it may appear at first sight, considering the extraordinary poise of the German character, Germany, likewise, is destined to suffer, in case of defeat, no lesser social upheavals. The effect of a disastrous war upon the population will be too severe not to bring to the surface destructive tendencies, now deeply hidden. The peculiar social order of modern Germany rests upon the actually predominant influence of the agrarians, Prussian Junkerdom and propertied peasants.

These elements are the bulwark of the profoundly conservative German régime, headed by Prussia. The vital interests of these classes demand a protective economic policy towards agriculture, import duties on grain, and, consequently, high prices for all farm products. But Germany, with her limited territory and increasing population, has long ago turned from an agricultural into an industrial State, so that protection of agriculture is, in effect, a matter of taxing the larger part of the population for the benefit of the smaller. To this majority, there is a compensation in the extensive development of the export of German industrial products to the most distant markets, so that the advantages derived thereby enable the industrialists and working people to pay the higher prices for the farm products consumed at home.

Defeated, Germany will lose her world markets and maritime commerce, for the aim of the war—on the part of its real instigator, England—will be the destruction of German competition. After this has been achieved, the laboring masses, deprived not only of higher, but of any and all wages, having suffered greatly during the war, and being, naturally, embittered, will offer fertile soil for anti-agrarian and later anti-social propaganda by the Socialist parties.

These parties, in turn, making use of the outraged patriotic sentiment among the people, owing to the loss of the war, their exasperation at the militarists and the feudal burgher régime that betrayed them, will abandon the road of peaceable evolution which they have thus far been following so steadily, and take a purely revolutionary path. Some part will also be played, especially in the event of agrarian troubles in neighboring Russia, by the class of landless farmhands, which is quite numerous in Germany. Apart

from this, there will be a revival of the hitherto concealed separatist tendencies in southern Germany, and the hidden antagonism of Bavaria to domination by Prussia will emerge in all its intensity. In short, a situation will be created which (in gravity) will be little better than that in Russia.

PEACE AMONG THE CIVILIZED NATIONS IS IMPERILED CHIEFLY BY
THE DESIRE OF ENGLAND TO RETAIN HER VANISHING
DOMINATION OF THE SEAS

A summary of all that has been stated above must lead to the conclusion that a rapprochement with England does not promise us any benefits, and that the English orientation of our diplomacy is essentially wrong. We do not travel the same road as England; she should be left to go her own way, and we must not quarrel on her account with Germany.

The Triple Entente is an artificial combination, without a basis of real interest. It has nothing to look forward to. The future belongs to a close and incomparably more vital rapprochement of Russia, Germany, France (reconciled with Germany), and Japan (allied to Russia by a strictly defensive union). A political combination like this, lacking all aggressiveness toward other States, would safeguard for many years the peace of the civilized nations, threatened, not by the militant intentions of Germany, as English diplomacy is trying to show, but solely by the perfectly natural striving of England to retain at all costs her vanishing domination of the seas. In this direction, and not in the fruitless search of a basis for an accord with England, which is in its very nature contrary to our national plans and aims, should all the efforts of our diplomacy be concentrated.

It goes without saying that Germany, on her part, must meet our desire to restore our well-tested relations and friendly alliance with her, and to elaborate, in closest agreement with us, such terms of our neighborly existence as to afford no basis for anti-German agitation on the part of our constitutional-liberal parties, which, by their very nature, are forced to adhere, not to a Conservative German, but to a liberal English orientation.

P. N. DURNOVO

February, 1914.

2. EXCERPTS FROM THE SPEECH OF MARKOV
THE SECOND^a

. . . In England, according to Miliukov,⁹ the state of affairs is such that she will not march with us to the end. I would add that not only will England not march with us to the end, but it seems that she does not even start with us; at least we have not noticed such a joint procession. But, of course, Miliukov considers it natural that she does not march with us. As if England would march to the end with us poor, miserable Russians! In taking issue with the Minister's speech,¹⁰ in which attention was called to the pernicious rôle of the press, Russian as well as German, in straining the relations between Germany and Russia, he [Miliukov] said: "Yes, at Berlin they denounce the press, and at Petersburg they have denounced it today, but at the 26th convention of the representatives of the press in London, they praised it." Poor Professor Miliukov! Why do they praise it in London? Because it is carrying out the task dictated by London, of getting Russia to quarrel with Germany. It is quite obvious that if the Russian press and the German press are carrying out this purpose of England's, they are praised in London. They are praised, for it is profitable for the English to have Russia and Germany fight each other, because if these two should smash their heads, England would grow more powerful. And it is strange that such a simple thought should not have occurred to those professors who want to debate with our Minister. . . . We have two groupings in Europe: On the one hand, the strong Triple Alliance with Germany, Austria, and England; (*Voices*: No, not England, but Italy!) and on the other, the alliance of the powers of the Triple Entente. This entente contains one alliance—how stable, I do not know—of France and Russia, and two friendships; one alliance and two friendships: a Franco-English friendship and a Russo-English friendship, something like a re-insurance union. But, gentlemen, what is a friendship? An alliance is understandable; nations conclude a treaty which is signed by their plenipotentiaries, a treaty that must be observed. But a friendship—well, that is something pleasant, something that pleases the ear, but it is very hard to put down, not only

^a Stenographic Record of the Duma, May 23, 1914, 419-431. Markov, N. E., born in 1866, member of the 3rd and 4th Dumas, organizer of reactionary societies, and director of a reactionary press subsidized by the Government.

⁹ Speech made by Miliukov on the same day.

¹⁰ Sazonov, S. D., Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-1916.

on paper, but even to see as a clear mental picture. What kind of friendship? Friendship between whom? Just recall here the words of the great founder of the Franco-Russian Alliance, Emperor Alexander III of blessed memory. Toasting the then Prince of Montenegro,¹¹ he said: "I drink to the health of Russia's only friend, the Prince of Montenegro!" Subsequent history has made certain amendments even in this case. I shall not refer to them now, (Laughter) but, at any rate, this toast proved that the man who had created the Franco-Russian Alliance believed that in Europe and all over the world Russia had no friends. His speaking of Montenegro's friendship was, of course, merely a nice compliment, since this Montenegrin friendship obviously could not have any practical value. Russia, as stated by Emperor Alexander III, had no real friends then, as she has none now.

But, gentlemen, if we have no friends, if Alexander III, who formed an alliance but not an *entente cordiale*, declared that we are without friends, then, gentlemen, it will not be a great mistake to say that where there are no friends, there can be no friendship, and that those who are basing any real expectations upon friendship are only preparing for themselves the greatest of surprises and troubles. Talking about the friendship of England and Russia, let me ask, gentlemen, what is happening in Persia? In Persia, we are being pushed out. We are being pushed out of there from every side, and who is it that is driving us out? It is England. . . .

Again, take the case of the Bosphorus. Professor Miliukov cited here the note of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, during that critical moment in January,¹² the note which stated that Russia would not mind taking some active measures, but that not a single power had been willing to join us. Mr. Miliukov cited that as, forsooth, an indictment against Austria and Germany, because they refused to join us. But I would add that it means that England and France, likewise, refused to join us. There you have friendship! When real help was needed, when the question of the Bosphorus was raised, England and France did not join us, and, naturally enough, Russia wisely refrained from active steps. I approve of her refraining, but I cannot help saying that the friendship of the English lasts only so long as there is no necessity for active assistance to Russia. This is where the limits of English friendship lie. I doubt very much if, in case of a European war, such as is being prophesied with especial glee by those

¹¹ On the occasion of his visit, May 30, 1889.

¹² The speaker has seemingly confused the notes and dates.

on the left, the British navy would come to defend Petersburg and the Baltic against the German fleet. I am by no means certain of this, and, so long as I have no evidence to the contrary, I assume that no such thing will happen. To put it succinctly, in all of the more important problems arising in this or that complication, we may expect practically nothing of real value from our friendship with England.

But we are gradually dissipating our friendship with Germany, and yet this friendship gave us, as recently as the Japanese War, tangible evidence of being real and not fictitious . . . I believe that, so long as the final word has not been spoken, so long as the war which will result from these group agreements is not yet here, it is my duty, as a representative of a considerable portion of the nation, if not the whole of it, to say: we should attempt up to the very last moment to lessen the pernicious consequences of this combining with England against Germany. We ought to see whether this grouping can not be changed. The situation is this: In case of war, we need the French troops and English warships; but only in case of war. In time of peace, we do not need them at all. Would it not be better if we started first with the question of peace and next with the problem of war? Is not this possibility of war merely the consequence of the alliance which we have entered? Are we not becoming involved in an inevitable war for the sake of interests of which I know nothing, and for no other reason than that we are associated with France and England against Germany and Austria? Is there no practical way out? Is it impossible to devise some sensible way out, which might satisfy the dignity and interests of both Russia and Germany? Are the conflicts between Russia and Germany really unavoidable? What is there to divide us and Germany? In what way does Germany interfere with us, or we with her?

We should not stick to old agreements just because they are concluded, but try to find something new.

Let the progressivists face forward, and not be conservatives, looking behind in matters of foreign policy. I, for instance, am by no means sure that the Straits, which we actually do need as an outlet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean—solely for this purpose—are being withheld from us by no one but Germany. I have the impression from history that it was not Germany at all that kept us out of the Straits, but rather England and France. (*Purishkevich*: Undoubtedly!) All history shows that it is England which has been keeping us out of the Straits, and now it is not Germany alone, not

General Liman von Sanders¹³ alone, who has been keeping us out, but our own, friendly England. Such is my own conviction, and I think that very many of you, here, share that conviction. But it may be that we can come to terms with Germany, so as to have the Straits opened for Russia, even against the wishes of England. For England does not wish to tie her hands with Russia. She reserves for herself her freedom of action. She offers us only her friendship. Well, then, let us give our friendship to her, but, at the same time, let us give our friendship to Germany, in return for the Straits, sacrificing, it is true, something which does not belong to us, and to which we are vainly turning our eyes, for it will never be ours, anyway. . . .

I believe, gentlemen, as the average person believes, that it were better if we had, in place of a great friendship with England, a small alliance with Germany. That would prove a simpler matter, and I believe we would find it much easier to come to an understanding. We have had no war with Germany for more than one hundred years; nay, I should say even more than one hundred years. The Napoleonic wars cannot be considered as wars with Germany. Why, we have not fought her since the days of Elizabeth Petrovna.¹⁴ We have no cause for war. There is need of war between France and Germany. There is need of war between England and Germany. But there is no need of war between Russia and Germany. Neither Germany nor Russia needs it; that is self-evident. Yet we are being dragged into war, because, after all, we possess two million bayonets and a small fleet of battleships, and these improve the chances of England and France. From their point of view they are quite right. But, no matter what their chauvinists may be writing, it is a fact that both the French and English are expert calculators, whereas the Russians are poor mathematicians, and frequently pursue a Don Quixotian policy. It is time for us to abandon this policy, even though it be called Slavophilism . . .

And so, gentlemen, summarizing what I have said here, I must state that the first duty of our diplomacy at the present moment should be to discover, if possible, a way to a peaceable understanding with Germany, one that will respect the dignity of each side and not violate our mutual interests. I deliberately refrain from mentioning Austria-Hungary, speaking only of Germany, and I believe that it is in this direction that the able captains of our foreign policy will find that solution which alone, in my opinion, answers the genuine,

¹³ German officer who became Inspector-General of the Turkish army in 1913.

¹⁴ 1741-1761. Period of Seven Years' War.

real, and not fictitious interests of the Russian people, of the German people, and of the whole world, since this is the only way of averting a most terrible war, the consequences of which no one can predict. . . .

3. RASPUTIN'S VIEWS

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO THE EMPEROR

*June 24, 1915.*¹⁵

. . . He [Rasputin] was much against the war. . . .

*November 14, 1915.*¹⁶

. . . Our Friend [Rasputin] was always against this war, saying the Balkans were not worth the world to fight about, and that Serbia would be as ungrateful as Bulgaria proved itself. . . .

"The war must be stopped—war must not be declared; it will be the end of all things."¹⁷

¹⁵ *Pisma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k Imperatoru Nikolaiu II*, I, 463. Grigori Efimovich Rasputin was born in 1871 and died in 1916.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 579.

¹⁷ Dehn, Lili: "The Real Tsaritsa," 106. This telegram Rasputin sent to Anna Vyubova when he heard of the order to mobilize.

CHAPTER II

OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Whatever differences of opinion existed between the reactionaries and liberals before August, 1914, disappeared immediately after the declaration of war. All parties in the Duma, from the reactionaries to the moderate Socialists, rallied around the Emperor and promised their support. They were carried away by a spirit of idealism and by the vision of a better day for Russia and the world. For the first time in his reign, the Tsar was popular and in agreement with the representatives of the people.

I. IMPERIAL MANIFESTO¹

August 2, 1914.

BY the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of all Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc., proclaim to all Our loyal subjects:

Following her historical traditions, Russia, united in faith and blood with the Slav nations, has never regarded their fate with indifference. The unanimous fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs have been aroused to special intensity in the past few days, when Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands which she foresaw would be unacceptable to a Sovereign State.

Having disregarded the conciliatory and peaceable reply of the Serbian Government, and having declined Russia's well-intentioned mediation, Austria hastened to launch an armed attack in a bombardment of unprotected Belgrad.

Compelled, by the force of circumstances thus created, to adopt the necessary measures of precaution, We commanded that the army and the navy be put on a war footing, but, at the same time, holding the blood and the treasure of Our subjects dear, We made every

¹"*Riech*," No. 193, August 4, 1914.

effort to obtain a peaceable issue of the negotiations that had been started.

In the midst of friendly communications, Austria's Ally, Germany, contrary to our trust in century-old relations of neighborliness, and paying no heed to Our assurances that the measures We had adopted implied no hostile aims whatever, insisted upon their immediate abandonment, and, meeting with a rejection of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia.

We have now to intercede not only for a related country, unjustly attacked, but also to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of Russia, and her position among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that all Our loyal subjects will rally self-sacrificingly and with one accord to the defense of the Russian soil.

At this hour of threatening danger, let domestic strife be forgotten. Let the union between the Tsar and His people be stronger than ever, and let Russia, rising like one man, repel the insolent assault of the enemy.

With a profound faith in the justice of Our cause, and trusting humbly in Almighty Providence, We invoke prayerfully the Divine blessing for Holy Russia and our valiant troops.

Given at Saint Petersburg, on the second day of August, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and the twentieth year of Our reign.

NICHOLAS.

2. SPEECHES ON THE OCCASION OF THE TSAR'S RECEPTION AT THE WINTER PALACE, AUGUST 8, 1914

(a) THE TSAR'S RECEPTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE DUMA AND STATE COUNCIL AT THE WINTER PALACE.²

. . . The Emperor deigned . . . to address the gathering in the following words:

I greet you in these momentous, alarming days through which all Russia is passing.

First Germany, and then Austria, has declared war on Russia.

The tremendous outburst of patriotic feeling, love of country, and devotion to the Throne which has swept Our whole country like a hurricane, serves in My sight and, I trust, in yours, too, as a pledge

² "Riech," August 8, 1914.

that Our great Mother Russia will carry to the desired conclusion the war which the Lord God has sent her.

From this unanimous impulse of love and readiness for any sacrifice, even of life itself, I derive sustaining strength and the ability to look calmly and confidently towards the future.

We are not only defending Our honor and dignity within Our Own country, but are fighting as well for Our Slav brothers, who are one with Us in blood and faith.

And at this moment I see with joy, also, that the union of the Slavs with all of Russia is strengthened and indissoluble.

I feel convinced that all of you, each in his own sphere, will help Me bear the trial visited upon Me, and that each of Us, beginning with Myself, will fulfil his duty to the end.

Great is the God of Russia.

(b) RODZIANKO'S ADDRESS AT THE TSAR'S RECEPTION OF DUMA
DEPUTIES IN THE WINTER PALACE.³

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY!

All Russia has heard with great pride and deep enthusiasm the words of the Russian Tsar, summoning his people to join him in a perfect union at this difficult hour of sore trials which has come upon our country.

Sire! Russia knows that your thoughts and desires have always been to bring about conditions which would make it possible for the nation to live and work in peace, and that your loving heart strove for a stable peace in order to protect the lives of your subjects that are dear to you.

But the terrible hour has struck. All of us, young and old, have seized the significance and profundity of the historical events which have unfolded themselves. A threat has been made against the prosperity and integrity of the State; national honor has been offended; and national honor is dearer to us than life. It is time to show the world how terrible the Russian people, which surrounds its crowned leader with a firm faith in Divine Providence, like an impenetrable wall, can be to the enemy.

Sire! The time has come for a stubborn fight to protect our national dignity, a fight for the integrity and inviolability of the Russian land. There is neither doubt nor hesitation among us. Summoned to participate in the life of the State, at Your Majesty's will, the

³ "Riech," August 8, 1914—Special edition, supplement to No. 197.

people's representatives now stand before you. The State Duma, reflecting the unanimous impulse of every section of Russia, and joined together in the single thought which unifies us all, has charged me to say to you, Sire, that your people is ready to fight for the honor and glory of the fatherland.

Without differences of opinions, views, or convictions, the State Duma, speaking in the name of the Russian country, is calmly and firmly saying to its Tsar: "Dare, Sire! The Russian people is with you and, trusting firmly in Divine mercy, will stop at no sacrifice until the enemy is crushed, and the dignity of our native land secured."

(c) THE TSAR'S RESPONSE ⁴

In response to the salutation of the Presidents of the two legislative chambers ⁵ the Emperor deigned to address the following words to the Members of the State Council and the State Duma:

I thank you heartily, gentlemen, for the sincere patriotic feelings you have expressed, which I never doubted, and which have been manifested in fact at this moment.

With all my soul, I wish you every success.

God is with Us!

3. SPEECHES AT THE DUMA, AUGUST 8, 1914

(a) RODZIANKO'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA ⁶

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma:

The Emperor has deigned, in this difficult hour through which our fatherland is passing, to convoke the State Duma, for the sake of a union of the Russian Tsar with his loyal people. The State Duma has already answered the Sovereign's call at today's reception by His Majesty. We all know that Russia did not desire war, and that the Russian people has no idea of conquest, but fate itself has seen fit to drag us into the fight. The lot is cast, and we are confronted by the gigantic problem of defending the integrity and unity of the State.

In this rapid whirl of events, unprecedented in the history of the world, it is a comfort to see the majestic and dignified calm which has taken possession of all of us, without exception, and

⁴ "Riech," August 8, 1914—Special edition, supplement to No. 197.

⁵ State Duma and State Council.

⁶ "Pravitelstvenny Viestnik," No. 165, August 9, 1914.

which emphasizes before the whole world, most strikingly and without any superfluous words the might and greatness of the Russian spirit. (Stormy applause. Cries of "Bravo!" and "Hurrah!" on all benches.) Calmly and without blustering we may say to our attackers: "Hands off!" (Applause and cries of "Hurrah!" throughout the Duma.) "Don't dare to touch our holy Russia! Our people is peace-loving and good, but terrible and powerful when forced to protect itself." (Stormy applause.) "Look at us," we might say to them. "You thought we were divided by strife and hatred, and yet all the nationalities dwelling in boundless Russia were welded into a single fraternal family when danger threatened our common fatherland." (Applause on all benches.) Nor will the Russian giant hang his head in discouragement, no matter what trials he may have to undergo. His powerful shoulders will bear everything and, after repulsing the enemy, our common, inseparable native land will again shine forth in peace, prosperity, and happiness in the full glory of its indestructible greatness. (Continued applause.)

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma! At this hour our thoughts and wishes are on our frontiers, where our gallant army, our glorious navy go into action unflinchingly. (Applause on all benches.) Our thoughts are with our sons and brothers where they personify the greatness of our country with their inherent bravery. May the Supreme Lord aid them, strengthen and protect them. Our fervent wishes for success and glory will always be with them, our heroes. We, who remain at home, will assume the obligation to work unceasingly in caring for the families left without providers, and may they know, in our army, that not merely in word, but in deed we will see to it that they suffer no acute distress. (Stormy and continuous applause; cries of "Bravo!" The Deputies rise; there are calls for the national hymn, which is sung, accompanied by shouts of "Hurrah!")

(b) KERENSKI'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA⁷

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma:

The Labor Group has instructed me to make public the following declaration:

"A sore trial has been visited upon our native land and great sorrow has overwhelmed the whole country! Thousands upon thousands of youthful lives are doomed to inhuman sufferings, and

⁷ "Riech," No. 198, August 9, 1914.

poverty and hunger are about to ruin the welfare of the bereaved families of the toiling masses.

"We are unshakably convinced that the great, irresistible power of the Russian democracy, with all the other forces, will offer determined resistance to the attacks of the enemy (Applause on the left, center, and right), and will defend the native land and culture, created in the sweat and blood of generations! We believe that on the fields of battle, in great sufferings, the brotherhood of all the nationalities of Russia will be consolidated (Applause on the left, center and right), and that there will be born a single will to free the country from its terrible internal shackles.

"The culpability of the Governments of all the European countries which, in the interests of the ruling classes, drove their peoples to this fratricidal war is unforgivable. The Socialists of all belligerent countries—France, England, Belgium, and Germany—tried to protest against the war that has now broken out. Only we, the Russian democracy, were prevented, even in the last terrible hour, from lifting our voice betimes against the approaching war. But, believing firmly in the unity of the laboring classes of all countries, we send our fraternal greetings to all those who did protest against this fratricidal slaughter among the nations, while it was being prepared.

"Citizens of Russia! Remember that you have no enemies among the laboring classes of the belligerent countries. While defending to the last everything that is our own, against attempted seizures by the Governments of Germany and Austria, which are hostile to us, remember that this frightful war would not have come had the great ideals of democracy, liberty, equality, and fraternity inspired the activity of Russia's rulers and the Governments of all other countries.

"Unfortunately, our Government, even at this dreadful hour, has no desire to forget internal strife. It denies amnesty to those who are fighting for the freedom and the happiness of our country, and it does not seek reconciliation with the non-Russian nationalities, who have forgiven everything and are, with us, fighting enthusiastically for our common fatherland. And, instead of ameliorating the condition of the laboring classes of the nation, it imposes upon these very classes the main weight of war expenditures, increasing the burdens of indirect taxation.

"You, peasants and workers, all you who desire the happiness and welfare of Russia, strengthen your spirit in these sore trials, gather all your forces, and then, having defended our country, set

it free. To you, our brothers, who are shedding their blood for our native land, our humble homage and fraternal greetings." (Applause on the left, center, and some seats on the right.)

(c) MILIUKOV'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA ⁸

The Faction ⁹ of Popular Freedom has repeatedly spoken in the Duma on the problems touched upon by the first two speakers on this platform.¹⁰ Its opinions on these problems are generally known, and, of course, cannot be altered by extraneous circumstances. When the time comes, the Faction will again speak of these problems and again point out the only possible road toward Russia's regeneration. It trusts that in passing through the sore trials which confront us the country may come nearer to its cherished aim.

At this moment, however, we have all been deeply impressed by other matters. Another problem, terrible and awful, stands before us and imperatively demands immediate solution. We must concentrate all our forces upon defending the country from a foreign foe, who is bent on pushing us aside, on his way towards world dominion. Our cause is a righteous cause. We fight for the freedom of our native land from foreign invasion, for the freedom of Europe and Slavdom from German domination (*Voices on the left*: "Bravo!"), and the freedom of the whole world from the unendurable yoke of constantly growing armaments, ruinous to peaceful labor (*Voices on the left*: "Bravo!"), causing more and more armed conflicts.

In this struggle we are all as one; we present no conditions or demands; we simply throw upon the scales of battle our firm determination to overcome the violator. (Applause on all benches. *Cries*: "Bravo!") This is why the Central Committee of our party, guided by these considerations, has addressed itself to its followers, in these words, which the Faction whole-heartedly approves, and which we consider our duty to proclaim from this high tribune:

At this difficult moment, when the foreign enemy is at the gate, when our brothers have gone forth to meet him, when Russian blood is ready to be shed for the salvation of our country, and when those who remain behind are called upon, in the very nature of things, to make great sacrifices, both spiritual and material, the leaders of the Faction of Popular Freedom express their firm conviction that

⁸ "Novoe Vremia," No. 13,783, August 9, 1914.

⁹ Faction was the term applied to a group of party members in the Duma.

¹⁰ A. F. Kerenski and V. I. Khaustov.

their political friends and followers, wherever they may be found and in whatever condition the war may overtake them, will fulfil their duty to the very end as Russian citizens in the impending struggle. Whatever our attitude towards the internal policies of the Government may be, our first duty remains to preserve our country, one and inseparable (Stormy applause in the center, on the right, and left), and to maintain for it that position in the ranks of the world powers which is being contested by our foes.

Let us, then, lay aside our internal quarrels, let us give no cause to the enemy for hope that discord may divide us (Stormy applause on the right, center, and left), and let us well remember that our first and only duty now is to support our soldiers with faith in the justice of our cause, to inspire them with a calm courage and confidence in the success of our arms. May the moral support of the whole country combine to give to our army all the effective strength of which it is capable. May our defenders not look behind in alarm, but go forward boldly, toward victory and a brighter future. (Stormy applause on the right, left, and center.)

(d) SPEECH OF DEPUTY FRIEDMAN IN THE DUMA¹¹

The high honor of expressing those sentiments which inspire the Jewish people at the present historical moment has fallen to me. In this grand enthusiasm which has aroused all the tribes and nationalities of great Russia, the Jews march on the battlefield, shoulder to shoulder with all the other nationalities. We, the Jews, have lived, and continue to live, under exceptionally harsh legal conditions. Nevertheless, we have always felt ourselves to be citizens of Russia, have always been loyal sons of our fatherland. No power whatsoever can tear us from our native Russia, from the soil to which we are bound by ties, centuries old. In defending our country against foreign invasion, we act not only from a sense of duty, but also from a sense of profound attachment. In this hour of trial, following the call that has come from the heights of the throne, we, Russian Jews, will, as one man, take our stand under the banners of Russia, and devote all our strength to the repulsion of the enemy. The Jewish people will do their duty to the last. (Tumultuous applause of the entire Duma.)

¹¹ "Novoe Vremia," No. 13,783, August 9, 1914.

(c) RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY¹² ADOPTED BY THE STATE
DUMA AT THE ONE-DAY SESSION¹³

Having heard the explanations of the Government, and having satisfied itself that all means were exhausted for the preservation of peace in keeping with Russia's dignity as a great power, the State Duma expresses its unshakable conviction that in this grave hour of trial, in the face of the approaching war storm, all nationalities of Russia, united in the common sentiment of love for the native land, and firmly believing in the righteousness of their cause, are prepared, at the summons of their Sovereign, to stand up in defense of their country, its honor, and its possessions. From this conviction the State Duma derives the calm assurance of the invincible power and glorious future of Russia.

Proceeding to regular business, and expressing its perfect readiness to aid in the cause of national defense and the care of the families of reservists, the State Duma sends its fraternal greetings to the valiant defenders of the country, who have self-sacrificingly entered upon the discharge of their heroic duty.

4. PROCLAMATION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF¹⁴ [GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS]
AUGUST 14, 1914

POLES!

The hour has struck for the cherished dreams of your fathers and forefathers to be realized.

A century and a half ago the living body of Poland was torn into parts, but her soul did not die. She lived in the hope that the hour of the resurrection of the Polish nation, of its fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia, would arrive.

The Russian armies are bringing you the glad message of this reconciliation.

Let the boundary lines which have cut the Polish nation asunder be obliterated. Let the Poles be reunited under the scepter of the Russian Tsar.

Under that scepter Poland will be reborn, free in her faith, language, and self-government.

¹² The extreme left, not wishing to vote against the resolution, left the hall ("Riech," August 9, 1914.)

¹³ "Pravitelstvenny Viestnik," No. 165, August 9, 1914.

¹⁴ "Riech," No. 204, August 15, 1914.

There is only one thing that Russia expects of you,—an equal regard for the rights of those nationalities with which history has linked you.

With an open heart, with an extended, brotherly hand, Great Russia greets you. She trusts that the sword that beat the foe at Grunewald has not rusted.

From the shores of the Pacific to the seas of the North, the Russian hosts are on the march.

The dawn of a new life is breaking for you.

Let there shine forth in this dawn the sign of the Cross, the symbol of the Passion and resurrection of nations.

*The Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
General-Adjutant NICHOLAS*

5. BOURTZEFF'S LETTER IN THE LONDON "TIMES"

EXPECTANT RUSSIA ¹⁵

To the Editor of "The Times":

Sir—May I be allowed to say a few words in connection with the excellent letter by my compatriot, Professor Vinogradov, which appeared in your paper today (September 14)? Professor Vinogradov is absolutely right when he says that not only is it desirable that complete unity of feeling should exist in Russian political circles, but that this unity is already an accomplished fact.

The representatives of all political parties and of all nationalities in Russia are now at one with the Government, and this war with Germany and Austria, both guided by the Kaiser, has already become a national war for Russia.

Even we, the adherents of the parties of the Extreme Left, and hitherto ardent anti-militarists and pacifists, even we believe in the necessity of *this* war. *This* war is a war to protect justice and civilization. It will, we hope, be a decisive factor in our united *war against war*, and we hope that after it, it will at last be possible to consider seriously the question of disarmament and universal peace. There can be no doubt that victory, and decisive victory at that (personally I await this in the immediate future), will be on the side of the Allied nations—England, France, Belgium, Servia, and Russia.

The German peril, the curse which has hung over the whole world for so many decades, will be crushed, and crushed so that it will

¹⁵ The London "Times," September 18, 1914, p. 9, Col. D.

never again become a danger to the peace of the world. The peoples of the world desire peace.

To Russia this war will bring regeneration.

We are convinced that after this war there will no longer be any room for political reaction, and Russia will be associated with the existing group of cultured and civilized countries.

Professor Vinogradov is right when he says that in Russia not one of the political Left parties has at the present time modified its program in any way in view of the war. The word on all lips in Russia now is "Freedom." All are hungrily awaiting a general amnesty, freedom of the Press and of national life.

All the parties without any exceptions have supported the Government without even waiting for it to make any definite announcement about these crying needs. This is the measure of the belief of the people in the inevitableness of liberal reforms. The Government unfortunately still seems irresolute, and has up till now only done the minimum to justify the popular belief in it, but we are convinced that circumstances will develop in such a way that the Government will not be able to delay for long that which has become for Russia a *historical necessity*. And the sooner this happens the better.

To ensure the complete success of Russia in this war against Germany and Austria, and also for the time when the terms of peace will be discussed, the strongest and most firm national unity is necessary. And this unity of all nationalities and all parties will be possible only when the Russian Government will frankly and resolutely inaugurate a new and free era in the political life of the country.

We are convinced that we have supporting us both the public opinion of England and that of her Allies—France and Belgium.

Yours truly,

V. BOURTZEFF

CHAPTER III

SEPARATE PEACE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The war had been going on but a few months when the German Government set to work to make trouble in the Russian camp and to separate Russia from her Allies. Being well-informed of Russian internal conditions and of the growing jealousies between the Tsar and Grand Duke Nicholas, the Germans proceeded to fan these sparks of jealousy into a flame by spreading false information among the soldiers.

The next move was to bring about a separate peace. For this purpose use was made of people close to the Russian Court. The Grand Duke of Hesse, brother of the Tsarina, and Maria Vasilchikova, a friend of the Emperor and Empress, did their best to draw Russia away from the Allies. When her letters remained unanswered, Maria Vasilchikova came to Petrograd to plead her case. When all their efforts failed, Count Eulenburg, Marshal of the German Court, wrote to Count Fredericks of the Russian Court on the same subject. But to all the flatteries, scares of Yellow Peril, and promises of the Straits, Nicholas II turned a deaf ear. His last words to the army were that the war "must be continued and brought to a victorious end."

I. AUSTRO-GERMAN PROCLAMATION TO RUSSIANS' *SOLDIERS:*

At the most difficult moment of his life, your Tsar is addressing you, soldiers.

This unfortunate war began contrary to my own will: It was provoked by the intrigues of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich and his adherents, who want to remove me, so that he himself may

¹ Semennikov, V. P.; "Politika Romanovykh Nakanunie Revoliutsii," 94-5. (From now on referred to as Semennikov, "Politika Romanovykh.")

occupy the throne. Under no condition whatever would I have agreed to the declaration of this war, knowing beforehand its sad issue for Mother Russia; but my cunning relative and treacherous generals prevent me from using the power given to me by God, and, fearing for my life, I am forced to do everything they demand of me.

Soldiers! Refuse to obey your treacherous generals; turn your weapons against all who threaten the life and the liberty of your Tsar, the safety and security of your dear country.²

Your unfortunate Tsar,

NICHOLAS

2. VASILCHIKOVA'S LETTERS

(a) VASILCHIKOVA TO THE TSAR³

Klein Vartenstein, Gloggnitz, Nieder Oesterreich

March 10, 1915

Your Majesty:

I fully realize the boldness of my step in writing to Your Imperial Majesty, but only boundless love for You, Sire, and for my fatherland, induces me to do it, and I pray that Your Majesty will deign to read through these lines which, though rambling, come from the heart.

At the present sad time, I believe, I am the only Russian woman who happens to be in an enemy country, and who has access to You, Your Majesty. Moreover, owing to the presence here, last summer, of the family of my nephew, Skoropadski,⁴ and because of anonymous accusations that I protect Russian spies, I am in captivity, *i.e.*, I dare not leave my garden. There have come to me here *three*—two Germans and one Austrian, all three more or less influential persons, and asked me, if possible, to report to Your Majesty "that every one is now convinced of the bravery of the Russians, and that, so long as all the belligerents are nearly in the same position, would not You, Sire, the ruler of the greatest tsardom in the world, be not only the Tsar of a victorious army, but also the Tsar of *Peace*? You were the first to conceive the thought of international peace, and on the initiative of Your Majesty the peace congress was called at The Hague. Now simply one mighty word from you—and the

² This proclamation was scattered among the soldiers about January, 1915.

³ Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 12-3.

⁴ Paul Skoropadski, Hetman of the Ukraine in 1918.

flow of the rivers of blood will stop. There is *no hatred* against Russia, against the Russians, either here, in Austria, or in Germany. In Prussia the Emperor, the army, the navy, realize the bravery and ability of our army, and in these two countries there is a large party for peace, for firm peace, with Russia. Now everything is dying: men are dying; the wealth of the country is dying; commerce is dying; prosperity is dying.—[While Europe is dying, there looms up] the terrible yellow race, and Russia alone, having You, Sire, at its head, can stand against it like a wall. (One word from You, and You will add the crown of immortality to Your numerous laurels.

I was quite astonished when they told me all this. To my question—what could I do?—they answered, "It is now impossible to use diplomatic means, therefore bring our conversation to the notice of the Russian Tsar,—and then it is necessary only for the most powerful of rulers, one who is not conquered, to say a word, and, of course, his wishes will be met in every way."—"And the Dardanelles?" I asked. They replied, "The Russian Tsar has but to wish it—and the straits will be free."

The persons who spoke to me are not *diplomats*, but people of position, who are personally acquainted and in communication with the imperial rulers of Austria and Germany. I recall Prince Lobanov^a—who was sincerely devoted to Your Majesty and Russia, and always stood for the friendship of the three emperors—l'Alliance des trois Empereurs.

Here, let me repeat, there is no hatred, not even any real feeling of enmity against Russia; and the three who spoke to me have been in Russia, know, and love her. Similarly, toward France and Japan, too, there is no bitterness,—but, there is an *enormous* hatred for England.

Your Majesty, I felt that I had no right not to transmit all that has been stated above, which they came to tell me, because there is no representative of Yours either in Germany or in England. [Austria?] I beg to be forgiven if Your Majesty finds that I did not act properly.

Of course, if You, Sire, with Your love of peace, should wish to convince Yourself of the correctness of the above through an authorized, near person, these three who spoke to me could personally state everything in one of the neutral countries, but *these*

^a Aleksei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovski (1824-1896), Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 11, 1895-September 1, 1896.

three—are not diplomats, but so to speak, the *echo* of both enemy countries.

Your Imperial Majesty's deeply devoted subject,

MARIA VASILCHIKOVA.

(b) VASILCHIKOVA TO THE TSAR⁶

Klein Vartenstein, Gloggnitz, Nieder Oesterreich

March 30, 1915

Your Majesty:

I don't know whether the letter I made bold to write to You (March 10) has reached Your Majesty. Since that time a great deal has happened—Przemysl has fallen, our brave warriors are fighting desperately in the Carpathians. The three (two Germans and one Austrian) came again to me, asking me to repeat what I wrote in the first letter and which may not have reached Your Majesty, namely, that there is a desire in Germany and Austria for peace with Russia, and You, Sire, who conceived the sacred thought of international peace and at whose wish there was called at The Hague a peace congress, You, the ruler of the greatest country in the world, You alone are the one who, as a victor, could first utter the word, peace—and the rivers of blood will dry up, and the present terrible grief will turn to joy.

They ask me to bring to the notice of Your Majesty that it is known from a *most secret* source that England intends to keep Constantinople for herself and to create in the Dardanelles another Gibraltar, and that there are now going on *secret* negotiations between England and Japan to turn over Manchuria to the latter. The persons who tell me this are not diplomats, but love their fatherland sincerely, and they *echo* the popular desire. They ask that the Russian Sovereign, not conquered, but conqueror, may in this capacity utter the word, peace, and his wishes will be satisfied in every way. The question of the Dardanelles, of course, will be settled, not in favor of England, but of Russia.

Again I beg forgiveness that I dare write all this,—but my Russian blood felt happy when I heard everything *these three*, who know Russia well, said. They are, let me repeat, not diplomats, but have relations with the reigning houses of both countries which are at war with Russia.

⁶ Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 14-5.

My first letter I sent through Her Majesty,—but this one I make bold to send directly to You, Sire!

Ah, would only the Easter chimes also proclaim peace!—Christ is risen. God grant to You, Your Majesty, to the Empress, and to Your most august children everything that is bright and joyful.

Your Imperial Majesty's deeply devoted subject.

MARIA VASILCHIKOVA.

Should Your Majesty wish to send a trusted person to one of the neutral countries, so as to convince Yourself, they will arrange it here to release me from captivity, and I could introduce these three persons to Your representative.

(c) VASILCHIKOVA TO THE TSAR⁷

Berlin, May 27, 1915

Your Majesty:

I make bold once more to write to You, Sire, and this time from Berlin, where I have been asked to come. It would be nearer the facts to say that I was sent for at Klein Vartenstein to come to Berlin, under the *pretext* that I might see my nephew, who is here in captivity, *but in reality* to transmit to Your Majesty the conversations I have had here.

It is known to Your Majesty that since the month of August I have been in Klein Vartenstein more or less a prisoner—I am forbidden to go outside of my garden. But here, in Berlin, I am enjoying perfect freedom, and I have been given all kinds of privileges, such as none of the foreigners who are now living in Berlin and Germany enjoy—and that with the knowledge of Emperor William, who is aware of the friendly attitude of Your Majesty and of the Empress toward me.

I regret bitterly that I left Russia, and now, in these hard times, I cannot be of service. Perhaps the Almighty has decreed it, and I may yet be of service to my country, though far away. This is why I make bold to transmit all I have heard.

Since the end of February they [three men] have been coming to me at Klein Vartenstein to talk about peace—as I wrote to Your Majesty. Now, although, of course, not officially, it is still possible to see clearly from all talks that the desire for peace with Russia has *greatly* increased. Here, many have visited me, and the Minister of

⁷ Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 15-9.

Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, whom I have known a long time, came to see me several times and spoke at length about the present situation.—I may say more, it is with his wish and knowledge that I am transmitting our conversations. As they were held in the French language, I shall try to report them literally in the same language, and You shall see that Germany is *sincerely* anxious to end the war as soon as possible and to become, not an enemy, but a friend and ally of Russia.

“Tous ici sont d'accord que la paix entre l'Allemagne et la Russie est une question vitale pour les deux pays qu'unissent tant d'intérêts commerciaux et en réalité aucunes divergences politiques ne séparent. Certes, l'Autriche devrait y être comprise, car l'Allemagne ne peut et ne veut lâcher l'Autriche, qui en tout cas sortira de cette guerre affaiblie. Il faut faire cesser le carnage justement maintenant où, malgré les grandes pertes de part et d'autre, pas un des pays qui est en guerre n'est battu. La Russie gagnerait beaucoup plus si elle faisait une bonne paix avec l'Allemagne même dans la question des Dardanelles, que l'Allemagne admet est une question de première importance pour la Russie. On est convaincu ici, que l'Angleterre voudra et insistera à avoir les coudées libres dans la Mer Noire, autrement dit, qu'elle voudra y dominer, car elle se dit être 'la Maîtresse de la Mer.'

“Ce serait un grand danger si un jour la Russie avait une guerre avec l'Angleterre. On m'a fait observer que l'Angleterre n'a jamais été la vraie amie de ses alliés,—elle aime qu'on lui tire les marrons du feu. L'Angleterre vise à obtenir l'influence dominante à Constantinople et malgré toutes ses promesses elle ne permettra jamais à la Russie de prendre cette ville ou de la garder si la Russie l'occupe.

“En Allemagne on a besoin d'une Russie forte et monarchique et les deux Maisons Voisines et Regnantes doivent soutenir les vieilles traditions monarchiques et amicales. La prolongation de la guerre est considérée comme un danger pour la Dynastie. On conçoit parfaitement que la Russie ne veut pas abandonner la France, mais là encore l'Allemagne comprend le point d'honneur russe et ne fera aucune difficulté à un arrangement équitable.

“Ici on ne songe pas à créer un nouveau royaume de Pologne, qui serait une source de discordes et outre cela finira bien vite par être suffoquée, n'ayant pas de libre issue à la mer, car ni la Russie, ni l'Allemagne ne songeront à sacrifier pour la Pologne un de ses ports sur la Mer du Nord.

“On comprend aussi que pour la sécurité de l'Europe contre la

race jaune il faut une Russie puissante. Du reste, le testament de Bismarck était de laisser la politique de la Russie libre en Asie.

"La guerre avec l'Italie n'effraye personne. Depuis l'automne tout le sud du Tyrol est rempli de troupes autrichiennes et les Allemands depuis quelque temps y ont également envoyé des forces. La guerre d'après des sources certaines est faite avec l'argent anglais et les meneurs politiques, francs-maçons, radicaux et tutti quanti dont le vrai but est de renverser les trônes, ont recueilli quelques millions de lires. Du reste, on croit savoir ici que Votre Majesté a été contre que l'Italie se mêlât à cette guerre. Et de la manière la plus positive on m'a répété maintes fois qu'il n'y a aucune haine dans le pays contre la Russie.

"On m'a aussi parlé du mauvais traitement des prisonniers allemands civils en Russie et on m'a raconté que Votre Majesté l'ayant appris a daigné écrire de Sa Main propre d'améliorer le traitement, et qu'au Ministère de la guerre on avait ajouté 'seulement avec ceux de provenance slave.' A Petrograd les civils ne se plaignent pas autant, mais un secrétaire de l'Ambassade d'Amérique a écrit ici que le traitement en province 'is a scandal,' plus encore pour les prisonniers civils que militaires. On est aussi fort impressionné du sort du Consul Allemand à Kowno Baron Lerchenfeld, qui depuis neuf mois se trouve à la forteresse Petro-Pavlovsk, étant accusé d'avoir eu chez lui des cartes éditées dans la topographie militaire. Une autre chose qu'on ne comprend pas ici est la condamnation à mort des deux officiers-aviateurs M. M. de Knobelsdorf et de Bubille, changée par la grace de Votre Majesté à une condamnation aux travaux forcés. Ils auraient jeté des proclamations, simple truc de guerre dont on se sert, paraît-il, dans toutes les armées.

"En général de toutes ces conversations il est clair de comprendre que l'Angleterre n'est pas une vraie amie à la Russie et cela n'étonnerait pas l'Allemagne si en quelques années elle propose ses forces à l'Allemagne contre la Russie,—mais l'Allemagne veut la paix durable avec la Russie."

From the above Your Majesty will see that the first attempt at rapprochement with Russia, even though not official, still comes from Germany. Here it is said that Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich has lately been making mistake after mistake, and that he has no mercy whatever on the soldiers. The wounded and captured Russians also say that—"the life of a soldier means nothing to him." By the second or third of May, new style, the Russian war prisoners in Germany were:

Officers	5,500
Soldiers	520,000

Since the recent fights in the Carpathians, the number of prisoners has increased considerably. The officers are in 25 camps, and the soldiers in 90 (exact data from the War Ministry). In Austria 194,000 have lately been transported by the railways, but how many Russian prisoners there are altogether in Austria, I don't know. . . .

My nephew Miloradovich, the son of my sister, with all the officers who were at Burg, has been transferred to Mainz, and I obtained permission to see him at Frankfort, to which he was taken by automobile to the General Commando, where I saw him for two hours without witnesses. Of course he feels very lonely, and it is painful to him that he is unable just now to serve his dear fatherland. Together with him at Mainz are many Englishmen, French, and Belgians. He says the English are more sympathetic than the others, but they are saying plainly, without embarrassment, as soon as there is peace, *we shall immediately conclude an alliance with Germany, to attack Russia!!!* Yes, not in vain did Khomiakov* say of England, "perfidious Albion."

The Grand Duke of Hesse, on learning that I was at Frankfort, at once telephoned for me to come to breakfast at Volfsgarten. Needless to tell with what love he spoke of You and the Empress, and how *sincerely* he wants peace and how glad he was that von Jagow had decided to talk it over with me.

This letter will be taken to Tsarskoe Selo and handed to the aide-de-camp on duty, to deliver into Your Majesty's own hands. I make bold to ask that orders be given to send me the reply, which I could transmit to von Jagow. I shall wait for it here, and then, alas! I must return to Klein Vartenstein, which I have no right to leave till the end of the war. If Your Majesty will resolve to pronounce the word, peace, from the height of Your throne, You will decide the fate of the nations of the whole world. If you will send a trusted person for the first negotiations, a person with similar authority will at the same time be sent from here.

Your Imperial Majesty's loyal subject, with a feeling of profoundest devotion,

MARIA VASILCHIKOVA.

Should Your Majesty desire that I should personally tell of all I have heard and all I have seen here and in Germany, my trip to

* A. S. Khomiakov, 1804-1860, one of the leaders of the Slavophiles.

Tsarskoe Selo will be facilitated in every way,—I shall, nevertheless, have to return to Austria until the end of the war.

3. GRAND DUKE HESSE'S LETTER

LETTERS FROM THE EMPRESS TO THE EMPEROR⁹

April 30, 1915

. . . I had a long, dear letter fr. Erni¹⁰—will show it you upon your return. He says that "if there is someone who understands him (you) & knows what he is going through, it is me." He kisses you tenderly. He longs for a way out of this dilemma, that someone ought to begin to make a bridge for discussion.

So he had an idea of quite privately sending a man of confidence to Stockholm, who should meet a gentleman sent by you (privately) that they could help disperse many momentary difficulties. He had this idea, as in Germany there is no real hatred against Russia. So he sent a gentleman to be there on the 28—(that is 2 days ago & I only heard today) & can only spare him a week. So I at once wrote an answer (all through Daisy) & sent it the gentleman, telling him you are not yet back, so he better not wait—& that tho' one longs for peace, the time has not yet come.—

I wanted to get all done before you return, as I know it would be unpleasant for you.

W. [William II] knows of course absolutely nothing about this¹¹—He says they [Germany] stands as a firm wall in France, & that his friends tell him, in the North & Carpathians too. They think they have 500,000 of our prisoners.—

The whole letter is very dear & loving;—I was intensely grateful

⁹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 451-2. During the war and while he was at the front, the Emperor and Empress corresponded regularly. Their letters are now in the archives of the Soviet Government, but copies of her letters to him were smuggled out to Berlin and published in 1922 under the title: "Pisma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k Imperatoru Nikolaiu II." The original letters are in English and are published in that language but the English leaves much to be desired. This shortcoming may be due more to the ignorance of the copyist and proof-reader, than to the writer. Soon after their appearance abroad the Soviet archivists brought out both his and her letters in a Russian edition under the title: "Perepiska Nikolai i Aleksandry Romanovykh." Instead, however, of publishing them in the original English they made a Russian translation. As it stands today we are not quite certain of the exact language used by either of the correspondents. In this book the quotations of the Empress' letters are from the Berlin edition and the Emperor's from the Russian edition translated back into English from the Russian.

¹⁰ Brother of the Empress, Grand Duke of Hesse.

¹¹ The Vasilchikova letters contradict this statement.

to get it, tho' of course the question of the gentleman waiting there & you away, was complicated;—& E. will be disappointed.—

4. PALÉOLOGUE'S QUERY ABOUT SEPARATE PEACE

(a) THE EMPRESS TO THE EMPEROR ¹².

June 27, 1915

. . . Paul ¹³ came to tea & remained 1 & 3-4 hours, he was very nice & spoke honestly & simply meaning well, not wishing to meddle with what does not concern him, only asking all sorts of things wh. I now repeat to you, with his-knowledge. Well, to begin with, Paléolog ¹⁴ dined with him a few days ago & then they had a long private talk & the latter tried to find out from him, very cleverly, whether he knew if you had any ideas about forming a separate peace with Germany, as he heard such things being spoken about here, & as tho' in France one had got wind of it—& that there they intend fighting to the very end. Paul answered that he was convinced it was not true, all the more, as at the outset of the war we & our allies had settled, that peace could only be concluded together on no account separately. Then I told Paul that you had heard the same rumor about France; & he crossed himself when I said you were not dreaming of peace & knew it would mean revolution ¹⁵ here & therefore the Germans are trying to egg it on. He said he had heard even the German mad conditions posed to us.—I warned him he wd. next hear, that I am wishing peace to be concluded.—

(b) THE EMPEROR'S ANSWER ¹⁶

June 29, 1915

Thank you heartily for your long letter in which you tell of your conversation with Paul. You gave him exactly the right answer on the question of peace. This is the principal point in my rescript to old Goremykin which will be published.

¹² "Pisma Imperatrity," I, 469.

¹³ Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovich, uncle of the Tsar.

¹⁴ M. Paléologue, French Ambassador.

¹⁵ The French and the Russian liberals predicted a revolution in case of a separate peace, while the Germans and many of the Russian reactionaries prophesied a revolution if Russia went on with the Allies to the end.

¹⁶ "Perepiska Nikolaia i Aleksandry Romanovykh," III, 223.

5. COUNT EULENBURG TO COUNT FREDERICKS¹⁷

Au mois de novembre 1915, le comte Eulenburg, ministre de la Cour de Prusse, adressa au comte Fredericksz, ministre de la Cour de Russie, une lettre dont voici les passages essentiels :

Les confiantes et cordiales relations qui nous ont unis pendant plus de trente ans m'autorisent à vous écrire cette lettre.

Notre devoir envers Dieu, nos souverains et nos pays nous oblige à faire tout ce qui dépend de nous pour rétablir entre nos empereurs l'amitié d'autrefois. Nul doute que, aussitôt cette amitié rétablie, nos deux gouvernements ne trouvent facilement les bases d'une paix honorable. . . .

La Lettre, confiée à un émissaire secret, fut mise à la poste dans un bureau de Petrograde. Le comte Fredericksz la communiqua immédiatement à l'Empereur, qui appela sur-le-champ M. Sazonow. Tous les trois s'accordèrent à penser qu'une telle lettre n'avait pu être écrite que par ordre, et sans doute sous la dictée de l'empereur Guillaume. Le Tsar dit alors à M. Sazonow :

"Vous connaissez mes idées. Préparez une réponse que signera le comte Fredericksz."

Le lendemain, M. Sazonow apporta à l'Empereur un projet de réponse ainsi conçu :

"Si vos sentiments sont tels que vous me les décrivez, obtenez de S. M. l'empereur Guillaume qu'il prescrive à son gouvernement d'adresser une proposition collective de paix à tous les gouvernements alliés contre l'Allemagne. C'est la seule procédure possible."

L'empereur Nicolas lut ce projet de réponse.

"Votre rédaction, dit-il, est parfaite. Aucun de nos alliés n'aurait rien à y reprendre. Mais, depuis hier, j'ai réfléchi. Et la lettre d'Eulenburg restera sans réponse. Si corrects que soient les termes dont vous vous êtes servi, j'aurais l'air d'admettre la possibilité d'une correspondance directe entre nos deux Cours. Et cela, je n'en veux à aucun prix."

Puis, prenant des mains de Sazonow la lettre du comte Eulenburg, il relit à haute voix la phrase : ". . . rétablir entre nos Empereurs l'amitié d'autrefois," et il écrit en marge :

"Cette amitié est morte. Qu'on ne m'en parle plus jamais!"

¹⁷ Frederic Masson in "Le Gaulois," No. 44,870, July 1, 1918. On this episode see also Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia," I, 251; Paléologue, "An Ambassador's Memoirs," II, 135-7.

6. VIEWS OF THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE ¹⁸

In any case, the chances of a separate arrangement with Russia were excellent in the latter part of the summer of 1915, [1916] when Russia was in very serious military difficulties and the Tsar had appointed the admittedly pro-German Sturmer to the premiership. I considered it, at the time, an unmistakable sign of willingness to negotiate, and I urged our leaders to grasp the opportunity. As a matter of fact, in the course of the summer and in the early autumn, numerous deliberations of a general character were carried on and terms considered; but all this took place privately among German diplomatists or extended only to conversations between them and the Higher Command. Practical deductions which might have resulted in the inauguration of relations with Sturmer were not discussed. We got no further than empty lamentations and futile complaints that the war had completely cut us off from all possibility of communicating with people across the frontier, that we could not join them, "the water was much too deep."

[For document 7, Imperial Rescript see page 122.]

8. SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY ¹⁹

BY HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR

December 25, 1916 [Jan. 7, 1917]

More than two years ago, in time of profound peace, Germany, who had long been secretly preparing to subjugate all the peoples of Europe, attacked Russia and her faithful Ally, France, which obliged England to join us and take part in the struggle. The complete contempt for all bases of law, which manifested itself by Germany's infringement of the neutrality of Belgium, and the merciless cruelty of the Germans in regard to the peaceful populations of the provinces occupied by their troops, gradually united all the Great Powers of Europe against Germany, and her Ally, Austria-Hungary.

Under the pressure of the German armies, inordinately strong owing to the superiority of their technical means, Russia, as well as France, were obliged, in the first year of the war, to cede a part of

¹⁸ *Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany*, 136-7.

¹⁹ Loukomsky, A.; "Memoirs of the Russian Revolution," 47-8.

their territory to the foe. This temporary reverse, however, did not crush the spirit of our brave Allies, or yours, my gallant troops. Meanwhile, by the united efforts of all the forces of the Empire, the difference in our technical means and those of the Germans was gradually disappearing. But, long before this, even since the autumn of the past year of 1915, our enemy was unable to occupy another foot of Russian territory, and in the spring and summer of this current year, the German troops experienced a series of severe defeats, and passed from aggression to a state of defense on the whole of our front. Their forces are obviously wearing themselves out, while the might and power of Russia and her valorous Allies surely and steadily grow. Germany feels that she will be completely routed, that the hour of retaliation for all her cruelties and violations of the law is near. And so—similarly to her sudden declaration of war at a time when she felt her military superiority over her neighbors, Germany, feeling her weakness, suddenly comes forward with an offer of peace to the Allies, strongly united against her in an indissoluble bond. She, very naturally, wishes to begin peace negotiations before the measure of her weakness becomes evident to all, before she definitely loses her fighting capacity. At the same time, [taking] advantage of her temporary victory over Rumania—due to the latter's want of military experience—she endeavors to give her enemies a false idea of the strength of her armies. But, if Germany could declare war and attack Russia and her Ally, France, at the most unfavorable moment for them—at the present moment these two countries, supported by noble Italy and powerful England, and fortified by the struggle, are able, in their turn, to enter into peace negotiations with Germany when they consider the time favorable for it. This time has not yet come: the enemy has not yet been expelled from the provinces which have been seized by him; Russia has not yet attained the aim created by this war—the possession of Tzar-grad²⁰ and the Straits; the formation of a whole and independent Poland out of its three existing, but as yet separate parts,—is still not assured. To conclude a peace with Germany at present would mean not to profit fully by the heroic efforts of the Russian Army and Fleet. These efforts, and the sacred memory of those gallant sons of Russia who have perished on the field of battle, forbid us even to think of making peace before achieving a final and complete victory over the foe, who dares to think that, if he could begin the war, he can end it whenever he likes.

²⁰ Constantinople.

I do not doubt for a moment that every loyal son of Russia, whether forming part of my glorious Army, or working for the might of that Army in the interior of the country, or pursuing his own peaceful labor, is imbued with this sentiment, and thinks alike on the subject. Peace can only be granted to the enemy when he is definitely broken and defeated, and gives us and the Allies solid proofs of the impossibility for him to renew his treacherous attack . . . when we may rest assured that he will be obliged, by the very force of circumstances, to keep his engagements, and fulfil the obligations laid upon him by the Treaty of Peace.

Let us then remain firm and immovable in our assurance of victory, and the Almighty will bless our banners; He will cover them once more with undying glory, and will grant us a peace worthy of your heroic deeds, my glorious troops,—a peace for which the coming generations will bless you, and which will render your memory forever sacred to them.

NICHOLAS.

9. TSAR'S ADDRESS TO THE ARMY ²¹

Headquarters, March 21, 1917

I appeal to you for the last time, my beloved troops. After the abdication of myself and my son, all the authority has passed into the hands of the Provisional Government, formed by the State Duma. So may God help them to lead Russia on the way to prosperity and glory!

And you, my valiant troops, God help you to defend our country against the cruel foe! For two and a half years you have daily and hourly borne on your shoulders the heavy burden of war. Much blood has been shed; many efforts have been made; and the day is near when Russia, closely united to her gallant allies in their common aspiration to victory, will break the resistance of the enemy. This war, unprecedented in history, must be continued and brought to a victorious end. Any one who dreams of peace at the present moment is a traitor to his country. I know that every honest soldier thinks so. Go on fulfilling your duty; stand to guard your glorious fatherland; obey the Provisional Government, and your chiefs. Do not forget that all disorder, all weakening of discipline, are so many assets for the foe.

²¹ Loukomsky, A.; "Memoirs of the Russian Revolution," 69-70.

I firmly believe that the love for your great country is, and ever will be, alive in your hearts. God will give you his blessing, and St. George, the Victorious, will help you to triumph over the foe!

NICHOLAS.

CHAPTER IV

PEACE CONVERSATIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the time of the declaration of war there was no clear understanding as to peace terms. Nothing was said on the subject until reports began to circulate that President Wilson contemplated offering mediation. This possibility forced the Allies to talk things over and these conversations led up to secret treaties. The letters here given show the steps that led up to the treaties.

1. TÉLÉGRAMME SECRET DE L'AMBASSADEUR À LONDRES¹

6-19 *Septembre*, 1914. *No.* 494.

Personnel. Très confidentiel. Le Roi m'a dit ce matin qu'il se pourrait que président Wilson soit tenté jouer très prématurément rôle de Roosevelt, qu'il ne redoutait pas intrigues maladroites de Bernstorff, mais que Dernbourg était plus habile et pouvait engendrer une campagne américaine pour paix. Le Roi m'a rappelé la déclaration de son Gouvernement et paroles de son discours hier de prorogation Chambre. Il me répéta qu'il maintient plus que jamais son opinion qu'aucune paix n'est possible avant que des événements décisifs permettent d'imposer une paix que assurerait l'écrasement durable de l'hégémonie militaire de l'Allemagne. Roi m'a dit qu'opinion qu'il émettait vis-à-vis de son Gouvernement pour le cas d'ouvertures indirectes américaines serait de les laisser sans réponse aucune en les ignorant tout-à-fait. Roi pense qu'il n'y a aucune nécessité pour les Gouvernements alliés de se consulter, que si les Gouvernements alliés entraient dans cette voie, ces pourparlers parviendraient à Berlin très rapidement et y seraient considérés comme symptômes d'irrésolution et de faiblesse. Le Roi m'a dit que très confidentiellement il avait voulu me mettre au courant de son opinion personnelle à ce sujet. Je remerciais Sa Majesté en l'assurant que j'avais l'intime conviction que l'Empereur partageait entièrement cette opinion. Le

¹ Pokrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina," 66-7. "The Intimate Papers of Colonel House," I, Chapter XI, throws some light on this subject.

Roi termina entretien en me parlant situation militaire et m'exprima son admiration pour succès de nos armes. Il me dit que rôle d'Angleterre serait dans peu de mois de fournir à la France les ressources nécessaires et exprima espoir qu'Angleterre mettrait alors à la disposition des alliés 500,000 hommes au moins. Il me dit que plus que jamais la persévérance et la fermeté sont nécessaires, que le temps est pour les alliés et que c'est là-dessus qu'il basait son opinion sur l'attitude absolument passive à opposer à toute tentative américaine pour la paix.

BENCKENDORFF ²

2. M. DELCASSÉ À M. PALÉOLOGUE À PÉTROGRADE

Bordeaux, le 24 Septembre, No. 123 ³

[*En chiffres*]

Notre ambassadeur à Washington ⁴ me fait savoir que l'Allemagne ne songe pas à la paix, mais continue en secret les pourparlers officiels avec le colonel House, un ami du président Wilson que ce dernier l'avait chargé l'an dernier d'une mission à Berlin pour la limitation des armements. M. House a dit à l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre qu'il serait utile que l'Angleterre fixât ses points de paix qu'il croyait être d'après les déclarations antérieures de l'Angleterre, satisfaction de la Belgique et des garanties contre le militarisme allemand. Il ajoutait que le c. Bernstorff serait prêt à causer avec l'ambassadeur anglais.

Sir C. Spring-Rice s'est contenté de répondre qu'une pareille entrevue ne pouvait se faire; que d'ailleurs les puissances de la Triple Entente ne concluraient pas de paix séparée.

3. M. PALÉOLOGUE À M. DELCASSÉ À BORDEAUX

Pétrograde, le 14 Septembre, No. 603 ⁵

[*En chiffres*]

Secret.

Pour le ministre seul.

Pendant un entretien tout amical M. Sasonow a développé devant Sir G. Buchanan ⁶ et moi ses idées non officielles sur la con-

² C. A. Benckendorff (1849-1917), Russian Ambassador in London.

³ Pokrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voïna," 71.

⁴ J. J. Jusserand.

⁵ Pokrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voïna," 73-5.

⁶ Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in Russia.

duite que la Russie, l'Angleterre et la France devraient tenir si le succès actuel de leurs armées était couronné par une victoire décisive. "Nous devons," nous a-t-il dit, "élaborer immédiatement un projet."

J'ai dit que selon moi les ministres des affaires étrangères de Russie, de France et d'Angleterre devraient encore se concerter entre eux trois pour fixer les bases générales de l'ordre nouveau à établir en Europe. Ils communiqueraient ces bases à leurs alliés secondaires—Belgique, Serbie, Monténégro. Ils les notifieraient ensuite collectivement à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche. Le projet n'établirait que les bases pour fixer les conditions de paix et résoudre les difficultés.

M. Sazonow a de son côté approuvé cette manière de voir. Allant plus loin dans la voie des confidences M. Sazonow nous a communiqué à grands traits comment il conçoit les remaniements que les trois alliés auraient intérêt à opérer dans la carte et la constitution de l'Europe.

1. L'objet principal des trois alliés serait de briser la puissance allemande et sa prétention de domination militaire et politique.

2. Les modifications territoriales doivent être déterminées par le principe des nationalités.

3. La Russie s'annexerait le cours inférieur du Niémen et la partie orientale de la Galicie. Elle annexerait au royaume de Pologne, la Posnanie orientale, la Silési ———^{*} et la partie occidentale de la Galicie.

4. La France reprendrait l'Alsace-Lorraine en y ajoutant à sa guise une partie de la Prusse rhénane et du Palatinat.

5. La Belgique obtiendrait dans ———^{*} un accroissement important de territoires.

6. Le Sleswig-Holstein serait restitué au Danemark.

7. Le royaume de Hanovre serait restauré.

8. L'Autriche constituerait une monarchie tripartite, formée de l'empire d'Autriche, du royaume de Bohême et du royaume de Hongrie. L'empire d'Autriche comprendrait uniquement les "provinces héréditaires." Le royaume de Bohême comprendrait la Bohême actuelle et les Slovaques, la Moravie. Le royaume de Hongrie aurait à s'entendre avec la Roumanie au sujet de la Transylvanie.

9. La Serbie s'annexerait la Bosnie, la Herzégovine, la Dalmatie et le nord de l'Albanie.

10. La Bulgarie recevrait de la Serbie une compensation en Macédoine.

^{*} Undeciphered word.

11. La Grèce s'annexerait le sud de l'Albanie, à l'exception de Vallone, qui serait dévolue à l'Italie.

12. L'Angleterre, la France et le Japon se partageraient les colonies allemandes.

13. L'Allemagne et l'Autriche payeraient une contribution de guerre.

M. Sasonow nous a instamment priés, Sir G. Buchanan et moi, de n'attribuer aucune importance officielle "à cette esquisse d'un tableau dont la trame n'est pas encore tissée." Mais quelques mots qu'il m'a glissés à part m'ont fait comprendre qu'il tient à nous mettre d'ores et déjà dans l'ordre de ses idées et qu'il attache plus de prix que jamais à être en étroit contact avec nous.

4. M. PALÉOLOGUE À M. DELCASSÉ À BORDEAUX

Pétrograde, le 26 Septembre 1914⁸

[En chiffres]

Secret.

Pour le ministre seul.

Le ministre de l'agriculture M. Krivocheine⁹—qui par son autorité personnelle et par la confiance dont il jouit auprès de l'Empereur, est le véritable président du conseil—est venu me voir hier pour m'exposer à titre privé ses vues sur les changements que les puissances de la Triple Entente devraient introduire dans l'ordre européen à l'issue de la guerre.

Je résume ci-après ses déclarations :

1. Les hostilités peuvent durer longtemps encore, mais il serait raisonnable d'admettre que pour des raisons étrangères à la stratégie elles puissent se terminer dans un délai plus court. Les gouvernements de la Triple Entente ne doivent pas se laisser surprendre par une demande de paix ; ils ont intérêt à fixer sans trop tarder leurs intentions communes.

2. Sur les modifications à introduire dans la configuration de l'Europe M. Krivocheine n'avait fait que reproduire le programme prévu le 14 septembre par M. Sasonow.

3. Concernant les Détroits, M. Krivocheine estime qu'ils doivent être libres ; que les turcs doivent passer en Asie et que Constantinople

⁸ Pokrovski, M. N. ; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina," 75-7.

⁹ A. V. Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture, 1908-1915.

doit devenir une ville neutre sous un régime analogue à celui de Tanger.

J'ai écouté Mr. Krivocheine sans formuler aucune opinion sauf sur la question de Constantinople. "C'est là," lui ai-je dit, "une question qui souleva de la part de l'Angleterre de fortes objections."

M. Krivocheine m'a demandé si j'avais quelques idées de vos intentions. Je lui ai répondu que je les ignore entièrement. A mon tour je lui ai demandé s'il avait eu l'occasion d'exposer ses idées à l'Empereur. "Oui, hier," a-t-il repris, "mais je vous assure que ces idées me sont toutes personnelles."

Ce matin en présence de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre j'ai rapporté à M. Sasonow mon entretien avec M. Krivocheine. Sir G. Buchanan s'est exprimé comme moi au sujet de Constantinople.

Mr. Sasonow nous a dit alors: "Sur le sort de Constantinople je ne suis pas entièrement d'accord avec M. Krivocheine, mais je pense comme lui que lors de la paix nous devons nous assurer une fois pour toutes le libre passage des Détroits."

D'un ton très ferme il a continué: "Les turcs doivent rester à Constantinople et aux environs. Quant à la liberté des Détroits elle nous doit être garantie et à trois conditions: 1, qu'aucune fortification ne puisse être érigée sur les flancs des Dardanelles, 2, qu'une commission assistée d'une force navale fasse la police dans les Dardanelles et le Mer de Marmara, 3, que la Russie ait à l'entrée intérieure du Bosphore—par exemple à Bouyoukdéré—une station de charbon. Cette question est pour nous d'un intérêt vital. Impossible de plus en différer la solution."

Sir G. Buchanan et moi avons eu l'impression qu'en nous parlant ainsi M. Sasonow ne nous confiait pas seulement un simple projet, mais une résolution.

5. M. DRAGOUMIS À M. VENIZELOS

*Pétrograde, le 4 Janvier 1915*¹⁰

[*En chiffres*]

J'ai appris que le président du conseil s'était rendu au quartier général où se trouva aussi l'Empereur.

Le ministre de Serbie tient de l'état major que cette rencontre a eu pour but de discuter la question d'une paix séparée avec l'Autriche.

¹⁰ Pokrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina," 78. M. Dragoumis was the diplomatic representative of Greece in Russia.

Les conditions du Gouvernement Russe seraient suivantes : la Galicie reviendrait à la Russie, la Bosnie à la Serbie, la Bohême recevrait l'autonomie.

D'autre part j'apprends que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche pour sauvegarder avant tout leurs propres territoires seraient disposées à reconnaître à la Russie le droit sur les Détroits. Le ministre de Serbie a reçu l'ordre de procéder à une démarche auprès du Gouvernement Russe en le priant de faire avancer ses troupes en Hongrie.¹¹

6. MÉMORANDUM DE L'AMBASSADE D'ANGLETERRE À PÉTROGRADE

*27 Février-12 Mars 1915*¹²

His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to make the following observations with reference to the Aide-Mémoire which this Embassy had the honor of addressing to the Imperial Government on February 27-March 12, 1915.

The claim made by the Imperial Government in their Aide-Mémoire of February 19-March 4, 1915 considerably exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by M. Sasonow as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time to take into consideration what their own desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace, Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes shall be satisfied with regard to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that M. Sasonow will realize that it is not in the power of His Majesty's Government to give a greater proof of friendship than that which is afforded by the terms of the above-mentioned Aide-Mémoire. That document involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government and is in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiment at one time universally held in England and which have still by no means died out. Sir Edward Grey therefore trusts that the Imperial Government will recognize that the recent general assurances given to M. Sasonow have been most loyally and amply fulfilled. In presenting the Aide-Mémoire now, His Majesty's Government believe and hope that a lasting friendship between Russia and Great Britain will be assured as soon as the proposed settlement is realized.

From the British Aide-Mémoire it follows that the desiderata of

¹¹ Pokrovski, M. N.; "Tsarskaia Rossiia i Voina," 78.

¹² *Ibid.*, 82-5.

His Majesty's Government, however important they may be to British interests in other parts of the world, will contain no condition which could impair Russia's control over the territories described in the Russian Aide-Mémoire of February 19-March 4, 1915.

In view of the fact that Constantinople will always remain a trade entrepôt for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government will ask that Russia shall, when she comes in the possession of it, arrange for a free port for goods in transit to and from non-Russian territory. His Majesty's Government will also ask that there shall be commercial freedom for merchant ships passing through the Straits, as M. Sasonow has already promised.

Except in so far as the naval and military operations on which His Majesty's Government are now engaged in the Dardanelles may contribute to the common cause of the Allies, it is now clear that this operation, however successful, cannot be of any advantage to His Majesty's Government in the final terms of peace. Russia alone will, if the war is successful, gather the direct fruits of these operations. Russia should therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, not now put difficulties in the way of any Power which may, on reasonable terms, offer to coöperate with the Allies. The only Power likely to participate in the operations in the Straits is Greece. Admiral Carden has asked the Admiralty to send him more destroyers, but they have none to spare. The assistance of a Greek flotilla, if it could have been secured, would thus have been of inestimable value to His Majesty's Government.

To induce the neutral Balkan States to join the Allies was one of the main objects which His Majesty's Government had in view when they undertook the operations in the Dardanelles. His Majesty's Government hope that Russia will spare no pains to calm the apprehensions of Bulgaria and Rumania as to Russia's possession of the Straits and Constantinople being to their disadvantage. His Majesty's Government also hope that Russia will do everything in her power to render the coöperation of these two States an attractive prospect to them.

Sir E. Grey points out that it will obviously be necessary to take into consideration the whole question of the future interests of France and Great Britain in what is now Asiatic Turkey; and, in formulating the desiderata of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Ottoman Empire, he must consult the French as well as the Russian Government. As soon, however, as it becomes known that Russia is to have Constantinople at the conclusion of the war, Sir E.

Grey will wish to state that, throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.

Sir E. Grey is as yet unable to make any definitive proposal on any point of the British desiderata; but one of the points of the latter will be the revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, so as to recognize the present neutral sphere as a British sphere.

Until the Allies are in a position to give to the Balkan States, and especially to Bulgaria and Rumania, some satisfactory assurance as to their prospects and general position with regard to the territories contiguous to their frontiers, to the possession of which they are known to aspire; and until a more advanced stage of the agreement as to the French and British desiderata in the final peace terms is reached, Sir E. Grey points out that it is most desirable that the understanding now arrived at between the Russian, French, and British Governments should remain secret.

CHAPTER V

PEACE PREPARATION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Early in the war the Governments of England and France formed special commissions to prepare material for the Peace Conference. Russia neglected to do so and that worried the scholarly Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich. On May 5, 1916, he raised the question with the Tsar and continued to urge upon him the necessity of such a commission. The Grand Duke was primarily a historian but his social position gave him opportunities to meet the leading men of his own and other countries. In these letters he gives his views on men and affairs and his general attitude toward the New Europe.

I. LETTERS FROM GRAND DUKE NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR

(a) MAY 5, 1916¹

I am sorry to bother you this time with a question which does not directly concern me, but in which I am personally deeply interested. It is this: Soon it will be two years since this unprecedented war broke out. I have an idea that the end is not far off. I feel that victory is on the side of Russia and the Allies. At the worst there may be no victors and no vanquished; the war may just stop because both sides will become financially exhausted. I refuse to think that we might lose the war.

In any case, it is necessary to make preparation *now*. People should be selected to uphold the honor and greatness of Russia at the coming congress or international conference. These men (probably 5 or 6) must not be bureaucrats, scribblers, or persons with the souls of routine officials. We should have for this honorable task men of broad education, men with backbone and courage, who fear

¹ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 63-4.

neither the newspapers nor the various cliques of our intriguing capital. It is not going to be an easy task to defend the interest of Russia and the greatness of the Tsar against both enemies and Allies. When I have turned over in my mind all the possibilities that might arise even at the preliminary negotiations, I become quite alarmed at what may happen when the conference reaches the point of the final peace terms. It is because of this that I take the liberty of calling to your serious attention this difficult problem and the need of selecting qualified men, not only from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but from the Ministries of War, Navy, and Finance as well. I should like to be one of the men chosen for this work. I renounce in advance all special considerations to which, as Grand Duke, I am entitled.

Obviously there is no precedent for this, and the Sazonovs and Izvolskis may become frightened; but then this war itself is not an ordinary one, and has no precedent.

You know my abilities and my faults. My tongue is without bones. I am liable to flare up and say what I think, but I am not afraid of people or of calumny. I studied much when a young man and have not stopped learning in my maturity. I seek nothing for myself. All I ask is an opportunity to be of real service to you and our dear Russia. I have several times discussed this topic with your mother and sister Xenia, and they have encouraged me. I have, therefore, decided not to put off longer making my request, but lay it, boldly, perhaps, but honestly, for your consideration.

There is still plenty of time to consider and discuss. I should like sometime to have a talk with you on the question [peace conference] which is constantly before my mind and gives me no rest day or night. When I recall, as historian,² all the past congresses of sad memory, I must confess that I am greatly worried.

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

(b) May 11, 1916*

Reverting to the question touched upon in my letter of May 5, I invite your attention to the selection and the future rôles of the persons who attend the conference or congress at the end of this international war.

If your choice is made in the course of the next few months, the

²The Grand Duke is known as a historian, the author of a life of Alexander I, and other important historical works.

*"Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 65-9.

selected persons will have to start on the preliminary work without the loss of a minute, for this reason:

First of all, they will have to get acquainted. Next, having received general instructions from you or Sazonov, they will have to consider those principal points on which an agreement has already been reached with our Allies. These agreements must be gone into thoroughly as regards both the main points and the secondary ones, because I, as well as many others in Russia, have somewhat lost faith in the ability of the leaders of our foreign policy. They lack the divine spark, and are dominated by mere routine which blocks every flash of inspiration.

The arguments against an early selection of persons to work out a unified program of action for the future conferences do not stand up under criticism. The fear that it might afford occasion for peace talk is groundless. Instead, it will produce a good impression, for even the troops in the trenches will know that they are not dying and being crippled in vain, but that the Government is even now taking steps to work out a peace that will be not only honorable, but profitable.

I make bold to think that our most amiable Sazonov himself does not always possess the gift of foresight—"prévoir et puis décider"—which would serve as a guarantee of success at the coming judgment day of Germany by her present foes. Appetites will be big. It will be necessary to reckon not only with the European Allies, but with the Japanese, and, perhaps, with the Americans, too, who are often forgotten behind those walls at the Pevcheski Bridge.⁴

If I am so insistent upon a good selection of our future Russian representatives at the congress, it is to prevent the sending to this gathering of people of such mental caliber as that well-known canary with his never-ending warbling, represented by V. N. Kokovtsov,⁵ or the self-complacent snobbishness of the grand Izvolski,⁶ or the venomous analyses of Polivanov.⁷ We need men of action, new ones, and men who are not bound up with the past and with mistakes already made.

Scanning the lists of the War Department, I stop instantly at the name of General Golovin,⁸ whose bold ideas have frightened our

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Minister of Finance, 1903, 1906-1914.

⁶ A. P. Izvolski, Russian Ambassador in Paris, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1906-1910.

⁷ A. A. Polivanov, Minister of War, June, 1915-March, 1916.

⁸ N. N. Golovin, author of many scholarly works on military subjects.

General Staff Academy, and who might select his own younger assistants.

Of the Admirals, whose abilities are better known to you than to me, good reports are heard of Admiral Kanin,⁹ and less unanimous praise of Rusin.¹⁰

In the Department of Finance, it seems to me that Bark¹¹ himself and, let us say, Pokrovski,¹² would both prove very valuable for the complicated financial problems which will be the most difficult ones in these discussions with the Allies.

I am taking the liberty of making a brief survey of previous congresses and conferences during the 19th century, as negative examples of our watchfulness.

In 1815 there were in Vienna the director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Count Nesselrode, Count Pozzo di Borgo, and Prince Andrei Razumovski. The first, half German and half Jew; the second, a crafty Corsican; and, the last, Razumovski, although a Russian, was senile and quite debilitated (in his younger years he was the lover of Paul Petrovich's first spouse). This trio was hardly equal to the task, and the interests of Russia were represented very queerly. Of course, the personal influence of Emperor Alexander I played the main part, especially in the affairs of the Polish Kingdom, which stirred the rosy hopes of the Poles and ended with the revolution of 1831.

After the Crimean campaign, a conference met at Paris in 1856. Here, Russia's chief representative was Prince Alexei Orlov, and some colorless officials. The results of the conference were worse than lamentable for our interests.

Lastly, in 1878, after the Turkish War, the memorable Congress of Berlin assembled. Counts Peter Shuvalov and [Paul] d'Oubril acted as Russia's representatives, under the leadership of the Chancellor himself, Prince Gorchakov, a sick and frail man, who would appear now in Berlin to provoke general ridicule at the Congress, and then in Petrograd to play a still sadder rôle.

Such were our representatives at the congresses of the nineteenth century, and what lamentable results we achieved!

At the coming congress the rôle of head of our interests will probably fall to Sazonov, as the Allies generally send their Ministers

⁹ Admiral of the Baltic Fleet.

¹⁰ Assistant Minister of the Navy.

¹¹ P. L. Bark, Minister of Finance, 1914-1917.

¹² N. N. Pokrovski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, November, 1916-March, 1917.

of Foreign Affairs. In connection with this possibility, I wrote to Sergei Dmitrievich that I should be delighted to work under his leadership like any other person, if you approved, of course.

On May 7, I received an answer from him which, although amiable, does not at all fit in with my plans. Later, Sazonov asked me by telephone to call, and I spent over an hour with him in animated conversation, but regret to say that we each stuck to our own ideas. Sazonov takes the view that it does not behoove a Grand Duke to act in a subordinate capacity, or to assume responsibilities, especially in these times when the Grand Dukes, as a whole, do not enjoy the love and respect of the Russian public. The only exception is Nicholas [Nicholaevich] whose popularity is ever increasing.

I find it strange that N. N. can and did bear immense responsibility, but that I cannot bear any. Sazonov tries to scare me by saying that I am liable to lose even my reputation as a historian, and that, moreover, the foreigners would look askance at me at the congress.

There is little logic in this. Sazonov said that he would like to put Count Benckendorff at the top of the list of his collaborators. Although he merits respect, his German name and religious faith would hardly produce a good effect upon the Russian public.

As I reported to you on the 6th, the name of Shebeko [N. N.] ¹³ would be more suitable, but Sazonov will hardly consent to that, seeing in him a possible successor, while Benckendorff would not be in his way.

This whole long talk, to tell the truth, grieved me, since, being fond of Sazonov, I had hoped to find him capable of a broader and clearer view.

He spoke at great length, also, on the Polish question.¹⁴ It may

¹³ Russian Ambassador in Vienna before the war.

¹⁴ Meeting of the Council of Ministers—July 29, 1915. Sazonov: "Such an act [autonomy for Poland by an Imperial Manifesto] would produce an excellent impression on our Allies, who are disturbed by the uncertain and wavering policy which we pursue toward the Poles. [In this act] the Poles would see that although the luck of war forces Russia to leave Polish soil temporarily, yet she is concerned about the fate of a brother people and is trying to bring about conditions under which the two nations can live together in the future on a basis of justice. This manifesto should be issued at once and posted on the walls of Warsaw before our troops leave that city. The Poles are tired of waiting and are beginning to lose confidence in the Proclamation of the Grand Duke [August 14, 1914]. The Imperial Manifesto would strengthen their hopes and would prevent Polish sympathies from turning toward the Germans who are ready to do anything to win them. I am certain that such an act, just as we are withdrawing from the Polish capital, would leave behind it thousands of people friendly disposed to us and unfriendly toward the Germans." This proposition of S. D. Sazonov met with

be that the promulgation of a manifesto now would be timely and produce a certain effect, since the charms of the proclamation signed by Nicholas [Nicholaevich] have already evaporated, and there is danger that the Germans may place the Polish crown upon the head of one of their numerous princes or archdukes . . .

I apologize for this lengthy epistle, and if I cannot contribute my mite of usefulness in fact, I shall grieve in silence, that is all,—the more so as I am alone, do not occupy any particular offices, and desire nothing for myself personally.

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

(c) AUGUST 8, 1916¹⁵

Grusheva (Kherson Guberniia)

. . . I now turn to another matter, connected with the plans for the coming conference. The question amounts to this: Who is to be humiliated and dismembered—Austria or Germany, and in what way shall they be rendered harmless for the future? Among us, there is an inclination to harm only Austria, and our whole attention is devoted to this ill-fated empire. The newspapers sharpen their appetites for the dismemberment of Austria for the benefit of Russia and the Slav States, but they talk very little about the humiliation of Germany—so strong is the spirit of the Germans and the Jews in our press.

To me it seems that, speaking of the Central Allied monarchies, all attention and all efforts ought to be concentrated upon Germany. Should there be a *complete* partition of Austria, we will have a situation like this: Hungary will become independent, possibly Bohemia too; Galicia and part of the Bukovina will go to Russia; Transylvania, probably to Rumania; and all the rest will be grabbed by the Serbs and Montenegrins, but especially by the Italians. What, then, will be left of Austria?—Carniola, Carinthia, Tyrol, and the Archduchy of Austria in the strict sense? Obviously, Germany will lay its hands on these provinces in the absence of something better, and will augment her possessions at the expense of her ally.

One of the diplomatists of the 19th century said: "Si l'Autriche n'existait pas—il faudrait la créer." It seems to me he was right, as it is more advantageous to have a multi-racial and weak Austria in solid opposition in the Council of Ministers. . . . ("Arkhirv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 22.)

¹⁵ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 75-9.

the center of Europe, than a strong Germany. It is, therefore, necessary to have recourse, in case of complete victory, to the humiliation and dismemberment of Germany. Schleswig-Holstein should be given back to Denmark; Alsace and Lorraine, to France; Luxemburg, to Belgium; part of the mouth of the Rhine, to Holland; Posen, to Poland; part of Silesia (the Saxon part) and part of Bavaria, to Austria, Germany should be compelled to reduce her navy to the minimum, but there should be no interference in her domestic affairs. Let her princes and dukes, burghers, Socialists, scientists, and beer-brewers,—in a word, all the representatives of “Deutschland über Alles,”—quarrel among themselves.

However, having all this on paper and by word of mouth is not sufficient. Historical examples are useful even after one hundred years. In 1815 the armies of occupation of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England were left in France until 1818, *i. e.*, three years, until everything was complied with and paid. Now we shall have to do something similar, but we must *come to an agreement right away*. Russia, France, England, Italy, Japan, Serbia, and Belgium will have to leave one army corps each in Germany till the execution of the treaty, making seven army corps.

You will perhaps smile and think that I am again running too far ahead, “*mais bien gouverner, c’est prévoir*,” and it is necessary to discuss all these things in advance and to come to an agreement among the heterogeneous Allies. . . .

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

(d) AUGUST 26, 1916¹⁸

Petrograd

. . . Of the foreigners here, I have thus far had two conversations with the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Carlotti, the cleverest among the ambassadors (after Motono). He no longer doubts that Rumania will come out one of these days, but he strongly denounces the Greeks, charging them with duplicity and sympathy for Germany. He is still more suspicious of the rôle of the new Spanish Ambassador in Petrograd, Marquis Villasinda, a noted pro-German, through whom various German agents are attempting to carry on their peace propaganda in government cliques. They are trying in every way to reach you and Her Majesty to work on your feelings,

¹⁸ “Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia,” 80-1.

thinking that, especially now, with Stuermer's German name, this will prove easier than before.

The Italian assured me that these same Spaniards have also cleverly mixed up the Polish question with the whole thing, in order to defer as long as possible the proclaiming of the expected manifesto on the destinies of Poland.

I am reporting all this for your information, and will add that the worse things become for the Germans on the battlefields and at home, the stronger will their efforts be here, and that every means, from family connections down . . . to the most contemptible frauds, will be made use of. This is my firm conviction, which I could later confirm by other facts. Just as they employ all kinds of abominations in war, asphyxiating gases, bombing the hospitals, and so forth, just so will they use all means for the attainment of peace, especially the ill-smelling ones.

Another diplomatist, Buchanan, who is almost my neighbor along the Quai, has often visited me this summer, and after the sympathy I expressed to him on the death of Kitchener and O'Beirne,¹⁷ he became more friendly and communicative. Although I do not regard him as a big man, he is really a confirmed enemy of the Germans and, under the influence of the new Counselor of the Embassy, Lindley, who is very able, Buchanan often talks to the point and wisely. During my stay at Grushevka he wrote to me twice, and I replied to his letters quite frankly. His second letter is interesting, and so I am sending it to you to read, as it coincides entirely with my views of the future fate of Austria and Germany.

Of the Frenchman, Paléologue, I say nothing, because that gentleman only gets things mixed, wherever possible, prates nonsense in various drawing-rooms, and, instead of being an efficient representative of friendly France, thinks only of his own career and his own hide, and therefore cannot be trusted. . . .

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

(e) SEPTEMBER 2, 1916¹⁸

I take the liberty of recalling to your attention my report of December 16, 1912, when I returned from Rumania, in view of the fact that she has now joined us and the object of my voyage was not in vain. My notes are in French.

¹⁷ H. J. O'Beirne of the Foreign Office, formerly Counselor of the British Embassy in Russia.

¹⁸ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 82; 148-50.

CONVERSATION AVEC LE ROI

Ma neutralité est possible car j'ai toujours gardé les souvenirs les plus reconnaissants à feu l'Emp. Alexandre II, quand nos troupes ont marché ensemble. Mais jamais je n'aurais pu lever mon glaive contre l'Allemagne comme un Hohenzollern—ceci est exclu. Alliance et intimité possible entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, mais aucun accord avec Serbie et surtout avec la Grèce. Je suis entièrement opposé à toute idée de confédération balkanique.

CONVERSATION AVEC TITO MAJORESCO, PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL

Vague. Neutralité peut-être. Aurait voulu rester en dehors du tout, pas de confédération balkanique, accord dangereux, pouvait provoquer dans le pays des troubles et des tendances révolutionnaires. Il voudrait rester au mieux avec les trois voisins de la Roumanie : la Russie, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie, gardant sa liberté d'action complète.

CONVERSATION AVEC TAKE-IONESCO

Vues plus larges que le président du Conseil. N'aurait lui pas voulu froisser l'Autriche, qu'il croit en état "de décomposition complète et de nervosité extrême," avant de s'engager avec la Russie en concordant l'action de la Roumanie avec les vues de la Russie. Faut surtout ménager la subtilité du vieux roi, vu son âge et son état de santé.

My comment.¹⁹ Intelligent, actif, faux, mais grand ami personnel de Kiederlen-Waechter.

CONVERSATION AVEC JEAN BRATIANO, LEADER DE L'OPPOSITION

Critique acerbe de la politique du Cabinet actuel, aussi de celle du roi. Aurait désiré que la Roumanie prenne position, fasse une politique plus active et pose nettement ses prétentions. Faut absolument tâcher d'entrer dans la confédération balkanique "en passant par dessus les petitessees" c. à. d. l'aversion du roi pour la Serbie et celle du pays pour la Grèce.

My comment.¹⁹ Vues larges d'un homme qui sent arriver bientôt son heure et prendre la pouvoir. Respect pour le monarque, mais regret de le voir tellement attaché aux indications venant de Berlin et de Vienne.

¹⁹ These words are written in Russian.

CONVERSATION AVEC BRATIANO

"Le pays saura se débrouiller dans la situation actuelle passant par dessus les personnes."—"La visite qu'il y a trois jours du Conrad von Hetzendorf purement de politesse avec lettre de l'emp. François-Joseph et réponse du roi Carol qu'il était disposé à soutenir toutes les solutions pacifiques. On veut nous forcer d'aller avec la Triplice, même les armes à la main, quitte à ne rien avoir d'avantageux, surtout si l'Autriche touchait ce qu'elle désire." Puis Bratiano m'a insinué assez vaguement que si la Russie s'engageait dans une guerre avec les austro-Allemands dans des conditions favorables pour elle, c. à. d. avec la France et l'Angleterre, les sympathies de la majorité des roumains iraient incontestablement vers la Russie, mais celles du vieux roi, même en cas de gros succès, resteraient acquises pour la gloire des Hohenzollern.—À ma question: "Et si Vous êtes un jour à la tête du gouvernement, feriez Vous des démarches pour avoir la Bessarabie?" Silence momentané et puis: "V. A. I. veut me blaguer: je ne puis même comme ardent patriote roumain désirer l'impossible, mais moi au pouvoir je mettrai la question de Transylvanie en première ligne et ferait tout pour me rapprocher de la Russie. Mais je Vous répète, avec le roi actuel cela sera très dure, avec le successeur . . . on pourrait s'arranger . . . je ne puis hélas Vous dire plus."—Moi: "Puis-je répéter cela aussi à mon souverain?"—"Si vous insistez—oui, autrement—plutôt non."

My conclusion.²⁰ Impression générale: la Roumanie ne veut pas s'engager à rien de précis; le roi est très allemand et ne le cache pas; les hommes politiques sont tous faux. J. Bratiano m'a l'air d'un individu de premier ordre. C'est Quelqu'un.

(f) SEPTEMBER 9, 1916²¹

Deeply touched by your dear lines, I make bold to submit a few supplementary considerations concerning the questions referred to in your letter.

I agree with you entirely that Austria was the instigator of the war, that all through the past few years her policy has been treacherous and base, and that she was in tow of the Germans. Consequently she fully deserves proper punishment, and her dismemberment would be justified as the logical consequence of her double-faced policy. But just as Germany was prepared for the war, had weighed every-

²⁰ These words are written in Russian.

²¹ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 85-6.

thing, considered everything down to the last detail, so was Austria unprepared and could only weakly support her powerful Ally, especially during the 1914 period of the war.

When the Germans began to lord it in Vienna and took the whole military business into their own hands, Austria temporarily improved, in the course of 1915, but now she finds herself again on the eve of a general debacle and complete disorganization. This is not surprising. It was hard for the Germans to revive a corpse that had been decomposing a long time. Hence, even though Austria merits dismemberment, against which I have nothing to say, it should not be in such a way that the Germans would get something out of it. The first question of the future will be a general demand by all the Allies that Germany be weakened to such an extent that she may never thereafter be able to threaten the peace of Europe. But how is this to be realized, if she is to retain all of her possessions, being deprived, perhaps, only of Alsace-Lorraine? To be sure, she will lose her colonies, but Germany must be struck at her very roots. If we want to finish with Austria, she, [Germany] too, must be rendered harmless. The English will hardly be able to deprive Germany of her entire navy, and to bring about the destruction of the Krupp works. If these demands are found to be impossible of execution, then, to my mind, she ought to be trimmed territorially on all sides. This is why I admitted the possibility of compensating Austria at the expense of Germany, but not the Germans to the disadvantage of an already stripped Austria.

There is still another circumstance to which attention ought to be directed at this time, that there may be no misunderstandings among the Allies later, during the peace negotiations. I have been struck even before this by the *benevolent* attitude of the English, and especially Buchanan, toward Bulgaria, but now it has begun to express itself in a more definite form. If, as a general rule, the English reckon only with countries that have outlets to the sea—which is to the advantage of Bulgaria—there is now still another tendency, namely, to draw the Bulgarians over to the side of the Allies. This is no longer a secret desire, but a manifest attempt to set apart the Bulgarians alone, to the disadvantage of the other Balkan nationalities, and especially unfortunate Serbia, which has no outlet to the sea anywhere. It is, therefore, necessary to take into consideration betimes these English tendencies, and to prevent them from developing so that there may be no unexpected conflict when the peace negotiations begin. While the Counselor of the Embassy,

Lindley, merely hints guardedly at the desirability of sparing Bulgaria, the good-natured Buchanan has spoken of nothing but this in recent weeks. Neither the French nor the Italians swallow the bait, but it would be desirable to cut loose the cork, also. . . .

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI M.

(g) OCTOBER 4, 1916²²

As I have been giving still more thought to the future peace negotiations, *but chiefly to the preliminary work in which everything* must be weighed and considered, I permit myself to submit the following additional ideas:

Even if the war should continue, say, another year, we ought nevertheless to prepare for the conference at this time. How is it to be carried out in reality? I assume that it would be well to create a commission not connected with any one Government department, of persons selected by you, who should be furnished with quite definite instructions, be familiarized with all the agreements and treaties between the Allies, and should proceed to work at once. Such a commission should also make a study of the historical, geographical, and especially ethnographical factors, and get acquainted with all the details of the scientific handling of the complex international questions of the future.

If I were chosen to be chairman of such a commission, I guarantee to carry the work *through successfully, and I would not be taken unawares* when the military operations end. But in selecting the members of the commission, attention must be given to the complicated situation in the country and the prevailing lack of confidence in the Government. It would therefore be desirable to draw into the commission persons whose public life would inspire with confidence not only you, but a majority of your subjects. It must be remembered, too, that the responsibility of the members of the commission will be great, both to you and to our country.

Such a commission, in my conviction, must work in seclusion and have a limited membership. I make bold to recommend from the State Council, Samarin²³ and Naumov,²⁴ two former ministers, but high-minded men, politically independent, and devoted to Russia; from the State Duma, Shulgin²⁵ and N. N. Lvov, who enjoy the

²² "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 88-92.

²³ A. D. Samarin, Oberprocurator of the Synod, July 18 to October 10, 1915.

²⁴ A. N. Naumov, Minister of Agriculture, November, 1915 to July, 1916.

²⁵ V. V. Shulgin.

confidence of their colleagues in the Duma and are of sterling character. The first is a Nationalist, the second belongs to the group of independent deputies. All four are personally known to you, but I do not know how you feel toward them. If we should add to these four, one man each from the army, navy, finance, and foreign affairs (for instance, Prince Gregory Trubetskoi²⁶ or N. N. Shebeko²⁷), that would make a membership of nine (9), quite sufficient for fruitful work.

In France and England such preparatory commissions have been busy for a long time, and the work among the French is especially successful under the initiative and guidance of Briand.

Now a few words about how I picture the organization of the commission, the rôle of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the relations between him and the commission. There must be an effort toward unity in the work, and the Minister should be made to see that the commission is only a temporary, auxiliary organ, and not an institution opposed to him. Only under such an arrangement would I agree to become a member, or the chairman, of this commission.

If you do consider the creation of an extra-departmental commission at all desirable, it should be unofficial, that is, established not by publishing a ukaz in the "Pravitelstvenny Viestnik," but simply on your verbal order—of course, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Should the ideas I have expressed as to creating such a commission merit your approval, and should you entrust me with the conduct of this business, I would ask to have with me, as secretary, some one with whom I am accustomed to work, for example, the member of the Imperial Historical Society, Prince N. V. Golitsyn,²⁸ or Professor A. S. Lappo-Danilevski.²⁹

The meetings of the commission could be held at my palace, where all the necessary archives for this work would be concentrated.

It may be that you will consider this renewal of my efforts for an early establishment of some organ or commission for the preparation of materials for the peace treaties as an annoyance. In that case, generously forgive me, since every man thinks his own geese are swans. Arrivé à l'âge, plutôt avancé de presque 58 ans, on change difficilement et j'implore, Sire, Votre indulgence, mais je sais que Vous me connaissez assez pour me pardonner mes entraînements pour une

²⁶ Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

²⁷ Russian Ambassador in Vienna before the war.

²⁸ Director of the Archives of State.

²⁹ Noted historian and member of the Academy of Sciences.

cause sacrée—celle de la grandeur et du bien-être de notre chère Patrie. In my excitement, I have commenced to chatter French, like a diplomat of the epoch of Alexander I and Napoleon!

The Japanese have safely departed, carrying away with them the very best impressions.

Let me add a few more details to what I have already written. As military member of the commission, General Beliaev,³⁰ who is well informed on everything, and now entirely free, would be very suitable; of the seamen, I don't know who is more sympathetic to you—Admiral Rusanov or Admiral Muraviev; as regards finance, Bark would probably recommend Feodosiev, who used to travel with him abroad.

All the nine members of the commission would be genuine Russians: Samarin, Naumov, Shulgin, Lvov, Prince Gregory Trubetskoi, General Beliaev, Admiral ?? and Feodosiev; and I, alone, have German blood, but it's cooling and there is little left of it.

I submit a very short outline of the problems which the commission I am planning would have to deal with:

1. What territory should Russia acquire in Europe and the East? What economic, political, and social advantages? What should be the methods of administering the newly acquired territories?

2. What are the views of our Allies: France, England, Italy, and Japan, as to their own territorial acquisitions?

3. How can we assist in the territorial restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Belgium?

4. Poland???

5. Acquisitions in Asia Minor—the formulation of the Armenian question.

6. Future fate of Persia.

7. Promises to Rumania?

8. How shall we treat Bulgaria?

9. The same about Greece.

10. Views of our Government and of the Allied Powers on the dismemberment of Austria.

11. The same questions as regards Germany.

12. Army and navy questions.

13. The future, in connection with The Hague Conference; how to interpret international laws after the "scrap of paper" of Bethmann-Hollweg.

³⁰ M. A. Beliaev, Minister of War, January 18 to March 13, 1917.

14. Occupation of enemy countries by Allied troops till the execution of all points of the peace treaty.

15. The problem of indemnity; the financial aspect of the matter.

16. Shall the future peace conference consist solely of the Allied Powers, or shall the enemy countries, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, be admitted?

17. What is of greatest advantage to us and to our Allies?

Such, approximately, are the principal questions which the preparatory commission would have to take up. The personality of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, no matter who he may be, is of no consequence here, provided that he has the good of the country at heart and looks upon the commission as collaborators and not as enemies. Among the enumerated eight names, I should especially appreciate the coöperation of three: Shulgin, N. N. Lvov, and Prince Gregory Trubetskoi; upon the others I do not insist, but General Beliaev, for example, although not clever, is well informed; Samarin is not an eagle, either, but he is held in esteem by Moscow; and Naumov is personally sympathetic to me. You see that I am perfectly frank, but, with our present dearth of men, one has to look hard for sterling sons of the fatherland, who are Russian in spirit, honest, unselfish, and not politicians.

I confess that I have become tired lately with reading and thinking about these questions; I should therefore like to rest up, for about a fortnight, and to warm myself, as wet and cold are here earlier than usual. I shall probably go to the Crimea at the end of the month to see Xenia, stopping over, perhaps, at Kiev for a day or two.

I apologize once more for the annoyance.

With all my soul yours,

NIKOLAI M.

PART II

THE WAR AND THE PUBLIC

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In no other war did the civilian population play such a visibly active part as in the World War. With the sound of the bugle, party differences were laid aside, coalition governments were formed, and national unity was achieved. England and France made use of this unity to enlist in the service of the Government captains of industry and commerce and public spirited citizens in general. It seemed for a time as if Russia would pursue a similar policy.

In his declaration of war Nicholas said:

... "let domestic strife be forgotten. Let the union between the Tsar and His people be stronger than ever, and let Russia, rising like one man, repel the insolent assault of the enemy."

These words were received with enthusiasm by his subjects. The Russians felt that they were put on an equality with Englishmen and Frenchmen, and they were eager to show that the confidence of the Tsar was not misplaced. Those who were called to the colors responded with a will and thousands of others went as volunteers. Offers of assistance poured in from the four corners of the Empire. It was believed that with such support, such allies, and such preparedness (as the Minister of War assured) Russia was bound to win not only the war but permanent unity of Tsar and people.

The overwhelming defeat in East Prussia came as a terrible shock to these trustful souls. They could not at first explain how it happened, but in the course of a few weeks they learned that unpreparedness in the rear and incompetence at the front were largely responsible for the disaster. Though the defeat caused great sorrow it did not bring on undue pessimism. The public still

had faith in the Government, accepted its explanations, gave it the benefit of the doubt, trusted in its promises, and continued to offer its services. With the exception of Red Cross assistance, and that was accepted grudgingly, the bureaucrats declined all offers. To have done otherwise would have been an *ipso facto* reflection on their ability.

Whether they would admit their unfitness or not, the Russian people became convinced of it after the Galician disasters in the spring of 1915. Excuses no longer availed, and a cry was raised that the worthless Ministers should be replaced by men who knew how to work with the public in order to win the fight. For once the Emperor listened to the voice of his people, removed the more objectionable men from the ministerial posts and authorized the formation of special war councils, composed in large part of members of the legislative bodies. This was a concession to the liberal elements and a curtailment of the power of the bureaucrats. The one group rejoiced and the other gnashed their teeth.

These innovations and changes did not bring with them the expected blessings. Unpreparedness in the rear and incompetence at the front were not alone responsible for Russia's sad plight. Among the other major causes was the almost total lack of co-operation between the military and civil authorities. Russia had two capitals—Headquarters and Petrograd—and one blamed the other for the evils that befell the country. By creating the councils and by handing over to them and to the public organizations (such as the Union of Cities and Union of Zemstvos) governmental functions the Tsar created a third center of jealousy. Every move of these newly formed institutions was resented and, so far as possible, blocked by the bureaucrats. The Duma took up the cause of the public organizations and rallied around itself all the elements opposed to the Government. It bitterly attacked the Ministers and the denunciatory speeches were loudly acclaimed by the press and silently approved by the army. The Ministers were unable to defend themselves, for the censorship was in the hands of their foes the military men. A point was reached where the poor Prime Minister dreaded the meetings of the Duma. He was too haughty to strike a bargain with it and too cowardly to face it. Under the circumstances he had the Duma summoned only

in case of necessity and had it adjourned as soon as possible, usually under irritating conditions. He excused his actions by saying that if he gave in to the Duma he would strengthen democracy. To this argument his enemies replied that by discouraging democracy he was actually encouraging the revolutionary movement.

This irritating policy, these political attacks from within and military defeats from without, for which the Government was blamed, demoralized the Ministry and brought on dissensions. Ministers resigned or were dismissed in such rapid succession that a continued policy was quite out of the question. Members of the Duma interpreted this chaotic condition as a premeditated plan by the reactionary Ministers to overthrow the Duma and bring on a separate peace with Germany.

That some of the Ministers were opposed to democracy is obvious; that any of them worked for a separate peace with Germany is not proved. It was, nevertheless, believed by a great many people and gradually the idea took hold that with the Ministers it was a question either of winning the war with democracy or losing the war with autocracy. It was a good battle cry and the Duma made the most of it. Its cries became louder and its demands bolder. In 1915, Duma members asked for a Ministry of confidence, but in 1916 they clamored for a responsible Ministry. Intoxicated by their own beautiful phrases and the plaudits of the street, the Duma members competed with one another in abuse of the defenseless Ministers and made them appear worse than they really were. Each, Duma and Government, regarded itself as more righteous; each expected the other to confess, repent and be forgiven; but neither would make the first move. A working agreement was at all times possible. Blinded by their passions, they stabbed at each other until they weakened themselves by the loss of blood. In undermining the Government, the liberal Duma did not see that it was digging its own grave and feeding the smoldering fires of revolution.

What was the Emperor doing at this time? He was at Headquarters befogged, bewildered, crushed under a pile of military reports. He was torn by conflicting accounts of the situation in the interior. He usually desired to do what was right but ended

by doing what was wrong. He was too much influenced by the Empress and those who surrounded her. After he had assumed the Supreme Command at the front, he left the government of the rear to her. The poor woman never understood and was always misunderstood by Russia. She did not mingle in society and because of her retired life certain stories and legends spread about her. She was lonely, friendless and distrusted in the big Empire. Her unpopularity, worries of all kinds, especially the poor health of her young son, broke her health. She suffered from insomnia and heart trouble. She looked on the world through dark glasses, suspected every one, especially the Grand Dukes and the Grand Duchesses,—political foes became bitter personal enemies. Believing that her husband lacked the strength of character to defend himself and his rights, she felt it to be her duty to help and protect him. She reached out for more power and obligations; she meddled in things which she did not understand; she worked until she became a nervous wreck, more fit for a sanitarium than a throne.

As she grew weaker, physically and mentally, she became more bitter, more vindictive and more credulous. For a number of years she had been under the influence of an ignorant, profligate but clever and intelligent peasant by the name of Rasputin, and this influence increased as her health declined. From September, 1915, to the time of his death at the end of 1916, Rasputin governed Russia through the Empress and the Emperor. In the meantime the country sank lower and lower; and the wave of restlessness mounted higher and higher. The Grand Dukes and Grand Duchesses became frightened and pleaded with her and the Tsar, but all in vain. They next formed a conspiracy to kill Rasputin, whom they regarded as the cause of all the troubles. His assassination, the first act of the revolutionary drama, failed in its purpose, for the Empress found another spiritual and political guide in Protopopov, Minister of the Interior. Protopopov had been gradually failing mentally and was hardly responsible for his acts. The next move of the conspirators was to remove the Empress herself. It was planned to lock her up in a convent and force the Emperor to abdicate in favor of his son, with his brother the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich as regent. But before this palace coup d'état came off the mob rose in revolt.

CHAPTER VI

RODZIANKO'S MEMOIRS¹

Soon after the first battles, shocking reports came from the front of the incompetency of the sanitary department, of its inability to handle the wounded at the front. There was great confusion. Freight trains came to Moscow filled with wounded, lying on the bare floor, without even straw, in many cases without clothing, poorly bandaged, and unfed. At this time my wife was patroness of the Elizabeth Society [Red Cross organization] and it was reported to her that such trains passed the field units of her society, stopping sometimes at the stations, but that those in charge would not allow the sisters to enter the cars. There was a certain amount of undesirable rivalry between the Ministry of War and the Red Cross. Each acted independently of the other and there was no coördination.

The War Department was particularly weak in first aid. Though it had neither carts, horses, nor first aid material, yet it allowed no other organization on the field. There seemed no other course than to bring the state of affairs to the attention of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich. I wrote him a letter in which I told him that patriotic enthusiasm had called forth a number of volunteer sanitary organizations, but that they could do nothing because of Evdokimov, the head of the sanitary division of the Ministry of War. Realizing that the volunteer organizations were of a higher order than his, and not willing to admit it, Evdokimov was doing everything that he could to block their efforts. But wounded cannot wait; they must be looked after; the fighting line must be provided with first aid. There must be no loss of time. In view of the fact that it was impossible to bring about a working agreement between the sanitary division and the volunteer organizations, it would be well to appoint some one with dictatorial powers to take charge of both and bring about some order.

I went also to see the old Empress, Marie Fedorovna, who lived

¹ "Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVII, 82 ff. Rodzianko, M. V. (1859-1924), President of the 3rd and 4th Dumas, was a very active and highly respected public-spirited man.

on Elagin Island. When I told her the situation she was horrified. "Tell me, what should be done?" asked the Empress.

I advised her to send a telegram to Nicholas Nikolaevich urging him to command Evdokimov to put things in order and to allow the Red Cross to go to work. She asked me to write such a telegram in her name.

As a result of these efforts there came a telegram, followed by a letter, from the Grand Duke stating that he agreed with the president of the Duma, and that he would take the necessary measures. Soon after that Evdokimov was called to Headquarters. A little later Prince Alexander Petrovich of Oldenburg² was made the head of the sanitary-evacuation division with dictatorial powers.

Grand Duke Nicholas wrote me that he had long before insisted on the removal of Evdokimov, but that it could not be done because he had the protection of Sukhomlinov and the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna. It was said that the young Empress persuaded the Emperor to leave Evdokimov in his place in order to spite the old Empress. . . .

Soon after my arrival at Warsaw in November [O. S.], 1914, I had a call from Vyruhov [V. V.], a representative of the Zemstvo Union, who asked me to go with him to the Warsaw-Vienna station where there were about eighteen thousand men, wounded in the battles near Lodz and Berezina. There I saw a frightful scene. On the floor, without even a bedding of straw, in mud and slush, lay innumerable wounded, whose pitiful groans and cries filled the air. "For God's sake, get them to attend to us. No one has looked after our wounds for five days."

It should be said that after these bloody battles the wounded were thrown into freight cars without order, and thrown out at this station without attention. The only medical aid they received was from Warsaw doctors and nurses, about fifteen in all, belonging to a Polish organization which volunteered its services. . . . I do not know their names, but with all my soul I hope that the hearty thanks of a Russian may reach them, as well as my highest respect and praise. When I was at the station, these good people had been steadily at work for three days without rest. I was quite worked up over the scene before me and at once telephoned to the head of the sanitary division, General Danilov [N. A.], and the representative of the Red Cross, General Volkov, to come to the station. When they arrived, we four (these two, Vyruhov and I) took up the question of what to do.

²Uncle of the Tsar.

Danilov and Volkov told me most positively that they could furnish no medical help. But I recalled that while visiting one of the Red Cross hospitals, I had seen six doctors and about thirty nurses who were doing nothing. I insisted that those men and women should be put to work at once to take care of the wounded. Danilov replied that it could not be done because those doctors and nurses had been detailed for a sanitary train which was being formed. This was said at a time when eighteen thousand suffering men were lying on the station platform. I demanded that General Danilov immediately prepare a train of warm freight cars to take the wounded from the station. He replied that he could not because, according to the instructions of the chief of the sanitary service, wounded could be moved to the interior only on sanitary trains, of which he had about eight. I was so outraged by this heartless attitude toward the suffering men that I threatened to telegraph to the Prince of Oldenburg, demanding that the officials be dismissed from the service and tried on a criminal charge. This frightened Danilov and he went to work. Enough doctors and nurses were found, so that in the course of two or three days the wounded were attended to and taken to the rear. . . .

While at Warsaw, I asked permission of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich to go to Headquarters. I wished to tell him what I had seen and heard at Warsaw. General Ruzski [N. V.] had complained to me of lack of ammunition and the poor equipment of the men. There was a great shortage of boots. In the Carpathians, the soldiers fought barefooted. . . .

The hospitals and stations of the Red Cross, which came under my notice, were in excellent condition; but the war hospitals were disorganized. They were short of bandages and such things. The great evil was, of course, the lack of coöperation between the two organizations. At the front, one had to walk about ten or more versts¹ from the war hospitals to those of the Red Cross. It was impossible to hire a cart because the inhabitants had either fled or lost all they owned.

The Grand Duke received me in a very friendly manner. . . . He approved my suggestion for collecting carts, filled with straw, for the transportation of wounded. In the course of a few days, carts and horses were being requisitioned in our guberniia for use at the front. . . .

The Grand Duke stated that he was obliged to stop fighting, temporarily, for lack of ammunition and boots.

¹A verst is two-thirds of a mile.

"You have influence," he said. "You are trusted. Try and get boots for the army, as soon as possible."

I replied that this could be done if the zemstvos and public organizations were asked to help. There was plenty of material and labor in Russia. But as it stood then, one guberniia had leather, another nails, another soles, and still another cheap labor. The best thing to do would be to call a congress of the heads of the guberniia zemstvos and ask their coöperation. The Grand Duke was greatly pleased with this idea.

When I returned to Petrograd, I asked members of the Duma their opinion as to the best way to get boots. After considering the matter, we decided to circularize heads of zemstvos and mayors of cities. In a short time, we received very encouraging replies. Realizing that there might be objections from the Government to calling a congress, I decided to talk it over separately with some of the Ministers. Krivoshein, Sukhomlinov, and Goremykin⁴ liked the idea and promised to support it when it came up in the Council of Ministers. My interview with Minister Maklakov⁴ was quite out of the ordinary. When I explained that it was the wish of the Commander-in-Chief to secure a supply of boots for the army quickly, through the help of the zemstvos, and for that purpose there would be a meeting of the heads of the cities and zemstvos, Maklakov said: "Yes, yes; what you tell me agrees perfectly with the information I get from my agents."

"What information?"

"According to the information of my agents, the congress to take up needs of the army has for its real object to discuss political questions and demand a constitution."

This announcement was so unexpected and so crude that I jumped from my chair and answered him rather roughly.

"You are crazy. What right have you to insult me by supposing that I, the President of the Duma, would take advantage of the war needs to call a congress for revolutionary purposes. Besides, you are greatly mistaken. We already have a constitution." . . .

Maklakov, apparently realizing that he had made a bad blunder, tried to explain.

"Michael Vladimirovich, please do not take this personally. In any case, I cannot authorize such a meeting without the consent of

⁴ A. V. Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture; V. A. Sukhomlinov, Minister of War; I. L. Goremykin, Prime Minister; and N. A. Maklakov, Minister of the Interior.

the Council of Ministers, and I shall bring the question before the body at the next meeting."

I told him that some of the Ministers had already promised the support, and left him rather excited.

Members of the Duma discussed the coming congress. Many of the heads of the zemstvos had been told unofficially of the wish of the Commander-in-Chief to have the zemstvos help in the war work. The response was encouraging. Some sent very useful information and others came to Petrograd. Word was received that certain zemstvos had already begun work, that material was being bought and boots made. One of the zemstvos sent an agent to Argentine to buy tannin. Even some of the governors wrote that they approve having the zemstvos help in the war work. Minister Maklakov, however, interfered whenever he could. He ruled that all orders should pass through the hands of the governors, which ruling irritated the public men and delayed matters. At this time he issued the famous order forbidding the export of the products of one gubernii to another. This nearly ruined the whole scheme, which was based on utilizing to the best advantage the products and resources of different guberniias. After a few days, a letter came from Maklakov notifying the President of the Duma that his proposition to call a congress was not accepted by the the Council of Ministers and that the order for boots had been placed in the hands of the head intendant Shuvaev [D. S.—later Minister of War], who would put himself in touch with the zemstvos and cities. On the day following, Shuvaev called and told me frankly that he could not do the work, that he had never had dealings with the zemstvos, did not think that the zemstvos had sufficient confidence in the intendency and doubted whether they would have any direct dealings with it. He asked me to help him. I told him that in view of the fact that the Council of Ministers had decided against me in this matter, the best thing for me to do was to keep out of it.

Soon after that Goremykin came to see me in regard to calling the Duma. I reminded him of our conversation and his promise to support my plan of a zemstvo congress.

"What congress?" asked Goremykin, in some astonishment. "We never discussed this question in the Council of Ministers." I then showed him Maklakov's letter. He read it through in amazement and assured me, again, that the question had not been before the Council of Ministers, and ended by saying that Maklakov "lied, as usual."

In spite of this obstruction on the part of the Government, the

zemstvos went on with their work. Shuvaev received boots. Maklakov's orders and rulings were resented. His order forbidding export from one guberniia to another was especially irritating and worked hardships. It came about that some districts had too much and others too little, and that landowners having estates in different guberniias could not move seed grain from one estate for use in another. . . .

In the beginning of April [1915] . . . I decided to go to Galicia. . . . I heard the same report everywhere—the army was short of munitions, the same complaint which Ruzski had made in the autumn of 1914. When I told it to the Grand Duke at that time [autumn], he quieted me by saying that it was a temporary shortage, that in two weeks more there would be plenty of ammunition. Now, the same complaints were heard everywhere. . . . We hardly had time to return to Lemberg when our tragic retreat began. What my son and all serious military men had foreseen, happened: the lack of ammunition made all our victories and all the bloodshed vain. . . .

On my return from Galicia, I stopped at Headquarters to give the Commander-in-Chief my impressions. . . . "Your Highness, you are throwing away lives in vain. You should demand a definite report from the artillery department of what it has ready and what you may count on. So far its promises have not been carried out."

To this, the Grand Duke replied: "I can get nothing from the artillery department. My position is a very difficult one. They are turning the Emperor against me."

The Grand Duke complained of Maklakov, who prevented an inspection of the State factories. The Grand Duke had persuaded the Emperor to appoint Litvinov-Falinski to visit the factories having war orders . . . but when the Tsar reached Petrograd, he changed his mind. . . .

In bidding me good-bye, the Grand Duke asked what could be done to save the situation. I laid before him my old plan, that is, to organize a committee of members of the Duma, representatives of industry, of the artillery, and other military departments, and give this body full power to handle all munition questions.⁵ The Grand

June 7 [1915]. . . . "Rodzianko's mixing up in this question has quite a history of its own. The Duma constantly called attention to the fact that the situation in the artillery department was quite unsatisfactory. . . . It should, however, be said that [Grand Duke] Sergei Mikhailovich undertook this big task when he was still ill, when he could not even move. To many this seemed quite wrong. It is likely that the present change, which takes this matter out of the hands of the artillery department, has for its object to satisfy public opinion and to enlist the support of the public. From that point of view it is commendable. As to results, the future will tell." ("Andrei Vladimirovich," 43.)

Duke jumped at the idea and promised to bring it before the Emperor, whom he was expecting. . . .

On my return to Petrograd I invited Litvinov-Falinski and the deputies, Savich [Ia. I.], Protopopov,* and Dmitriukov, to meet me and together we took up the question of forming a committee. Litvinov and Savich reported that many factories had offered to make more ammunition, but the military authorities refused their offers. Orders were not given to private firms, and the State factories, owing to their poor organization, produced only about one-fifth of what they should. Everybody in the capital talked openly of the dishonesty and graft in the artillery department. . . . The cartridge factory on the Liteiny was entirely without guard; the same was true of other factories; and the blame for the explosion in the powder mill was laid to the men at its head, who were distrusted.

At the head of many of the State factories were German subjects, who could not be removed because they were under the protection of the Minister Maklakov, some of the grand duchesses, and the court cliques. The situation suggested treason, otherwise some of the things that were taking place right before our eyes could hardly be explained. . . .

Having gathered this information, I wrote to the Grand Duke at Headquarters. I repeated what I had told him at our interview. This time, I supported my statements with facts and documents. I told him, also, of the dreadful situation in the army owing to the lack of ammunition and the incompetence in the higher military circles, and mentioned Sukhomlinov in particular. The Emperor went to Headquarters, and I received the following telegram from the Grand Duke: "Your project will have to wait." The next day, there came another telegram, calling me to Headquarters and asking that I bring with me such persons as might be useful. I took Litvinov-Falinski, Vyshnegradski, and Putilov. At Headquarters I was received by the Emperor. I vigorously urged upon him the calling of a committee with public men in it, told him how people in the rear felt, of the army's lack of confidence in the military leaders in the rear, and that this lack of confidence would grow as the army retreated. The Emperor was greatly moved. His face was pale, and his hands shook. He was especially touched when he saw that I was moved almost to tears in telling him of the great love and loyalty of the

* A. D. Protopopov, Vice-President of the Duma, later Minister of the Interior; I. I. Dmitriukov, member of the Duma.

troops to the Tsar and the country, and their readiness to offer their lives in the fulfilment of their duty. . . .

My suggestion to form a special council pleased the Emperor, and a general plan for its organization was quickly drawn up. It was to be composed of representatives of industry, and of banks that subsidized factories, public men, representatives of the legislative chambers, and the war ministry. The men to be first named were Litvinov-Falinski, Putilov [A. I.], Vyshnegradski [A. I.], the banker, Utin [Ia. I.], Guchkov [A. I.], and others.

In answer to the Emperor's question as to who should preside over the special council, I replied that it could be no other than the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, since the conference had to do with military supplies. If any other person was put in that position, the council would meet with difficulties at every turn.

The news, as yet unofficial, that a council would be organized, disturbed the War Ministry. An attempt was made to prove to the Emperor that such a council was illegal, that it would be, as it were, a new Ministry for which a new law and certain formalities were necessary, all of which would take time. Fortunately, the Emperor swept aside all these objections and intrigues. The next move was to tell him that since the Duma was not in session, there was no presiding officer, and therefore my participation in the council was illegal. To this argument, the Emperor paid no attention.

In accordance with the law, the creation of a special council had first to pass through the Council of Ministers and then be confirmed by the Emperor. Against this new institution Ministers Maklakov and Scheglovitov [I. G.]¹ made a vigorous fight. Maklakov called on all those close to the Tsar and tried hard to get an audience, but the Emperor would not receive him. Just before the ministers were to meet, the Tsar sent for Sukhomlinov and said, "Tell the Council of Ministers that I should like to see a special council formed, in which members of the legislative bodies would be included." When Sukhomlinov delivered this message at the meeting, Goremykin announced that, under the circumstances, there was nothing to deliberate, but they must do what His Imperial Majesty desired. Just before voting, Sabler [V. K., Procurator of Synod] and Scheglovitov agreed quietly between themselves to accept the measure, and the only person to vote against it was Maklakov. (It was said that this greatly displeased the Emperor.) The measure was confirmed by the Tsar and the Special Council went to work.

¹ Scheglovitov, Minister of Justice.

Before the formation of the Council was finally enacted as a law by the legislative chambers, I felt it my duty to call members of the Duma together to deliberate on the subject. At the end of May, the Council of Elders [leaders of political parties in the Duma] met, to whom I related all the events leading up to the idea of a council. The attitude of the different parties to this question was quite characteristic. Parties of the right kept quiet as was expected; the Nationalists and Octobrists warmly approved everything that I had done; and the Cadets, much to everybody's surprise, came out, through their leader Miliukov, against my scheme, saying that any relation or coöperation with the War Minister, Sukhomlinov, would be a disgrace to the Duma and therefore the Cadets would under no circumstances take part in the Council. But an even greater surprise awaited me when Kerenski bitterly attacked this point of view. He warmed up to the subject and savagely denounced the absurd position of Miliukov. "The Cadets," said Kerenski, "always start with a theory and fall into an abstraction, rejecting every proposal that does not fit with their theory, even though the proposal is good in itself. I am a political opponent of the President of the Duma, but I can see that he is greatly disturbed by our failures and is doing his very best to find a remedy for some of the shocking defects in our military organization. We, Laborites, appreciate and approve what he has done, and will support him."

After listening to the opinions of my colleagues I put the question of confidence, and my actions were unanimously approved. We had great difficulty in persuading the Cadets to take part in the Council. The extreme left wing declined, giving as their sole reason that members of the Government would look upon them with suspicion and prejudice.

In May, 1915, there was to be a congress of industrialists at Petrograd. I heard from all sides that the delegates were greatly excited and that there were likely to be revolutionary speeches at the congress. This was just the occasion Maklakov wanted to justify his denunciations to the Tsar, to close the congress, and arrest its leaders. Those who seemed to know said that the commerce-industry circle of Moscow had prepared a radical resolution for the congress, almost a demand for a Constituent Assembly.

On the morning of the day of the meeting, Prince G. E. Lvov and V [A.] Maklakov, member of the Duma, came to my house. They were frightened and excited over the congress and especially over the Moscow resolution. They advised me not to attend, saying,

"Remember what responsibility you are taking upon yourself." But to fear responsibility meant to do nothing. I decided to go, to save the congress, and to calm disturbed minds.

These two men next tried to bring pressure through my wife to keep me at home, but she told them that she did not mix in my affairs, and that she had confidence in the outcome. [Rodzianko made a speech which won the congress and the resolutions were not against the Government.]

At the end of May I asked the Emperor to receive me. Four or five days passed without a reply. In the meantime, reports reached me that Minister Maklakov was trying to arouse the Tsar against the Duma, telling him that its president was coming to him with a most unusual request, almost an ultimatum. Rumors of this even reached Moscow. Young Iusupov, who came from that city, said that it was whispered that the President of the Duma had placed himself at the head of a revolutionary movement, and, notwithstanding the opposition of the Government, was trying to form a "Comité du salut public," like that of the French Revolution. (This, apparently, is how some people understood the Special Council.)

Finally the Emperor set a day, May 30 [June 12], for the audience. When I entered his office he seemed disturbed, pale, and I thought at once of Maklakov's intrigues. It was necessary to disabuse his mind immediately.

"Your Majesty," I began, "I come to you without demands and without ultimatums."

"Why do you speak of ultimatums? What ultimatum?"

"Your Majesty, I have information that I have been pictured to you as a very dangerous man, coming to you not with a report, but with a demand. You have even been advised not to receive me."

"Who told you that? To whom do you refer? Who sets me against you?"

"Your Majesty, it may be that it is all gossip, but these rumors come from such good authorities that I have decided to bring them to your attention. Minister Maklakov talked to you about me. Your Majesty, I have no report to make to you about Duma affairs. I come to you to speak about affairs in general. I come to confess as a son before a father, in order to tell you the whole truth, as I know it. Have I your permission to speak?"

The Emperor turned, and while I was talking, looked me in the eyes, to test me, as it were. I, also, kept my eyes on him. I told him everything—of the artillery department; the insignificant pro-

duction in the war mills; the fact that Germans were at the head of a majority of the factories; the disorders at Moscow; the condition of the army, which was sacrificing itself at the front and being betrayed in the rear by people in charge of munition supplies; the vileness and intrigues of Maklakov; and many other things. In speaking of the Miasoedov [spy] affair, I referred to the feeling against Sukhomlinov, who was detested at the front and in the rear, and was regarded as an accomplice of Miasoedov. I tried to explain and prove that Maklakov, Sukhomlinov, Sabler, and Scheglovitov could no longer be tolerated; that Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich must resign,* since otherwise the feeling against the artillery department would fall upon a member of the royal family and indirectly on the Tsar's family. In short, I told him everything I knew, which the Emperor should know.

My report lasted more than an hour and during that time the Emperor did not smoke a single cigarette, indicating how attentively he followed. Towards the end he put his elbows on the table and covered his face with his hands. When I stopped, he sat there in the same position.

"Why did you rise?"

"Your Majesty, I am through. I have said all there is to say."

The Emperor also rose, took my hand in both of his, and, looking me straight in the eye with his soft, kindly eyes, pressed my hand and said, "Thank you for your straight, sincere, and fearless report."

I bowed, feeling tears in my throat. The Emperor, seemingly, was also moved, and after saying the last words, pressed my hand once more and quickly went out through another door, so as to conceal his emotion.

Only later, in the days of the revolution, when I was called before the commission which did its best to find something criminal in the acts of the Tsar, did I learn why he was so moved. I spoke for five hours straight before that body, trying to show that there was nothing criminal in the Tsar's action, but only unsound and

* August 15 [1915]. . . . "[General Danilov (G. N.) said that Polivanov's] constant concessions to the Duma were not accidental, but part of a plan. By yielding to this body, he inevitably encourages the Duma to demand more and more, and it will end by transforming the Duma from a legislative to a controlling body, which is a bad precedent. General Danilov is quite right in saying that these concessions will sharpen the appetite of the Duma, and that there is danger that the Duma will soon attack [Grand Duke] Sergei Mikhailovich, charging him with failing to supply guns and ammunition. If Polivanov should yield on this point also, then the Duma will call for the dismissal of Ianushkevich, and after that will come the turn of others." . . . ("Andrei Vladimirovich," 58.)

confused politics, harmful to the country, but not harmful in its intent.

When I had finished, Senator Tagantsev came up to me and said, "Now that you have finished, please read this paper."

The document was of the month of May, 1915, but I do not remember the exact day. It was, however, about the time when I was summoned to Headquarters after the celebrations in honor of the Lemberg victory. The paper was written by Minister Maklakov to the Tsar. I give it here from memory:

"I most humbly report to Your Imperial Majesty: I have had the honor to inform Your Majesty on numerous occasions that the Imperial Duma and its President are striving, whenever an opportunity presents itself, to exceed their power and influence in the Empire, to seek popularity, and lessen the power of Your Imperial Majesty. I have the honor to call your attention to the conduct of the President of the Duma after you left Lemberg. The President, making use of the Emperor's departure, received the honors of the people of Galicia, as if he were the head of the State.

"In calling the attention of Your Majesty to the above, I wish to remind you that I have more than once pointed out to Your Majesty the necessity of reducing the rights of the Imperial Duma and making it a legislative consultative body."

On the back of this document the Emperor had written:

"The time has really come to curtail the Duma. It will be interesting to know how Rodzianko and Company will feel about it."

At the time when the Tsar made this comment, he was favoring the work of the Duma and public organizations, and was discussing with me the question of organizing a special council of defense. . . .

Rumors began to circulate that the Tsar desired to remove Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich and assume the supreme command. It was said that this was the wish of the Empress, who hated the Grand Duke and desired to relieve the Tsar from internal affairs, and in this way while he was at the front she could govern the rear. In the Duma and in public circles the removal of the Grand Duke was looked upon as a serious blunder. It was easy to imagine the possible consequences of such an act. Owing to the military failures, all kinds of reports, true and false, spread among the people, and the Empress' name was more and more associated with these rumors. Something had to be done to prevent the threatening misfortune. . . .

At the audience, I told the Emperor of the general desire to

replace Ianushkevich [N. N.] by Alexeev. In reply, I heard, to my great horror, "I have definitely determined to remove the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich and put myself at the head of the army."

"Against whom, Your Majesty, are you raising your hand? You are the supreme judge. If there should be failures, who would judge you? How can you put yourself in such a position and leave the capital at such a time? In case of failure [military], you and the dynasty will be in danger."

But the Tsar would not listen and sternly said, "I know. Let me be lost, but I will save Russia."

After this audience, I wrote the Emperor a long letter repeating my views and begging him to abandon his decision.

On September 5, an order was issued regarding the army and navy, in which the Emperor announced his decision to stand at the head of the troops. Many were in panic over this act. Princess Z. N. Iusupov called on us and with tears in her eyes told my wife: "This is terrible. I feel that this is the beginning of the end. He will lead us to revolution."

Contrary to the general fear and expectation, this change did not produce much of an impression on the army. This may have been because there was an increase in ammunition and therefore the army had more confidence in itself. . . .

The Emperor went to the army, and the Empress began to manage internal affairs. The Ministers, especially Goremykin, went to her with their reports, and there was an impression that she had unofficially been made regent. . . .

On September 9, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Goremykin raised the question of dismissing the Duma, on the ground that it unsettled the public and interfered with the work of the Government.⁹ At this very time the Duma was busily occupied with a number of urgent questions connected with the war. . . . The new Ministry, with the exception of the Minister of Justice, Khvostov, [A. A.] did not agree with Goremykin. When the latter announced that the Emperor, in the main, agreed with him on this point, the Ministers suggested that in order not to arouse the country, it would be well to come to some understanding with the President of the Duma so that he would, on his own initiative, adjourn the session on the pretext that the deputies should go home to vote at the zemstvo

⁹ *Empress to Emperor, September 10, 1915.* . . . "He [Goremykin] says all right shutting Duma, but Sunday holiday, so better Tuesday, he sees you before. Fiends ministers, worse than Duma." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 503.)

election for members of the State Council. But Goremykin refused all compromises and, without saying a word to any one, went to Headquarters a second time, returning with an order to dismiss the Duma. When, at the next meeting of the Council, he told what he had done, the Ministers resented his act, saying that he should not have taken such a serious step without informing them. He tried to bring the meeting to a close, and, when that failed, left without saying good-bye. After he had gone, the Ministers decided to resign in a body. Polivanov and Scherbatov went to Headquarters, and the others gave them their written resignations and told them to say that they could not work with Goremykin. . . . When the two men came to Headquarters, the Emperor took the papers handed him, tore them into small bits, and said, "This is childish. I do not accept your resignation. I have confidence in Ivan Loginovich [Goremykin]." Scherbatov [N. V.] and Polivanov [A. A.] returned with empty hands, and Goremykin felt himself stronger than ever.

On the evening of September 15, Goremykin called me on the telephone to say that he had something very important to tell me, but was very tired and hoped I would come to him. I had quite a number of members of the Duma in my house at the time, talking over the rumors that Goremykin planned to dismiss the Duma. It seemed quite unbelievable that he would do this, and when the telephone message came, it was generally assumed that Goremykin wished to deny the false reports. When I saw him he came to the point at once.

"Here is the order to adjourn the Duma. Read it tomorrow."

This is all he said.¹⁰

In hurrying the adjournment of the Duma, Goremykin thought that, by so doing, he would deny the members of the Duma time to form a plan and that, in case they made sharp speeches, he would

¹⁰ *Petrograd, October 12 [1915]. . . .* "I had a talk today with Prince V. Volkonski, Assistant Minister of the Interior, and formerly Vice-President of the Duma. . . . He spoke of the numerous mistakes made by the Government lately. 'I can not think of the dismissal of the Duma [September 16] without fear and trembling. Why was it necessary to do that just now, when all seemed to work so well and there came to be a certain amount of confidence in the Government? . . . It is not right to ignore public opinion . . . we either treat it with contempt or are indifferent to it. That's a great mistake. Public opinion in Russia has grown of late, and has influence on public affairs. It is said that we must have a war-dictatorship. I understand a dictatorship as authority based on an army. But now that the whole army is on the war front and none in Russia, there is nothing left for the Government to fall back upon. That is a mere fiction. I can understand authority based on public opinion. In this there is real strength.'" . . . ("Andrei Vladimirovich," 97-8.)

dissolve the Duma altogether. When I returned home and told the news to the waiting deputies, they became quite worked up. It was decided to ask all the party leaders, immediately, to come to the Duma the following morning at nine, instead of eleven.

I was there at eight. A meeting was called of the party leaders, who were boiling over with excitement. There was great indignation and some of them were ready to come out with revolutionary speeches, that the Duma should not adjourn and should declare itself a Constituent Assembly. It took a great deal of work to cool down the more fiery spirits and show them that such acts would ruin the Duma, and the country, and play into Goremykin's hands. . . .

When the Duma opened at eleven o'clock, there was such an uproar as was never before heard in the hall. . . . The excitement of the deputies was contagious. It was felt by the public, which seemingly expected that the Duma would not be able to control itself, that something would happen. . . . It seemed that the Duma must accept the defi, the insult of being adjourned at a time when so many urgent projects relating to the war were under consideration. However, everything ended beautifully. . . . While the order was being read, all was quiet; and at its conclusion I called, as usual, for a cheer for the Emperor, which was given by the deputies with a right good will. After that every one started for home. The crowds dispersed feeling, as it were, that this was the only thing to do, that the Duma had risen above the petty provocation of the authorities and, by so doing, given a fine example of high statesmanship.

Public organizations responded in the same way. Chelnokov [M. V.], the mayor of Moscow, appealed to the workmen to go on with their work, so necessary for the war. At meetings of the zemstvos and the nobles all over Russia, resolutions were passed asking the Emperor to take into consideration the people's desire for a Ministry with strong power and the confidence of the country.¹¹ The Moscow nobility decided to send six representatives to the Emperor, but he would not receive them.¹² It seemed as if the whole of Russia were asking for one and the same thing, that the cries of the suffering land must be heeded. . . . Instead of calling people who had the

¹¹ *Empress to Emperor, September 22, 1915.* "Well look what they spoke about at Moscou, again those questions, wh. they had come to the conclusion to drop and asking for an answerable ministry which is quite impossible. . . ." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 526.)

¹² *Empress to Emperor, September 30, 1915.* "Now you dont, thank God, receive the Moscou deputation, all the better—again they intend asking, and dont you give in, else it looks as tho' you acknowledge their existence (whatever you may even say to them)." (*Ibid.*, 549.)

country's confidence, the two popular ministers, Samarin and Scherbatov, were forced to go.¹³

The dismissal of Samarin came about in the following manner. While Varnava was bishop of Tobolsk, he found the relics of a certain John and, not waiting for the canonization of the Synod, proceeded to render him the religious services due to a saint. Samarin [A. D.] laid the matter before the Synod, which asked Varnava to report at the capital to explain. He came, appeared before the Synod, but refused to give any explanation, saying rather curtly, "I have nothing to say to you."

He left the meeting and went into hiding, so that for a long time no one knew his whereabouts. During that time he was living at the home of Prince Andronnikov, one of Rasputin's friends. Samarin wished to bring charges against Varnava and have his office taken from him, but the Synod was given to understand that it must not touch him. Varnava produced a letter written by the Emperor himself, authorizing Varnava to perform special religious services to St. John. This was against all canonic regulations.¹⁴ Samarin went to see the Tsar, who was at Tsarskoe Selo, and took with him a detailed report. As the report was rather long, Samarin asked the Emperor whether he would prefer to have an oral report. Instead of giving

¹³ *Empress to Emperor, June 29-September 30, 1915.* "When Gregory heard in town yesterday . . . that Samarin [Oberprocurator of the Synod] was named . . . he was in utter despair as he, the last evening here . . . begged you not to change him Sabler just now, but that soon one might perhaps find the right man—and now the Moscou set will be like a spider's net around us, our Friends enemies are ours and Scherbatov will make one with them, I feel sure. . . . Samarin goes on speaking against me—hope to get you a list of names and trust can find a suitable successor before he can do any more harm. . . . Samarin knows yr. opinion and wishes and so does Scherbatov and they don't care, that's the vile part of it. . . . At once, my love, clear him [Samarin] out and Scherbatov too. This night he sent out a circular to all papers that they may print anything they like against the Government (your government)—how dare he—only not against you. But they do all in a hidden way . . . and he plays fast and loose a very fool indeed. . . . Scherbatov must leave, a man who openly shows your telegrams and Gregory's wh. he has kidnapped and Samarin too—are utterly unworthy ministers." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 459, 473, 499, 524, 532.)

¹⁴ *Empress to Emperor, September 11-October 1, 1915.* "Perhaps you had better give Samarin the short order that you wish Bishop Varnava to chant the laudation of St. John Maximovitch because Samarin intends getting rid of him, because we like him and he is good to Gr. . . . The article about Varnava in the papers is untrue, he gave exact answers to all questions and showed yr. telegram about the salutation. . . . Varnava implores you to hurry with clearing out Samarin as he and Synod are intending to do more horrors and he has to go there again, poor man, to be tortured. . . . He [Goremykin] begged me to let Varnava know that he must not appear at the Synod but say he is ill. . . . Varnava has left for Tobolsk, our Friend said we were to send him back. The old man said he was no more to show himself at the Synod." (*Ibid.*, 504, 529, 530, 535, 555.)

him a straight answer, the Emperor reminded him that he should hurry to the meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Emperor kept the document, saying that he would look it over at his leisure. Samarin departed and when he reached the meeting, before he could take part in it, Goremykin took him aside to show him a letter from the Tsar, announcing to Samarin that he had been removed from the office of the Oberprocurator of the Synod.

Samarin returned to Moscow where he was given a great reception, almost an ovation, at the meeting of the nobility.

Soon after Samarin was dismissed, Prince Scherbatov handed in his resignation, saying that he was tired of intrigues and that under present conditions there was little to be done.

At this time, the cities were suffering from a lack of various things, due, in part, to the inflow of refugees and, particularly, to government mismanagement. To fight the high cost of living, the authorities fixed the prices for wholesalers and retailers. In some cases, the fixed price was lower than the cost and, as a result, the merchants withdrew their goods from the open market and sold them secretly. Another reason for the high cost of living was the demoralization in the railway service, especially the graft. The cost of the freight was often more than the cost of the goods. A. K. Trepov, who succeeded Rukhlov [S. V.] as Minister of Transportation, had never had any railway experience and caused worse confusion than his predecessor. As a result of these various troubles, Petrograd was threatened by famine. Therefore, the Council of Ministers decided to stop all passenger traffic between Moscow and Petrograd for six days, so that freight could be moved more readily.¹⁵ This measure, however, was of little use because those in charge did not, at the same time, see to it that freight was brought up from other places to Moscow. Though passenger traffic came to a standstill, the freight cars still returned from Moscow half empty. . . . The more the Government tried, the more it failed, and there seemed to be no doubt that it was both incompetent and unable to organize the rear.

In the meantime, the Special Council did excellent work in sup-

¹⁵ *Empress to Emperor, October 23, 1915.* "Our Friend . . . is otherwise quiet about the war, now another subject worries him very much and he spoke scarcely about anything else. It is this that you must give an order for wagons with flour, butter and sugar should be obliged to pass . . . and that then we shall have no strikes. . . . He would propose 3 days no other trains should go except those with flour, butter and sugar . . . its even more necessary than meat or ammunition just now . . . if passenger trains only very few would be allowed and instead of all 4 classes these days hang on wagons with flour or butter fr. Siberia." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 571.)

plying the army. The Zemstvos and War-Industry committees helped very much, and in spite of the obstacles placed in the way by government officials, the amount of ammunition and other war material increased daily at the front. At this time something happened in the Special Council which showed clearly the evil influence of irresponsible persons, even in the matter of army supplies. Putilov's was one of the leading factories for war material. The leading stockholder was Putilov, who was also director of the Russian-Asiatic Bank. He wanted a subsidy of thirty-six million rubles from the Government and so arranged that his own bank would refuse him credit. The management of the factory then appealed to the Government for the money, saying that unless it received the subsidy it would have to close the factory. In view of the importance of this plant, it was clear that the money would have to be handed over, even if it did amount to thirty-six millions. Those who kept in touch with the situation knew what was back of the demand. I proposed that instead of paying, the property be sequestered. My suggestion was almost unanimously approved by the Council, but all of a sudden there came a request from His Majesty to reconsider. Rasputin, with whom Putilov was on good terms, was back of this move. When the question was taken up at the next meeting, all the representatives of the Government voted against sequestration, and one of them, Admiral Girs, openly declared, "I have been ordered to vote against the measure." Members of the Duma and the [State] Council were divided. Some of the best and most determined men, unfortunately, for one reason or another, refused to vote. Sequestration was dropped. I was almost the only one who voted for it. I was outvoted by gold. The Putilov factory was only one of many questions of that kind with which the Special Council had to deal.

At the beginning of the war a committee was formed in London to centralize the foreign war orders. It was composed of various industrialists, English and Russian. At first the chairman was Grand Duke Michael Michaelovich, and later General Germonius. Until the Special Council was organized, this committee acted without any kind of control. When the committee was organized, the English Government had stipulated that all Russian foreign war orders should go through the hands of the committee. The result was that we were not masters of our own affairs, but under the control of English industrialists. American orders were delayed; there were endless discussions and numberless unexpected obstacles. The ships which delivered the orders were convoyed by English cruisers. Making use

of this situation, the English proposed that our whole merchant fleet come under their control, in order to have a united command, as they put it. Had we agreed to this, we would have become the bond-servants of England. At the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the proposition was acceptable. I raised the question before the Special Council on January 15, 1916, and pointed out that such a proposal had to come before our body. Only Gurko [V. I.] supported me; the others would not commit themselves, probably because they knew that it was against the wish of the Emperor. After this meeting, Sir George Buchanan, the English Ambassador, and Knox [Sir Alfred], the military attaché, came to see me. I told them frankly that I thought that the English were taking advantage of our situation to force the Emperor to agreements that were disadvantageous to Russia. "This extortion is unworthy of a great nation and Ally. The Russians cannot tolerate such a humiliation. The matter will be discussed in the Duma."

When I had my next audience with the Tsar, I repeated what I had said. After this the English dropped the matter. At the same time Minister Grigorovich [I. N.] of the Navy, foreseeing difficulties with England, opened negotiations with Japan. By paying Japan the cost of the reparation, we secured from her the return of the cruisers *Iuriag*, *Peresvet*, and *Polluxa*, which were damaged in the Japanese war. These vessels reached Archangel by way of Africa, and after that we had our own convoys.

In the ukaz adjourning the Duma, it was indicated that the Duma would be summoned not later than November. But judging from Goremykin's conduct and the rumors, there was doubt not only whether the Duma would be called in November, but whether it would be called at all. November was already toward its end and not a word had been uttered on this subject. Meantime, the budget commission was busily at work. The deputies were irritated and demanded to know what the situation was. When I had an audience with the Emperor, I again called his attention to Goremykin, the way he interfered, blocked, and delayed work in the rear. I told him, also, about the part banks were playing in war orders. When I asked that the Duma be summoned soon, he said, "Yes, good. I will discuss it with Ivan Loginovich [Goremykin]."

I had barely reached home from Tsarskoe Selo, in fact, it was within half an hour of my arrival, when a rescript by the Tsar was handed to me as President of the Duma. It said that as soon as the budget commission had completed its work, the legislative cham-

bers would be summoned.¹⁶ This rescript put me in a very difficult position. The budget commission always worked while the Duma was in session, and there was no connection between the completion of the work of the one and the summoning of the other. The rescript was issued immediately after my audience with the Tsar and made it seem as if it were in line with an agreement I had made with him. It was a trick of Goremykin to ruin me in the eyes of the Duma. Of course the deputies could not understand it, but hardly any one believed that I was responsible for the delay. At the same time, rumors circulated that the President of the Duma would receive some high reward. Sure enough, on December 6 I learned that I was awarded the Order of Anne of the first degree. I should like to add that before this, Minister Polivanov, without my knowledge, had recommended that I be rewarded for special service in connection with army supplies, but his recommendation was not acted upon. The award was given me now to make it appear that it was in payment for concessions in summoning the Duma.¹⁷ In order to prevent misunderstandings and show that the decoration did not come for services in the Special Council, it was definitely stated in the document of award that it was given to me as "Patron of the Novomoscow Men's Gymnasium," that is, not as head of the Duma.

Conditions in the country went from bad to worse. Profiteering, graft, and the accumulation of great riches by clever people reached enormous proportions. In the cities, the cost of living mounted, due to the disorganized transport service. In the factories doing war work, there were strikes followed by arrests, usually of those who were for order and against quitting work. . . .

¹⁶ *Empress to Emperor, November 28-December 11, 1915.* "Well, it's the question about calling the Duma together now—he [Goremykin] is against it. They have no work to do. . . . If they sit idle they will begin talks about Varnava and Our Friend and mix into governmental questions to wh. they have not the right . . . well, this is the old man's council . . . he would advise you writing two rescripts, one to Kulomzin [President of the State Council] . . . and the other to Rodzianko—giving as reason that the budget has not been worked through by the Duma. . . . I am going to ask Ania to quite privately speak of this to our Friend . . . to ask what he would bless. . . . He [Goremykin] intends asking you not at all to call the Duma to-gether . . . and Gregory told him it was not right to ask such a thing of you . . . and as soon as their preliminary work is ready it would be wrong not to call them to-gether—one must show them a little confidence." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 599, 607.)

¹⁷ *Empress to Emperor, November 16, 1915.* "Then about Rodzianko of the Duma—Khvostov finds he ought to receive a decoration now, that wld. flatter him and he wld. sink in the eyes of the left party, for having accepted a reward from you—Our Friend says, also, that it would be a good thing to do—Certainly its most unsympathetic, but, alas, times are such just now, that one is obliged out of wisdom sake to do many a thing one wld. rather not have." (*Ibid.*, 582.)

With some other members of the Duma, I went to the Putilov works to find out about the war orders and talk to the workmen. The laborers were quite frank. They assured us that the strikes had no political motive, but were due to the fact that the wages were falling below the high cost of the necessities of life. After we had talked it over with the management, the just demands of the workers were granted. But, as if on purpose, the men with whom we talked were arrested. These arrests led to more trouble, and it was only after urgent demands that the workmen were freed.

At the beginning of December Prince Lvov, head of the Union of Zemstvos, came to Petrograd. He called on me, and we sat up until three in the morning discussing the situation. He told me that Moscow was becoming more and more revolutionary. Some of the most loyal people talked openly of the collapse of the Government and laid the blame on the Tsar and Tsarina. . . .

After my talk with Prince Lvov . . . I decided to write to Goremeykin.

Dear Ivan Loginovich:

I write you while the impressions, facts, and information which came out at the recent meeting of the Special Council are still fresh in my mind. They have to do with the terrible condition of our railways. This question was raised at the first session of the Special Council. A special committee was appointed to look into it, but aside from discussion, nothing was done, and now the threatened catastrophe is on us.

The chairman of the Special Council has no doubt given you all the details of the condition of the factories doing war work, which will, under present conditions, be forced to close; also, of the approaching famine in Petrograd and Moscow, with the disorders that may come in its train. It is clear to me, as to members of the Council, that our country is on the road to ruin, thanks to the complete apathy of the government authorities, who do nothing to remove the causes that lead to ruin. It is the duty of the Council of Ministers, over which you preside, to occupy itself, without delay, with the fate of Russia. What is happening now was foreseen by the members of the Special Council six months ago, and you, Ivan Loginovich, cannot deny that I more than once told you all the facts, and that the only answer I could get from you was that you were not interested in the war and did not care to mix in it.

Such replies are now out of date. The war is coming to a decisive point. In the rear of our brave and much-suffering army there is a growing, general disorganization in all fields of national life, affecting the first necessities of existence. Inaction on the part of the Government will break down the people's belief in victory and in their own strength.

Your first duty is to do all that you can to remove, at once, without the loss of another minute, all the obstacles that stand in the way of victory. I wish to declare to you most emphatically that we, members of the Duma, who have merely a consultative voice, do not assume responsibility for the inevitable catastrophe.

If the Council of Ministers will not adopt such possible measures as can save the country from shame and humiliation, then the responsibility is on you. If you, Ivan Loginovich, have not the strength to carry the heavy load

and to make use of such means as are present to lead the country to victory, at least have the manhood to acknowledge it and to step aside for a younger and stronger man. We are at a critical moment: threatening clouds are moving toward us, full of fatal consequences for the honor of Russia. Do not delay, I pray you. The country is in danger. . . .

When Goremykin received the letter he read it at the Council of Ministers, seemed indignant at its "harsh tone," and announced that he would report it to the Emperor.

In addition to the popular unrest created by the above indicated events, a rumor started that Germany was offering Russia a separate peace and that unofficial conversations were being carried on. There seemed some ground for this report for in September [1915], I received a strange letter from M. A. Vasilchikova, written in Austria, in which she tried to persuade me to help bring about peace. The letter was in sufficiently poor Russian to give the impression that it was translated from the German. There was neither stamp nor postmark on the envelope, and it was delivered by some unknown man. Letters of the same kind were sent to the Emperor, Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna, Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fedorovna, A. D. Samarin, Prince A. M. Golitsyn, and Minister Sazonov [S. D.]—seven in all. I immediately sent mine to Sazonov, who told me that he and the Emperor had each received one, and advised that they be thrown into the waste basket. I could not help asking Sazonov why he allowed this woman to keep her court title. . . .

To the great astonishment of all, M. A. Vasilchikova appeared at the capital in December. She was met by a special messenger at Torneo [Swedish-Finnish frontier], and special rooms were prepared for her at the Astoria [hotel]. This was stated by Sazonov, who added that he thought orders to that effect had been issued at Tsarskoe [Selo]. None of the lady's friends would have anything to do with her, but she was received at Tsarskoe, a fact which was kept secret. When the question of a separate peace and the rumors along that line were raised in the budget commission, the Minister of the Interior, Khvostov, declared that it was true that some one was circulating such rumors but that no such question had ever been raised in government circles, and that should it ever be raised, he would resign in a minute. After this declaration, I told the meeting about the letters and that Vasilchikova was at the capital. Khvostov became confused and finally admitted that she had been there, but said she had been sent out. After the meeting he told us privately that the day after her arrival she went to Tsarskoe (He did not say whom

she saw); and that he, personally, made a search of her rooms at the Astoria and found among her papers a letter from Francis Joseph to her and evidence indicating that she had seen William at Potsdam, had received instructions from Bethmann-Hollweg as to what to do at Petrograd, and had spent a whole month with the Prince of Hesse and brought letters from him for his two sisters, the Empress and Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fedorovna. The Grand Duchess returned her letter unopened. This was reported by Countess Olsuviev, mistress of her court.

It was said that the Emperor was much displeased at the coming of Vasilchikova and gave orders that she be sent to Solvychevodsk [Convent]. However, Vasilchikova lived quietly on the estate of her sister Miloradovich in Chernigov guberniia.

On January 27, 1916, Pitirim, the newly appointed Metropolitan of Petrograd, rang me up on the telephone to say that he would like to speak with the President of the Duma. Pitirim, former bishop of many guberniias and exarch of Georgia, had succeeded, through Rasputin, in winning the confidence of the Empress and receiving the appointment of Metropolitan in place of Vladimir.¹⁸ Pitirim was a great intriguer and there were all kinds of whispers about his character. He tried to play a part from the very beginning. Ministers called on him and gave him consideration, and his name was always in the papers. He visited the Emperor at Headquarters,¹⁹ and it was reported in the papers that he was authorized to notify the President of the Duma of the time of calling the Duma.

He came to my home accompanied by the priest [Duma] deputy, Nemertsalov, whom he brought, apparently, as witness. He plunged at once into politics.

"I came to express to you my great delight over the letter which you wrote to Goremykin. I ought to tell you that Headquarters has heard of it."

"This is no news to me for I sent a copy of it to the Emperor."

¹⁸ *Empress to Emperor, September 21, 1915.* "I find those 2 bishops ought at once to be taken out of the Synod—let Pitirim come and sit there as our Friend feared Nikolasha would harm him if he heard that Pitirim venerates our Friend." (*Pisma Imperatritsy*, I, 524.)

¹⁹ *Empress to Emperor, January 23, 1916.* "I hope you dont mind I wired about Pitirim, but he wld. so much like to see you quietly and tell you all his ideas and improvements he wld. like to make." (*Ibid.*, 637.)

Emperor to Empress, January 25, 1916. "... In the course of the day I received Pitirim. He spoke of the Synod, clergy, and especially about the calling of the Duma. This [calling of the Duma] took me by surprise, and I should like to know who has been talking to him. He was very happy that he was received and was given the opportunity to have his say." (*P'er-piska Nikolaia*, IV, 52.)

Pitirim calmly continued, "Ivan Loginovich [Goremykin] will not remain in office much longer. He is a bit old. It is quite likely that Sturmer [B. V.] will succeed him."²⁰

"Yes, I heard that, but it will not improve matters very much. Besides he has a German name and in these days, it has not a musical sound."

"He will change his name to Panin."²¹

"That will not fool anyone." . . .

Pitirim next turned the conversation to the Duma and intimated that he would like "to come to an understanding with the representatives of the people and work hand in hand with them."

I told him that I thought this was hardly possible because, outside of the Synod budget, there was no contact between the Duma and the Metropolitan. . . .

What Pitirim had said came true. Goremykin was dropped, and Sturmer was put in his place. This appointment made a bad impression. Those who had known Sturmer formerly had no respect for him. His name was associated with the rumors of a separate peace. His coming into office was interpreted to mean that it was done to spite public opinion, and that the influence of the Empress and Rasputin was once more predominant.²²

The opening of the Duma was set for February 22. It was reported that the members of the right would break up the session. . . .

²⁰ *Empress to Emperor, November 19-January 22, 1916.* "Well Lovy, He [Rasputin] thinks I better now see the old Gentleman and gently tell him, as if the Duma hisses him, what can one do, one can not send it away for such a reason. . . . He is so sorry as he venerates the old man. . . . Our Friend told me to wait about the old man until he has seen Uncle Khvostov on Thursday, . . . Well, I saw Our Friend . . . yesterday at Anias. He cannot bear the idea of the old man being sent away. . . . He thinks better to wait according to God one ought not to send him away. . . . You must get the old man out and calmly tell him yr. decision—now its easier as you dont agree quite and he did not have that circular printed (showing he is a bit old and tired and cant grasp, alas, everything, dear old man)." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 586, 590, 595, 637.)

²¹ *Emperor to Empress, January 18, 1916.* ". . . I do not cease thinking about the question of a successor to the old man [Goremykin]. On the train I asked the fat Khvostov [A. N., Minister of the Interior] what he thought of Sturmer. He praised him, but was of the opinion that he [Sturmer] was somewhat old, and that his mind was not as active as before. By the way, this old Sturmer sent me a petition that he be allowed to change his name to Panin. I replied through Mamant [-ov, V. I., Chief of the Bureau of Petitions] that I could not grant the permission without first consulting the living members of the Panin family." ("Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 24.)

²² *Empress to Emperor, January 22, 1916.* ". . . Our Friend said about Sturmer not to change his name and to take him for a time at least, as he is such a decided loyal man and will hold others in hand,—let one scream if one wishes, they always will at any nomination." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 636.)

Ambassadors of the Allies, as well as many foreigners who had war contracts, were quite worked up over the reports that the Duma would be dissolved. . . . Something had to be done to dissipate these rumors, to raise the spirit of the country, and to quiet the public. It seemed to me that the best thing would be to persuade the Emperor to visit the Duma. . . . When I raised the question with Sturmer, his bureaucratic soul trembled, but in the end he promised not to interfere, especially after I pointed out to him that he personally would gain in popularity from such a move, for it would be said that it was he, the new Prime Minister, who put the idea in the Emperor's head. My next move was to ask the coöperation of a certain Klopov, an old idealist and patriot, whom the Tsar knew, loved, and received. Klopov also came to see me from time to time. He granted my request, wrote to the Tsar on the subject, and soon received a favorable reply.

On February 22, within half an hour of the opening of the Duma, Sturmer came to announce that the Emperor would come directly from Headquarters.²⁸ A meeting of the Council of Elders was called at once at which I told the glad news. All the deputies, regardless of party lines, were greatly pleased and hoped that this visit signified better days to come. It was decided to celebrate in honor of the occasion—to notify and invite the representatives of the Allies. News of the Emperor's visit spread through the city and was joyfully passed along from mouth to mouth, "The Tsar in the Duma—Thank God, now there will be a change for the better." All the deputies were assembled. In the Catherine Hall the diplomats of the Allies, members of the State Council, and Senators were gathered. The President of the Duma with his associates, the Council of Elders, greeted the Emperor at the entrance. He came accompanied by the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich and Count Fredericks. After the greetings, the Emperor entered the Catherine Hall, to the shout of "Hurrah," and kissed the cross. His Majesty was very pale and so excited that his hands shook. Service began; the choir sang wonderfully well; everything went off with enthusiasm and feeling; members of the Duma joined in singing, "Lord, Save Thy People"; and even the public took part. The warm reception and the service quieted the Emperor and the expression on his face changed. When the choir sang the hymn in honor of those who had

²⁸ *Emperor to Empress, February 17, 1916.* ". . . I wish to return to be present at the opening of the State Duma and the State Council. For the time being, please say nothing about it. . . ." ("Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 83.)

fallen in battle, the Emperor fell on his knees, followed by all the Duma.

At the end of the service he came to me with tears in his eyes and remarked that he would like to say a few words to the Duma. . . . His speech made a good impression and was received with cheers. . . .

Making use of the opportunity, I called his attention to his cordial reception by the Duma and suggested that this would be a good time to grant a responsible ministry. "You cannot imagine," said I, "the greatness of such an act, its quieting influence on the country, and its effect on the successful outcome of the war. You would be writing a glorious page in the history of your reign."

"I shall think about it." . . .

Sturmer's declaration, read after the Emperor left, had a depressing effect . . . and it looked even worse when it came out in the papers. His phrases were wordy and confused, and gave no idea of his program. When he left the stand there was a deathly silence. Some one on the extreme right clapped his hands and that was about all. His first act made it evident that he was a nonentity. . . . When Polivanov appeared, he was given an ovation, and his business-like speech was listened to with attention. Sazonov and Grigorovich [I. K.] were also warmly received by the Duma. The day's session came to an end with the declaration of the Progressive Bloc in favor of a ministry of confidence, by whose aid the resources of the country might be organized for victory, order brought about in the rear, and all those responsible for our failures at the front called to account. . . . The Government, by its acts, quickly spoiled the good effect of the Emperor's visit. It followed the old course—it would be truer to say the lack of course. In the Duma the right wing raised its head. Markov Second came out in quite an unparliamentary way against the public organizations, accusing them of arousing the population and enriching themselves out of the war. He made these charges without producing any evidence and for the sole purpose of arousing distrust in these organizations. The congress which the extreme right wing held at Nizhni-Novgorod did not satisfy them and they proceeded to organize a new one in which they planned to include peasants and clergy. At the head of this combination was Scheglovitov, former Minister of Justice, and it was lavishly financed by the Government. Alongside of these reports of intrigue there were others that the Duma would be dissolved and there would be a change in the ministry.

Profiting by the Tsar's arrival at Tsarskoe, I asked for an audience and was received by him on March 8. The audience lasted an hour and a half. I told him everything—of the intrigues of the Ministers who worked against each other through Rasputin, of the lack, as formerly, of a definite policy, of the abuses everywhere, of the failure to take public opinion into consideration, and of the limit of public endurance. I reminded him of the adventures of Rubinstein [D. L.] and Manus [I. P.] and other heroes of the rear, of their contacts with Rasputin, of his dissipations and orgies, and that his relation to the Tsar and his family and his influence on State matters in these war times deeply aroused honest people. There was no doubt that Rasputin was a German agent and spy.

"If Your Majesty's Ministers were really free agents and had, as their single object, the good of the country, the presence of a man like Rasputin would carry no weight in State matters. But the trouble is that they are dependent on him and draw him into their intrigues. I must tell Your Majesty that this cannot continue much longer. No one opens your eyes to the true rôle which this man is playing. His presence in Your Majesty's Court undermines confidence in the Supreme Power and may have an evil effect on the fate of the dynasty and turn the hearts of the people from their Emperor."

While I was enumerating these sad truths, the Tsar was either silent or showed astonishment, but was at all times affable and courteous. When I finished, he asked, "How do you think the war will end—in our favor or against us?"

I replied that we could count on the army and the people, but that it was the military leaders and the internal politics that stood in the way of victory.

My report did some good. On March 11 an order was issued sending Rasputin to Tobolsk; but a few days later, at the demand of the Empress, this order was canceled. . . .

On March 28 Minister of War, Polivanov, was dismissed.²⁴ He had just returned from Headquarters where he was kindly received. His dismissal was unexpected by him and by everyone else. . . . This act was quite depressing. The papers were full of his praise and of his deeds. In the Duma and in public much was said of irresponsible influence, of the ministerial leapfrog game, and of the fact that the

²⁴ *Empress to Emperor, March 19, 1916.* "Oh, how I wish you could get rid of Polivanov, wh. means Guchkov. . . . Polivanov is his [Sturmer's] despair—and longs you would change him. . . . Polivanov simply treacherous, the way he repeats at once all that is spoken over in secret at the Council of Ministers." ("Pisma Imperatitsy," II, 297.)

enemy was reaching out farther and farther and crushing those who were harmful to Germany and beneficial to Russia.

People looked to the Duma, which was popular at that time and enjoyed the confidence of the country. But the Duma realized that so long as the influence of Rasputin and the Empress continued, little could be accomplished either at the front or in the rear.

The disorders in the rear were assuming a threatening character. In Petrograd there was a shortage of meat, but those passing through the city could see a string of carts, loaded with spoiled carcasses which were being taken to the soap factory. This was done in broad daylight and made a bad impression, for while there was no meat on the market, tons of it were being wasted.

Members of the Special Council went to examine the cold storage houses near the Baltic Station. They found them in good order; the meat they contained was not spoiled; but outside of them were mountains of rotting carcasses.

On inquiry it came out that this meat was intended for the army, but there was no place to keep it. When permission and money were asked for new cold storage plants, they were refused. The trouble was that the different Ministries did not coöperate. The intendency ordered the meat, the railways brought it, but there was no place to store it, and it was not allowed to be placed on the market. This was no worse than some other things. . . .

Members of the Special Council reported at the meeting what they had seen. I wrote to Alexeev, and it was only then that some interest was shown in the meat question. In the meantime, thousands of puds of meat were ruined. Meat hauled from Siberia suffered the same fate. Owing to disorganization and lack of transportation, not only thousands but hundreds of thousands of puds went to waste. It was hard to put a hand on the guilty party, for one blamed the other, and all together blamed the general economic demoralization. Polivanov said that this meat waste was not an accident, not even the result of disorganization, but part of a German plan. . . .

In May, representatives of the French Government, Viviani and Thomas, came to Russia. The Duma gave a banquet in their honor. . . . The next day, Thomas desired to have a long talk on the question of army supplies. He spent the evening with me, and his knowledge of our situation greatly astonished S. I. Timashev, member of the Special Council. In discussing our shortages, he enumerated all our weak points and ended with a penetrating and significant phrase:

"La Russie doit être bien riche et sûre de ses forces pour se permettre le luxe d'un gouvernement comme le vôtre, car le premier ministre—c'est un désastre et le ministre de la guerre—une catastrophe."

When, a day later, the Frenchmen were departing, I saw them off and asked one of them, "Dites-moi, Monsieur, sincèrement votre opinion, qu'est ce que Vous manque en Russie." The Frenchman replied:

"Ce qui nous manque? C'est l'autocratie de votre gouvernement car si j'ose vous dire encore, M. le président, la Russie doit être bien forte moralement pour supporter pendant le temps sérieux que nous passons, cet état de douce anarchie que règne dans votre pays et se jette aux yeux."

. . . A certain Manasevich—Manuilov [I. F.], who was a journalist of no importance but had contacts with the Rasputin circle, played a prominent part in Sturmer's affairs. Indeed, he was instrumental in getting Sturmer his post. He was a kind of private secretary to Sturmer and made use of his position to extort money from the banks. Count Tatischev [V. S.], director of the United Bank, and Khvostov, Minister of the Interior, decided to trap Manuilov. He took a bribe in five hundred ruble notes, which were marked by Ivan Khvostov, nephew of the Minister. This was followed by a search; some of the notes were found; and Manuilov was arrested. All this took place while Sturmer was away. When he learned what happened, he would not at first believe it, but when there was no doubt about it, he started back to Headquarters, and on his return, called his colleague, Khvostov, on the telephone to say, "You gave me unpleasant news about the arrest of Manuilov; it is now my turn to give you news—you are no longer Minister of the Interior."

In place of Khvostov (the elder), Protopopov, Vice-President of the Duma, was appointed.²⁵ After his return from abroad and his meeting at Stockholm with a representative of Germany, his name had appeared more and more in the papers. It was said that Protopopov, with some bankers, was planning to publish a paper, "Volia Rossii." Tereschenko [M], Litvinov-Falinski, and others had warned me that Protopopov was surrounded by suspicious characters, that

²⁵ *Empress to Emperor, September 20, 27, 1915.* ". . . Gregory begs you earnestly to name Protopopov there [Minister of the Interior]. You know him and had such a good impression of him—happens to be of the Duma (is not left) and so will know how to be with them. . . . God bless yr. new choice of Protopopov—our Friend says you have done a very wise act in naming him." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 402, 406.)

his name was associated with Rasputin's, and that the Rasputin circle was trying to make him Minister of the Interior. . . .

After his appointment, a report started that the President of the Duma would be Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. Quite unexpectedly Protopopov came to see me and, "Do you know, Michael Vladimirovich, that there is a move at Headquarters to make you Minister of Foreign Affairs?"

"How can I be Minister of Foreign Affairs?" I said, laughingly.

"You will have assistants who will look after the technical work."

"Well, then, will it be necessary for me to be Prime Minister as well?"

"Surely."

It was time to put an end to this comedy.

"Listen," said I to him. "You are carrying out somebody's commission. You have been sent to get my opinion on this question. In that case, tell the Emperor my conditions [if appointed]. I am to hold office for no less than three years; I am to select my Ministers. The Empress must not interfere in State affairs, and, until the end of the war, she must live and stay at Livadia [Crimea]. All the Grand Dukes must be removed from active service; not one of them should be at the front. The Emperor must make his peace with all the Ministers who have been unjustly humiliated. Polivanov must be assistant to the Emperor at Headquarters, and Lukomski [A], Minister of War. Each week there must be a conference with the right to vote on all but strategic questions." . . .

The Empress went oftener and oftener to Headquarters, and when she was at Tsarskoe, the Ministers went to her with their reports. . . . She was never popular, and when it became generally known what influence Rasputin had over her and the way she interfered in State affairs, people began to condemn her, to call her "German," and to blame her for everything that the Tsar did which was harmful to Russia.²⁶

Prince Nicholas of Greece, who was married to Grand Duchess Elena Vladimirovna, came to Petrograd through Vienna and Berlin.²⁷

²⁶ September 24 [1915]. ". . . It is strange how unpopular poor Alix is. It can be stated most positively that she has never done a thing to justify the charge that she is sympathetic toward the Germans, but nevertheless everyone insists that she is. The only charge that can be made against her is that she does not know how to be popular." ("Andrei Vladimirovich," 85.)

²⁷ *Emperor to Empress*, July 28, 1916. ". . . Yesterday I had a long and interesting conversation with Niki. He leaves today for Kiev to visit mother; from there he will return to Pavlovsk, and will, of course, call on you. He looked aged and nervous, and I therefore let him have his say and explain

It is said that he had some secret mission. He remained here several months. He went to Headquarters. General Alexeev complained that whenever he came to report to the Emperor, the Prince and Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna were there. The Tsar asked Alexeev to report in their presence, but he begged for a private interview. Alexeev felt that the Greek prince had no business at Headquarters and that he should not be allowed to return to Greece—at least not through Berlin and Vienna. The military authorities insisted on this, and when the Prince started back he was sent not through Torneo [Swedish frontier], but by way of Archangel to England. He arrived in Greece just in the midst of the trouble there. Later we read in the paper that, "at the Court of Constantine, it is said that the mission of Crown Prince Nicholas was a great success."

After taking office, Protopopov announced that his main task would be the solution of the food problem.²⁸ At the Council of Ministers, he raised the question of transferring the food question from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of the Interior. The press and the zemstvo leaders, who acted as agents for the Ministry of Agriculture, came out against this proposal. They feared that if the Ministry of the Interior got control, they would come under the authority of the governors, police, *et al.* A majority of the zemstvo leaders announced that they would not work with the Ministry of the Interior. Their fear was quickly justified, as may be seen from the following incident, which took place at Ekaterinoslav guberniia. The governor of that guberniia telephoned to Gesberg,

the mission on which Tino [Constantine of Greece] sent him. It should be admitted that the diplomats of the Allies have blundered as usual. The support of this Venizelos may react unfavorably on us. Tino thinks that the policy of the Allies threatens the dynasty, and that it is unnecessary to play with fire. Everything that Niki told me was supported by official documents, copies of some of which he brought along with him." ("Perejiska Nikolaia," IV, 371.)

²⁸ *Empress to Emperor, June 22-November 12 13, 1916.* "Wld. it not be wiser to give over all that question about food and fuel to the minister of the Interior, whom it concerns more than the minister of Agriculture—The Minister of Interior has his people everywhere, can give orders and direct instructions to all the Governors. . . . Forgive me for what I have done. . . . Our Friend said it was absolutely necessary . . . so I spoke to Sturmer yesterday and they both completely believe in our Friend's wonderful, God sent wisdom. St. sends you by this messenger a new paper to sign giving over the whole food supply now at once to the minister of Interior. St. begs you to sign it and at once return it . . . then it will come in time before the Duma assemblies on Tuesday. I had to take this step upon myself as Gr. says Protop. will have all in his hands and finish up all the Unions and by that will save Russia, . . . Our Friend is dreadfully angry that Protopopov, who out of cowardice wld. not have it announced that the food supply question shld. be in his hands now." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 358, 436, 439.)

the head of the zemstvo and agent for the Ministry of Agriculture, that he should permit agents of the Ministry of the Interior to purchase one and one-half million puds of barley for Petrograd. To have allowed these inexperienced men to buy would have forced up the prices and led to graft and other evils. Gesberg offered to secure and ship the barley, but the governor would not have it that way, saying that he must carry out the orders of the Minister of the Interior, and that if it were not done, necessary steps would be taken. To this Gesberg replied that he, as head of the zemstvo and agent of the Ministry of Agriculture, could not take orders from the governor on matters relating to food. This reply was sent to Protopopov, who decided to send Gesberg to Siberia on the ground that he had a German name. . . . It was only after much difficulty that he was persuaded not to do so.

Protopopov behaved very strangely and gave the impression that he was not altogether normal. He came to the meeting of the budget commission of the Duma dressed in the uniform of a police official. The Duma received him coldly and his food plan was universally condemned. This was also the attitude of the zemstvo and city unions. Protopopov desired to have a conference with his former colleagues of the Duma and asked me to help him. He, apparently, thought that he would meet only representatives of the zemstvos, Octobrists, but I called together all the leaders of the parties in the Progressive Bloc. Protopopov behaved very strangely that evening. He raised his eyes and with an enthusiasm which seemed unnatural said, "I feel that I will save Russia. I feel that only I can save her." Shingarev [A. I.], who is a doctor by profession, gave it as his opinion that Protopopov was a sick man. Protopopov remained with me until three in the morning, being unable to make up his mind to go, and finally I had to insist that he go to bed. . . .

At the opening of the Duma, Sturmer and his Ministers were present. After the President had spoken and as Sturmer got up to make a speech, cries came from the left. "Put him out; down with the traitor, Sturmer." Sturmer, followed by all his Ministers, walked out. . . .

At the session of the Duma on November 18 [1916], something happened which left a deep impression not only on the Duma, but on the country as a whole. During the speech of Markov . . . there walked into the hall Minister of War Shuvaev²⁹ and Minister of

²⁹ *Empress to Emperor, March 26, 1916.* "I am thinking so much about Shuvaev and do greatly wonder whether he can fill such a place, know

the Navy Grigorovich. They asked permission to make a declaration. Shuvaev, greatly excited, said that he, an old soldier, had confidence in the Russian army, that the army was well supplied with all its needs, thanks to the support of the people and their representatives. He quoted figures showing how war supplies had gradually increased from the time the Special Council of Defense was created. He ended by asking support and confidence in him in the future. Grigorovich made a speech along the same line. The idea back of their speeches was this: "If the other Ministers disagree with the Duma, we two, representing the army and navy, wish to go hand in hand with the people." . . . These men came on their own responsibility.³⁰ After this Sturmer and Protopopov pleaded with the Empress to dissolve the Duma. . . .

On November 22 [1916], Sturmer, Trepov, and Grigorovich went to Headquarters. New changes in the ministry were expected. Sure enough, Sturmer was dropped and Trepov made Prime Minister.³¹ . . . When the Empress learned of the fate of Sturmer, she and Protopopov started at once for Headquarters.

On the day following, Trepov came to see me and assured me that he would like to work with the Duma and that he would be able to offset the influence of Rasputin. I told him that first of all he should remove Protopopov, Shakhovskoi [V. N.], and A. Bobrinski (Minister of Agriculture). Otherwise, no one would have any confidence in him. . . . It was said that Trepov accepted his post

how to speak in the Duma, as one time one abused him and the ordinance department." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 306.)

Emperor to Empress, March 27, 1916. ". . . I am fully convinced that good, old Shuvaev is just the man for the Ministry of War. He is honest, loyal, not in the least afraid of the Duma. . . ." ("Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 148.)

Empress to Emperor, November 21, 1916. "I find Grigorovitch and Shuvaev did not find the right note in their speech but Shuvaev did the worst thing—he shook hands with Miliukov who had just launched forth things against us." ("Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 445.)

Empress to Emperor, November 22, 23, 1916. "Our Friend says Sturmer can remain still some time as President of the Council of Ministers as that one does not reproach him so much. . . . He [Rasputin] implores either he [Sturmer] should go on leave for a month or at once to name another man in his place as Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . . In that ministry, he is the red flag and at once all will be quieter if he is changed. But leave him as President of the Council of Ministers. . . . I received old Sturmer and he told me yr. decision—God grant, all is for the good, tho' it gave me a painful shock you also take him away fr. the Council of Ministers. . . . He [Rasputin] is very sad, Sturmer did not understand he ought to have gone for a rest not knowing Trepov, of course he is anxious for you." (*Ibid.*, 445, 446, 447.)

on condition that Protopopov be dismissed, but unfortunately this did not take place.³² . . .

On December 29 [16], the Duma adjourned for the Christmas holidays.³³

On the night of December 30, Rasputin was killed,³⁴ and this event may be regarded as the beginning of the second revolution. There is no doubt whatever that the principal actors in this tragedy were actuated by patriotic motives. They saw that legal methods failed to free Russia from the dangerous favorite, and therefore decided that it was their sacred duty to free the Tsar's family and Russia from the hypnotic influence. The result, however, was quite contrary to their hopes. The country came to the conclusion that the only way to advance the interests of Russia was by terror. . . .

Protopopov not only continued to play his part at Tsarskoe, but even took Rasputin's place. It was said that he became interested in spiritism and called forth Rasputin. . . .

The food situation became very bad. Cities were without food, villages without shoes, and every one felt that there was plenty in

³² *Empress to Emperor, November 24, 1916.* "I entreat you dont go and change Protopopov now, he will be alright, give him the chance to get the food supply matter into his hands and I assure you, all will go. . . . Of course, I more than regret that Trepov is at the head. . . . Protopopov is honestly for us. . . . Protopopov venerates our Friend and will be blessed . . . dont change Protopopov. . . ." (*"Pisma Imperatritsy,"* II, 447, 448.)

³³ *Empress to Emperor, December 22, 26, 27, 1916.* ". . . Trepov has combined with Rodzianko to let go the Duma from Dec. 17-Jan. 8, so as that the deputies should have no time to leave Petrograd for the holidays and to keep them here in hand. Our Friend and Kalinin entreat you to close the Duma not later than the 14th of Feb., 1st or 15th even, otherwise there will be no peace for you—In the Duma, they only fear this, a longer intermission and Trepov intends to catch you, saying that it will be worse if the people return home and spread their news—but our Friend says, nobody believes these delegates when they are alone in their homesteads, only have strength when to-gether. . . . I read in the papers that he [Trepov] told Rodzianko now, that the Duma will be shut about on the 17th till first half of Jan. . . . I did so hard beg for sooner and longer—Thank God, you at last fixed no date in Jan. and can call them to-gether in Feb. or not at all. . . . Trepov was very wrong in putting off the Duma now and wishing to call it beginning of January again, the result being (which he, Rodzianko and all counted upon), that nobody goes home and all will remain, fomenting, boiling in Petrograd." (*Ibid.*, 456, 457, 461, 462.)

³⁴ *Tsarskoe Selo, August 30 [1915].* "It is true that all these charges [against Rasputin], like other charges, exaggerate, mislead, and confuse. But the fact remains there is some truth in them. Who will undertake to disprove them? The only thing to do now is to get up sufficient courage to put an end to Rasputin, guilty or innocent. It does not matter what he did, or who he is. The thing to be kept in mind is that he is the cause of public accusations of a rather unpleasant sort, against a certain person [the Empress?] That in itself is sufficient reason for being careful, and not arousing public discontent at a time when, even without that, all is not as it should be." (*"Andrei Vladimirovich,"* 75.)

Russia, but that nothing could be had because of the disorganization in the rear. Moscow and Petrograd were without meat, while at the same time, according to the papers, about half a million puds of meat were piled up on Siberian stations and would spoil with the first thaw. . . . Each minister and official laid the blame on the other. All they could think of was to stop passenger traffic for a time to allow freight to come through; but they failed even in this. . . . It seemed as if the ministers were working purposely against Russia and in favor of Germany . . . and that it all led to the Empress through Protopopov.

In January, 1917, General Krymov came from the front and asked to be allowed to tell the members of the Duma unofficially of the tragic situation at the front. I invited many deputies of the Duma, State Council, and members of the Special Council. We listened excitedly to the report of the fighting general. . . . He said that, until the political horizon cleared, until the Government changed its course or a new Government came in, which the army trusted, there could be no victory. The rear interfered with the war and temporary victories were of no account. He ended with the following words:

"The feeling in the army is such that all will greet with joy the news of a coup d'état. It has to come; it is felt at the front. Should you decide to do this, we will support you. Seemingly, there is no other way out. You, as well as others, have tried everything, but the evil influence of the wife is mightier than the honest words spoken to the Tsar. We cannot afford to lose time."

After Krymov finished, we sat there deeply depressed. The first to speak was Shingarev.

"The General is right—a coup d'état is necessary. But who will dare to undertake it?"

Shidlovski exclaimed in anger, "We cannot waste pity on him [the Tsar], if he ruins Russia."

Many of the members of the Duma agreed with Shingarev and Shidlovski. They became noisy in their differences of opinion. Someone quoted Brusilov: "If it comes to a choice between the Tsar and Russia, I will take Russia."

Tereschenko spoke so harshly that he aroused me. I stopped him, and said, "You are not thinking of what might happen after the abdication. I will never raise my hand against the Emperor. I have taken the oath of loyalty. I beg you not to discuss it in my house."

If the army desires the Tsar to abdicate, let it proceed through its officers, but I shall try until the last minute to work through peaceful means and not by force."

We talked a long, long time that evening. We felt the storm approaching, and feared the future. . . .

At about this time, I had a rather strange interview with Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna. . . . She spoke of the situation in the interior, of the worthless Government, of Protopopov and of the Empress . . . that it was necessary to change, remove, destroy.

I tried to find out what she was driving at and asked what she meant by remove.

"Well, I don't know. It is necessary to undertake something. You understand. The Duma should do something. . . . She should be done away with."

"Who?"

"The Empress."

"Your Highness," said I, "let us forget this conversation." . . .

The idea that it was necessary to force the Tsar to abdicate seemed to have taken hold of Petrograd at the end of 1916, and the beginning of 1917. A number of people from the higher circles declared that the Duma and its president should undertake this task and save the army and Russia.

On January 21 [1917], there came to see me, quite unexpectedly, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich [brother of the Tsar], who said, "I should like to talk to you about what is going on and to consult you as to what should be done. We understand the situation. . . . Do you think there is going to be a revolution?"

"As long as the war goes on, the people realize that division means ruin for the army. But there is another kind of danger. The Government and the Empress lead Russia toward a separate peace, to shame, and into the arms of Germany. The nation will not tolerate it, and should it prove true—and there are plenty of rumors to that effect—we shall have a terrible revolution which will carry away the throne, the dynasty, you and me. There is still time to save Russia, and even now the reign of your brother could attain unheard-of greatness and glory, if the policies of the Government were altered. It is necessary to appoint Ministers whom the country trusts, who would not hurt the people's feelings. I am sorry to say, however, that this could be done only if the Empress were removed [from political affairs]. . . . She and the Emperor are surrounded by sinister and worth-

less characters. The Empress is hated and there is a general cry that she should be removed. As long as she is in power we shall drift toward ruin."

"Imagine,—Buchanan said the same thing to my brother. Our family realizes how harmful the Empress is. She and my brother are surrounded by traitors—all decent people have left them. But what to do?"

"You, Your Highness, as his only brother, should tell him all the truth; all the harm the Empress does; that the people regard her as Germanophile, working against the interests of Russia."

"Do you think that there must be a responsible ministry?"

"Not a single resolution calls for a responsible ministry. All that is asked is a strong Government, with some one at its head who has the confidence of the country. Such a person would form a cabinet responsible to the Tsar." . . .

This interview lasted more than an hour. The Grand Duke agreed with everything and promised to help. . . .

On January 20, I had an audience with the Tsar.

"From my second report, Your Majesty may have seen that I regard the situation as worse than ever. The frame of mind of the country is such that very serious outbreaks may be expected. Political divisions no longer exist, but Russia, as one, demands a change in Government, and the appointment of a responsible Prime Minister who has the confidence of the country. It is necessary to work in agreement with the legislative bodies and public organizations in order to organize the rear and conquer the enemy. To our great shame in these war times, everything is in disorder. There is no government, no system, and no coöperation between front and rear. Wherever one looks he sees only disorder and betrayal. The constant change of Ministers arouses irritation at first, but later indifference, and leads to demoralization in the service from top to bottom. It is believed by the people that you have removed all Ministers who had the confidence of the Duma and public organizations, and replaced them by incapable and untrustworthy persons. Let me recall them: Polivanov, Sazonov, Count Ignatiev [P. N.], Samarin, Scherbatov, Naumov [A. N.]. All these were loyal to you and Russia and yet were removed without cause and without blame. Recall such old State workers as Golubev and Kulomzin [A. N.]. They were displaced for no other reason than that they refused to close the mouths of honest people in the State Council. The idea spreads that everything is done that harms Russia and benefits the

enemy. Strange rumors circulate about traitors and spies in the rear of the army. There is not one honest man in your entourage; all decent people have either been sent away or have left. . . . It is no secret that the Empress issues State orders without consulting you; that Ministers go to her with their reports; and that at her will those she disapproves of are removed and are replaced by others who are totally unfit. . . . She is regarded as a partisan of Germany, which she protects. Even the common people speak of it."

"Produce your facts," said the Emperor. "You have no evidence to support your words."

"There are no facts, but her politics are such that the masses draw that conclusion. In order to save your family, Your Majesty must find a way to remove the Empress from politics. The hearts of the Russian people are breaking at the threatening future. The people are turning from their Tsar because after so much suffering, sacrifice and bloodshed, they see nothing but trouble ahead."

I then turned the conversation to the front and recalled how I had pleaded with him not to take the supreme command and that now, after the failure on the Rumanian front, all blame fell upon him.

"Do not bring about a situation, Your Majesty, which will force your subjects to choose between you and the good of the country. Until now, Tsar and country have been one, but lately a distinction has been made."

The Tsar pressed his head with his hands and said, "Is it possible that for twenty-two years I have tried to do some good, and that for twenty-two years I have failed?"

It was a trying moment.

"Yes, Your Majesty, for twenty-two years you have followed the wrong trail."

Notwithstanding this open expression of opinion which could not be agreeable to the Emperor, he bade me good-bye in a friendly way, without showing any ill-will. . . .

I have been informed that the Petrograd police are being trained in the use of machine guns. A number of machine guns in the capital and other cities, instead of being sent to the front, have been handed over to the police.

There is also a strange order which takes the Petrograd Military District out of the Army of the Northern Front and puts it [the district] under the direct command of the Government. . . .

It is said that there is some hidden reason for this move. Persistent rumors are afloat that the Empress is determined to have a

separate peace with Germany, that Protopopov, who is helping her in this matter, is stirring up the population to disorders because of lack of provisions, with the idea of putting them down and using them [the disorders] as a reason for a separate peace. These rumors continue and have aroused considerable feeling not only among members of the Duma, but among the representatives of the Allies. Members of the Special Council of Defense decided to raise the question of the French artillery and machine guns at their next meeting. They asked Beliaev [M. A.], Minister of War, what right he had, without authorization of the Special Council, to transfer such a large amount of weapons, needed at the front, to the Minister of the Interior. He promised to give an answer but did not, and when we insisted on a reply, he tried to end the discussion. . . . Not getting anywhere, we decided to adopt radical measures and ask the Emperor to preside at the next meeting. . . . Beliaev, however, said that he would not ask him, that it was inopportune, and that the Tsar should not be troubled about matters of secondary importance. Under the circumstances, the members decided to write to the Tsar. I sent their document, together with my report, but received no reply.

On February 23, I had an audience with the Tsar. . . . I was received very coldly. . . . I began to read my report. The Emperor listened not only with indifference, but with a kind of ill-will . . . and he finally interrupted me with the request that I hurry a bit, as Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich was waiting for him to have a cup of tea. . . .

When I raised the question of the transfer of machine guns, he remarked: "Strange, I know nothing about this." . . . When I spoke of Protopopov, he became irritated. . . . When I called his attention to the threatening situation in the country and the possibility of a revolution, he broke in again by saying: "The information I have is quite contrary to yours, and as to the Duma, I should like to say that if it permits itself such harsh speeches as last time, it will be dissolved."

"Your Majesty, I regard it as my duty to tell you that I have a foreboding, and a conviction that this is my last report to you."

"Why?"

"Because the Duma will be dismissed, and the course which the Government pursues will lead to no good results. . . . There is still time and opportunity to turn back and form a Government responsible to the chambers [legislative]. But this, seemingly, is not to be. You, Your Majesty, do not agree with me, and things are as they

have been. The result will be a revolution and such anarchy as no one will be able to control."

The Emperor made no reply, and bade me good-bye rather formally.

The Duma was to begin its session on February 27. Some days before, I was told that at the first meeting, Petrograd workmen would come to make certain demands. At the same time, I learned that some one, passing himself for Miliukov [P. N.] had visited factories and incited the workers. Miliukov wrote a letter for the press exposing the imposter and warning the workmen not to lend themselves to provocation. The war censor would not allow its publication and only after my persistent demands was the permission granted. . . . Before the very opening of the Duma, all but two of the Labor members of the War-Industry Committee were arrested. They were moderate men and it was difficult to understand their arrest. The two who were free appealed to the workmen to remain quiet, but their appeal, like the letter of Miliukov, was not allowed to appear.

The opening of the Duma passed off quietly. . . . The Duma had been in session about a week, when I learned indirectly that the Tsar had called Prime Minister Golitsyn and some of the other ministers to discuss the question of a responsible ministry. It was agreed that the Tsar should appear at the Duma the following day to announce his wish to grant a responsible ministry. Prince Golitsyn was greatly pleased and went home quite happy. In the evening, the Emperor sent for him once more to come to the Palace and told him that he was going to Headquarters.

"But, Your Majesty, how about the responsible ministry? You planned to go to the Duma tomorrow?"

"That's true. But I have changed my mind, and am going to Headquarters this evening."

Golitsyn explained this sudden determination to go to Headquarters by the desire of the Emperor to escape new reports, conferences, and discussions.

The Tsar departed; the Duma continued to debate the food question. On the surface all looked well, but all of a sudden there came a crash and the State locomotive jumped the rails. The threatening and ruinous event, of which the Court had been warned but which it would not take to heart, had taken place.

CHAPTER VII

SPECIAL COUNCILS, PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, DUMA

I. IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ISSUED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, GOREMYKIN¹

June 27, 1915

IVAN LOGINOVICH :

From every corner of our native land addresses are reaching me which testify to the great eagerness of the Russian people to devote their energies to providing supplies for the army. From this unanimous expression of the nation, I derive an unshakable confidence in a bright future.

The prolonged war demands ever fresh exertions. But in the increasing difficulties and in the inevitable vicissitudes of war the resolution becomes more firm and more rooted in our hearts to prosecute the war, with God's help, to the complete triumph of the Russian arms. The enemy must be crushed. Till then, there can be no peace.

With a firm belief in the inexhaustible strength of Russia, I expect of the Government and of public institutions, of Russian industry, and of all the loyal sons of our native land, without distinction of opinion and position, harmonious, wholehearted coöperation for the needs of our valiant army. Upon this national task, from now the only task, must be concentrated all the thoughts of a united and, consequently, unconquerable Russia.

Having created, for dealing with the problems of the army supply, a Special Commission made up in part of members of the legislative institutions and representatives of industry, I find it also necessary to hasten the time of the summoning of the legislative institutions themselves, so that we may hear the voice of Russia. I have, therefore, decided that the State Council and State Duma should resume their work not later than August of the present year, and I ask the

¹"Riech," No. 164, June 30, 1915.

Council of Ministers to work out, under my direction, the legislative bills called for by the exigencies of war.

The original is signed in His Imperial Majesty's own hand:

NICHOLAS.

Headquarters, June 27, 1915.

2. SPECIAL COUNCILS²

Law passed by the State Council, State Duma, and confirmed by His Majesty, relating to the formation of Special Councils to deliberate and coördinate measures relating to the national defense, fuel, transportation, State and public institutions, and undertakings which work for the defense of the State, food supply, and the transportation of fuel, food, and war material:

I. The following acts of the Council of Ministers, [formerly] confirmed by the Emperor, are hereby repealed:

1. April 13, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 865), relating to certain measures having to do with supplying fuel to the army, navy, transportation, and private institutions working for the State defense.

2. May 15, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1091), extending the power of the Minister of Transportation, granted to him on March 17, 1915, over the supply of fuel for state and public institutions.

3. June 1, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1169), granting the Minister of Commerce and Industry special power to deal with the food question in the Empire.

4. June 11, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1215) determining how hard fuel should be distributed among the users.

5. June 20, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 1280), approving a Special Council to bring together the various measures for providing the active army with war supplies and materials, and the Imperial Ukaz of March 17, 1915 (Collection of Laws, Chapter 634), to bring under the control of the Minister of Transportation all measures relating to fuel for the army, navy, transport, and private institutions working for the defense of the State.

² "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," No. 1, September, 1915, 188-9.

The Law on the Special Council to Deliberate and Coördinate Measures for the National Defense.

The Special Council is the highest organ created by the State. No government institution or official can issue orders to the Special Council or demand accounting from it.

August 30, 1915.

COMPOSITION OF THE FOUR SPECIAL COUNCILS *

Members of Councils Name of Council	Presidents of Legislative Bodies	Members of State Duma	Members of State Council	Representatives of Zemstvo and City Unions	Representatives of War-Industry Committee	Representatives of Ministries	Chairmen
National Defense	2	9	9	2	4	10	Minister of War
Food	7	7	2	..	9	Minister of Agriculture
Fuel	7	7	2	3	11	Minister of Commerce and Industry
Transportation	7	7	2	..	20	Minister of Transportation

* "Izvestiia Vserossiiskago Soiuza Gorodov," No. 21-22, December, 1915.

II. For the duration of the war the above-noted laws are changed and supplemented by the following laws:

1. A Special Council to deliberate and coördinate all measures for the defense of the state;

2. A Special Council to deliberate and coördinate all measures for supplying fuel for transportation purposes to state and public institutions and undertakings working for the defense of the country;

3. A Special Council to deliberate and coördinate all measures relating to food;

4. A Special Council to deliberate and coördinate all meas-

ures relating to the transportation of fuel, food, and war material.

Signed: President of the State Council,
KULOMZIN.

On the original His Majesty has written: So Be It.

Tsarskoe Selo

August 30, 1915.

Countersigned by the State Secretary, KRYZHANOVSKI.

3. WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEES, AND LABOR PARTICIPATION

(a) ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEES^{*}

On September 9 [1915], His Majesty confirmed the following regulations, recommended by the Council of Ministers, relating to the War-Industry Committees:

1. To help government organizations supply the army and navy with all necessary military and food supplies, there are being formed, for the duration of the war, central, regional, and local war-industry committees.

2. The war-industry committees are public organizations which have no commercial aims. Consequently economic institutions belonging to them furnish military and food supplies at cost. When placing orders with private industries and business houses, the committees, to cover general expenses, may have a rebate, the amount of which to be determined by the committees with the factories and business houses, but in no case is it to be more than one per cent of the cost of the order.

3. The composition, resources, relations [with other institutions] and activities of the Central War-Industry Committee are determined by the committee itself. The composition, resources, relations and activities of regional and local committees are determined by these committees in accordance with the general principles of organization and activities of war-industry committees, in agreement with the Central War-Industry Committee.

4. The relations between government institutions and war-industry committees in the matter of supplying the army and navy with military and food supplies is determined by mutual agreement between the committees and the military and civil authorities concerned.

^{*} "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," No. 2-3, October 14, 1915, 141-2.

5. The Central War-Industry Committee has the right to take over every kind of movable and unmovable property; to conclude contracts with private individuals, with government and public institutions; to assume all kinds of obligations; in particular, to carry out government orders for supplies and work; to organize, in agreement with the Ministries of War and Navy, methods of receiving and delivering war materials, etc.; to sue and be sued. Similar rights are enjoyed by the regional committees, organized and confirmed by the Central War-Industry Committee, as well as the local committees, organized and confirmed by the regional committees.

6. All money, property, and resources in the hands of the war-industry committees at the time of their liquidation go to the State.

(b) LABOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEES ⁴

Petrograd. On September 10, [1915] there was the first pre-election meeting of the workmen in the factory, "Novyi Lessner." At the end of the day's work, the day shift packed the court of the factory and notified the management that they were to take up the question of electing delegates to the Central War-Industry Committee. The management told the men to go ahead, and they immediately elected a presiding officer.

It has been a long time since the capital witnessed such a large gathering. The night shift, instead of going to work, joined the day shift at the meeting. There were present about 4,000 workmen. After explaining the origin of the war-industry committees, the chairman proposed that the workmen should give serious thought to the idea of labor participation in the mobilization of industry, and speak out freely before the election whether it was possible or necessary to have the elections.

After this talk, and as the discussion was about to begin, something happened. The gates of the factory flew open, the mounted police rode in and told the workmen to disperse.

Those in charge of the meeting explained to the police officers that it was a legal assembly, called at the request of the Central War-Industry Committee. The police were not satisfied. A. I. Guchkov [President of the Central War-Industry Committee], members of the Duma, and others were called by telephone and, finally, through their mediation, the police allowed the meeting to go on, but remained to listen.

⁴ "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," Nos. 2-3, October 14, 1915, 228-32.

Representatives of the two wings of the Social-Democrats [Mensheviks and Bolsheviks] and of the Narodniks [Socialist-Revolutionists] made speeches.

All agreed that the workmen should have the right to organize, that it was necessary to have unions, coöperatives, etc., to fight the high cost of living. But when it came to questions in which Marxists' and Narodniks' doctrines were involved, they disagreed. The Bolsheviks favored taking part in the primary election but opposed participating in the final. Instead of voting at that time they proposed to proclaim their program.⁵ The Mensheviks took the stand that the workmen should take a broader view, make use of the elections to form factory and municipal committees, and attempt to call a labor congress, etc. The Narodniks, though not advocating any particular program, were yet not in favor of participating beyond electing delegates.

By the time it came to the resolutions, it was already ten o'clock. The political demands were accepted, with the exception of the point relating to a responsible ministry, which the majority did not support. It was decided to call a new meeting to take up the question of election. . . .

On September 11, there was a large meeting of workmen at the Lessner factory to discuss the question of participation in the Central War-Industry Committee. Police appeared and asked the workmen to leave, but no attention was paid and the meeting continued. It passed a resolution, emphasizing the need of utilizing the election campaign to organize labor on a large scale and demand the calling of a labor congress to decide whether the workmen should participate in the War-Industry Committee. . . .

In connection with the election of representatives of labor to the Central War-Industry Committee and the need of having free pre-election meetings, chairman A. I. Guchkov and vice-chairman A. I. Kononov, of the Central War-Industry Committee, called on Prince N. B. Scherbatov, Minister of the Interior. They impressed upon him the importance of having free elections so as to interest the workmen of the capital in the great work. Guchkov also went to see General Frolov, the chief of the Petrograd Military District, while Kononov called on Prince Obolenski, the head of the Petrograd police.

⁵ There were two elections. In the first one every factory having no less than five hundred workmen elected one delegate for every thousand employees. In the second election the delegates selected ten men to represent them in the Central War-Industry Committee.

All the above-named representatives of the Government said that they would place no obstacles to the election of such delegates. On September 14, Konovalov and M. S. Margulies went to see Prince Shakhovskoi, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and asked him to issue instructions along that line to the factory inspectors, which he promised to do.

It was intended to ask all government factories to take part in the election. With that in mind, Konovalov went to the Ministries of War and Navy and to the Red Cross to ask that elections be permitted in their institutions. . . .

The Central War-Industry Committee sent 1,130,000 notices to the different factories, calling upon the workmen to unite with the public organizations to drive off the foe, notifying them that the authorities had been asked to keep the police and inspectors from interfering in the pre-election assemblies and the elections, and requesting the owners of factories to assist the workmen in every possible way, provide them with halls, etc. for discussion and election. . . .

In many factories there were large, orderly meetings, at which labor decided to take part in the election. The workmen made some changes in the electoral system suggested by the War-Industry Committee. They [workmen] proposed that commissions should be selected in every factory to count votes, to take up with the city authorities matters relating to the elections, etc. Workmen attach much importance to these commissions, hoping that they may become permanent bodies and occupy themselves with the welfare of the workers, cost of living, improvement in labor conditions, etc. . . . At pre-election meetings, it was agreed to name candidates, one for every thousand workmen. . . . It is likely that the number of men chosen will be greater than that supposed by the War-Industry Committee. . . .

The appeal of the Central War-Industry Committee to the workmen to participate in the mobilization of industry became the most discussed question in all the large Petrograd factories. The original plan of some groups, to elect workmen to the Central War-Industry Committees, did not meet with much response in Labor circles. Several pre-election meetings of workmen had already taken place and the question was thoroughly discussed.

At the "Novyi Lessner" factory there was a large pre-election meeting on September 25. The management set aside one of its large shops for this purpose, erected a tribune for the speakers, and

placed a table for the chairman. In short, it offered the workmen opportunities that they had not enjoyed for a long time. Representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Narodniks made speeches.

The meeting did not end without differences of opinion. It was decided to name a factory commission to count votes, prepare for the election, etc. . . .

It became clear immediately that there would be two tickets: One of the Mensheviks and Narodniks combined, and the other of the Bolsheviks. The majority voted for the combined ticket. Before voting, it was proposed that the three parties be given an equal number of candidates and all go on the same ticket, but the Bolsheviks declined. Consequently, the commission of twenty-six persons elected were made up of Mensheviks and Narodniks. The next question taken up was the selection of a committee of five to prepare for the election of representatives to the War-Industry Committee. There was no agreement even on this point.

At the time of selecting the committee, which will take place on October 5, two tickets will be put in the field. When some people present expressed their discontent with the way the political groups were acting, the Bolsheviks left the hall. The meeting lasted five hours, and the workers of the two shifts took part.

(c) MEETING OF MINISTERIAL COUNCIL ⁶

September 6, 1916

Scherbatov: Guchkov's Central War-Industry Committee has decided to have elections in the factories for representatives to the labor section. . . .

Shakhovskoi: I fear that the labor leaders will make use of this opportunity to carry on agitation. . . . They are very much opposed to Guchkov's Committee but they will not decline to form the beginning of a labor center. . . . It would be well to open Guchkov's eyes so that he may see where his committee and its labor section is leading to.

Khvostov: Guchkov would not believe us. . . .

⁶ "Arkhirv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 101.

4. THE MAIN COMMITTEES TO SUPPLY THE ARMY OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN UNIONS OF ZEMSTVOS AND CITIES ⁷

[Soon after the outbreak of the War the principal cities of Russia formed a Union of Cities and the zemstvos a Union of Zemstvos. At the head of each union was a board of directors known as the Main Committee. During the first ten months of the war these unions rendered very valuable Red Cross services. The Union of Zemstvos alone had 175,000 beds, sanitary trains, etc. Members of the Union helped not only the soldiers but the refugees.

When after the Russian defeats in Galicia, in the spring of 1915, it became clear that the army was poorly supplied with clothing and ammunition and that the task was too big for the Government, the unions offered their help. On June 12, 1915, there was a joint meeting of the two Main Committees to discuss how they could be of assistance. Before coming to a definite decision it was agreed to call together the mayors of cities and representatives of zemstvos in order to learn what they could do.

On June 18 the two unions met separately and deliberated several days on the questions before them. The Union of Zemstvos agreed that it was its duty to help supply the army with food, clothing and ammunition, that this could be done best by working through the Union as a whole rather than through the parts, that the executive power of the Union should be in the hands of the Main Committee and five others to be selected, and that in order to coördinate its efforts with that of the War-Industry Committee it should have representatives in that body. A somewhat similar resolution was passed by the Union of Cities.

Each of the unions went to work separately. It put itself in touch with the Government, with the War-Industry Committee, and other organizations working for the Army. After a two months' trial, it was concluded that for the sake of bringing about better coördination the two unions should work through one head, and they formed the Main Committee to Supply the Army. This body was composed of the president and four members of each union. It was the duty of this new organization to receive Government credits and war orders, to distribute these orders among the zemstvos and cities, and to build such factories as were needed to fill the orders. The

⁷ "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," No. 1, September, 1915, 1-34.

Union of Zemstvos was represented in the new body by its president, Prince G. E. Lvov, and N. S. Lopukhin, D. M. Schepkin, S. M. Leontev, N. N. Kovalevski; the Union of Cities was represented by the president, M. V. Chelnokov, and N. V. Nekrasov, N. A. Arteniev, A. G. Khrushov, M. I. Tereschenko.]

RESOLUTION⁸ OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HIGH COST OF LIVING

Moscow, July 24-26, 1915⁹

The year of the war has put the country to a great test. The results achieved and the great sacrifices offered show that the brave Russian army was not sufficiently equipped with fighting material. The necessary measures for providing the needed supplies were not taken in time by the organs of the Government, which are not responsible to the country.

The great effort and sacrifice of our army is made more difficult by the internal disorganization of the food supply, trade, and transport. The army and the civilian population are ready to make sacrifices and to undergo hardships to defend the country and to conquer the enemy who has crossed our border.

At the opening of the war all the elements of the population, conscious of their historic duty to the country and her future, united in the struggle for victory. But this burst of enthusiasm and popular exertion found no way of expressing itself.

The expectation that there would be a transformation in the organs of Government was not realized.

1. In order to succeed in the fight it is necessary to bring together all the forces of the land and to adapt, as quickly as possible, the whole life of the country to a state of war.

2. In this time of danger, an act to conciliate and to forget the old political fight would arouse the spirit of the population and would bring back to work and to public service many citizens who, for political reasons, have been kept away.

3. With the view of uniting all the forces of the country, an end should be put to the legal differences that exist between the different religions and nationalities in Russia.

4. For the same reason and in order to fight effectively against

⁸ "Izvestiia Vserossiiskago Soiuza Gorodov," No. 16, August, 1915, 31-2.

⁹ Representatives of the Union of Cities, coöperatives, labor organizations, public organizations, and learned professions were present at this conference. It was the first meeting of its kind after the outbreak of the war and the first opportunity for the expression of public opinion.

the high cost of living, as well as to provide steady and better conditions of employment in factories and mills, it is necessary to permit at once the free organization of labor, and to grant freedom of speech and the press.

5. Without taking into consideration the different forms of popular representation which are proposed by the various political groups and parties, the Conference agrees that at the present time, for the successful carrying on of the war, the Government should at least be made up of persons who have the confidence of the country. Only such men will make the Government strong, vigorous, capable of carrying this great country to victory.

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ¹⁰

August 31, 1915.

MINISTRY OF CONFIDENCE

Scherbatov: At the home of Kononov at Moscow there was a secret meeting of the so-called progressive men, which, in other words, means Cadets, and their sympathizers, to discuss the present position of the country. The reports which have reached me indicate that those present unanimously agreed to make use of the present favorable situation to demand a new government, which has the confidence of the country and possesses full power. . . .

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ¹¹

September 1, 1915

MINISTRY OF CONFIDENCE

Krivoshein: . . . The report of the Minister of the Interior [that the Moscow Duma had passed a resolution asking for a Ministry of Confidence] disturbs me a great deal. It agrees with the news which I have received from Moscow. . . . There is no doubt that other cities, zemstvos, and public organizations will make similar demands and requests. Imagine our position when not only the press and the War-Industry Committee but all the public organizations start a loud clamor for a Ministry having the confidence of the country. . . . Let us betimes find a way out, take a definite stand, have a clear plan. . . . We should talk to the Emperor . . . and

¹⁰ "Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 77.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 84.

tell him frankly the position in which His Government . . . finds itself. . . . We should tell His Majesty . . . that there are but two ways out of the difficulty: either a strong war dictatorship, if a strong person can be found, or an understanding with the public. . . . Hesitation, middle courses, and waiting for something to happen will not get us anywhere. . . .

MEETING OF THE IMPERIAL COUNCIL ¹²

September 3, 1915

MINISTRY OF CONFIDENCE

Goremykin: . . . In my opinion the reply to the telegram [of the Moscow Duma] should limit itself to the thanks of His Majesty for their loyalty. . . .

Sazonov: This will not do, it sounds like irony. It is not a question of loyalty. The telegram was written by people whose hearts are bleeding for their country. . . . It is very difficult to make a case for a Government which is not strong and which has not the confidence of the country.

Scherbatov: . . . It is one of two, either ignore and be silent about these public demands or meet them half way. . . .

Goremykin: . . . The agitation which is now going on [discussion shifted to the subject of the Tsar replacing the Grand Duke as Supreme Commander] is bound up with the public clamor for a Ministry of Confidence, *i. e.*, limiting the power of the Tsar, and is nothing else than an attempt of the left to make use of the Grand Duke to discredit the Emperor. . . .

Sazonov: . . . We categorically protest against this interpretation of this public agitation. It is not the result of intrigue but a cry of self-help and we should join in it.

Goremykin: . . . Believe me with concessions you will get nowhere. It is clear that all these parties in favor of a change are taking advantage of the unfavorable war situation to limit the power of the Monarchy.

Khwostov: No matter how much you give, the Chkhaidzes and Kerenskis will still be dissatisfied and will not stop to agitate the public. . . .

Sazonov: What have we to do with such insignificant fellows as the Kerenskis and Chkhaidzes and other revolutionists? We are not

¹² "Arkhir Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 90-7.

thinking of them but of Russia, which is being forced into the arms of these men. . . .

5. PROGRESSIVE BLOC

*September 7, 1915*¹⁸

The undersigned representatives of factions and groups of the State Council and State Duma, actuated by the conviction that only a strong, firm, and active authority can lead the fatherland to victory, and that such an authority can be only that which rests upon popular confidence and is capable of organizing the active coöperation of all citizens, have arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the most important and essential object of creating such an authority cannot be attained without the fulfilment of the following conditions:

1. The formation of a united Government, composed of individuals who enjoy the confidence of the country, and who have agreed with the legislative institutions upon the execution, at the earliest date, of a definite program.
2. Decisive change in the methods of administration employed thus far, which have been based upon a distrust of public self-help, in particular:
 - (a) Strict observance of the principles of legality in the administration.
 - (b) Abolition of the dual authority of civil and military powers in questions having no direct bearing upon the conduct of military operations.
 - (c) Renewal of the local administrators.
 - (d) A sensible and consistent policy directed towards the maintenance of internal peace and the removal of cause of dissension between nationalities and classes.

For the realization of such a policy the following measures must be adopted, by means of administration, as well as legislation:

1. By means of Imperial clemency, a discontinuation of cases started on charges of purely political and religious crimes, not aggravated by crimes of a generally felonious character; the release from punishment and the restoration of rights, including the right of participation in the elections to the State Duma, Zemstvo, and municipal institutions, etc., of persons condemned for such crimes;

¹⁸ "Riech," No. 234, September 8, 1915.

and the amelioration of the condition of others condemned for political and religious crimes, with the exception of spies and traitors.

2. The return of those exiled by administrative order, in cases of a political and religious character.

3. Absolute and definite cessation of persecution on religious grounds, under any pretext whatsoever, and revocation of circulars issued in restriction and distortion of the sense of the Ukaz of April 17 [30], 1905.

4. Solution of the Russo-Polish problem, *viz.*: abolition of restrictions upon the rights of Poles throughout Russia; the prompt drafting and presentation to the legislative institutions of a bill for the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, and the simultaneous revision of the laws concerning Polish land ownership.

5. Entry upon the path of abolition of restrictions upon the rights of the Jews, in particular, further steps towards the abolition of the Pale of Settlement, facilitation of admission to educational establishments, and removal of obstacles to the choice of professions. Restoration of the Jewish press.

6. A policy of conciliation in the question of Finland, in particular, changes in the composition of the Administration and Senate; cessation of persecution against officials.

7. Restoration of the Little Russian press; immediate revision of cases of inhabitants of Galicia kept in confinement or exiled; and the release of those wrongfully subjected to persecution.

8. Restoration of activity of trade unions, and cessation of persecution of workers' representatives in the sick-benefit organizations, on suspicion of membership in an unlegalized party. Restoration of the labor press.

9. Agreement between the government and the legislative institutions regarding the early introduction of:

a) All bills immediately concerned with the national defense, the supply of the army, welfare of the wounded, care of the refugees, and other problems directly related to the war.

b) The following legislative program aiming at the organization of the country for coöperation towards victory and maintenance of internal peace:

Equalization of peasants' rights with those of other classes.

Establishment of *volost zemstvos*.¹⁴

Change of zemstvo statutes of 1890.

Change of municipal statutes of 1892.

¹⁴ Volost—unit corresponding to township.

Establishment of zemstvo institutions in the border regions, such as Siberia, Archangel Province, Don Territory, The Caucasus, etc.

A bill concerning the coöperative societies.

A bill concerning rest for commercial employees.

Improvement of the material condition of the post and telegraph employees.

Confirmation of temperance for all time.

Concerning zemstvo and municipal congresses and unions.

Statutes concerning revisions.

Introduction of Courts of the Peace in those provinces where their establishment was held back by financial considerations.

Inauguration of legislative measures that may be indispensable to the administrative execution of the above outlined program of action.

For the progressive group of Nationalists,

COUNT V. BOBRINSKI.

For the faction of the Center,

V. Lvov.

For the faction of Zemstvo-Octobrists,

I. DMITRIUKOV

For the group of the Union of October 17th,

S. SHIDLOVSKI.

For the faction of Progressists,

I. EFREMOV.

For the faction of Popular Freedom,

P. MILIUKOV.

6. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOC¹⁵

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

September 8, 1915

ADJOURNMENT OF THE DUMA AND THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC

Goremykin: We should decide today the question of adjourning the legislative bodies. . . .

Polivanov: Was it not agreed last time that before deciding there should be a conference with Rodzianko and other well disposed deputies? We should like to hear the results of these conversations. . . .

¹⁵ "Arkhirv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 105-27.

Gorcmynkin: I have as yet had no conversations. They are unnecessary until after the Council of Ministers has determined the time of adjournment. If I should raise the question with that chatterbox Rodzianko the whole world would know about it. I shall talk to him when all is settled.

Sazonov: . . . There is no doubt that this act [adjournment] will lead to disturbances, not only among public organizations associated with the Duma but . . . also among the workmen. . . . We should examine the question from different angles. It may be that the "meetings" of the Duma is a lesser evil than labor troubles without the Duma.

Grigorovich: According to my information the adjournment of the Duma will certainly lead to disorders. . . .

Goremykin: . . . The Government will be blamed no matter what happens. . . .

Sazonov: . . . Our wish to become acquainted with the program of the bloc [Progressive Bloc] is known to all. Would it be well to dismiss the Duma without first discussing the acceptability of the program with the majority [in Duma]. . . . I think that we could come to an understanding. . . . After having come to an agreement the deputies would go home feeling . . . that the Government is ready to meet their just requests. It would be a great mistake to turn our backs on them and give the adjournment the appearance of forcible expulsion. . . .

Goremykin: . . . Talking with them will get us nowhere. There is no reason for associating the labor troubles with the adjournment of the Duma. . . . Labor leaders are handicapped by lack of organization. The organization is badly crippled by the arrest of five members of the Duma.¹⁶ . . .

Sazonov: . . . There is a practical question before us: To what extent will the adjournment affect the factories and mills? A majority of the members of the Council of Ministers are of the opinion that it will affect the workmen, the country and the national defense. . . .

Goremykin: I am not disputing the fact that the adjournment of the Duma will be used for purpose of agitation. What guarantees have we that the workmen will not be stirred up if the Duma is in session? The moment that the labor leaders think they are strong enough and are sufficiently organized they will act. . . . Whether we are with the Bloc or against it is a matter of indifference to labor.

¹⁶ G. I. Petrovskii, A. E. Badaev, M. K. Muranov, F. N. Samoilov and N. P. Shagov. They were arrested on November 24, 1914.

There are other ways of dealing with the labor movement. The Minister of the Interior has always taken care of that.

Sazonov: I disagree. It is not right to ignore the public in war time. It would be better to unite all classes of the population. . . .

Goremykin: The Bloc was formed to seize power. It will not last long and its members will start fighting among themselves.

Sazonov: It seems to me that for the good of the State we should support the Bloc because of its moderation. If it should go to pieces its successor would be much more radical. . . . Who will benefit by that? In any case not Russia.

Polivanov: What effect will that have on the national defense, and on the enemy who is carefully watching our internal disorganization. . . .

Sazonov: It is dangerous to excite the radicals and to take the fight outside of parliament. . . . The situation is bad enough without making it worse. . . .

Goremykin: I regard the Bloc itself . . . as unacceptable. Its aim—to limit the power of the Tsar—is poorly concealed. . . .

Shakhovskoi: . . . The Duma is not legislating but is having "meetings," exciting the country and arousing the workmen. Its adjournment may or may not lead to disorders. Of these two evils I prefer the lesser and am in favor of adjournment at once, even tomorrow. But we should do it in a nice kind of way. Have a talk with representatives of the Bloc about their program, and come to some understanding with them, et cetera. By following this conciliating policy we are making it possible for members of the Duma to get out of a bad hole, for they realize the hopelessness of their situation and fear that they may in the end become the playthings of the radical elements.

Scherbatov: The Duma should be adjourned now . . . but not in anger. . . . [If done in a proper manner] the adjournment will be to the credit of the Government and the country will know that we work in harmony with the Duma. It will make it easier for us to govern and to carry out some of the tasks of the war. . . .

Goremykin: You forget that one of the fundamental points in the program of the Bloc is a prolonged session. . . .

Scherbatov: That is only for public consumption.

Sazonov: A majority of the Duma is against a long session.

Goremykin: Yes, but it will never admit it publicly.

Sazonov: But it will not stand in the way of adjourning the session and, in case of necessity, will support us. But first of all we

must come to an understanding and agree on a joint program of action during the adjournment.

Kharitonov: I, too, am in favor of adjournment but on the conditions just suggested. Let's examine together the program of the Bloc and throw away what we cannot accept.

Goremykin: About three-fourths of it will have to go.

Scherbatov: How can we tell before we have examined it? But even so there will be enough left to form a basis for discussion and compromise. . . .

Khvostov: I have not much faith in all this but I am not against talking it over [with the Bloc] . . .

Goremykin: These talks should not bind the Government. We cannot assume formal obligations. This is not the time for it.

Kharitonov: This is beside the mark. Just now it is not a question of agreements but of getting information. . . .

Goremykin: . . . Let's take a look at the program of the Bloc and see whether we can come to an agreement on it among ourselves. . . . [Examination of the various points of the program follows].

Sazonov: It is now clear that between the Bloc and the Government there can be no practical questions on which an agreement cannot be reached. According to the opinion expressed here . . . it is evident that five-sixths of the program of the Bloc may be incorporated in the program of the Government.

Goremykin: I do not like to have it put that way. If the Government finds to its advantage to carry out some of the proposed measures it may do so, but to accept the whole program of the Bloc and tie our hands in war time is unthinkable.

Sazonov: It is not a question of tying hands with a formal treaty, but only to come to some understanding to make mutual concessions and thereby gain mutual support.

Goremykin: Which means talk and more talk with the Bloc. . . . What are we going to decide about the adjournment of the Duma? In any case this decision should be made before a conference with members of the Bloc. . . .

Polivanov: . . . We can set a definite date only after the conference. . . .

Goremykin: I am going to ask the State Comptroller [Kharitonov], assisted by the Ministers of Justice, Commerce, and Interior, to enter into conversations with representatives of the Bloc. The conversation should have as its object the getting of information and

the bringing about of an atmosphere of good-will so that we may part as friends and not as enemies. . . . Just now there can be no question of coming to an agreement. If no obstacles should arise we could renew our conversations in November.

[Kharitonov and his associates met with members of the Bloc on September 9 and on the day following reported the results of the meeting. The Ministers were of the opinion that an understanding could be reached with the Bloc and recommended that the discussions continue a day or two longer. Goremykin, however, was unwilling to waste any more time and put the question of adjournment to a vote. Most of the Ministers favored adjournment, but insisted that nothing should be done which might antagonize the Duma and public organizations. They pointed out to Goremykin the tremendous influence these institutions had at the front and in the rear and that without their support the war could not be won and the revolutionary movement halted. Not being able to come to an agreement, Goremykin went to see the Emperor at Headquarters. On his return the Ministers were assembled.]

(b) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ²⁷

September 15, 1915

Scherbatov: Police agents are unanimously agreed that there are going to be very serious labor troubles. . . . At the Putilov works there was a clash between the workmen and the police. The workmen demand that the Duma should not be adjourned, that the five radical Duma deputies be freed, that their wages be increased fifteen per cent., et cetera. These reasons are mere pretexts. The real object of the unseen labor leaders is to make use of the unfortunate military situation and internal unrest to bring on a social revolution and to seize power.

Sazonov: The picture before us is gloomy indeed. On the one hand labor troubles, seemingly organized, and on the other the cup of discontent among the public organizations in Moscow is full and running over. It is reported that, on the ground of carrying on the war to a victorious end, members of the Duma together with the Congresses of Zemstvos and Cities are aiming to declare themselves a constituent assembly. Things are seething, brewing everywhere . . . and at this threatening time it is proposed to adjourn the Duma. . . .

²⁷ "Arkhirv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 132-6.

Goremykin: . . . I have His Majesty's command to close the Duma not later than Thursday, September 16, which I shall do.

Sazonov: But we all remember that on September 3 His Majesty was gracious enough to grant our petition to act on the question of adjourning the Duma only after the Council of Ministers had deliberated and reported. Does it mean that the Emperor has changed his mind? We should like to know the reasons for the change.

Goremykin: His Majesty's will, definitely expressed, is not subject for discussion by the Council of Ministers. I should like to ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs not to put such questions to me.

Sazonov: We are not mere figureheads, but men responsible for the government of Russia. If we are not to discuss questions on which the fate of Russia depends then what is the use of the meetings of the Council of Ministers?

Goremykin: I reported to His Majesty everything that has been said here on the adjournment of the Duma and the change in policy. I gave Him the different opinions of the Ministers and all the details. His comment was that I should close the Duma and that all Ministers should remain at their posts. What else is there to be said?

Polivanov: The whole question is *how* you reported our opinions.

Sazonov: Just *what* did you say?

Goremykin: I reported *how* and *what* took place at the Council meeting. I will not permit that question to be put to me in this manner.

Sazonov: But in view of the fact that our humble advice was declined we are naturally interested to know what caused His Majesty to issue such a sharp order.

Goremykin: If you wish to know . . . ask the Emperor. I am not obliged and do not think it necessary for me to reply.

Sazonov: Naturally, if I cannot get an answer here I shall turn to the Emperor. . . .

Krivoshin: Of course, His Majesty's orders are not subject to discussion. But I think that it is not only our right but our duty to look into the possible consequences of the act about to take place.

Sazonov: It is clear to every Russian that the consequences will be terrible, that the very existence of the state is in the balance.

Goremykin: His Majesty sees things differently. I called his attention to the dangers brought out in the Council of Ministers, but the Emperor did not change his opinion. What more is there to say? It is now time to act should any kind of disorders arise.

Scherbatov: In order to guide me in the future I should like to

have the opinion of the Council of Ministers on the Moscow Congresses [zemstvo and cities]. The Governor [of the guberniia], the Governor of the city, and the director of the police agree that the situation in Moscow is very serious. The city is seething, aroused, irritated, strongly anti-government, and looks for betterment through radical changes. The flower of the intelligentsia opposition is gathered there and demands authority to carry the war to a victorious end. The workmen, and the population as a whole, have lost their heads and are excellent inflammable material. An outbreak of disorder may come any minute. Unfortunately there is hardly any force in Moscow to put it down. There is on hand only one battalion of reserves of about eight hundred men, only half of whom are available, for the other half is on guard duty at the Kremlin and at other places. There is in addition one hundred Cossacks, and finally a few companies of armed volunteers in the suburbs. Even this force is not altogether dependable and it would be difficult to get it to come out against the mob. In the uiezd there are no troops at all. Neither the city nor the uiezd police is large enough to meet the needs of the situation. I should also remark that Moscow has about thirty thousand convalescent soldiers. It is a turbulent, undisciplined band. It behaves disgracefully and falls foul of the police (recently one of the force was killed by them). . . . There is no doubt that in case of disorders this horde will side with the mob. What would you advise the Minister of the Interior to do under the circumstances? You must keep in mind that he has not full authority for the military is there. How can I oppose the congresses, which are out of legal bounds but which may at any minute get the mob on their side and cause an explosion? Legally we can interfere but practically what can we do? Speaking generally, I should say that the Unions of Zemstvos and Cities are . . . a colossal Government blunder. Such organizations should not have been allowed without . . . definitely limiting the sphere of their activities. They started out as charitable organizations, and have become tremendous institutions, possessing all kinds of functions, some of a purely State character, and are taking the place of government institutions. This was accomplished by means of usurpation under the protection of the military authorities, such as Danilov the red [General N. A.], who makes wide use of them and supplies them with large means. Lately they have even been referred to in the laws as official institutions, but there is nothing in the law to determine the composition of their personnel and the Government knows nothing of their

internal organization. They attract those who are trying to get out of military service, the opposition elements, and all kinds of gentlemen with political pasts. To close these institutions now is impossible because they work for the army and because of the political complications that would ensue. I suppose we must put up with them. There is no doubt whatever that the congresses will be occasions for political demonstrations or perhaps something worse. There will be rousing speeches, fiery resolutions, and such like. . . . What shall be done? . . .

Goremykin: If they just talk, let them talk. But if this talk is directed against the safety of the State they should be dispersed. . . . I call the attention of the Minister of the Interior to the need of acting with a strong hand . . .

Krivoshein: Today's discussion has clearly demonstrated that you, Ivan Loginovich [*Goremykin*] have lately drawn further and further apart from the majority of the Council of Ministers on matters of policy and in the evaluation of the present state of affairs. You have reported to the Emperor these differences in our points of view, and He agreed with you and not with us. You are now going to carry out the Imperial Order [adjournment of the Duma] and whatever comes out of it, but your collaborators, according to the Imperial Order, are the same men who have come out so strongly against your policy. Pardon me, just one question. What are you going to do when the Ministers are convinced that other means of action are necessary, when the whole machinery of Government in your hands is opposed to you, when the internal and external events become daily more and more threatening?

Goremykin: I shall do my duty to my Emperor to the end no matter what opposition and unpleasantness I may run up against. I told everything to the Emperor and begged him to put in my place a more up-to-date man, but His Majesty's order followed that, that's law to me. As to the future? His Majesty said that when he comes he will personally look into the whole question.

Sazonov: It may then be too late. Tomorrow blood may flow in the streets and Russia may be cast into the pit. Why! It is terrible! In any case, I say it loudly, that I assume no responsibility for your [*Goremykin*] acts and for the adjournment of the Duma at the present time.

Goremykin: I assume responsibility for my own acts and ask no one to share them with me. The Duma will adjourn on the day set and there will be no flowing of blood.

Polivanov: This is a debatable question which the events alone can answer. May I ask just how the act of adjournment will take place? Will there be some kind of an official announcement before the legislative bodies?

Goremykin: I do not regard it as necessary to appear either in the State Duma or in the State Council, and I do not intend to make any announcements. It is useless and untimely.

Polivanov: This means that you intend to break completely with the Duma. You do not intend to observe even outward respect for the legislative bodies which the Emperor summoned to work for the State.

Kharitonov: Never before was the Government present at adjournment.

Khvostov: I see no reason for making a precedent.

Sazonov: What happened before is no argument. Times have changed. It is now a question of the fate of Russia.

Goremykin: This is exaggeration and without foundation. If you are to be present at the adjournment of the Duma I see no obstacles in the way of your going.

Sazonov: Thank you very much for the suggestion. But I would rather not be associated with an act which means the commencement of the ruin of our country.

Goremykin: In any case the Duma will adjourn and I shall not be present. There is no more discussion. His Majesty's orders are not to be criticized in the Ministerial Council. I declare the meeting closed.

(c) THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLOC¹⁸

On September 10 the Council of Ministers met to hear the report of P. A. Kharitonov on his meeting the day before with those members of the legislative chambers who signed the program of the parliamentary bloc. . . .

When he had made his report, P. A. Kharitonov stated his own conclusions in general terms.

He noted the solidarity that existed among all the signatories of the agreement, and pointed out that the fact that there was such an agreement was worthy of serious attention, because the ideas therein expressed attracted representatives of most diverse political opinions. This, in itself, makes it necessary to treat this matter with especial care. In his view, the program outlined in the agreement did not contain anything censurable. If it were admitted that there is

¹⁸ "Riech," No. 237, September 11, 1915.

a possibility at the present moment of undertaking, in addition to the problems raised by the war, legislative means of a general character, then the program outlined in the document need not arouse any serious objections. But the practicability of this program, in the opinion of Kharitonov, was a different question, which, in view of the circumstances surrounding the Council of Ministers, he did not undertake to answer in the affirmative.

But the main point of the whole problem, in the opinion of P. A. Kharitonov, is Article 1, which deals with the question of forming a Government that would enjoy the confidence of the nation. While not denying the correctness of such a principle, in general, P. A. Kharitonov holds that this question is beyond the competence of the Council, which, in this instance, can only bring it—should that be found desirable—to the attention of the Sovereign Power, and a desire for such action was emphatically expressed by the members of the legislative chambers.

The report was followed by a discussion, from which it appears that the Council of Ministers recognizes that the *program drawn up by the signatories of the parliamentary agreement does not meet with serious objections, but that the Council of Ministers, as at present constituted, cannot take upon itself the task of its realization.*

As regards Article 1, *dealing with the formation of a Government enjoying the confidence of the country, the Council of Ministers resolved to bring it to the attention of the Sovereign Power.*

CHAPTER VIII

PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT

I. SPEECH OF THE CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ZEMSTVO UNION, PRINCE G. E. LVOV, AT THE CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PROVINCIAL ZEMSTVOS IN MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER

20-22, 1915¹

Gentlemen: At the very start of the war, when Russia was confronted with problems that were beyond the administrative capacities of our governmental machinery, and when the unprogressive methods which had become firmly and deeply rooted proved themselves bankrupt in the face of those unexpected, feverish demands of history which suddenly overwhelmed us,—we, men of the Zemstvo, went to work without any hesitation for the good of the State.

We knew that life itself would summon us to this work. To us, the call did not come as a surprise. Recall to your minds the modest proposals made to us at the beginning of the war, that we should take part in the relief of the sick and wounded soldiers, and compare them with our expectations at that time and the present state of affairs. We do not fight, and we do not now have to fight, for the right to take part in the activities of the State. Life itself is giving that right to us, and we have gradually gone ahead in our work, from rendering hospital service to supplying the wants of the army in the trenches, furnishing it with ammunition, preparing shells, constructing lines of defense, and so on. Hospital, commissary, artillery, engineering services, every branch of the life of our army at the front and in the rear, has become near and dear to us. We have actually been welded together with the army. National in its objects, the war has become truly national in the manner of its conduct as well. . . .

¹ "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," Nos. 2-3, October 14, 1915, 4-7; published by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and Cities. Lvov, Georgi Evgenievich (1862-1925) became Prime Minister of the Provisional Government.

Gentlemen, this national war has turned upside down all the old notions, traditions, and the old standards. In reality, we have no longer those old divisions and cells among which the component parts of the body politic had been distributed and artificially maintained. All distinctions between the nationalities composing our State, all party differences, are obliterated. The age-old distribution of functions among the different elements of the State is changing. It is true that the force of habit still makes them hold on to the old forms, but the new demands are more powerful than force of habit, and we all feel that life itself is seeking, and finding, a fresh channel for its mighty current. Life is stronger than laws that are written. Life writes its laws in the hearts and in the minds of men before they write them down on paper, and we do not even notice how we enter a different kind of life, and that we are already living under new laws that are still unwritten.

Before us, gentlemen, there are now arising the most weighty and responsible tasks that ever could have confronted the citizens, even of the most perfect political régime. This war has equipped the forces of the public with all kinds of organs for performing the tasks of the State, but we must not ignore the fact that the war demands of us an ever-increasing exertion, and imposes upon us an ever-growing responsibility. We have already abandoned the position of mere passive objects of government. Actual events have in this particular domain far outstripped our fondest wishes. Life has shown that we have to be self-sufficing. Let us, therefore, rely upon ourselves, let us grow strong in our self-confidence. Only such faith could give us a firm basis for our attitude toward the historical events we are passing through at present.

Upon our conference, gentlemen, history has laid a vast and responsible task. In difficult moments of the national life, the Zemstvos, in their capacity of leading public organization, ought to maintain, like the keel of a ship in the face of the storm, the steady course of the State. The country feels that everything is not as it ought to be, and it is only natural that it should feel alarmed, and that its heart should beat faster. And Russia now expects of you, gentlemen, some weighty word. Speak it calmly, in the full consciousness of your duty: Let not the Russian Land despair because of its sore trials; let not the faith of the Russian people in their might be shaken; and let them have no doubt as to the ultimate happy issue. For us, no peace is possible. No yoke will be accepted by the Russian people. For them, there can be only one issue of this war—complete

victory. We are now retreating, yes, but we know that we shall again advance. We are fully aware that our valiant army and our heroic people are conquering, even while retreating. Their valor and their self-sacrifice give strength also to our own spirit, the spirit of the rear. And it is our sacred duty to uphold this spirit, this courage, and to organize for a conquering spirit in the rear. But we must not for an instant forget that the future of our national existence, of our great country, hinges not only upon the issues of the war, but likewise upon the things that happen in the course of the war. We are fully aware that the loftier the ideal we are aiming at, the longer and harder must be the road we have to travel, and the more we shall require endurance and patience.

Our country is longing not only for the resumption of peaceful existence, but for the reorganization of that existence. Never before has the need of solidarity among all the forces of our country, probably, been felt as keenly as at this time. Never before has this unity, which was proclaimed from the heights of the throne as the pledge of a victorious issue, been needed as urgently as now.

We are happy to see how deep this unity has gone among the masses of the people, a unity that has actually welded together all the nationalities of the empire into a single unit with the army. To our regret, however, we fail to observe solidarity between the ruling powers and the people, and this we are bound to declare emphatically to these powers, for that is the only thing that still obstructs our organization of victory.

Exactly three months ago, when it was made clear to the Russian people that our valiant army was forced to retreat before the enemy because it was lacking shells, we,² and the whole country with us, unanimously agreed that the lawful popular representatives should take part in the work for the national defense. We believed that it was possible, on the basis of one single, common, sacred purpose—the salvation of our native country—to organize the activities of the public and governmental forces so as to be animated by a spirit of mutual confidence. Today, after two months of work by the State Duma, we feel even more convinced of that necessity.

Like a shining lamp in the dark labyrinth of events along the mysterious paths of history, the State Duma has always been showing the way out. And we cannot help recognizing that this suspension³ of its sessions throws us back into darkness, that it harms the cause

² Meeting of Zemstvo Union, June 18, 1915.

³ September 16, 1915.

of the national defense, that it weakens our army. So ardently desired by the whole country, the powerful combination of governmental and public effort has not been brought about. But this has by no means rendered the consciousness of the necessity of mutual confidence between the forces of the Government and the public less acute; on the contrary, it has only strengthened it. At the very first indication that a certain section of our government was inclined to look upon the work of the State Duma as superfluous, the whole of Russia experienced something like a shock and declared that a new Government was needed. But we are faced with a fact: the Government itself intends to organize for victory, and considers it unnecessary for the popular representatives to take part.

At moments like these we have to manifest civic courage of a high order, bearing in mind that it is not the Government, but the people, that is fighting the war. The Government may hold itself aloof from the people, but we shall be only still more confirmed in our conviction that the organization of victory is possible only through full union of the Government and people, through their legal representatives, and we regard it as indispensable to have the work of the State Duma resumed as soon as possible.

But in the face of the formidable foe, we must not be dismayed, because of this situation that prevails. Let the purely formal responsibility for the issue of the war and for the fate of our country rest with the Government; upon us will always rest the duty of true sons of our fatherland, and this we are bound to discharge under any circumstances. And so we shall continue unflinchingly to work and to perform our national duty.

2. RESOLUTIONS

(a) RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CITIES OF RUSSIA

*September 22, 1915*⁴

The Congress of Representatives of the Cities of Russia considers it a sacred duty at this moment of sore trial to salute warmly our steadfast, valiant army. May it rest assured that all the thoughts and sentiments of Russia's citizens are united in the effort to win a victory, in the fervent desire to assist our heroes with all our means

⁴ "Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," Nos. 2-3, October 14, 1915, 38-9, published by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and Cities.

in the trying struggle that has fallen to their lot. As heretofore, the Russian people is determined to prosecute the war to final victory, in perfect accord with our faithful Allies.

But fatal obstacles in the path of final victory, the old faults of our State organization are still here: the irresponsibility of the Government, and its lack of real contact with the people. A determined and real turning toward a new path is indispensable. It is demanded by patriotic duty.

In the place of the present Government, there should be summoned persons possessing the confidence of the nation; the constructive work of the popular representatives should be resumed without delay; and internal peace and solidarity of spirit—those important conditions of victory—should be assured in our country by reconciliation, the forgetting of the political strife of the past, and the equality of all citizens before the law.

The Representatives of the Cities of Russia, inspired by a firm belief in the future of our country, in perfect self-control and the calm assurance of the righteousness of their cause and power, will continue, in common with the whole nation, their tireless and concerted activity in aid of the army, mindful of the fact that every hour of interruption in this work would defer the achievement of victory. . . .

The Congress of Representatives of the Cities of Russia has appointed a special deputation of three persons,⁵ together with representatives of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos, to bring to the notice of the Emperor the alarms and hopes which are agitating the nation, and to express the view of this Congress on the necessity of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion, the immediate resumption of work in the legislative institutions, and the summoning to the Government of such persons as enjoy the confidence of the nation.⁶

(b) RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PROVINCIAL ZEMSTVOS

September 22, 1915⁷

At this dreadful hour of national trial, we, the Representatives of the Provincial Zemstvos, united in the All-Russian Union of

⁵M. V. Chelnokov, P. P. Riabushinski, N. E. Astrov.

⁶The Emperor refused to receive the combined deputation.

⁷"Izvestiia Glavnago Komiteta po Snabzheniiu Armii," Nos. 2-3, October 14, 1915, 16-7, published by the All-Russian Unions of Zemstvos and Cities.

Zemstvos and assembled at Moscow, reaffirm our unshaken faith in the strength and courage of our army, and our firm trust in ultimate victory, before which there should and could not be any thought of peace.

In the consciousness of the great responsibility to our fatherland which ought to unite all of its sons, we shall continue and expand with unflagging energy our work for the benefit of the army. But, although convinced of the possibility of utterly defeating the enemy, we see with alarm the approaching danger of a fatal disruption of that internal unity which, at the very beginning of the war, was proclaimed from the heights of the Throne as the true pledge of victory.

This peril can be averted only by a reformation of the Government, which will be powerful only if it has the confidence of the nation and is in unity with its lawful representatives.

The indispensable work of the State Duma in strengthening our defenses inspired courage and confidence not only among the popular masses, but in the army itself.

In accord with the wishes of the nation, the State Duma indicated the road that would lead Russia out of the trials which have been visited upon her. In this unprecedented unanimity of purpose in the Duma, the Government failed to join. It rejected the indicated program, and suspended the activities of the Duma. Coöperation of the representative and governmental forces has not been realized, although ardently desired by the whole country and indispensable to victory. We know how profoundly the public mind has been disturbed as a result of this.

It compels us once more to point out the need of the speediest resumption of the work of the State Duma, which alone can afford a reliable basis for a strong government. Then, and then only, will the powers of the Russian people be manifested in all their fullness, and Russia's capacity to bear the most difficult trials.

In the consciousness of our great responsibility and duty to our native country, let each one of us redouble his efforts to attain our common object, victory; and may concerted and zealous work preserve the order and tranquillity that are needed for the salvation of Russia.

The following resolution was also unanimously passed:

To instruct a deputation of three persons,^a specially selected by this Convention, to report to His Imperial Majesty the views which

^a Prince G. E. Lvov, P. V. Kamenski, S. N. Maslov.

appeared at the Convention of Representatives in connection with current events, and were expressed in the above resolution.

Considering the fact that the Congress of Representatives of Cities has also resolved to appoint a special deputation to report to His Imperial Majesty the resolution passed by that Congress, it is desirable that the deputations be presented to the Emperor together.

3. REPORT OF PRINCE SCHERBATOV, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, TO THE TSAR^{*}

September 29, 1915

At first, the prorogation of the State Duma caused great excitement among its members.

Among the representatives of its Left groups, the view was expressed that their members ought to be recalled from all government commissions created to help in the national defense; that pressure should be brought to bear on all public organizations devoted to this work to stop their activities; that a protest should be organized among the laboring masses against the prorogation of the State Duma; and that all means should be employed to force the Government to accept the program of the Progressive Bloc, formed in the Duma, demanding political amnesty, a responsible Ministry, and equal rights for the nationalities. Later, however, a more moderate view gained the upper hand among the members of the Duma, its advocates expressing themselves in favor of preserving absolute tranquillity in the country and of lending all public support to the work of organizing the country for victory. It was feared that the cessation of this work and the excitement and disorder which would inevitably follow the inauguration of the extremist program would, first of all, and above all, cause irreparable harm to the country itself, and weaken its efforts to fight the enemy.

In wider public spheres, too, the news of the prorogation of the State Duma has produced a very tense atmosphere. After the first moments of general consternation which followed this unexpected event, two dominant opinions were noticeable among the public. One, rather extreme, insisted upon the immediate presentation to the Government of a demand that it accept the program of the Progressive Bloc, threatening, otherwise, to stop the work of all the public organizations which serve the needs of the army. The other, more

^{*} Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 97-9.

moderate, considered such action untimely, for the reasons mentioned above, *i. e.*, injury to the national defense.

The agitation of the representatives of the extreme Left tendency in Petrograd and Moscow met with some success among the laboring masses, with the result that strikes broke out in many mills and factories, accompanied by acts of violence against the police officers and those workers who refused to join the strike.

But this movement among the workingmen not only failed to carry the masses into the extremist camp, but, indeed, had a sobering effect on the public, which was still under the impression of the May riots in Moscow. This was expressed in the resolutions passed at an extraordinary meeting of the Moscow City Council on September 18 to discuss the measures for ending the strike on the street railways. A resolution proposed at this meeting by some of the councilmen, to the effect that the public rejects all responsibility for the consequences of the present governmental policy and denounces its action in proroguing the State Duma, as a serious crime against the country, met with determined opposition from the majority which, following an appeal by Chelnokov, Mayor of Moscow, passed a resolution of an entirely different nature. It condemned the strike movement and merely pointed out the need of an early resumption of the sessions of the legislative chambers, and of having persons in the Government who enjoy the confidence of the nation.

A similar difference of opinion toward the prorogation of the State Duma was noted at the congresses of the Zemstvo and City Unions held at Moscow, September 20-22. Although their immediate object was to take steps toward a proper evacuation of wounded soldiers and refugees, they actually engaged in taking note of the attitude of various groups of the public toward the events now taking place in the country, and in framing a common plan of action.

Taking advantage of this situation, the representatives of the extremist parties of the State Duma and of the working people in the factories and mills were persistent in their attempts to exploit these congresses, chiefly that of the City Unions, for the passage of their own program, and with this object in view they tried to take a direct part in the work of the latter congress. However, thanks to the dominant influence of the adherents of the more moderate tendency, but especially of the Mayor of Moscow, Chelnokov, who refused to admit these representatives of the State Duma and the workingmen to any share in the congress of the City Unions,

also thanks to the Member of the State Duma, Shingarev, who, in his address, stressed the need of more moderate and careful tactics, both conventions adopted resolutions which disappointed the expectations of the extreme Left parties.

4. MILIUKOV'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA¹⁰

November 14, 1916

Gentlemen, Members of the State Duma!

With a heavy heart, I ascend this tribune today. You remember the circumstances under which the Duma met over a year ago, August 1, 1915. The Duma was then suffering from the blows of our military failures. These were due to the scarcity of munitions; and for this scarcity the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, was responsible. You recall how at that moment the country, under the influence of the terrible peril that had become obvious to all, demanded a union of the national forces and the formation of a Ministry composed of persons in whom the country had confidence. And you recall how even Minister Goremykin, at that time, admitted from this very platform that "the course of the war demands an immense, extraordinary spiritual and physical effort." You remember that the Government then yielded. The Ministers¹¹ who were odious to the public were then removed before the convocation of the Duma. Sukhomlinov, whom the country regarded as a traitor, was removed (*Cries on the left: "He is a traitor"*), and, in response to the demand of the popular representatives, Polivanov, at the session of August 10 announced to us, amid general applause, as you may recall, that a commission of investigation¹² had been appointed and a beginning made toward bringing the former Minister of War to justice. And, gentlemen, the public agitation at that time was not without consequences. Our army obtained what it needed, and the nation entered upon the second year of the war with the same enthusiasm as in the first year.

What a difference, gentlemen, there is now, in the 27th month of the war! A difference which is especially striking to me, after several months spent abroad. We are now facing new difficulties, and these difficulties are not less complex and serious, not less profound,

¹⁰ "Riech," No. 330, December 13, 1916.

¹¹ Sukhomlinov, Maklakov, Scheglovitov, Sabler.

¹² This commission, under the chairmanship of N. P. Petrov, was organized on August 7, 1915.

than those that confronted us in the spring of last year. The Government needed heroic measures to combat the general disorganization of the national economy.

We ourselves are the same as before; we, in this 27th month of the war, are the same as we were in the tenth and in the first month. As heretofore, we are striving for complete victory; as heretofore, we are prepared to make all the necessary sacrifices; and, as heretofore, we are anxious to preserve our national unity. But, I must say this candidly: there is a difference in the situation. We have lost faith in the ability of this Government to achieve victory (*Cries: "That's true"*), because, as far as this Government is concerned, neither the attempts at correction nor the attempts at improvement, which we have made here, have proved successful.

All the Allied Powers have summoned to the support of the Government the best men of all parties, all the confidence, and all those organizing elements present in their countries, which are better organized than our own country. What has our own Government accomplished? Our declaration has told that. When there was formed in the Fourth Duma a majority [Progressive Bloc], which the Duma lacked before, a majority ready to vote its confidence in a cabinet worthy of such confidence, then nearly all those men who might in some slight degree have expected confidence were forced, systematically, one after another, every one of them, to leave the cabinet.¹³ And, if we have formerly said that our Government had neither the knowledge nor the ability which were indispensable at the moment, we say now, gentlemen, that this present Government has sunk beneath the level on which it stood in the normal times of Russian life. (*Cries on the left: "True! Right!"*) And now the gulf between us and that Government has grown wider and impassable. (*Cries on the left: "True!"*) Gentlemen, a year ago, Sukhomlinov was placed under judicial investigation. Then the hateful Ministers were removed before the opening of the [Duma] session, but now the number of such ministers has been augmented by one. (*Cries on the left: "True!" A voice on the right: "Protopopov?"*) At that time, we did not appeal to the reason and the knowledge of the Government, but, instead, to its patriotism and its conscience. Can we do so now? (*Cries on the left: "Of course, not!"*)

In the French Yellow Book there has been published a German

¹³ Scherbatov, October 9, 1915; Samarin, October 13, 1915; Krivoshein, November 8, 1915; Kharitonov, February 7, 1916; Polivanov, March 26, 1916; Sazonov, July 20, 1916.

document in which rules are laid down for the disorganization of the enemy's country, showing how to stir up trouble and disorder. Gentlemen, if our own Government wanted deliberately to set itself a task, or if the Germans wanted to employ their own means for the same purpose—the means of influencing and of bribing—they could not do better than to act as the Russian Government has acted. (*Cries on the left: "Correct!" Rodichev: "Unfortunately, that is true."*) And now, gentlemen, you have the consequences. As early as the 26th of June, 1915, I uttered a warning from this platform that, "the poisonous seed of suspicion is already yielding abundant fruit," and, "from one end of the Russian land to the other, there are spreading the dark rumors of treachery and treason." I am quoting the very words which I then used. I pointed out at that time—and I am again quoting my own words—that, "these rumors reach high and spare none."

Alas, gentlemen, that warning, like all the others, was not heeded. Consequently, we find the following statements in the declaration of the twenty-eight presidents of guberniia zemstvo boards,¹⁴ who met at Moscow on the 11th of November of the present year: "Painful, terrible suspicions, sinister rumors of treachery and treason, of occult forces fighting for the benefit of Germany and striving, through the destruction of national unity and the sowing of dissension, to prepare the ground for a disgraceful peace, have reached a point where it is generally felt that an enemy hand is secretly influencing the course of our State affairs. It is but natural that from such foundation there should arise the rumor that our governing circles have admitted the uselessness of further struggle, the timeliness for ending the war, and the necessity of a separate peace."

Gentlemen, I should not like to dwell on those perhaps exaggerated, abnormal suspicions with which the alarmed conscience of a Russian patriot reacts to all that is taking place here. But how are you going to deny the possibility of such suspicions, when a handful of sinister individuals, from personal and base motives, direct the most important affairs of State? (*On the left: applause and cries, "True!"*) I hold in my hand the issue of the "Berliner Tageblatt" of September 16, 1916, carrying an article entitled, "Manuilov, Sturmer." The information contained in this article is partly belated, partly incorrect. Thus, the German writer is naïve enough to assume that it was Sturmer who had his personal secretary, Manasevich-Manuilov, arrested. But, gentlemen, you all know that this is not

¹⁴ Gubernskie Zemskie Upravly.

so, and that those persons who really arrested Manasevich-Manuilov, without asking Sturmer's consent, were removed from the cabinet in consequence.¹⁵ No, gentlemen, Manasevich-Manuilov knows too much for them to dare to arrest him. Sturmer did not arrest Manasevich-Manuilov. Sturmer freed him (*On the left: applause and cries, "True!" Rodichev: "Unfortunately this is the truth!"*).

You may ask, "Who is this Manasevich-Manuilov? why should he interest us?" I will tell you, gentlemen. Manasevich-Manuilov is a former official of the Russian secret service in Paris, the well-known "Mask" of the "Novoe Vremia," who contributed to that paper piquant details about the life of the underground revolutionists. But—and this is of greater interest to us—he is also the executor of special, secret missions. One of these missions may prove of immediate interest to us. A few years ago Manasevich-Manuilov attempted to carry out a mission entrusted to him by the German Ambassador, Pourtales, who set aside a large sum—it has been rumored that there were 800,000 rubles—to bribe the "Novoe Vremia." I am very glad to say that a member of the staff of the "Novoe Vremia" threw Manasevich-Manuilov out of his house, and it cost Pourtales not a little trouble to hush up this unpleasant story. This, gentlemen, is the kind of mission on which, not so long ago, was employed the private secretary of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sturmer. (*On the left, prolonged tumult and cries: "Shame!"*)

Presiding Officer: I ask that this noise be kindly stopped.

Miliukov, continuing: Why was that gentleman arrested? This has been known a long time, and I shall add nothing if I repeat what you already know. He was arrested because he accepted a bribe. But why was he released? This, gentlemen, is no secret, either. (*Tumult. Rodichev: "Everybody knows that!" Tumult. Cries: "Let us hear it! Silence!"*)¹⁶

Presiding Officer: I request the members of the State Duma to observe silence.

Miliukov, continuing: Manuilov, Sturmer—two other names are mentioned in that article,¹⁷ Prince Andronnikov and Metropolitan Pitirim. (*Tumult on the left.*) Allow me to dwell in greater detail

¹⁵ A. A. Khvostov, Minister of the Interior.

¹⁶ *Empress to Emperor, December 23, 1916:* "On Manuilov paper I beg you to write 'discontinue the case' and send it to Minister of Justice—an ugly story got up by others to harm our Friend, Pitirim, etc."—(*"Pisma Imperatritsy,"* II, 457.) *Emperor to Minister of Justice, December 27, 1916:* "I order you to discontinue the Manuilov case and not allow it to come to trial. Nicholas."—(*Semennikov: "Politika Romanovykh,"* 122.)

¹⁷ Article in "Berliner Tageblatt," mentioned above.

upon this appointment—I mean the appointment of Sturmer as Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was abroad¹⁸ when the appointment was made, and it is interwoven with the impressions of my foreign travels. Let me simply relate to you in consecutive order what I learned on my way over and back, and you can then draw your own conclusions.

Now, I had scarcely crossed the frontier, a few days after Sazonov's retirement, when, first, the Swedish, next, the German and Austrian newspapers carried a series of reports on the manner in which Germany had reacted to the appointment of Sturmer. Here is what those papers said. I will read the excerpts without any comment. The "Berliner Tageblatt": "The personality of Sazonov afforded the Allies a pledge of stability in the foreign policy of the past five years. Sturmer is a blank sheet of paper in foreign politics. Undoubtedly, he belongs to circles which look upon the war with Germany without special enthusiasm." The "Koelnische Zeitung": "We, Germans, have no cause to regret the latest change in the Russian Government. Sturmer will not obstruct the desire for peace in Russia." The "Neues Wiener Tageblatt": "Although this is not the day of diplomats, still it is a relief to see a man [Sazonov] retire upon whom rests the guilt of starting the war." The "Reichspost": "Sturmer will, at all events, be freer in his dealings with Downing Street." Especially interesting is the editorial article in the "Neue Freie Presse" of July 25: "No matter how well Russianized old Sturmer may be (Laughter), it still seems quite strange that in a war which has issued from Pan-Slavism, the foreign policy should be directed by a German (Laughter). Prime Minister Sturmer is free from the error which caused the war. He has not promised"—gentlemen, note this—"he did not promise never to conclude peace without Constantinople and the Straits. In Sturmer's person, a weapon has been acquired which may be employed as desired. Thanks to the policy of weakening the Duma, Sturmer has become the man who satisfies the secret wishes of the right wing, which is not at all anxious to be allied with England. He will not insist, like Sazonov, that it is necessary to render the Prussian military caste harmless."

But whence do the German and Austrian newspapers derive this confidence that Sturmer, in carrying out the wishes of the right wing, will act against England and against the continuance of the war? From the reports of the Russian press. At about that

¹⁸ A group from the Duma, among whom was Miliukov, made an official visit to England and France in May and June, 1916.

time, the Moscow papers published a memorandum of the extreme right wing—again, gentlemen, a memorandum of the extreme right, always a memorandum of the extreme right (*Zamyslovski*: "And every time it turns out to be a lie!"),—which was sent to Headquarters in July, before Sturmer's second trip. In that memorandum it is stated that, even though we ought to fight on to final victory, the war should be ended in good time, for otherwise the fruits of our victory would be lost through revolution. (*Zamyslovski*: "The signatures! The signatures!") This is an old theme for our Germanophiles, but is elaborated in a series of new attacks. (*Zamyslovski*: "The signatures! Let us have signatures!")

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma *Zamyslovski*, I request you not to speak from your seat.

Miliukov, continuing: I am citing Moscow newspapers.

Zamyslovski: Slanderer! name the signatures. Don't slander!"

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma *Zamyslovski*, I kindly ask you not to speak from your seat.

Zamyslovski: Give us the signatures, slanderer!

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma *Zamyslovski*, I call you to order!

Vishnevski the First: We demand the signatures; he must not slander!

Presiding Officer: Member of the State Duma *Vishnevski the First*, I call you to order.

Miliukov, continuing: I have given you my sources—they are the Moscow newspapers from which reprints were published in foreign papers. I am telling you how the announcement of Sturmer's appointment was interpreted in the foreign press. I am telling you that from this reprint of the Moscow papers the impression has spread abroad that a memorandum was submitted to Headquarters by the extreme right, stating the theory that this war ought to be ended soon because otherwise things would go badly, as there would be a revolution.

Zamyslovski: "Slanderer! That is what you are!"

Markov the Second: "He merely communicated something he knew to be untrue."

A voice on the left: Are such expressions from the benches permissible, Mr. Presiding Officer?

Presiding Officer: I repeat, Member of the State Duma *Zamyslovski*, that I am calling you to order!

Miliukov, continuing: I am not sensitive about the expressions used by Mr. *Zamyslovski*. (*Cries on the left*: "Bravo!") I repeat that

the ancient theme is now being elaborated with new details. Who is it that is planning revolution? These are the culprits: the City and Zemstvo Unions, the War-Industries Committee, the meetings of liberal organizations! These are the most certain signs of impending revolution! "The left parties," asserts that memorandum, "want to go on with the war, in order to organize meanwhile, and prepare for revolution."

Gentlemen, you know that, besides the just quoted memorandum, there are a number of other memoranda developing the same thought. There exists an act of indictment against the City and Zemstvo organizations as well as other indictments of which every one knows. And so, gentlemen, this *idée fixe* of a revolution coming from the camp of the left wing, this *idée fixe* which absorbs every new member of the Cabinet to the point of insanity¹⁹ (*Cries on the left*: "Correct!")—to this *idée fixe* everything is sacrificed, lofty national enthusiasm, the support of the war, the first buds of Russian freedom, and even the solidity of our relations with the Allies.

Of this last circumstance I was especially convinced as I continued my journey and reached London and Paris. There, I saw the first impressions of Sazonov's retirement. I must testify that it was an impression as of an act of vandalism. Just think of it, gentlemen. The foundations for the existing international situation had been laid as far back as 1907. Gradually, slowly, as is always the case, old suspicions, old prejudices were removed, mutual confidence attained, and a belief established that this state of affairs would go on in the future. Gentlemen, it was on the strength of this belief, that it was for the best national interests of Russia, that it was possible to abandon the old ideas. Only on the basis of complete mutual confidence could that agreement of which I spoke to you—the agreement on Constantinople and the Straits—be signed. And, consequently, the Allies displayed amazing persistence in the fight, and a willingness to make sacrifices. In this respect they disappointed all the hopes of our enemies, exceeding even our own expectations. It seemed as if Russia was just about ready to gather the fruits of her labors and of the labors of two Ministers of Foreign Affairs in a period when an extraordinary, rare, political condition was created, probably unique in history, the beginning of which was signaled by the activity of King Edward VII.

And then, gentlemen, precisely at that moment, there appeared in the place of experienced leaders who enjoyed personal confidence—

¹⁹ Referring to Protopopov.

and this, too, is capital, and, moreover, the kind of capital which it is hard to obtain—a "blank sheet of paper," an unknown individual, ignorant of the alphabet of diplomacy, (*Cries on the left*: "Correct!") who is ready to serve any dubious influence from outside.

Gentlemen, you will understand the consequences of this change. When Sazonov had charge of the Ministry, people in England and France knew that whatever our Ambassadors said was said by the Russian Government. But what faith could they place in the same Ambassadors after Sturmer had taken his place behind them? Of course, it is true, gentlemen, that relationships built up in the course of decades are not destroyed at the caprice of a single individual. In this regard, the Allied and our own press was right when it claimed that the change of a person had not changed Russian policy. But in the delicate affairs of diplomacy there are nuances. There is fine lace-work, as there is rough sewing, and lace-work is possible only under special conditions and under particularly favorable circumstances. Gentlemen, I witnessed the destruction of these most slender, most delicate threads of the international fabric; I saw this destruction. It was going on before my very eyes in London and in Paris. That is what Mr. Sturmer has accomplished, and it was perhaps not without reason that he did not promise the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits. I asked myself, then, "According to what recipe is this being done?"

I continued my journey to Switzerland, intending to rest there, and not to occupy myself with politics. But there, again, those somber shadows were following me. On the shores of Lake Geneva, at Berne, I found it impossible to get away from Mr. Sturmer's former Department—the Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Police. Of course, Switzerland is the place where all kinds of propaganda meet, where it is especially convenient to watch the machinations of our enemies, and it is only natural that in such place the system of "special missions" should be especially well developed.

However, there are among them some missions of a peculiar nature, provoking our particular attention. People would come to me saying: "Please ask at Petrograd what the notorious Rataiev is doing here. Find out why a certain official, Lebedev, whom I don't know, has come here. Ask why these officials of the Police Department happen to be constant visitors at the drawing rooms of Russian ladies, known for their pro-Germanism." It appears, gentlemen, that Madame Vasilchikova has her successors and followers. I shall not name here that lady, whose sympathy for an Austrian prince changed

into sympathy for a German baron, whose salon in the Via Curia in Florence, and later at Montreux in Switzerland, was famed for the outspoken pro-Germanism of its mistress. And then, at about that time, the lady moved from Montreux to Petrograd. The papers mentioned her name on highly solemn occasions. Passing through Paris on my return, I found still fresh the traces of her stay there. The Parisians were scandalized by the German leanings of this lady, as well as by—I have to add this, with mortification—her contacts with the Russian Embassy, for which our Ambassador should not, however, be blamed. Incidentally, this is the same lady who launched the diplomatic career of Mr. Sturmer, having tried several years ago to get for him the post of Ambassador to one of the secondary powers of Europe. I must say that these recommendations were then considered ridiculous, and her request proved unsuccessful. (Laughter.)

What do I mean by referring to this? Gentlemen, I do not pretend to have positively discovered one of the channels of communication. But it is one of the links in the solid chain which binds, very closely, certain public circles. To uncover the ways and means of that propaganda of which Sir George Buchanan told us openly not so long ago, we need a judicial investigation such as was undertaken in the case of Sukhomlinov. At the time when we accused Sukhomlinov, as now, we did not possess the facts which were brought to light by the investigation. We had only what we have today—the instinctive voice of the whole country and its subjective certainty. (Applause.)

Gentlemen, I might, perhaps, not have decided to speak of each of my several impressions separately, had there been no general impression, had there not been that confirmation which I obtained when I went from Paris to London. (*Cries on the left: "Aha!"*) While in Switzerland and Paris, I asked myself whether there was not some other diplomacy behind our official diplomacy, but here, I was forced to ask questions of a different nature. I beg to be excused if, in telling of so important a matter, I cannot mention its source. But if my statement is true, Mr. Sturmer will probably find traces of it in his archives. (*Rodichev: "He will destroy them!"*) I pass over the Stockholm affair, which, as you know, preceded the appointment of the present Minister of the Interior and made a painful impression upon our Allies. I am in a position to speak of that impression as an eyewitness. I should like to believe that this was merely a manifestation of that quality so well known to the old acquaintances of Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov—the inability to reckon with the consequences of his own actions. (*A voice on the left: "Fine*

qualification for a Minister!" *A voice on the right*: "Your leader!") Fortunately, in Stockholm he was no longer a representative of the delegation, since no delegation really existed at that moment: it was getting back to Russia piecemeal. The thing which Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov did at Stockholm was done in our absence.²⁰ (*Markov the Second*: "You did the same thing in Italy!")

Nevertheless, gentlemen, even though I do not entertain any personal suspicions, I am unable to tell precisely what part that affair played in the antechamber²¹ already known to us, through which, hard on the heels of the others, Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov, also, passed on his way to the Ministerial seat. (*Noise and cries on the left*: "Magnificent!") Over there [antechamber] they probably like such things. (*Cries on the right*: "What antechamber?") I have named those persons: Manasevich-Manuilov, Pitirim, Sturmer. They are that "party" which, according to the "Neue Freie Presse," triumphed in the appointment of Sturmer. At all events, I have some reason to believe that the proposals made to Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov by the German Counsellor, Warburg, were repeated. This is why I felt not the least surprise on hearing from the lips of the British Ambassador a severe indictment of the same circle, charging it with the desire to prepare the way for separate peace.

Perhaps I have dealt too long with Mr. Sturmer? (*Cries*: "No! No!") but, gentlemen, it was mainly around him that the feeling and sentiments of which I have spoken were concentrated. I believe that those feelings and sentiments prevented him from occupying this seat: he heard the outcries with which you greeted his appearance here. Let us all hope that he will not return. (*On the left*, applause, tumult, cries: "Bravo!")

Yes, gentlemen, there is a vast difference between that meeting of ours, under Goremykin, which took place on the first of August, 1915, and even in February, 1916, and the meeting taking place today. These meetings are just as different as is the general condition of the country. At that time we could talk about organizing the country with the help of Duma legislation. Had we then been given the opportunity to carry through the laws which we had planned and prepared for passage, including the law on the volosts, Russia would not now be so helpless in the face of the food supply problem. That was the situation then. But now, gentlemen, the problem of legisla-

²⁰ Protopopov had conversations with the German agent, Warburg.

²¹ Rasputin, Vyubova, et al.

tion has been shifted to the background. Today we see and understand that with this Government we cannot legislate, any more than we can, with this Government, lead Russia to victory. (*Cries on the left: "Correct!"*) Formerly, we tried to prove that it was impossible to start a fight against all the vital forces of the nation, that it was impossible to carry on warfare within the country when there was war at the front, that it was necessary to utilize the popular enthusiasm for the achievement of national tasks, and that otherwise there could be only killing oppression, which would merely increase the very peril they were trying to avert by such oppression.

Today, gentlemen, it seems that everybody feels convinced that it is useless to go to them with proofs; useless when fear of the people, fear of their own country, blinds their eyes, and when the fundamental problem has become that of hastening the end of the war, were it even without gain, merely to be freed from the necessity for seeking popular support. (*Cries on the left: "Correct!"*) On the 23d of February, 1916, I concluded my speech with the statement that we no longer dared to address our appeal to the "political wisdom of the Government," and that I did not expect any answer from the existing Cabinet to the questions which agitated us. At that time, my words appeared to some people too pessimistic. But now we go further, and perhaps those words will sound clearer and more hopeful. We are telling this Government, as we told it in the declaration of the Bloc: "We shall fight you; we shall fight with all legitimate means until you go!" (*Cries on the left: "Right! Correct!"*)

It is said that a member of the Council of Ministers,—and this was correctly heard by Duma Member Chkheidze—on being told that the State Duma would on this occasion speak of treason, exclaimed excitedly: "I may, perhaps, be a fool, but I am not a traitor." (Laughter.) Gentlemen, the predecessor of that Minister was undoubtedly a clever Minister, just as the predecessor of our Minister of Foreign Affairs was an honest Minister. But they are no longer in the Cabinet. And, does it matter, gentlemen, as a practical question, whether we are, in the present case, dealing with stupidity or treason? When the Duma keeps everlastingly insisting that the rear must be organized for a successful struggle, the Government persists in claiming that organizing the country means organizing a revolution, and deliberately prefers chaos and disorganization. What is it, stupidity or treason? (*A voice on the left: "Treason!" Adjemov: "Stupidity!" Laughter.*) Furthermore, gen-

tllemen, when the authorities, in the midst of this general discontent and irritation, deliberately set to work stirring up popular outbreaks, that is to say, when they purposely provoke unrest and outbreaks,—is that being done unconsciously or consciously? We cannot, therefore, find much fault with the people if they arrive at conclusions such as I have read here, in the words of those representatives of guberniia administrative boards.

You must realize, also, why it is that we, too, have no other task left us today, than the task which I have already pointed out to you: to obtain the retirement of this Government. You ask, "How can we start a fight while the war is on?" But, gentlemen, it is only in wartime that they are a menace. They are a menace to the war, and it is precisely for this reason, in time of war and in the name of war, for the sake of that very thing which induced us to unite, that we are now fighting them. (*Cries on the left: "Bravo!" Applause.*)

Gentlemen, you understand that I can deal with no other theme today than this one. I cannot emulate Duma Member Chkhaidze and occupy myself with our internal [Duma] controversies. This is not the time for it, and I shall make no reply to his references and attacks upon me. For me, answer has been given in that declaration which we read here. We have many, very many, different reasons for dissatisfaction with the Government. When we have time, we shall speak of them. But all those various reasons come down to this one general reason: the incapacity of the Government as at present composed. (*Cries on the left: "Right!"*) This is our main evil, the overcoming of which will be tantamount to the winning of the whole campaign. (*Cries on the left: "Right!"*)

And, therefore, gentlemen, for the sake of the millions of victims and the torrents of blood poured out, for the sake of the achievement of our national interestes,—which Sturmer does not promise us—in the name of our responsibilities to that nation which has sent us here, we shall fight on until we achieve that genuine responsibility of government which has been defined by the three points of our common declaration: an equal understanding by all the members of the Cabinet of the immediate problems of the present; their agreement and readiness to execute the program of the majority of the State Duma; their obligation, not only in the realization of this program, but throughout their activity to look to the majority of the State Duma for support. A Cabinet which does not satisfy these

three standards does not merit the confidence of the State Duma and must go. (*Cries: "Bravo!"* Stormy and prolonged applause on the left, in the center, and the left section of the right.)²²

5. PURISHKEVICH'S SPEECH IN THE DUMA²³

December 2, 1916

The State Duma has listened with profound attention to the words of the President of the Council of Ministers.²⁴ They offer many brilliant prospects, and one must believe that the time will come when the hopes and desires enunciated in the speech of the President of the Council of Ministers will be realized. But at this time, we must take notice of the sad and dark picture of Russian reality. I am speaking here of conditions in the rear, for at the front the situation is splendid, thanks to the incomparable courage of our troops.

The situation in which we find ourselves at present, and in which we have been placed, to a considerable extent, by the chaos prevailing among our rulers, compels me to speak today on this tribune. This tribune serves today as the only ventilator, the only air-valve, through which Russian public sentiment can escape. This tribune is at the present moment enjoying extraordinary confidence in Russia, and we should, above all, see to it that the speeches that are heard here reach the ears of the nation. (*Cries: "Bravo!"*) We must see to it that the honest, truthful words which go forth from this place penetrate to the mass of the people, for there is not and cannot be in Russia today any other watchword but that of "Victory!" (*Cries: "Bravo!"* *A voice on the left: "No, there is still another!"*) Any attempt against the honest and clean aims, communicated from this place to the people, is a crime. (*Cries on the left: "Bravo!"* Applause on the left and in part of the center.)

Gentlemen, I mount this tribune today with inexpressible emotion, and this, not because I have left the ranks of my party. It is

²² *Empress to Emperor*—Nov. 17, 1916: "Miliukov's speech yesterday when he quotes Buchanan's words that Sturmer is a traitor and Buchanan to whom he turned in the box—held his tongue—vile behavior. We are living through hardest times, but God will help us through, I have no fear. Let them scream—we must show we have no fear and are firm. Wify is your staunch One and stands as a rock behind you."—(*Pisma Imperatritsy*, II, 441-2.)

²³ "Novoe Vremia," December 3, 1916. Purishkevich, Vladimir Mitrofanovich (1870-1918).

²⁴ Sturmer was forced to resign on November 22, and A. F. Trepov succeeded him as President of the Council of Ministers.

impossible for me to abandon the ranks of the Right, for I am the most extreme of the Rights. But there are moments when one cannot speak from the belfry of a district or provincial town, but must ring the alarm from the bell tower of Ivan the Great. Today, as formerly, I am guided by infinite love for my native land, a boundless and most devoted allegiance to my Sovereign. I am living at this moment with but a single thought—that of Russian victory. But today, as before, I have within me no slavish submission to authority. I cannot sign up in the ministerial antechamber. (Applause in center and on the left. *Cries in center*: “Bravo!”) I see clearly who it is and what it is that hurts Russia, and postpones the hour of her victory. With soldiers and officers such as we have, we cannot be defeated. But the hour of victory may not be very near, because the enemy is stubborn, and I want to add that, because of the chaos we observe in the Government at this time, the hour of that victory will be long delayed. . . .

The Government asks us to aid, and not to undermine it—a peculiar request, I might say, to be heard within the walls of the State Duma, which desires nothing more than that the Government should act consistently and meet the demands of the army. Not so very long ago, the late A. S. Suvorin²⁵ sang the praises of the Government for its confidence in the public. How everything has changed! Today it is the Government itself that pleads for the confidence of the public, and fails to get it. The Government has up to the present time been suffering, and is still suffering, from top to bottom, from a disease of the will power. It may be that matters will improve in the near future. But as regards the recent past, covering something like a year, the Cabinet has represented nothing but a dozen Sleeping Beauties. (Laughter.) I should like to believe what the President of the Council of Ministers has said here. Unfortunately, the facts prove that words and deeds are at variance, and while speeches are made about one thing, something entirely different is actually being done.

Gentlemen, if there is so much shouting that there will be no peace, it means that some one is striving for peace. (*Cries on the left*: “Right!”) Our gallant Allies say little of peace, for they have none of those corrupting influences which reach the organs of the Government and undermine the will of its highest representative. To us, the will of the Sovereign is sacred. We remember his words—that so long as even a solitary German foe remains within the borders of the

²⁵ Editor of the “*Novoe Vremia*.”

Russian Empire, there shall be no peace. And now the representatives of the Government appear here, one after another, and enter denials. What is it that they deny? Are we not all agreed that we seek no peace? Whom, then, do they contradict? They contradict those sinister rumors, that mysterious, invisible work going on in certain circles that are trying in one way or another to obtain a separate peace. Time and again we have found valid reason to point out that the ruling powers are far less patriotic than we are, notwithstanding all our divisions into parties and factions, and that the Government, although united, does not merit the public confidence it would like to enjoy. One cannot accuse us, of the Right, of unwillingness to work with the Government. We are very anxious for that. But where was it all this time, this "united Government?" Wherein has its activity been shown, lately, other than in the red pencil of the censor on everything not directly connected with matters of national defense and the divulging of war secrets, but which might impair the authority of this or that minister.

Russia has reached the end of her patience waiting for a strong Government—not the authority of the police bigotry, such as Russia has known since olden times—but a Government that could show us that it has some program and some system. But the only strong authority which we see is the systematic and consistent internal disorganization of the State. (*Cries on the left: "Right!"*) The disorganization of our rear is undoubtedly being carried out by the enemy, and it is being done by a strong and relentless hand. This system was set up by William himself and is being thoroughly practised with the aid of the German party working in our rear, and of those elements—the scum of Russian society—who can bring themselves to serve the enemy. (*Cries on the left: "Right!"*) More than any one else, it is the Government itself which, through its lack of a program, its lack of a system, has been killing the patriotism of the nation. (*A voice on the left: "Right!"*) It has had a depressing effect upon popular enthusiasm; it has paralyzed the impulse to work for the achievement of victory. (*Cries on the left: "Right!"*) Field-Marshal Hindenburg has said that what they need is patience and silence. He who possesses the stronger will, the greater patience, he says, will win. Yes, we shall suffer in patience. And, however those who have gone out of this place may urge us, we shall not, nor shall the people, rush into the streets, for we know only too well that any act of that kind will be to the advantage of our enemies. Suffer we shall, yes; but to observe silence at this moment, to re-

frain from telling of what we are witnessing, that is a sin, because we encourage impunity by our silence.

Turning now to the picture presented by our internal affairs, we have before us a boundless ocean of gubernatorial orders which show that each province, even each district, pursues its own policy, particularly in questions of food. This is due to the fact that there is no guidance from the center. . . . Really, at this time, when the representatives of the highest authority are daily bursting like soap-bubbles, one is at a loss to whom to turn, whom to question, from whom to expect a word of truth. Every Minister is now playing his own game, or, at all events, has been so far. He has his day and then disappears without a trace. Public opinion and the Government are unable to agree because of these constant changes of administrators, and because of the divergent views prevailing among the Ministers themselves. Show me a single moment, ever since Russia entered upon the path of public activity in our legislative institutions, when there has been such a thing as coördination between the acts of the Government and those of the public. There is none. In our country there are two different attitudes towards the public: one, of confidence, which, from the point of view of the Right, implies a surrender of every position of the State to the extreme Left; the other, of suspicion, when the Government assails and strangles public initiative with a long series of repressive measures. Never before did these jumps from one policy to the other manifest themselves as strikingly as at this time. Under these circumstances one cannot be certain of the morrow, and one can neither live nor work. Every man who enters upon and occupies the post of a Minister considers the moment of his accession to power as the beginning of a new era. We have one era dating from the birth of Christ to the Minister's advent; and the other era dating with his advent. And each time that he delivers his program speech, he throws open new horizons, as if no one had ever conceived of them before.

We, Russians, I believe, are not surprised that up there, in the high places, they should be casting about for the right man to occupy the proper post. A mistake up there is quite possible. But we are certainly astonished that, at so grave and critical a moment, certain people should so little know their own selves, or, perhaps, be so passionately anxious to make careers for themselves, as to forget the present condition of our country, to forget the enormous responsibility which rests upon each one occupying a position of importance, to forget themselves to such an extent as to accept the prof-

ferred posts when they know full well, Alexander Dmitrievich, (speaking to Protopopov in the ministerial box) that they lack the strength to carry out honestly their duties to the State. (Loud applause in the center and on the left. President rings for order.) . . . We do need, gentlemen, a united ministry and cabinet; but instead of that, we have strife and dissension. Just look closely at this same business of food supply. Look at the piles of projects on food supply in the various ministries, and watch each chief clerk in each separate room compose his own project, without the slightest relation to any other plan. . . . I repeat, gentlemen, by such methods the Government is creating an opposition and preparing the ground for a successor to the present State Duma—a Duma of an altogether different character. . . . Alas! Our Government is not noted for its foresight or prudence. Under some of our Ministers we had an agrarian policy, under others, a liberal, and under still others, a conservative. Contemplating the policy now followed within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, I cannot call it anything but a *strictly shoddy* policy. (Laughter on the left. Applause.)

The principal scourges of Russian public and official life right now are four in number: the first is the senseless censorship of that which ought not to be censored at all; the second is the hypocrisy and paralysis of the Government; the third is the dangerous symptoms of the triumph of pro-German tendencies among the organs of the Government; and, in this connection, the fourth is absolute uncertainty as to the morrow, with governmental decrees and legislative bills framed and baked from day to day. I have here before me two circular orders, one dated September 14, the other September 22. By these orders the newspapers are prohibited from writing anything about changes in ministerial circles, and that A. D. Protopopov and Count A. A. Bobrinski²⁶ may either be forced out or are likely to leave their posts. But one of them has gone already, and so we must assume that the other one, as well, will be compelled to resign his post within the immediate future. (Noise, applause.) Zamyslovski keep quiet, you do not sympathize with this! (*Zamyslovski*, from his seat: "I was silent." *Voices on the left*: "But who signed that circular?") The signature under that circular reads, "Adabash." Now, these two circular orders are absolutely meaningless, I should say, because the fact of a transfer or retirement of Count Bobrinski and Protopopov cannot have any effect upon the activities of our allies and of our own troops, nor can it divulge one military secret

²⁶ Minister of Agriculture.

or another. Gentlemen, the activity of the censor now constitutes one of the greatest evils of Russian life. What extremes it may reach in its pettiness can be seen from a fact like the following, which sounds like fiction. The censor—some young lady or noncombatant lieutenant—crossed out in a news item about the action of our troops the word “blue” in the phrase, “The sun shone brightly, the blue sky was cloudless,” because it was believed that such a blue sky could be found only in the south, and that it might therefore reveal that the action took place in the south. (Laughter and applause.) Deletions of this sort are an almost daily occurrence and ought to be the very first thing to attract the attention of the State Duma.

But this is not all. We know how complete has been the paralysis thus far of our rulers in fighting the marauding profiteers in our rear. . . .

But there are still worse things. While campaign plans are being carried out at the Imperial Headquarters, a regular clique is organizing a queer, totally incomprehensible German orgy. There are numerous facts to show that this is not mere accident, that there is in existence some evil will, some powerful hand, that is directing all this. Allow me to dwell on several such facts.

Archangel is the only port by which we get the things we need for the equipment of the army. But it is precisely to Archangel, to the Province of Archangel, that we are sending numerous parties of German war prisoners. The effects are already beginning to show; there have already been all kinds of explosions. Again, recall the situation in Turkestan. To this outlying territory, which is so important and so necessary to us in a military sense, there were sent veritable mobs of Germans, who, as instructors of the natives, stirred up social unrest. Germans are being sent incessantly and without surveillance to Siberia, where they escape by way of China, and I do not doubt that in due course of time there will be raised along that frontier a new regiment of those very Germans who were taken prisoners by us. . . .

Other pictures are still more sad. They show us that some hidden hand has been at work these past two or three months, seeing to it that the German influence is not squeezed too hard, that the Germans are not fought so strenuously.

In the spring of this year, we had a Government commission organized, for the purpose of combating German domination. This struggle found expression in the promulgation of a number of laws under Article 87 of our Fundamental Laws, self-contradictory, it is

true, as well as mutually exclusive, but existing all the same. So long as this committee was headed by Trepov, matters went along fairly well. There was no remissness, and the liquidation proceeded smoothly. But since August the committee has been headed by A. S. Stishinski, a member of the Right in the State Council, and from that moment the committee abruptly changed its policy and is trying to satisfy nearly every German request, disregarding even contradictory reports of governors, and even the wishes of the petitioners themselves. For this committee not only grants their requests, but gives them even more than they ask for. . . .

Let us take an instance in another field. Everything that tends to put the activity of our Allies and the immense help they are rendering us in the proper light is being stifled. Only a few days ago two of our governors—Baron von Grewenitz of Chernigov and von Bunting of Tver—prohibited the delivery of lectures on the subject of "Our Ally, France, and her Part in this War." We know, moreover, that one of the most powerful German spy organizations in the East is the firm of Kunst & Albers, about which not a little has been written. And yet this center of German espionage is flourishing and at work. Look into our factories and you will see there, because of some queer, unfathomable combination of circumstances, Germans on every hand. It is impossible to reveal here the situation in some of the factories, such as the Obukhov, Petrogradski, Artillery, and Putilov Works. All I want to say is that here, too,—excepting the Putilov Works, where the trouble is of a different character—Germans are at work. I am taking the liberty of turning these facts over to the Minister of War. (Purishkevich leaves the rostrum and hands the papers to the Minister of War.) As a characteristic instance, I want to call your attention to the fact that right now large numbers of workers are being discharged, who would like to go on working and increasing the output of these factories. (*Rodichev*, from his seat: "They are being provoked to it by the Police Department.")

Gentlemen, is there any assurance that all these doings will be stopped? If a man with a strong will and a definite program stood at the helm of the internal administration of Russia, a great deal could be passed over in silence. To our profound regret this is not the case. On the basis, not of mere individual statement, but of documentary evidence, I shall take the liberty of describing to you the Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, not referring to his office of

Minister, but as a member of the Octobrist faction, up to the moment when he obtained the post.

During one of those paroxysms of garrulousness, at the time he received the appointment as Minister, Protopopov said he had lost three or four pounds of weight, due to overwork. I make free to say here, on the basis of documents in my possession, that Protopopov has lost *all* his weight, all of his authority, in the eyes of the Russian public. (Applause, cries: "Bravo!")

Gentlemen, in the course of this war a resolution was adopted by a certain society, inviting the attention of the Presidium of the State Duma and of the Simbirsk nobility to the strange spectacle of the combination in one person of the highest elective office and the part of figurehead in a newspaper²⁷ which was to cater to the interests of a bank with a pronounced German coloring, and they asked us to call the attention of the Government to the peril of creating a new factor of public opinion in the control of a privately owned, financial institution under the influence of German capital. . . .

Regarding the share of the present Minister of the Interior, then Vice-President of the State Duma, Alexander Dmitrievich Protopopov, in the organization of that newspaper, I should like to say that his part in the Stockholm pourparlers with the German diplomat²⁸ was a mere trifle as compared with the part he played and still appears to be playing in this paper. (Commotion.) (Purishkevich here recalls Protopopov's conferences with banking representatives, already reported in the press.) However, when the banks saw what the trouble was, seven of them immediately withdrew. . . . This paper is not going to come out bluntly with the statement that there is no need of fighting the dominating German influence, but will say: "You are now combatting the German influence, but in place of it, you will only fall prey to English and French domination." For I myself have been told by the Ex-President of the Council of Ministers, Sturmer, that the appetites of our Allies ought to be somewhat curbed, as they are demanding too much of us. (*Exclamations*: "A—A! O—O!") *Rodichev*: "Rejoice, you Sturmerites!") These words were spoken to me by Sturmer. My memory is good, I am not a fool, and I was amazed to see that at this moment, when the Allies are rendering us all possible assistance, we could suspect their loyalty, and that the representative of the Ministry of Foreign

²⁷ "Volia Rossii."

²⁸ Warburg.

Affairs thinks we ought to act with a little more reserve. (*Cries on the left: "German flunkey!"*) I am giving you warning, gentlemen, that you may know what Protopopov represented in his capacity of Vice-President of the Duma, and what he may represent now that he is Minister. If, in addition to this, you will recall that one of the very first persons to come to him with his report was Hakebusch, the editor of that same paper, which Protopopov has not relinquished, and which he is going to manage after he retires. . . .

But the root of the evil is, after all, not in Protopopov. Such people, after all, are merely small fry. (*A voice on the left: "And miserable!"*) without the outlook of the statesman, who have simply bounded to the top. The real trouble comes from those occult powers and those influences which shove this or that individual into position, helping into high positions those who are incapable of holding them. (Commotion, voices on the left: "Correct! Disgraceful!")

These nights I cannot sleep, you may take my word of honor for it. I lie with open eyes, and I see visions of countless telegrams, reports, notes, addressed now to one, then another minister, but most often, it is said, to Protopopov. (*President: "Please, do not enlarge upon this theme."*)

I shall take the liberty of addressing now, quite apart from the Duma, the Council of Ministers. If the Ministers consider duty above career,—and I believe that at this moment duty should precede career—and if you really are a united cabinet, go to the Tsar and say that things cannot go on any longer in this way. This would not mean sabotage, but a duty to the Sovereign. If you are really loyal to your Sovereign, if the glory of Russia, her power, her future, intimately and inseparably bound up with the grandeur and splendor of the Tsar's name, are dear to you, go to the Imperial Headquarters, throw yourselves at the Tsar's feet, and beg permission to open his eyes to the dreadful reality. (Applause on the left. *President: "I ask you again not to enlarge upon this theme."*) Let not those who are to shape the historical destiny of Russia be the people who are brought up on German money, are betraying Russia, and have found shelter in all kinds of institutions. (Applause in the center and on the left. *Cries: "Bravo!"*)

Let there disappear from our horizon, in these terrible days through which we are now passing, days which demand the greatest caution and statesmanlike tact, men like Andronnikov, and Varnava, and Mardari,²⁹ and Manasevich, and all those men who are the shame

²⁹ A protégé of Volzhin, Oberprocurator of the Synod.

of Russian life. Trust me when I say that I know that all Russia, irrespective of party affiliations, thinks the same way, and speaks the same words,—a loyal Russia desires the happiness of her Tsar, her Church, and her people. In her days of sorrow, self-sacrificing Russia is, as always, incapable of speaking the language of slaves, but is ready to lay candidly at the foot of the throne, words of bitter and unvarnished truth, for the sake of the good of Tsar and nation.

Gentlemen, we must plead with the Sovereign, and you, his loyal servants, chosen to do his bidding, you, who bear the brunt of responsibility for the course of the Russian ship of state, in common with us, go to Headquarters and plead with the Sovereign . . . to deliver Russia from Rasputin⁸⁰ . . . (Prolonged and general applause.)

6. PLOT TO KILL RASPUTIN

PURISHKEVICH'S DIARY⁸¹

December 2, 1916.

For the first time in many years I have had the moral satisfaction to feel that I have done my duty honestly, conscientiously, and courageously. I made a speech in the Duma on the present state of Russia. I addressed myself to the Government, demanding that the truth be laid bare before the Emperor, who is surrounded by clever intriguers. I demanded that the Monarch be warned against the danger that threatens Russia from the obscure forces in the rear. . . .

Today, for the first time, I have gone back on my oath—oath of silence. I did it not for political reasons, not for the sake of gaining the good-will of the militant members of the hostile political parties, but in order that the voice of the Russian people might reach the throne.

* * * * *

I expressed the thoughts of thousands of the best Russians, regardless of political parties and opinions. I felt that I had done so as I left the Duma platform after having spoken for two hours. I felt it in the shouts of "Bravo;" in the clapping of hands, in the faces of the excited crowd which gathered around me after my speech. Among them were representatives of Russian society; for on this day the Taurida Palace was filled with the intellectual and social leaders of the nation and its highest functionaries.

⁸⁰ "Revue de Paris," 1923, Tome V, 721-46.

⁸¹ Pourichkevitch, V.: "Comment J'ai Tué Raspoutine," 37-46.

I know that I have expressed the feeling of Russia. I know that there was not a single false note in my speech. . . .

December 3.

I have not had a moment's peace today. As I sat at my desk I have been kept busy answering the telephone, which has not stopped ringing for a second. From morning until evening all kinds of people, known or unknown, call up to congratulate me. I must confess that it has reached a point where I can no longer remain at my desk. It is difficult to imagine a situation more stupid than the one I am in, sitting listening to these nightingales singing my praise without being able to stop them.

* * * * *

Among those who telephoned was a Prince Iusupov, Count Sumarokov-Elston. He has aroused my curiosity. After expressing the usual compliments he inquired if he could see me to explain certain things about Rasputin's relation with the Court, things which he could not tell over the telephone. I made an appointment for tomorrow morning at nine. I am anxious to know what he has to say and what he wants.

December 4.

He was on time . . . and at once made a very good impression on me. . . . He looks as if he possessed a great deal of will power and much strength of character. . . .

"Your speech will not have the results you expect," said he. "The Emperor does not like to have one bring pressure on him. Rasputin's power will grow greater rather than less owing to his boundless influence over the Empress. It is she who really governs the State. The Emperor is at Headquarters much occupied with military operations."

"Well, what are we going to do about it?" I asked.

He gave a mysterious smile and looked me straight in the face.

"Get rid of Rasputin."

"That's easy to say. But who will do it? Russia has nobody with backbone enough for such a deed. The Government could do it easily, but the Government clings to him and watches over him as if he were a treasure."

"Yes," said Iusupov, "one can not count on the Government, but I dare say there are men in Russia who would do it."

"Do you think so?"

"I know it. One of them is right before you. . . ."

* * * * *

I smiled. "Prince," said I to him, "I am no longer astonished at anything that happens in Russia. I am not trying to get anything for myself; I have no personal ambitions. But if you wish . . . to deliver Russia from Rasputin, here is my hand. We are going to examine the means to bring it about, and we will undertake it if we can find some others to join us. . . ." ³²

7. CONGRESS OF THE NOBILITY ³³

December 11-16, 1916.

The resolution of the Congress reads:

The Twelfth Congress of the united associations of nobles, always devoted to their sovereigns, notes with deep sorrow that in the terrible historical moment through which Russia is passing, when the monarchist principle is especially vital to the solidity and unity of the State, this ancient basis of the State is being shaken to its foundations.

In the administration of the State, irresponsible, dark powers, alien to the legitimate authority, are gaining influence. These powers are subjecting the heights of the Government to their influence and are even encroaching upon the administration of the Church.

The worthiest pastors of the Church are troubled by the shameful deeds that are taking place in the view of all. The Church, guardian of the truth of Christ, does not hear the free word of its bishops and knows that they are oppressed.

It is necessary to assure to the Church its internal administration as established by the canons.

The civil administration of the country is not less shaken. Moreover, subjected to the same fatal influences, it lacks the necessary solidity, singleness of thought and purpose, and does not enjoy the confidence of the people.

Such a situation, ruinous at any time, is especially fatal at this time of world war; and it has caused chaos in every branch of the national life.

It is necessary to eliminate, once for all, the influence of the dark powers in the affairs of State.

It is necessary to form a strong Government, Russian in thought

³² They were joined by Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich, Doctor S. S. Lasovert, and Lieutenant S—, and together they killed Rasputin on the night of December 29-30, 1916.

³³ "Riech," No. 332, December 15, 1916.

and feeling, enjoying popular confidence, and capable of working in common with the legislative institutions, but responsible to the Monarch alone. It should be armed with the fullness of authority, in the person of the President of the Council of Ministers, and firmly united in a common program.

Only such a Government can assure the prosecution of the war to final victory, without which the popular conscience does not admit any conclusive peace.

8. RESIGNATION OF COUNT IGNATIEV, MINISTER OF EDUCATION ³⁴

January 9, 1917

Your Imperial Majesty, Most Gracious Monarch:

At Your Majesty's Imperial Headquarters on December 2, [1916] I felt bound by my duty, oath, and conscience to sound the alarm over the part played by certain persons and the political situation of the country. I pray Your Imperial Majesty not to oblige me to be an accomplice of these persons whose acts I regard as ruinous to the throne and the State.

I am firmly convinced that the only kind of government that could be useful to Your Imperial Majesty and the country is one that is united in its conception of the state, in its understanding of the fundamental objects of government and in the manner of realizing them. It is my duty as a loyal subject to beg most humbly Your Imperial Majesty to relieve me of the unbearable burden of serving against the dictates of my conscience. Believe me, my Sovereign, that in making this petition I am guided by the traditions of my ancestors who were from old devoted to the ancient [monarchic] principle. It is in this principle and the union of Tsar and people that the Russian State was created and grew strong.

While not directly participating in the affairs of Government, I shall follow in the steps and obey the testament of my father and remain the loyal servant of Your Majesty, the Throne, and the Country.

Your Imperial Majesty's most loyal and devoted servant,

Master of the Horse,

COUNT PAUL IGNATIEV.

³⁴ "Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima," VI, 26.

CHAPTER IX

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

I. HIGH COST OF LIVING AND LOW WAGES

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ¹

August 24, 1915.

. . . In conclusion, General Ruzski [who had been called in for consultation] touched upon the condition of labor in the Petrograd factories. He emphasized the fact that labor is carrying an exceedingly heavy load and is bending under the weight of the high cost of the necessities of life. At the same time the employers have not adjusted wages to the new conditions. In order not to starve, the laborer is obliged to work overtime, which exhausts him. He [Gen. Ruzski] suggested that serious attention should be paid to this question and that something should be done quickly; otherwise there may be strikes and disorders. If that should take place "the war situation would be hopeless." . . .

2. RURAL CONDITIONS

(a) NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR ²

August 8, 1916

Grushevka (Kherson Guberniia)

In accordance with my promise, I am writing about my impressions here. My estate represents an immense area of 75,000 desiatins. It is situated in three uiezds of three guberniias: Kherson and Ekaterinoslav, uiezds of the same names, and Taurida guberniia, uiezd of Melitopol. There are sixteen villages on the estate, and seven German colonies, one of which moved away last year on its own initiative. The remaining colonies are waiting for the decision of the Government; most of them are Mennonites, who are inclined

¹ "Arkhirv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 66.

² "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 75-9.

to stay, and one, of Wurtembergers, intends to move. Thus far there have been no misunderstandings with them.

The Mennonites emphasize the fact that they left Germany two hundred years ago, spent a long time in Poland, migrated to us under Emperor Alexander II, and have been dwelling here over fifty years. Although they do not believe in war, they furnished soldiers who serve as hospital orderlies. In conversation, they stress their anti-German attitude, even though everywhere in their homes there are portraits of the Kaiser, and also old Vasili Fedorovich,³ as well as of Bismarck and Moltke. Personally, I hope that they will clear out bag and baggage after the war.

Complete statistics of losses in men in our Russian villages could not be obtained. For the present, I have data only for one village, that of Grushevka. The figures are: 115 (10 killed, 34 wounded, 71 missing or in captivity) out of 829 souls mobilized. Consequently, for the village of Grushevka the losses amount to 13 per cent of the total population of 3,307 souls, of whom 829 souls were in the army. In the village of Grushevka alone, more than five hundred petitions have been presented by widows, wives, and mothers of soldiers in active duty. They are getting allowances regularly, but the widows of the killed soldiers decorated with the order of St. George have thus far received nothing. I have collected all the information and turned it over to the proper authorities. We have also a goodly number of refugees: the largest percentage comes from Kholm guberniia, but there are also refugees from Grodno and Minsk guberniias. They all receive allowances regularly.

The grain harvest is good—in some places all that can be desired. Harvesting and threshing are going on everywhere, and there is hope that the work will be finished on time in the fall. In addition to women, children, and the aged, I have working for me 36 people from the Kherson jail, and 947 Austrian war prisoners. There are no Germans. The Austrians are made up of Czechs, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Croatians, Poles, and Transylvania Rumanians. The latter are lazy and grumbling; the others work well and without driving. . . .

I shall probably remain at Grushevka until the 20th of August, *i.e.*, three whole weeks. The air here is incomparable. Space galore. Cannot see the horizon. Fields, fields . . . without end. At dawn I hunt anything that comes along. So far, with the aid of six urchins who beat the bushes, I have bagged six foxes, fourteen quail, and eight partridges.

³ Kaiser William I.

I ask Alix and you to accept my best wishes for the birthday of Alexei. May the Lord God protect you all.

Sincerely yours,
NIKOLAI M[IKHAILOVICH]

3. WAR REFUGEES

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF 'MINISTERS'⁴

August 12, 1915

[General discussion of the refugee question]. . . . Headquarters has lost its head. . . . One cannot follow the precedent of 1812 and make a desert of the territory abandoned to the enemy. . . . But neither logic nor State interest has any weight with Headquarters. . . . Everything has to bow to "military necessity." . . . There are three [four] kinds of refugees: (1) Jews . . . who are driven with a whip from the neighborhood of the front. They are accused as a body, without differentiation of any kind, of spying, signaling, and in other ways helping the enemy. . . . And this Jewish mass is extremely embittered . . . and becomes revolutionary. The situation is further complicated by the fact that these hungry and homeless Jews are not received any too well by the inhabitants of these places . . . where they happen to settle anew; (2) Officials of civic and military organizations in the rear with their dozens of loaded freight cars. The tens of thousands of people who stumble along the railway tracks are passed by trains piled full of furniture from officers' clubs, including canary birdcages and other junk . . . ; (3) Voluntary refugees who flee from their homes because of the reports of German atrocities; (4) Refugees who have been ordered by the military authorities to depart in order to remove all the population from the territory about to fall into the hands of the foe. This last category of refugees is the largest and the most embittered. It is torn from its native home, given a few hours to collect its worldly possessions and told to move on, no one knows where. What it cannot take along is burned right in front of its eyes. . . . All this embittered mass of humanity spreads like a flood in all directions. . . . They die by the hundreds from hunger, thirst and disease . . . they accentuate the difficulties of war time conditions, they bring on food crises, high cost of living, and excite the already aroused population. . . .

⁴ "Arkiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 32.

(b) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ⁵

August 17, 1915

Krivoshein: . . . Of all the grave consequences of the war this one [refugee] is the most unexpected, the most serious and the most difficult to remedy. . . . It has been worked out by the wise strategists to frighten the enemy. . . . Misery, sickness, sorrow and poverty go with them [refugees] all over Russia. They create panics wherever they go and put out whatever still remains of the ardor of the first days of the war. They move like a wall, knocking down the grain, trampling down the plowed fields and destroying the forests. . . . Their trail is like that of the flight of locusts or the bands of Tamerlane on the warpath. The railways are choked, and pretty soon it will be impossible to move war freight and food supplies. . . . I have an idea that the Germans watch with pleasure the result of this attempt to repeat the tactics of 1812. If on the one hand they [Germans] are deprived of certain local provisions, they are, on the other hand, freed from the care of the population and have full freedom of action in the depopulated areas . . . In my capacity as member of the Council of Ministers I should like to say that this undertaking of Headquarters to bring about a second migration of peoples will lead Russia into darkness, revolution and ruin.

4. CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ⁶

August 29, 1915

Krivoshein: . . . Indeed, our papers go not only beyond the bounds allowed by law but also decency. . . . Until now it was principally the Moscow journals, but lately it would seem as if the Petrograd papers have gotten out of hand. They have taken a stand which is intolerable, not only in a monarchy but even in a republic, especially in war time. Their abuse, their sensational news, their baseless criticism arouses public opinion against the Government. . . . Have not we a war censorship, war censors, generals, lieutenants, and finally a special officer at the head of the press? What are they doing? . . .

⁵ "Arkiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 37.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 75-6.

Scherbatov: In the military zone the censorship is under the control of the military authorities; and the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of the Press are, as is well known to the Council of Ministers . . . mere spectators. The political censorship has been taken out of the hands of the civilians and I have no means of interfering with the lies and agitations with which our papers are filled. . . .

Kharitonov: If the almighty generals . . . are unwilling to help the Minister of the Interior to fight against the scoundrelly press then let's get rid of them and put in others. . . .

Polivanov: We are attacking the war generals because they fail to put the screws on the press; but it should be remembered that they are soldiers and not politicians . . . they censor everything which might help the enemy. . . .

Krivoshain: But to alarm the public and to spread revolutionary ideas . . . is the greatest help to the enemy. . . .

Goremykin: We shall have to ask the Minister of the Interior to put himself in touch at once with the military authorities . . . and see what can be done to put the press in its place. . . .

Scherbatov: Very good. We will take the necessary measures and immediately there will come protests, questions and alarms from the Duma. How will we meet them when we have no right to a political censorship?

Goremykin: The matter is so serious that we can issue warning that interference by the Duma may lead to its dismissal.

Bark: I hardly think it will come to that. The Duma understands that in war time the press cannot be allowed to kindle political fires.

Goremykin: I have not the optimism of Bark. . . .

(b) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ⁷

September 10

Polivanov: . . . The war censorship, like other institutions of the Russian Empire, is bound by law and in the law of the military censorship no provision was made for political censorship. . . .

Scherbatov: . . . What can the Chief of the Press Control do when the most important places where the most influential and widely circulated papers appear are out of his control, being regarded either as a part of the military or under military regulations? . . .

Krivoshain: In this lies the whole tragedy—our tragedy, Russia's tragedy, the root of all the discontent and restlessness. One hears everywhere talk about a united front, union with the people, but

⁷ "Arkhirv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 127.

for a whole year the military and civilian authorities have tried to get together and to coöperate but all in vain. The Council of Ministers deliberates, pleads, expresses a desire, indicates a request, issues a demand, but the generals treat us with contempt and do nothing. . . .

5. GROWING AGITATION AND UNREST

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS⁸

August 24, 1915

Scherbatov: The Council of Ministers knows that there were disturbances in Moscow which ended in bloodshed. . . . There were even more serious disorders at Ivanovo-Voznesensk when it was necessary to fire on the crowd with the result that sixteen were killed and thirty wounded. There was a critical moment when it was uncertain what the garrison would do. . . .

Shakhovskoi: I have information . . . that the workmen are quite aroused. Any kind of spark may start a fire. . . .

Goremykin: . . . I should like to ask the Minister of the Interior what measures he is taking to put an end to the lawlessness . . . going on everywhere. His principal function is to protect the State from disorder and danger.

Scherbatov: The Minister of the Interior is taking all the measures which his duty and present circumstances permit. I have more than once called your attention to the abnormal position of the Minister. Half of European Russia is out of his jurisdiction. Elsewhere in the rear the real government is in the hands of lieutenants who have despotic inclinations and little understanding. I have brought to your notice the fact that even in Petrograd, which gives tone to the whole of Russia, the Minister of the Interior is a mere resident. He has only as much power as the war lords will grant him. . . . How can you expect me to fight the growing revolutionary movement when I am refused the support of the troops on the ground that they are unreliable, that one can not be certain that they will fire on the mob? You can not quiet the whole of Russia by the police alone, especially now when the ranks of the police are being thinned out . . . hourly and the population is growing daily more excited by the speeches in the Duma, by newspaper stories, by continuous defeats, and rumors of disorders in the rear. The demon-

⁸ "Arkhiiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 63-6.

strations and disorders come about from most unforeseen causes. At Moscow patriotic reasons were responsible. Newspapers gave out that the Dardanelles had been taken and that our troops had recaptured Kovno. One silver-tongued orator was arrested and trouble started. . . . I agree that something ought to be done. But how can you do anything when you have no support, when those in responsible places [ministers] can not get a hearing [Emperor] on questions on which the fate of the State may depend? . . . I have in my portfolio several telegrams from governors. They inform me that the flow of refugees, German-colonists and Jews driven out by the military authorities is ever rising and that the local population is so aroused against the newcomers that they receive them with clubs. . . . The governors ask for instructions and help. What can the Minister of the Interior reply. . . . Among the workmen, as among the population in general, there are terrible reports of graft in connection with war orders. . . .

(b) MILIUKOV CALLS ON THE WORKMEN NOT TO COME OUT ON THE STREET ⁹

It has been brought to my attention that a person whom I do not know and who represents himself as Duma Deputy Miliukov has, during the past few days, been carrying on propaganda in the factories (in particular at Lessner's), calling upon the workers to go out on the streets of Petrograd on February 14, the day when the State Duma resumes its session, to demand, in a more determined manner, action by the State Duma, and protest against the war. From the same source I learn that certain persons claiming to be members of the State Duma have been distributing arms among the workers.

I hasten to warn those who believed such declarations that they have been made the victims of the most brazen fraud. My views upon the war and the work of national defense are too well known for me to contradict the opinions that have been expressed in my name. I merely wish to call to the attention of the workers that the evil and dangerous suggestions which are being made to them by such contemptible means spring, obviously, from a very dark source. To listen to such counsels means playing into the hands of the enemy. I, therefore, earnestly request all persons who have heard such counsels and representations to refrain from any demonstration on

* "Riech," February 23, 1917.

February 14, and to remain calm on that day. Their calm will frustrate the plans of their enemies and most effectively help their friends. The intelligent attitude of Labor toward the difficulties we are experiencing makes me hopeful that my warning will be heard and that the treacherous design will fail.

Member of the State Duma,

P. MILIUKOV.

(c) LABOR MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA DURING THE WAR ¹⁰

Months	STRIKES OF ECONOMIC CHARACTER			
	No. of Strikes	No. of Strikers	No. of Working Days Lost	Average No. Days Lost Per Striker
1914				
August	22	22,738	142,123	6.25
September	10	4,661	7,831	1.68
October	9	1,153	1,285	1.11
November	11	1,751	5,461	3.11
December	9	1,604	2,098	1.30
1915				
January	14	6,814	14,760	2.17
February	21	19,609	90,213	4.60
March	20	10,409	29,935	2.87
April	103	35,507	263,447	7.41
May	149	57,732	211,372	3.66
June	162	76,930	226,165	2.94
July	90	27,827	75,309	2.71
August	26	10,696	41,109	3.84
September	69	26,245	82,484	3.14
October	71	75,935	334,842	4.41
November	48	33,437	243,477	7.28
December	46	16,118	51,248	3.18
1916				
January	128	74,961	469,085	6.26
February	104	82,528	579,396	7.02
March	61	47,792	222,893	4.66
April	150	96,302	295,052	3.06
May	153	17,448	768,477	6.46
June	118	190,459	581,357	6.43
July	81	64,402	325,448	5.05
August	97	38,491	147,920	3.84
September	88	46,850	166,868	3.56
October	79	48,603	246,282	5.07
November	51	28,579	74,473	2.61
December	57	39,649	98,966	2.50
TOTAL	2,047	1,205,230	5,799,376	4.81

¹⁰ Fleer, M. G., "Rabochee Dvizhenie v Gody Voiny," 6, 7.

STRIKES OF POLITICAL AND NON-ECONOMIC CHARACTER				TOTAL FOR THE TWO			
No. of Strikes	No. of Strikers	No. of Working Days Lost	Average No. Days Lost Per Striker	No. of Strikes	No. of Strikers Working	No. of Working Days Lost	Average
2	1,950	600	0.30	24	24,688	142,723	5.78
...	10	4,661	7,831	1.68
...	9	1,153	1,285	1.11
5	895	833	0.93	16	2,646	6,294	2.38
...	9	1,604	2,098	1.30
6	2,039	1,973	0.96	20	8,853	16,733	1.89
7	3,498	2,618	0.74	28	23,107	92,831	4.01
6	4,959	1,201	0.24	26	15,368	31,136	2.02
1	220	220	1.00	104	35,727	263,667	7.38
13	1,323	922	0.69	162	59,055	212,294	3.59
2	3,124	2,008	0.64	164	80,054	228,173	2.85
...	90	27,827	75,309	2.70
50	43,929	61,347	1.39	76	54,625	102,456	1.87
115	87,621	141,998	1.62	184	113,866	224,482	1.97
8	2,057	2,281	1.10	79	77,992	337,123	4.32
6	6,106	5,923	0.97	54	39,543	249,400	6.30
1	959	572	0.59	47	17,077	51,820	3.03
38	53,489	56,485	1.06	166	128,450	525,570	4.09
4	9,450	7,000	0.74	108	91,978	586,396	6.37
46	50,643	113,481	2.24	107	98,435	336,374	3.41
7	16,147	77,786	4.82	157	112,449	372,838	3.31
1	750	750	1.00	154	118,198	769,227	6.51
5	9,870	14,531	1.47	123	100,329	595,888	5.94
1	12,115	23,606	1.95	82	76,517	349,954	4.56
7	8,428	7,700	0.91	104	46,919	155,620	3.31
...	88	46,850	166,868	3.56
119	138,531	362,516	2.62	198	187,134	608,798	3.25
15	10,877	9,246	0.85	66	39,456	83,719	2.12
...	57	39,649	98,966	2.49
465	468,980	895,597	1.91	2,512	1,674,210	6,694,973	4.00

PART III

ARMY AND NAVY; 1914-1917

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Every patriotic Russian had a just grievance against the Government not only for mismanaging the war, but also for misleading the public and arousing false hopes. Minister of War Sukhomlinov prided himself on being a soldier of the old school. He looked backward and not forward and from that point of view he had some reason for believing that Russia "is prepared for war." Sukhomlinov was not alone to blame. The antiquated autocratic system of government was largely responsible. The Minister of War was not master of his own house. In his ministry there was a Department of Artillery, with Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich at the head, which was practically independent of the Minister. The Grand Duke was certainly incompetent and if he was not also corrupt those near him were. It was he, more than Sukhomlinov, who was responsible for the shortage of ammunition. But being a Grand Duke, he could not be touched and therefore the attacks were made on the Minister of War.

Ammunition and rifles were not the only things Russia lacked. Such essentials as road maps did not exist and the army lost its way on its own territory. The shortage of locomotives and cars, the policy of Headquarters to drive the population from the war zone into the interior choked the railway lines and highways, interfered with the movement of troops and supplies, created panic and famine in the rear. For this unhappy state of affairs Headquarters threw the blame on Petrograd and Petrograd passed it back to Headquarters.

The Empress and Rasputin, who distrusted the Grand Duke Nicholas, persuaded the Emperor to assume the Supreme Command. Though they wished to get rid of the Grand Duke and his Chief of Staff Ianushkevich, the Ministers foresaw the evil

results that might follow the proposed change of command. They pleaded with the Emperor, but all to no purpose. The Empress never forgave them for what she regarded as a treacherous move; and before a year passed she had most of the objectionable Ministers dismissed.

After taking command the Tsar spent most of his time at the front. The Tsarina treated him as if he were a little boy, quite incapable of taking care of himself. She watched over him, gave him advice, and asked for confidential information which she passed on to Rasputin. What he did with it is not clear. There is, as yet, no evidence that he was a German spy, but that does not necessarily mean that the Germans did not indirectly make use of him. Rasputin and the Empress used to discuss the military situation, pray over it, and send advice to the Emperor. How far it influenced actual operations is not clear, but there is no doubt that they influenced appointments of generals. A man's fitness to command was determined by his loyalty to Rasputin.

The defeats, the causes of the defeats, the bickerings and jealousies between Headquarters and Petrograd, the removal of the Grand Duke from command, the interference of the Empress and Rasputin (both of whom were reputed to be working for Germany) completely demoralized the front and the rear. It was difficult to get people into the army and those who went in tried to get out by deserting and by surrendering. By 1916 the morale of the army was so low that the commanders had lost confidence in it. The army was a hot-bed of discontent in which the radical agitators worked, preparing for the day of reckoning. It came sooner than they expected. The revolutionists of March 1917 had a comparatively easy task to turn the army against the Tsar and his Government.

CHAPTER X

PREPARATION AND EFFICIENCY

I. RUSSIA WANTS PEACE, BUT IS PREPARED FOR WAR¹

Under this title, the evening edition of the "Birzheviya Viedomosti" published the following article:

We have received information from an unimpeachable source which leaves no doubt that Russia, which has increased the fighting strength of its army at the command of its Supreme Leader, does not contemplate war, but is prepared for all eventualities. We may say with pride that the time has passed when Russia need fear external threats. Russia cannot be intimidated. Russian public opinion, which has treated with sensible serenity the saber-rattling started abroad during the past few days, was right. We have no cause for alarm.

Russia is prepared!

From time to time in the course of the past five years, fragmentary reports have appeared in the press of the world telling of various measures taken by the War Department for the military preparation of our troops. We, therefore, state nothing new or unknown. Fully aware of the great power of our native country, so absurdly assailed in the foreign press, we give here a mere outline of the more important matters accomplished during this period at the command of the Monarch.

Every one knows that our general plans for a possible war were of a defensive character. Now, however, it is realized that the defensive idea has been superseded and that the Russian army will take the offensive.

Nor is it a secret that a number of fortresses, which were considered as bases of operations under the earlier war plans, are being abandoned, while, in their stead, defensive lines of the greatest importance as fortifications, are constructed.

The remaining fortresses Russia is well able to strengthen and

¹"Riech," No. 57, March 13, 1914. It was taken for granted at the time, and it has never been denied, that this article was either written or inspired by General V. A. Sukhomlinov, Minister of War.

equip to the limit, for purposes of defense. Some of them have been preserved only to protect certain strategical and tactical points in the Western provinces.

The officers' corps has been considerably increased and its educational qualifications both raised and made uniform. The modern army officer is not only drilled in theory, but is given training of a general military character. The legislative bill concerning reserve lieutenants settles the problem of the qualifications of reserve officers. The second-lieutenants of the reserve are to discharge the duties of both privates and the lowest commissioned officers.

Russian field artillery has been supplied with excellent guns, not only equal to the French and German model guns, but in many respects even superior to them.

Siege artillery has been reorganized and may be found with every large fighting unit.

Our coast and fortress artillery is supplied with guns technically far superior to those in many countries of Western Europe.

The lessons of the past have not been forgotten. In a future war, the Russian artillery will never have to complain of a lack of shells. The artillery is supplied with a large equipment and assured of a properly organized delivery of shells.

In recent years the army engineering has been highly developed, and who is not aware that the army automobile service in Russia has been raised to a very high level? The military telegraph has become available to all branches of the service. Even the smallest unit of the army has its telephone connection. The Russian army is abundantly supplied with searchlights. Both officers and privates have shown themselves experts at railroading and are able to function without the help of the regular railway personnel.

Nor has aviation been overlooked. In the Russian army, as in most European armies, the main emphasis has been on aeroplanes, and not dirigibles, which make great demands, especially in time of war. The type of aeroplane has not yet been definitely settled, but who ignores the wonderful achievements of Sikorski's machines, those aerial dreadnaughts of the Russian army—actual dreadnaughts, and not little scouting planes!

We have the right to expect that, if circumstances bring us to war, the Russian army will be not only immense in numbers, but well trained, well armed, and equipped with the latest inventions of modern military science.

The Russian army, which has always been victorious, and has

usually fought on enemy territory, will entirely forget the meaning of "defense," so persistently impressed upon it formerly. That army, already increased by one-third in peace time, with regiments of uniform composition throughout, and with an improved officers' and privates' corps, is the first in the world in both its quantitative relation to the cavalry and the completeness of its equipment.

It is important for the Russian public to realize that our country is prepared for any eventuality, but that it is so prepared only for the sake of peace, as proclaimed by its Monarch, the noble initiator of The Peace Conference.

Of course, any Power that has aggressive designs against Russia is not pleased with our new military strength. No one may now cherish ambitions to take any portion of Russian territory.

"Si vis pacem, para bellum,"—"If you want peace, prepare for war."

Russia, in perfect accord with its Supreme Leader, wants peace, but is also prepared [for war]!

2. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS²

Headquarters, December 2, 1914.

. . . The only great and serious difficulty for our army is again the lack of ammunition. Because of that our troops are obliged, while fighting, to be cautious and to economize. This means that the burden of fighting falls on the infantry. As a result our losses are enormous. Some army corps have been reduced to divisions, brigades to companies, et cetera. . . .

3. MEMOIRS OF POLIVANOV³

. . . In this manner the question of supplying artillery for the army was practically out of the hands of the Minister of War, and had it not been for the fact that all orders for military supplies had to go through the hands of the War Council, of which the Minister of War was chairman, it could be said that alongside the Minister of War there existed a Ministry of Artillery Supplies with a Grand Duke [Sergei Mikhailovich] as Minister. . . .

² "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 53.

³ Polivanov, A. A.; "Memuary," 153. Polivanov was born in 1855 and died in 1920.

4. LETTER OF SUKHOMLINOV TO IANUSHKEVICH ⁴

May 22, 1915.

. . . The telegram of the Supreme Commander about ammunition has been on my conscience. I tried, unknown to the artillery department, to get in touch with the manufacturers, and hereby enclose certain data. If after looking it over you think it best to lay it before His Imperial Highness, you may do so. It would be well if he brought it to the attention of His Majesty. I could then, without interfering with Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich,⁵ push matters without the delays of the artillery department. . . .

I have just learned these facts. On September 22, 1914, I called industrialists together and asked them to undertake the manufacture of ammunition. "The Russian Company for the Manufacture of War Materials" offered its services, and on November 7, 1914 . . . the office of the chief of the artillery department replied to this offer by saying . . . "that the offer cannot be accepted because there is no need for shrapnel." The order was finally placed on January 25, 1915, when I went after them [artillery department?]. That's the kind of collaborators [that I have?]. It is a great pity they do not work for the German army. . . .

5. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ⁶

Headquarters, July 7, 1915.

. . . Again that cursed question of shortage of artillery and rifle ammunition — it stands in the way of an energetic advance. If we should have three days of serious fighting we might run out of ammunition altogether. Without new rifles, it is impossible to fill up the gaps. The army is now almost stronger than in peace time; it should be (and was at the beginning) three times as strong. This is the situation in which we find ourselves at present.

If we had a rest from fighting for about a month our condition would greatly improve. It is understood, of course, that what I say is strictly for you only. Please do not say a word of this to any one.

⁴"Krasny Arkhiv," III, 59-60. V. A. Sukhomlinov, Minister of War. N. N. Ianushkevich, Chief of the Staff of the Supreme Commander.

⁵Chief of the Artillery Department.

⁶"Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 241.

6. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH⁷*October 9 [1915].*

. . . The directors of the "Pulemet" Company, organized quite recently for the purpose of making guns, have sent me a pile of documents to explain the object of the company. Among these papers was a copy of a letter to the Minister of War, dated in August of this year. In this letter one reads:

"To our great regret the offer of our organization to build a gun factory has not yet been acted upon. . . . We wish to say that the remarks of certain persons that the "Pulemet" Company has done nothing, have no foundation because [1] it was organized only in September of last year, that is to say, in war time, and [2] all its offers to make ammunition and all other kinds of war materials were declined by the artillery department. For example, on November 6, 1914, our company proposed to the Assistant Minister of War to make shrapnel. This offer was declined by the head office of the artillery department on November 15, on the ground that "there is no need of ammunition." . . .

7. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS⁸*July 2, 1915.*

. . . Owing to the heat we take long rides in automobiles and go very little on foot. We selected new districts and explored the surrounding country, being guided by our maps. Often we made mistakes because the maps we have were made eighteen years ago and since then some of the forests have disappeared while new woods and new villages have appeared. . . .

8. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH⁹*May 6 [1915].*

. . . We get all our food from Russia. The Ministers have taken upon themselves the organization of the food supplies needed for the

⁷ "Andrei Vladimirovich," 40. Other letters follow, showing that the "Pulemet" Company made numerous offers to supply the army with guns, ammunition, and other war supplies, and that nearly all of these offers were pigeonholed.

⁸ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 231.

⁹ "Andrei Vladimirovich," 31.

millions in the army. We have now reached the time when the supply is less than the demand. To the continuous demands and to the insistent arguments that the shortage leads to a crisis, the Ministers answer quite coolly: "Cut down the demands. Give the horse ten instead of twenty pounds of oats, five instead of fifteen pounds of hay, or don't give him anything at all." The same is true of meat. I have often discussed this question with the Chief of Supplies of our front. He has been at Headquarters attending conferences with the Ministers, and came away with the impression that they "have stopped fighting." They take the stand that the country has given all that it can give, and any further attempt to squeeze more out of it will lead to uprisings, which is, of course, undesirable. In reply they were told that the war is first and foremost, and that an army cannot fight without food. But they are, seemingly, little concerned with the army, and are mainly interested in keeping the country quiet.

The truth is that the requisitions have called forth considerable comment, due in large part to the fact that the whole burden of the requisition has fallen on the propertyless classes. Take, for example, the meat situation. All pure-bred, registered, listed and all such live stock, none of which the peasant has, is exempted from requisition. The poor peasant loses his last cow, but the rich man is not touched. With feed it is somewhat different. Speculators, by concealing grain from the Government, succeed in raising the price and enriching themselves. Had we in Russia a proper system of registering all products, we might have escaped this evil. The fact remains that our front gets almost no oats or hay. What will come out of it? . . .

9. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ¹⁰

Imperial Headquarters, June 24, 1916.

. . . He [Sturmer, Prime Minister] is an excellent, honest man, but, it seems to me, unable to make up his mind to do what is needed. The most important and immediate question is fuel and metal,—iron and copper for ammunition. Without metals the mills can not supply a sufficient amount of bullets and bombs. The same is true [lack of fuel] in regard to the railways. Trepov [Minister of Transportation] assures me that the railways work better this year than last and produces proof, but nevertheless every one complains that they are not doing as well as they might. These cursed affairs. They confound me so much that I do not know where the truth lies. But it is neces-

* "Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 306.

sary to act very energetically and to take definite steps to settle these questions once and for all. Just as soon as the Duma is adjourned, I will summon all the Ministers here to deliberate on these questions, and I shall settle everything here. They continue to come here almost daily and take up my time. I usually go to bed after 1:30 A.M., spending all my time in hurried writing, reading, and receiving ! ! ! It's terrible! . . .

CHAPTER XI

THE SUPREME COMMAND

1. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH¹

October 10, 1915

. . . A few days ago mother had tea with Niki and Alix. She [mother] reported that Niki was in good spirits. He is pleased with his new position and the fact that he knows what is going on. She reminded him that it was his wish at the very outbreak of the war to put himself at the head of the army and that his ministers dissuaded him. "Yes," said Niki, "that was my wish, but they interfered." . . .

2. MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS²

July 29, 1915.

Goremykin: . . . The Empress . . . as you know, was never favorably disposed toward Nicholas Nicholaevich and during the first days of the war protested against his appointment as Commander-in-chief. . . .

3. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR³

October 2, 1914.

. . . I am so happy for you that you can at last manage to go. . . . It was a topic I on purpose did not touch, knowing and perfectly well understanding your feelings, at the same time realizing that it is better you are not out at the head of the army. . . .

4. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR⁴

November 30, 1914

.. . It's good you can have a thorough talk with N. & tell him your opinion of some people & give him some ideas. May again your presence there bring good luck to our brave troops. . . .

¹ Dnevnik B. Velikogo Kniazia Andreia Vladimirovicha, 96. To be referred to as Andrei Vladimirovich. The Grand Duke was a cousin of the Tsar.

² "Arkhir Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVII, 21.

³ "Pisma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k Imperatoru Nikolaiu II," I, 378 (To be referred to as "Pisma Imperatritsy").

⁴ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 398.

5. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁵*December 7, 1914*

. . . I don't listen to the gossip of town which makes one otherwise quite nervous, but only believe what Nikolasha lets know. Nevertheless I begged A. [Anna Vyrubova] ⁶ to wire to our Friend [Rasputin] that things are very serious and we beg for his prayers. . . .

6. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁷*December 27, 1914*

. . . Our Friend arrives tomorrow and says we shall have better news from the war. . . .

7. CONVERSATION BETWEEN GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS NICHOLAEVICH AND RODZIANKO ⁸

. . . When the conversation touched on Rasputin I told him of the rumors that circulated at Petrograd. It was said that Rasputin telegraphed for permission to visit the Headquarters and that Nicholas Nicholaevich answered, "Come—I'll hang you." When I asked the Grand Duke whether this was true, he laughed and said, "Not quite that." It was quite evident, however, that something like that did actually take place. . . .

8. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁹*October 3, 1914*

. . . Our Friend is happy for your sake that you have gone and was so glad to have seen you yesterday. He always fears Bonheur, that is to say, the crows ¹⁰ want him [Grand Duke] to get the P[olish] throne or in Galicia that that is there [their] aim but I said she should quieten him, even out of thanks you would never risk such a thing. Gr. [Rasputin] loves you jealously and can't bear N. [Nicholas] playing a part.

⁵ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 406.

⁶ The mutual friend of the Empress and Rasputin.

⁷ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 412.

⁸ Rodzianko, M. V.; "Arkhir Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 85.

⁹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 380.

¹⁰ Princesses Militsa and Anastasiia of Montenegro, wives of the Grand Dukes Nicholas Nicholaevich and Peter Nicholaevich.

9. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹¹*Feb. 11, 1915*

. . . Our Friend came there [Vyrubova], as He wanted to see me a second. . . . I am so glad you had good talks with N. . . . others influence him & he tries to play your part wh. is far from right—except in military matters—and ought to be put a stop to—one has no right before God and man to usurp your rights as he does—he can make the mess & later you will have great difficulty in mending matters. Me it hurts very much. One has no right to profit of one's unusually great rights as he does. . . .

10. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH ¹²*June 1 [1915]*

. . . We had a visitor at the Staff today, F. F. Palitsyn [formerly Chief of Staff]. . . . F. F. was greatly displeased that Nicholas Nicholaevich was given the title of "Supreme."

"It won't do," said F. F. "You can not pull the feathers out of the crown and distribute them right and left. Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Supreme [Chief] of Evacuation, Supreme Council—they are all supreme except the Tsar. Wait, you will see some of the evil results of this system. The Tsar alone is supreme; and no one else can be supreme. What does it lead to? He [Grand Duke Nicholas] is occupied with politics—Ministers come to see him—if I were in his place I would not receive them—but is not commanding the army. I told him so. I said that he has divided his authority among his subordinates and that he is no longer master of the situation. It won't do. It won't do to mix war and politics. They do not go together and no good can come of it. Besides, he has no competent organizations. Moltke has said—and that is true for all times—that strategy in itself is not complicated—its formulas are few and simple. But there is no strategy without supplies. The army has to live, to be fed, to be kept up, to be supplied. It should have everything and it would give everything. If you demand everything from the army you must supply it with everything. He who demands should give. As it is now, the Supreme Commander has neither supplies, nor the control of the rear. He does not have all the threads in his hands. He orders an offensive and is told that it is

¹¹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 424.

¹² "Andrei Vladimirovich," 35-6.

not ready. From the point of view of military technique, this won't do at all. As long as he is not full master of everything, he is nothing. He can not demand, if he himself gives nothing. . . ."

II. MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS¹³

July 29, 1915

Krivoshein: "It should be remembered that the law about putting the government on a military basis was made on the supposition that the Emperor himself would be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In that case there could have been no conflicts . . . for all power would have been in the hands of one person. But now that this is changed [the Emperor is not Supreme Commander] there should be a change in the law to meet the new situation. For no matter how talented the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander may be, he cannot take the place of the Council of Ministers and, in general, of the machinery of government of the Russian Empire." . . .

12. MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS¹⁴

August 6, 1915

Krivoshein: Yesterday I received a letter from General Ianushkevich of an unusual character. He writes that "one meets rarely the hero, the idealist and altruist of the fairy-story book . . . he is not more than one per cent, and all the rest—are people who look forward to pay day . . . to fight for Russia is a beautiful idea but the masses do not understand it . . . a man from Tambov is ready to defend Tambov guberniia to the last, but war in Poland has no meaning for him . . . and therefore the soldiers surrender in large numbers. . . ." from all this General Ianushkevich has come to the conclusion that "to get the Russian soldier to fight the enemy it is necessary to interest him [soldier] in a material way . . . it is necessary to buy heroes." . . .

The writer of the letter is either unusually naïve or unpardonably stupid. . . . At the front all goes to pieces, the enemy is nearing the very heart of Russia, and Mr. Ianushkevich is thinking only how to throw off on others the responsibility for what is taking place. In reading his letter I am impressed more and more by his desire to prove an alibi. From the moment of the very first defeats there came from Headquarters loud cries of lack of ammunition, lack of

¹³ "Arkhir Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 21.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 23-5.

activity in the rear. . . . Every one was to blame for the Russian defeats, every one except Headquarters. . . . How can General Ianushkevich have the manhood to continue to conduct war operations when he has no confidence in the army, does not believe in love of country and in the Russian people. This is terrible! Just think, gentlemen, in what hands lies the fate of Russia, of the monarchy and of the world. . . . What has poor Russia done to bring on herself such a tragedy? I can no longer be silent. No matter the consequences, I cannot shout from street corners and squares but I must tell you and the Tsar. I reserve for myself the right to lay the letter of General Ianushkevich tomorrow before the Emperor and tell His Majesty what I think of it. . . .

Sazonov: This shameful letter does not take me unawares. One may expect anything from General Ianushkevich. It is terrible to think that the Grand Duke is a prisoner of such men. It is no secret that he is hypnotized by Ianushkevich and Danilov [G. N. Quartermaster General], he is in their pocket. They jealously guard him from contact with the outside world. . . .

13. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH¹⁵

August 25 [1915] Tsarskoe Selo

. . . [S. D.] Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dined at mother's. After dinner he told us the following:

"General Ianushkevich [N. N.], Chief of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, takes unheard of liberties. Under the circumstances it is quite impossible to do anything. Let me illustrate by several incidents. When the Allies decided to carry on operations at Gallipoli they asked us to take part. This would not only have aided them but would have been of great importance to us, the principal beneficiaries in case Constantinople was captured. After negotiations with the Staff of the Supreme Commander, the army corps of General Irmanov was brought together at Odessa. I received from the Staff even the list of the officers, which I passed on to the Allies, telling them that the expeditionary force was ready to start in a few days. Some time later I learned quite incidentally that this corps was in Galicia. When I reported to the Emperor, I called his attention to this matter, and he told me that he, too, had only recently and quite by accident, learned of this change from the Grand Duke Georgi Mikhailovich,

¹⁵ "Andrei Vladimirovich," 67-9.

whom he had appointed at the head of one of the battalions in the corps. . . . Imagine my position in regard to the Ambassadors of the Allies. It must be remembered that this corps was detailed with the Tsar's authorization and all of a sudden, without even notifying him, the corps is moved to Galicia. His Majesty merely remarked that the whole army is at the service of the Supreme Commander and that it is difficult to interfere with his orders.

"Another incident took place in March. Bark [P. L.], Minister of Finance, received a telegram from Ianushkevich, informing him [Bark] that he was to send over to America, by January, 1916, 400 million rubles gold to pay for shrapnel. Bark was almost bowled over. The amount in question is one-third of our total gold fund. Without consulting any one, they [Grand Duke and Ianushkevich] signed the contracts. Such an attitude toward the finances of the country can lead only to the ruin of the treasury. Poor Bark has not yet recovered from the shock. In addition, he [Ianushkevich] has taken an impossible stand in our Persian policy. His Majesty found it necessary to send one [military] division to Persia, where our affairs are not advancing very well, as a punitive force in order to re-establish our prestige and to bring order out of chaos. In reply Ianushkevich said that the division would not be sent. Such an attitude toward the will of His Majesty cannot be tolerated, aside from the fact that under such conditions it is impossible to carry on a policy. As it stands we have two authorities at the same time, one excluding the other. . . .

"Fortunately all this will soon come to an end. The Emperor himself will assume command. He wished to do that a long time ago, but hesitated, and at last, decided . . ."

Sazonov pointed out, however, the dangers of this act, for every failure would lead to criticism of the Emperor. In view of this, Sazonov asked the opinion of Boris [Vladimirovich] on the effect the change in command would have on the troops. Boris was quite certain that it would have a good effect, that the morale would be improved, and that the news would be received with great enthusiasm. He added that the removal of Nicholas Nicholaevich would pass unnoticed. I am not of that opinion. During the year of the war, notwithstanding the series of important defeats, he was very popular. He carried out honestly the duties laid upon him in spite of the difficulties in the way. One of these is the composition of his staff, which was given him ready-made and which he did not select.

14. CORRESPONDENCE OF EMPEROR AND EMPRESS

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS¹⁶*Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief**October 6, 1914*

. . . Ugh! Nikolasha [Grand Duke Nicholas], as I feared, does not let me go to Osovs. This is intolerable because it prevents me from seeing the troops that were recently in the fight. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS¹⁷*Headquarters, March 15, 1915*

. . . N. [Grand Duke] would not even listen [to the suggestion] that I go to Lomzha on the very first day. He says that German aeroplanes are flying there over our troops in search of our reserves, that all the roads are packed full of cars and wagons, and for these reasons he advised General Po not to go in that direction. I shall decide what to do. I sent Dzhunkovski [V. F.] to see what is going on over there. He is a practical man and can judge whether the trip is practicable. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR¹⁸*March 18, 1915*

. . . Don't you tell N. & go off where it suits you & where nobody can expect you—of course he will try to keep you back. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS¹⁹*March 18, 1915*

. . . It seems to me that you think that N. is holding me and takes pleasure in keeping me from the troops. As a matter of fact it is not so at all. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS²⁰*April 18, 1915*

. . . Nicholas proposed that I should go as soon as possible to Lvov and Przemyśl. . . . Bobrinski said the same thing a few days

¹⁶ "Perepiska Nikolaia i Aleksandry Romanovykh," III, 17. To be referred to as "Perepiska Nikolaia."

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁸ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 432.

¹⁹ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 136.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 148.

ago. Nicholas will accompany me as this is my first visit to the conquered area. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²¹

April 19, 1915

. . . Well, I shall ask our Friend to quite particularly pray for you there—but, forgive my saying so—its not for N. to accompany you—you must be the chief one, the first time you go. You find me an old goose, no doubt, but if others wont think of such things, I must. He must remain & work as usual—really don't take him, as the hate against him must be great there—& to see you alone will rejoice those hearts that go out to you in love and gratitude. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²² °

April 20, 1915

. . . When A. [Vyrubova] told Him in secret, because I want His special prayers for you, he curiously enough said the same as me; that on the whole it does not please Him "*God will help; but it is (too early) to go now, he will not observe anything, will not see his people, it is interesting, but better after the war.*" . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ²³

April 20, 1915

. . . My dear, I do not agree with you that N. should remain here while I go to Galicia. On the contrary, just because I go in war time to the conquered area, the commander-in-chief should accompany me. I believe that all in my circle here find this to be the right thing to do. It is he who accompanies me and not I who am on his staff. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²⁴

June 25, 1915

. . . Would to God N. were another man & had not turned against a man of Gods [Rasputin], that always brings bad luck to their work & those women wont let him change. . . .

²¹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 441.

²² *Ibid.*, 442.

²³ "Perepiska Nikolaia," 154.

²⁴ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 465.

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²⁵*June 23, 1915*

. . . Remember you have reigned long, have far more experience than they—N. has only the army to think of & success—you carry the internal responsibilities on for years—if he makes faults (after the war he is nobody), but you have to set all straight. No, hearken unto our Friend, believe Him, He has yr. interest & Russians at heart—it is not for nothing God sent Him to us—only we must pay more attention to what He says—His words are not lightly spoken—and the gravity of having not only His prayers, but His advice—is great. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²⁶*June 29, 1915*

. . . . I always remember what our Friend says & how often we do not enough heed His words.

He was so much against yr. going to the Headquarters, because people get round you there & make you do things, wh. would have been better not done ²⁷—here the atmosphere in your own house is a healthier one & you would see things more rightly—if only you would come back quicker. I am not speaking because of a selfish feeling, but that here I feel quieter about you & there am in a constant dread what one is concocting—you see, I have absolutely no faith in N.—know him to be far fr. clever & having gone against a Man of Gods, his work cant be blessed, nor his advice be good. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²⁸*July 7, 1915*

. . . you must show you have a way & will of yr. own, & are not lead by N. & his staff, who direct yr. movements & whose permission you have to ask before going anywhere. No, go alone, without N., by yr. very own self, bring the blessing of yr. presence to them—don't say you bring bad luck—at Lemberg & Przemyśl it happened because our Friend knew & told you it was too early, but you listened instead to HEADQUARTERS. . . .

²⁵ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 462-3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 473.

²⁷ Change in ministers.

²⁸ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 485.

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²⁹*July 8, 1915*

. . . Ah my Nicky, things are not as they ought to be, & therefore N. keeps you near, to have a hold over you with his ideas & bad counsels. Wont you yet believe me, my Boy?

Cant you realise that a man who turned simple traitor to a man of Gods, cannot be blest, nor his actions be good—well, if he must remain at the head of the army there is nothing to be done, & all bad success will fall upon his head—but interior mistakes will be told home upon you, as who inside the country can think that he reigns beside you.

Its so utterly false & wrong. . . .

O, what joy, if you really return on Sunday.³⁰ . . .

MEMOIRS OF POLIVANOV ³¹

. . . On Tuesday, August 17, [1915] after my usual report which took place at the Alexander Palace in Tsarskoe Selo, the Emperor turned to me and said that he intended to assume the supreme command of the army. He had had in mind doing this after the declaration of the war, but yielded to the Council of Ministers, which advised against it. But now that the army is in a difficult situation he feels morally responsible to join it and to lead it during the duration of the war. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ³²*Imperial Headquarters**August 21, 1915*

. . . It seems as if a year had passed since we took communion together in those trying days before my coming here! I remember quite well that, as I stood opposite the large image of the Savior, on the high place in the big church, some inner voice seemed to urge me to come to some definite decision independently of what our Friend [Rasputin] told me, and to write my decision at once to Nik [Grand Duke Nicholas]. . . .

²⁹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 486-7.

³⁰ After his return, July 11, the Empress prevailed upon the Emperor to dismiss the Grand Duke and make himself Supreme Commander, which he did in September against the strong protest of his ministers and other influential men.

³¹ Polivanov, A. A.; "Memuary," 203. Polivanov, Minister of War.

³² "Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 406.

15. TELEGRAM OF EMPEROR TO GENERAL-ADJUTANT
COUNT VORONTSOV-DASHKOV ³³*Borzhom*

[August 23, 1915]

I am sending you Dmitri Sheremetev with a letter. It is necessary to tell you that I have decided to take over the command of the army. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich will be freed from his duties as Commander of the armies and will be appointed in your place. I am sure that you will understand the serious reasons that have caused me to make such an important change.

NICHOLAS

16. LETTER OF COUNT VORONTSOV-DASHKOV
TO THE TSAR ³⁴*Your Majesty,*

I have read the letter of my dear Sovereign, handed to me by Dmitri Sheremetev, with a feeling of deep gratitude. It gives me the right to live the remnant of my days with a clear conscience. I cannot help repeating on this occasion what I have said so many times, namely, that without Your Majesty's support and confidence, I would not have been able to prove useful to You.

The telegram from Your Majesty, received on the 23-d, has inspired me with the following ideas, which I allow myself to express to You with the frankness You have permitted me.

Your Majesty desires to assume command of the army. In this case, considering future events connected with the administration of the vast Russian State, the army under Your command must be victorious. Failure would fatally affect Your further reign. Personally I feel convinced of ultimate success, but I am not sure of an early turn for the better. Much has been damaged by the present command, and one can hardly expect a quick correction of the errors. —It is necessary for You to select a worthy Chief of Staff in place of the present incumbent. Voices from the western front reaching the Caucasus name General Alexeev. The voice of the army probably does not err.

The appointment of Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich as Your

³³ Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 80-1. Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion Ivanovich (1837-1916).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 86-7.

Viceroy in the Caucasus I consider very desirable. It is easier for the Grand Duke than for a common mortal to rule the Caucasus; such is the character of the Orient. I am convinced that the Grand Duke will soon learn to love the Caucasus and its inhabitants, and that the inhabitants will love him for his kindness and sympathy. But will he care to take this place? Degradation from priesthood to deaconship, deeply affecting his pride, cannot help proving very hard for him, and he will be asking Your Majesty for retirement from the high post he occupies, on grounds of ill-health, without any other appointment, or for permission to rest for a more or less lengthy period.

Should the Grand Duke agree to take the new post at once, I would ask for Your permission not to wait for him in Tiflis, but to meet him at the Caucasus boundary, in Rostov-on-the-Don.

Once more I beg my dear Sovereign to accept my expression of deep gratitude for everything in Your letter. That letter will be sacredly preserved in our family archives.

Christ be with You.

Devotedly Yours,

I. VORONTSOV

17. RODZIANKO'S LETTER TO THE TSAR ³⁵

*To His Imperial Majesty,
The Most Humble Report of
The President of the State Duma*

Your Imperial Majesty:

Supplementing my verbal report, which I had the honor to lay before You on the twenty-fourth of August, I make bold to beg Your Majesty again not to subject Your sacred person to the dangers in which You may be placed by the consequences of Your decision.

Sire! You are the symbol and the standard around which all the nationalities of Russia rally. This standard cannot and must not be dragged into the stress and storm of the ordeals that have come to us. It must shine radiantly as the torch for all the strivings of the nation, and serve as the invincible bulwark of all the sons of Russia and as the promise of security for their minds, alarmed by these events.

Sire! You have no right, in the face of the nation, to allow

³⁵ Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 84-5.

anything to happen that might possibly cast the faintest shadow to fall upon this sacred standard.

At this dreadful hour of peril, unprecedented in the history of Russia, when the possibility arises of a heavy Teuton yoke over the Russian land, You, Sire, must be beyond and above those organs of government which shoulder the duty of immediately repulsing the enemy.

You cannot act as executive: You must be judge, a benign encourager or implacable punisher.

But if You, Sire, should take over the direct command of our glorious army—You, Sire, the last refuge of Your people—who will then pass judgment, in the event of failure or defeat? Is it not really obvious, Sire, that You will then voluntarily have surrendered Your inviolable person to the judgment of the people?—and that is fatal to Russia.

Consider, Sire, what You are laying hands on—on Your own self, Sire!

Our native land is going through a painful crisis. General mistrust surrounds the present Government, which has lost confidence in itself and will power. All idea of authority has been shattered by its disorderly measures, and yet, more than ever before, there has now grown up in the country a realization of the need for a firm, unshakable faith in oneself and in the popular strength of the Government. The minds of all the Russians have reached a state of an unprecedented strain, fearing for the fate of Russia.

The nation is impatiently longing for a power which will instil confidence and lead the country into the path of victory. Yet at such a time, Your Majesty, You decide to displace the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, whom the Russian people still trusts absolutely. The people will interpret Your step in no other way but as inspired by the Germans around You, who in the minds of the people are identified with our enemies and with treason to the Russian cause.

In the popular mind, the result of Your Majesty's decision will be a realization of the hopelessness of the situation and of the chaos which has invaded the administration.

Sire! The situation will be even worse if the army, deprived of a leader enjoying its absolute confidence, loses its courage.

In this event defeat is inevitable, and within the country revolution and anarchy will then break out, sweeping everything from their path.

Your Majesty! Before it is too late, revoke your decision, no matter how hard it may be for you.

Retain Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich at the head of the army.

Reassure alarmed and agitated minds by forming a government of people who enjoy Your confidence and are known to the country by their public activities.

Sire, it is not yet too late!

On bended knees I beg You fervently not to delay the decision which will protect the sacred person of the Russian Tsar and the reigning dynasty.

Sire, give heed to this truthful word from the heart of Your loyal servant.

The President of the State Duma,

MIKHAIL RODZIANKO

Petrograd, August 25, 1915.

18. COLLECTIVE ADDRESS OF THE MINISTERS TO THE TSAR ³⁶

Most Gracious Sovereign:

Do not count against us our bold and candid address. We are driven to this action by our duty as faithful subjects, our love for You and our native country, and our alarmed consciousness of the dire portent of the events now taking place.

Yesterday, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers under Your personal chairmanship, we laid before You our unanimous appeal that Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich should not be removed from his part in the supreme command of the army. But we fear that Your Imperial Majesty did not deign to incline to our plea, which, in our opinion, is the plea of all loyal Russia.

Sire, we dare once more to tell You that, to the best of our understanding, Your decision threatens Russia, Yourself, and Your dynasty with evil consequences.

At the same meeting the radical difference between the view of the President of the Council of Ministers and our own became manifest in estimating events within the country and considering the course of action to be followed by the Government. A situation such as this, intolerable at any time, is fatal in these days.

³⁶ Semennikov; "Politika Romanovykh," 87-8.

In these circumstances, we lose faith in the possibility of being of service to You and the country.

Your Imperial Majesty's loyal subjects:

PETER KHARITONOV	PRINCE N. SCHERBATOV
PETER BARK	PRINCE VSEVOLOD SHAKHOVSKOI
COUNT PAUL IGNATIEV	SERGEI SAZONOV
ALEXANDER KRIVOSHEIN	ALEXANDER SAMARIN

Sept. 3, 1915

19. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²⁷

Sept. 4, 1915

. . . You have fought this great fight for your country & throne—alone & with bravery & decision. Never have they seen such firmness in you before & it cannot remain without good fruit.

Do not fear for what remains behind—one must be severe & stop all at once. Lovy, I am here, dont laugh at silly old wify, but she has "trousers" on unseen, & I can get the old man [Goremykin] to come & keep him up to be energetic—whenever I can be of the smallest use, tell me what to do—use me—at such a time God will give me the strength to help you—because our souls are fighting for the right against the evil. . . .

Only get Nikolasha's nomination quicker done—no dawdling, its bad for the cause. . . .

Give me some news as soon as you can. . . .

Tell me the impression, if you can. Be firm to the end, let me be sure of that otherwise shall get quite ill from anxiety.

Bitter pain not to be with you—know what you feel, & the meeting with N. wont be agreeable—you did trust him & now you know, what months ago our Friend said, that he was acting wrongly towards you & your country & wife—its not the people who would do harm to your people but Nikolasha & set Guchkov, Rodzianko, Samarin, etc. . . .

20. LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ²⁸

Headquarters, September 7, 1915

. . . Thank God it is over. Here I am again with a new responsibility on my shoulders. God's will be done!—I feel at peace as if I had been at Holy Communion.

²⁷ "Pisma Imperatrity," I, 490-1.

²⁸ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 266-8.

On the memorable morning of September 5 when I arrived, I prayed long and reread without end your first letter [September 4]. As the moment for our meeting approached, I felt more and more at peace.

N. entered with a smile and just asked when he was to leave. In the same manner I replied that he might remain two days. Then we discussed several questions relating to military operations, generals, etc., & that was all. . . . This is the beginning of a new clean page and what will be written on it God alone knows. Wify, dear, don't you think you should help hubby while he is away? It is too bad that you have not done this before, at least during the period of the war.

I do not know of a more agreeable feeling than to be proud of you as I have been these last months, when you have kept after me to be firm and to stick to my opinion.

We had just finished playing dominoes when I received, through Alexeev, a telegram from Ivanov that today our 11th army in Galicia attacked two German divisions. . . . With such good results that we took more than 150 officers, 7,000 soldiers, 30 cannons, and many machine guns.

This happened immediately after our troops learned that I assumed the chief command. This is a mark of God's grace and so soon! . . .

21. LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR³⁹

Sept. 28, 1915

. . . God grant only that nothing shld. succeed in the Caucasus,⁴⁰ & the people show their devotion to you & allow no playing of a grand part. . . .

April 19, 1916

. . . How splendid Trebizond has been taken by our splendid troops—I congratulate you with all my loving heart. It makes me sad that all the luck is down there—but the good will come here too in time. . . .

³⁹ "Pisma Imperatrity." .

⁴⁰ Grand Duke Nicholas was made commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus.

CHAPTER XII

WAR SECRETS

THE EMPRESS, RASPUTIN

I. LETTERS OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ¹

September 13, 1915

. . . Now I will say a few words about the military situation. It is threatening toward Dvinsk and Vilna, serious in the center, around Baranovich, and good in the south (Gen. Ivanov) where our success continues. The seriousness consists in the extremely weak condition of our regiments, which are only about one-fourth full. It will be impossible to fill their ranks before a month because the new recruits will not be ready and because we have few rifles. . . .

I ask you, my dear, to say nothing of this to anybody. I am writing this for you only. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²

November 16, 1915

. . . He brought yr. secret marcheroute . . . to me & I won't say a word about it except to our Friend to guard you everywhere. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ³

June 18, 1916

. . . A few days ago we with Alexeev decided not to advance in the north, but to concentrate our strength a little more to the south. But I ask you to say nothing about it to any one, not even to our Friend. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ⁴

June 20, 1916

. . . I told Alexeev how much you are interested in war questions and about all the details which you asked me in your last letter No. 511. He smiled but said nothing. . . .

¹ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 290.

² "Perepiska Nikolaia," IV, 290-1.

³ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 582.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 295.

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR⁵*September 29, 1916*

. . . I begged our Friend to particularly pray for the success of our new plans, & he does so & hopes God will bless them. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR⁶*October 6, 1916*

. . . Our Friend says about the new orders you gave to Brusilov, etc.: "Very satisfied with father's orders, all will be well." He won't mention it to a soul, but I had to ask His blessing for yr. decision. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR⁷*October 7, 1916*

. . . Our Friend is much put out that Brusilov had not listened to yr. order to stop the advance—says you were inspired from above to give that order & the crossing of the Carpathians before winter & God wld. bless it.—Now he says again useless losses.—

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR⁸*October 9, 1916*

. . . Our Fr. worries that one did not listen to you [Brusilov] as your first thought was the right one & a pity you gave in, yr. spirit was right wishing the change. . . .

2. KHVOSTOV'S TESTIMONY⁹

. . . Rasputin went to Tsarskoe and Rubinstein [D. L., banker] asked him to find out whether the Russian army would advance or not. . . . Rubinstein needed the information in order to determine whether to buy timber in Minsk Guberniia or not. . . . Rasputin went, and on his return related what took place at Tsarskoe. . . . It should, however, be said that when sober, Rasputin said very little, but when he had a few drinks in him, he talked a great deal. His friends knew this and therefore took him to a restaurant, gave him a bottle of madeira, and then he told them what had happened at Tsarskoe. . . .

⁵ "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 408.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 419.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 420.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 423.

⁹ "Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima," I, 31-2. A. N. Khvostov, Minister of the Interior.

"I came," said Rasputin, "to Tsarskoe, and walked in. Papa [Tsar] sat there looking glum. I stroked his head and said, 'Why so sad?' He replied, 'Scoundrels all about me! No boots, no guns; it is necessary to advance, but to advance it is impossible.' . . .

" 'But when will you advance?'

" 'We will have no guns before two months, that's the earliest that we can advance.' ". . .

CHAPTER XIII

THE EMPRESS AND RASPUTIN AS MILITARY ADVISERS

I. CALLING OF THE SECOND CLASS

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹

June 23, 1915

. . . The same about the question wh. our Friend takes so to heart & wh. is the most serious of all, for internal peace's sake—the not calling in the Second class—if the order has been given, you tell N. [Nicholas Nicholaevich] that you insist upon its counterordering. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ²

June 24, 1915

. . . Please, my Angel, make N. see with your eyes—don't give in to any of the 2nd class being taken—put it off as long as only possible—they have to work in the fields, fabrics, on steamers, etc.; rather take the recroutes for next year now—please listen to His advise when spoken so gravely & wh. gave Him sleepless nights—one fault & we shall all have to pay for it. . . .

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS ³

June 29, 1915

. . . When I said that I desire that the class of 1917 should be called, all the ministers gave a sigh of relief. N. agreed at once. . . . It is understood of course that if the war goes on we might be obliged to call some of the 2nd class, but for the time being the matter is dropped. . . .

¹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 462.

² *Ibid.*, 463-4.

³ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 223-4.

2. STRATEGY

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁴*November 19, 1915*

. . . Our Friend, whom we saw yesterday evening, when he sent you the telegram, was afraid that, if we had not a big army to pass through Roumania, we might be caught in a trap from behind.—

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁵*November 28, 1915*

. . . Now, before I forget, I must give you over a message from our Friend, prompted by what He saw in the night. He begs you to order that one should advance near Riga, says it is necessary, otherwise the Germans will settle down so firmly through all the winter, that it will cost endless bloodshed and trouble to make them move—now it will take them so aback, that we shall succeed in making them retrace their steps—he says this is just now the most essential thing and begs you seriously to order ours to advance, he says we can and we must, and I was to write it to you at once.—

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁶*January 4, 1916*

. . . Our Friend is always praying & thinking of the war—He says we are to tell him at once if there is anything particular—so she did about the fog, & He scolded for not having said it at once—says no more foggs will disturb.—

LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ⁷*February 17, 1916*

. . . Now a perfectly private question of my own—as one reads always that the germans continue sending & artillery & troops to Bulgaria, if, when we advance at last, they come from behind through Rumania—who covers the back of our army? Or does the guard get sent down to the left of Keller & to protect towards Odessa? These are my own thoughts, because the enemy always finds our weak points—they prepare everywhere & for all emergencies always & we very superficially as a rule, therefore lost in the carpathians etc.

⁴ "Pisma Imperatrity," I, 586.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 597.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 620.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 281-2.

as had not sufficiently fortified our positions. Now, if they force their way through Rumania upon our left flank—what has remained to protect our frontier. Excuse my bothering you—but involuntarily all such thoughts come. . . .

LETTERS OF EMPRESS⁸

June 17, 1916

. . . He [Rasputin] begs we should not yet strongly advance in the north because he says, if our successes continue being good in the south, they will themselves retreat from the north, or advance & then their losses will be very great—if we begin there, our losses will be very heavy—He says this is an advise.—

3. GENERAL ALEXEEV

LETTER OF EMPEROR TO EMPRESS⁹

September 9, 1915

. . . I cannot tell you how pleased I am with General Alexeev. What a conscientious, wise, and modest man, and such a worker! . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR¹⁰

August 16, 1916

. . . If only Alexeev has taken our Friend's Image in the right spirit, then God is sure to bless his work with you. Don't fear to mention Gregory's name to him—thanks to Him that you remained firm & took over the commandment a year ago, when all were against you, tell him that & he will understand the wisdom then—& many wonderful escapes to those he prays for at the war who know Him—not to speak of Baby [crown prince] & Ania. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR¹¹

August 17, 1916

. . . Regret, I did not speak more vehemently at the Headquarters & not to Alexeev—yr. prestige will be saved—. . . listen to old wify who only thinks of yr. good & knows this step is the right one.—Let Alexeev think otherwise—only better quite put him away. . . .

⁸ "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 354.

⁹ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 274.

¹⁰ "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 386.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 387.

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹²*November 18, 1916*

. . . A man who is so terribly against our Friend as poor Alexeev is—cannot have blessed work. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹³*December 17, 1916*

. . . Remember to forbid Gurko [General] speaking & mixing himself into politics—it ruined Nikolasha & Alexeev,—the latter God sent this illness clearly to save you fr. a man who was losing his way & doing harm by listening to bad letters & people, instead of listening to yr. orders about the war & being obstinate. And one has set him against me—proof—what he said to old Ivanov.— . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹⁴*August 7, 1916*

. . . I overtired myself—so remain quiet today & only go to A this evening to see our Friend.—He finds better one shld. not advance too obstinately as the losses will be too great—one can be patient without forcing things, as ultimately it will be ours; one can go on madly & finish the war in 2 months, but then thousands of lives will be sacrificed—& by patience the end will also be gained & one will spare much blood. . . .

LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹⁵*August 21, 1915*

. . . Wonder, what you are doing about the guard,—will they keep quiet now for some time.—Our Friend hopes we wont climb over the Carpathians and try to take them, as he repeats the losses will be too great again. . . .

¹² "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 442.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 451.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 385.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 390.

CHAPTER XIV

STATE OF MIND OF THE ARMY

1. RECRUITING

(a) MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ¹

August 17, 1915

Scherbatov: I should say that recruiting is going from bad to worse. The police is unable to handle the slackers. They hide in the forest and in the grain fields. If it should become known that the recruits of the second class are called out without the approval of the Duma I fear, that under the present conditions, we would not get a single man. . . .

(b) MEMOIRS OF POLIVANOV ²

. . . The following letter of July 31, 1915, General Ianushkevich [Chief of Staff of Grand Duke Nicholas] wrote to me [General Polivanov, Minister of War]. . . .

"We get information that in the villages the new recruits are being advised, under the inspiration of the left parties not to fight to the point of getting hurt but to surrender in order to live. If we should have two or three weeks of drilling with one rifle for every three or four men in addition to this kind of teaching it will be impossible to do anything with such troops. His Majesty has already confirmed two measures: (1) that the families of those who surrender of their own free will shall be deprived of Government support, and (2) that at the end of the war such [returned] war prisoners will be sent to colonize Siberia. It would be exceedingly desirable to impress upon the population that these two measures will be rigidly enforced, and that the land portion [of those who surrender] will be transferred to the landless men honestly doing their duty. The pocket argument (land) is the most effective of all arguments. An expression from the Duma on this subject will carry more weight than that of any one else.

¹ "Arkhiiv Russkoi Revoliutsii," XVIII, 38.

² Polivanov; "Memuary," 184-5.

"Not wishing to pass over the Government by appealing directly to Rodzianko, the Grand Duke directed me to ask you whether you would use your authority with members of the Duma to get through a corresponding statement, even if made only in passing by Rodzianko or leaders of the center, that it is quite evident that men who forget their duty to their country and surrender of their own free will can not expect the same treatment [as others who do their duty] and that the two measures indicated above are justifiable. . . ."

2. THE BALTIC FLEET*

November 30, 1915

Dear Sir, Ivan Loginovich:

[Goremykin, Prime Minister]

I have the honor to bring to the attention of Your Excellency the information, which has been laid before me by agents, on the state of mind of the men in the Baltic Fleet.—

Humbly yours,

A. KHVOSTOV, [Minister of Interior]

Our recent temporary failures on land have had a bad effect on the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. The seizure by the enemy of large parts of the Vistula and Baltic regions and his reconquest of Galicia from us, as well as certain shortcomings in our naval forces, are attributed, by the sailors, to the traitorous acts of our military leaders of German origin. . . .

Among the factors which tend to work on the sailors are: the dismissal of the State Duma and the criticism of the Government by the radical legal press, . . . especially the "Riech" which is widely read by the rank and file. . . .

The excited state of mind of the sailors is evidenced (1) in their interest in the activities of the left parties of the Duma, (2) in open expression of dissatisfaction with the inactivity of the Russian Government, which, according to their opinion, has done little to win the war and, in contrast to the German Government, has done nothing for winning the war in the course of the year, and finally (3) in their indignation at the weak efforts made to root out German domination by the Government which, they say, is in the hands of the German party at Court. To this party these sailors attribute the

* "Krasny Arkhiv," IX, 97-102.

appointment [transfer] of the Supreme-Commander-in-Chief to the Caucasus and they even think that this party may bring on a peace favorable to Germany. Such a peace, according to them, would bring about a revolution, the like of which has been unheard of until now in history, and which would not only "wipe out the Romanovs but would change completely the form of government in Russia."

This being the state of mind of the Baltic Fleet, revolutionary elements of all shades make use of it to spread this discontent among large circles of the army and navy, in order, as it were, to settle old scores with the Government. For this purpose they realize the importance of having the army with them. . . .

On November 3 trouble broke out on the ship *Gangut*. The men worked until evening coaling and at the end were given a thin buckwheat mush. Being dissatisfied with this, the men protested and declared that they are being worn out by unbearable hard labor, and are given poor food. They demanded the removal of the Germans from the fleet, especially the officer with the German name who was in command and who wears them out by work and by constant threats of shooting them. . . . As a result 95 men were arrested. . . .

The happenings on the *Gangut* aroused a great deal of excitement on all the ships of the Baltic Fleet. . . . The sailors decided to make demands . . . and if not granted to declare a general strike. . . .

The main reason for this discontent is evidently with the officers of German origin. This dates back to the very beginning of the war and increased, in particular, after the ostensible traitorous attempt of Captain Von-Den, who while in command of the cruiser *Novik* in May of this year, was surrounded by German ships and intended to surrender. The other officers opposed this act, had him arrested, and brought the cruiser into safety. On the return to Reval Von-Den shot himself.

After the arrest of the sailors on the *Gangut*, feeling runs so high that, according to sailors, it is possible that the objectionable officers of some of the vessels will be thrown overboard.

3. REPORTS TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTHERN FRONT *

. . . A new form of agitation has appeared among the soldiers. About the time of attack and when the artillery is in action, whole

* "Krasny Arkhiv," IV, 417-21.

companies leave their positions and try, by wounding themselves in the finger or cheek, to rush in a "mass" the sanitary train and thereby escape punishment. This form of agitation is recommended as a means of getting home. . . .

COLONEL SAZONOV.

According to information received, but not confirmed, anti-government propaganda has been at work among the men of the Siberian Corps, and as a result there is a noticeable decline in the war spirit. The soldiers are unwilling to attack and, as a general thing, they, like the officers, stand for putting an end to the war regardless of the consequences.

COLONEL [signature not clear].

October 28, 1915.

4. REPORT OF THE WAR-CENSORSHIP SECTION OF THE TWELFTH ARMY*

February 1, 1917

Judging from the letters read and from the table here attached, it is clear that the morale of the army has become noticeably better of late, that is to say, since the end of last November. This change for the better may be explained by the improvement in the (1) supply of warm clothing and linen, (2) food, (3) living quarters, (4) organization of soldiers' stores, and (5) entertainment for the lower ranks.

The most important reason for the change is undoubtedly the excellent and timely supply of warm clothing. This winter the lower ranks do not suffer at all from cold and frost as they did last winter. One seldom hears complaints on this subject. On the contrary the letters show that the army is not freezing and that all units have more warm clothing than they need. . . . One soldier writes that he is sending home his "extra" warm linen.

In this manner, by having an abundance of warm clothing and by improving the food situation, were removed the two most important factors working on the morale of the army.

It is interesting that this improvement came about, as it were, in spite of numerous evil influences affecting the army. Among these are the long stay in the trenches, which came to an end only on

* Pokrovski, M. N., and Iakovleva, Ia. A.; "Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu," 7, 8.

January 5, alarming reports from home about high cost of living and decline in the village economy, the misbehavior of the wives at home, and live discussions about peace (seemingly in connection with the German peace proposals, Wilson's speeches, et cetera). Notwithstanding the above enumerated influences for evil, the spirit of the army is rising and since the first of the year (after the December fights) the number of cheerful letters has gone up two per cent.

INTEREST IN POLITICS

Among the interesting developments of the last mentioned period should be noted:

- (a) Intense interest of the soldiers and officers in the political happenings in Russia and in the capital (the acts of the government, State Duma, and German influence on certain circles);
- (b) Complaints about the high cost of living.

COMPLAINTS ABOUT DELAY IN PROMOTION

- (1) Officers of siege artillery complain that their promotion comes more slowly than of those of field artillery.

COMPLAINTS REGARDING FURLOUGH

- (2) Soldiers complain of the impossibility of getting a furlough. . . .

BAD INFLUENCE OF WAR PRISONERS

- (3) War prisoners, doing state work, are having a bad influence on our soldiers. Here is what one writes. . . .

"In our district . . . work 2000 Czechs, building a military railway. Their influence on our soldiers is very bad. The Czechs boast openly that they are the only wise people on earth because they refused to fight from the very beginning. As a consequence they are well dressed while others rot in the trenches. They call our fighting soldiers asses. Our men listen willingly to this kind of talk and conclude that the Czechs are really wise people."

I would suggest that the necessary steps be taken to isolate completely the war prisoners. . . .

Chief-Adjutant-Colonel
SOKOLOV

5. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF⁶

Headquarters, December 30, 31, 1916.

General Ruzski [Northern Front]. Riga and Dvinsk—the misfortunes of the Northern Front, especially Riga. These two places are hot-beds of propaganda.

Brusilov [Southwest Front]. Quite right. When the Seventh Siberian Corps came from the Riga district it was completely under the influence of propaganda. The soldiers refused to fight. There were cases of mutiny. One officer was killed. It was necessary to take severe measures; to shoot several men, to change the commanding officers, and now the corps is improving.

Evert [Western Front]. . . . It is necessary to put in supplies into the empty central and food warehouses. Instead of having a month's provisions on hand we live on daily imports. We are under-supplied and undernourished . . . which reacts banefully on the spirit of the soldiers . . . the local supplies are also exhausted. . . .

Ruzski. The Northern Front does not receive even its [meat] allowance. The general opinion is that we have everything but it is impossible to get anything. For example, in Petrograd the poor man is in need but the rich man may have everything. We lack internal organization.

Shuvaev [Minister of War]. At the outbreak of the war we had to feed 1,300,000 soldiers and now we feed ten million. To this number should be added about two million workmen. It is not right to give everything to the Army and nothing to those who work for the Army. . . .

Gurko [Commander of Sixth Army]. There is plenty of meat in Siberia but we can not get it here because we need three hundred locomotives which we have not. Our railways are functioning badly, all the railway men were sent to the front at the very beginning of the war and there is no one to repair the locomotives.

6. GENERAL ALEXEEV AND THE GOVERNMENT⁷

Several months before the revolution the following confidential conversation took place between General Alexeev and a journalist:

⁶ Pokrovski, M. N., and Iakovleva, Ia. A.; "Razlozhenie Armii v 1917 Godu," 7, 8.

⁷ "The Russian Revolution," by Alexander Petrunkevitch, Samuel N. Harper and Frank A. Golder—pp. 51-2.

Alexeev: I can get nothing from them [ministers]. My supplies are decreasing. . . . It is even necessary to think about bread. We are already cutting down the rations. They have forgotten about food for the horses. . . .

Journalist: What are you going to do about it?

A: What shall I do? With these people there is nothing that can be done.

J: Have you said anything to the Tsar about it?

A: I have . . . but it does no good.

J: Why?

A: While you talk to him he pays attention, gets worked up, is eager to do something . . . but as soon as he leaves you he forgets about it. All kinds of pressure are brought to bear upon him; he is not a free man.

J: Is it true that the Tsarina has much influence?

A: It is only too true. Her influence is irresistible. What is worse she never comes out in the open. She interferes with everybody, but works behind their backs. You never can tell what she will do next. Every time she comes here she makes new trouble.

J: Do the ministers ever consult you?

A: They come, they talk. What can they do? The honest men leave and the worthless remain. . . . If it were not for the war I should resign too. If I should leave, what would not they do with the army? Do I not understand that Sturmer and Company are thinking only of an alliance with Germany? . . . The home situation is serious. They [Sturmer and Company] are purposely instigating hunger disturbances in order to provoke a revolution so as to have an excuse for breaking away from the Allies and end the war. Our army is now in condition to crush Germany, without which there can be no real peace in Europe. But a permanent peace is not desired by Sturmer and Protopopov; they wish to keep the people under the heel of a strong Germany. Apart from the Germans no one will protect them from the revolution. The pity of it all is that at the head of the government there still are men who are interested in crushing the people.

PART IV

GOVERNMENT BY THE EMPRESS

CHAPTER XV

HOW A. N. KHVOSTOV BECAME MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

How A. N. Khvostov got his appointment as Minister of the Interior is an excellent illustration of the way the Empress governed the Empire. "Fat" Khvostov was a clever, unprincipled young man. In order to secure office he made friends of Anna Vyrubova, Prince Andronnikov and Rasputin. He made a study of the Empress' strong and weak points and used them in dealing with her. He quite won her over, and after that she kept after the Emperor until he appointed Khvostov Minister of the Interior, Goremykin and A. A. Khvostov, Minister of Justice and uncle of A. N., who knew the young man, worked in vain against the appointment. But all in vain. As soon as Fat Khvostov came into office he began to intrigue against his colleagues, against the Prime Minister himself in order to get his place, and finally against his benefactor Rasputin. Khvostov overreached himself, was betrayed by his own accomplice and was dismissed. Not long after that he was succeeded by Protopopov, another protégé of the Empress, and equally unfit for the post.

I. LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR¹

Sept. 11, 1915.

. . . Beloved, A. [Anna Vyrubova] saw Andr. [Andronnikov]² & Khvostov & the latter made her an excellent impression (the old

¹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 505.

² Prince Michael Michaelovich. Andronnikov—adventurer, intriguer, go-between of Rasputin and those who wished to make use of him.

man [Goremykin] is against him, I not knowing him, dont know what to say.) He is most devoted to you, spoke gently & well about our Friend [Rasputin] to her, related that tomorrow has to be a question about Gr. [Grigori Rasputin] in the Duma one asked for Khvost's signature, but he refused & said that if they picked up that question, amnestie would not be given—they reasoned & abolished again asking about him. He related awful horrors about Guchk. [ov] was at Gorem. [ykin] today, spoke about you, that by taking the army you saved yourself. Khvost. took the question about German overpowering influence & dearth of meat, so as the left ones wld. not take it—now the right ones have this question it is safe—she feels taken by him & has good impression. Gorem. wanted to present Kryzhanovsky ³ but I said you would never agree. Do talk him over except Neidhardt ⁴—I did not see his [Khvostov's] article then—I mean his speech of the Duma its difficult to advise. Are others against him, or only the old man, as he hates all the Duma. Awfully difficult for you to decide again, poor Treasure. . . .

Sept. 13, 1915 ⁵

. . . I am glad you had a good talk with the old one as our Friend calls Gorem.—what you mention as having put off till your return, I suppose means the change of the Minister of the Interior—how good if you could see Khvostov & have a real talk with him & see whether he would make the same favorable, honest, loyal, energetic opinion on you as upon A. . . .

Sept. 20, 1915 ⁶

. . . Your poor dear head must be awfully tired with all this work & especially the interior questions? Then, to recapitulate what the old man said: to think of a new minister of the interior, (I told him you had not yet fixed upon Neidhardt; perhaps, when you return, you can think once more about Khvostov). . . .

Sept. 24, 1915 ⁷

. . . Please take Khvostov in his place. Did you look through his book? He wants very much to see me, looks upon me as the one to

³ Sergei Efimovich Kryzhanovski—Secretary of the State Council and one time (1906-1911) Assistant Minister of the Interior.

⁴ A. B. Neidhardt—Director of one of the Sections of the Red Cross of which the Empress was president.

⁵ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 508.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 521.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 532-3.

save the situation whilst you are away (I told it Andronnikov) & wants to pour out his heart to me & tell me all his ideas.—He is very energetic, fears no one & colossally devoted to you, wh. is the chief thing nowadays.—His gaffes, one can warn him against making them—he knows the Duma people well, will not allow them to attack one, he knows how to speak; please Sweetheart seriously think of him, he is not such a coward & rag as Scherbatov. The Government must be set to right & the old man needs good, devoted & energetic men to help him in his old age working; he cannot go on like this. . . .

Sept. 28, 1915⁸

. . . Am so anxious, how it will be with the ministers—now you cant change them once they come there & its so essential, only you must get a look at the others first. Please remember Khvostov. . . .

Sept. 29, 1915⁹

. . . Gregory . . . made us understand that Khvostov wld. be good. You remember, he went once to see him (I think by yr. wish) to N. Novgorod. . . .

Sept. 30, 1915¹⁰

. . . Deary. Khvostov came to Ania again & entreated to see me, so I shall today. From all he told her one sees he thoroughly understands the situation & that with skill & cleverness, he thinks, one can manage to set all to rights. He knows that his Uncle¹¹ and Goremykin are against him, *i. e.* they are afraid of him as he is very energetic. But he is above all devoted to you & therefore offers his services to you, to try him & see whether he cannot help. He esteems the old man very much & would not go against him. Once already now he stopped the question in the Duma about our Friend in time—now they intend bringing it up as one of the first questions. . . . Now that Gregory advises Khvostov I feel its right & therefore I will see him. He got an awful shock as in the evening papers one said Krizhanovsky (is that the name) had left for the Headquarters, he is a very bad man & you very much always disliked him & I told the old Man so—God forbid him having advised him again. . . . I do so pray to God always to make me be yr. Guardian Angel & helper in everything—some look at me as that now—& others cannot find nasty enough things to say about me. Some are afraid I am

⁸ "Pisma Imperatrity," I, 543.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 545.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 546, 547; 549, 550.

¹¹ A. A. Khvostov, Minister of Justice.

meddling in state affairs (the ministers) & others look upon me as the one to help as you are not here (Andronnikov, Khvostov, Varnava¹² & some others) that shows who is devoted to you in the real sense of the word—they will seek me out & the others will avoid me—is it not true, Sweetheart? . . . Really, my Treasure, I think he [Khvostov] is the man & our Fr. hinted to A. in his wire;—I am always careful in my choice—but I have not the feeling wh. I had to Scherbatov when he came to me. And he understands one must watch Polivanov since Guchkov has got into the Council of the Empire, is not oversure of him. He sees & thinks like us—he did nearly all the talking.—Try him now, because Scherbatov must leave, a man who openly shows about your telegrams & Gregory's wh. he has kidnapped & Samarin too—are utterly unworthy ministers & no better than Makarov¹³ who showed my letter to our Friend, to others too—& Scherbatov is a rag & stupid.—If the old man grumbles—does not matter—wait & see how he proves himself to be, worse than Scherbatov he cannot be, but I think 1000 times better. God grant, that I am not mistaken & I honestly believe I am not. I prayed before seeing him, as was rather frightened of the talk. Looks one straight into the eyes. . . .

Khvostov has refreshed me, my spirit was not down, but I yearned to see a *man* at last—& here I saw & heard him. And you together would keep each other going. . . .

Nobody is any the wiser I saw him. . . .

Sept. 30, 1915¹⁴

. . . sent you two wires because of Khvostov & hoped you would mention a wee word. . . .

With pleasure I continue thinking over Khvostov's talk & wish you had been there too—a man, no petticoats—& then one who will not let anything touch us, & will do all in his power to stop the attacks upon our Friend, as then he stopped them & now they intend beginning again. . . . Well dear, there is nothing to be done with those Ministers, and the sooner you change them, the better. Khvostov instead of Scherbatov. . . .

Fat Andronnikov telephoned to Ania that Khvostov was very contented with his talk, [with the Empress] & other amiabilities wh. I shan't repeat. . . .

¹² Bishop of Tobolsk and friend of Rasputin. See chapter on The War and the Public.

¹³ A. A. Makarov, former Minister of the Interior.

¹⁴ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 550-4.

Khvostov also has ideas about the press. You will think, that I have now got a tail¹⁵ growing in. . . .

*Mogilev, Oct. 1, 1915*¹⁶

. . . I have just received your last dear letter of September 30 in which you speak of the good impression young Khvostov made on you. . . . In order not to lose time, I will see him at six o'clock on the very day that I arrive. . . .

*Oct. 3, 1915*¹⁷

. . . God grant, if you find Khvostov suitable, he will put a stop to all.

Luckily he is still here & even went to Goremykin to place all his ideas before the old man. Andronnikov gave Ania his word of honor, that nobody shall know, that Khvostov comes to Ania (she sees him in her house, not in the palace). . . .

*Dec. 9, 1915*¹⁸

. . . Our Friend dined with him [Khvostov] yesterday & was very contented. . . .

*Jan. 1, 1916*¹⁹

. . . We talked a lot about the supply question with Khvostov, he says the ministers really try working together (putting Polivanov & Bark beside), but its the Duma's fault wh. hung commissions with 70 members onto them & the Minister of Interior's powers consequently are greatly diminished & he can take no particular measures, without it having passed through the commission. . . .

One person, whom not only the tail (Khvostov), but many good intentioned people are against & find not at the hight of his place is Bark. He certainly does not help Khvostov—ever so long one has asked for money for him to buy the "Novoye Vremya" partly (the ministers, alas, told Bark to do it instead of Khvostov who wld. certainly have succeeded, whereas Bark dawdles for his own reasons)—& the result is Guchkov with Jews, Rubinsteins etc.²⁰ buy up the paper, put in their own mendacious articles. . . .

¹⁵ A play on the word Khvostov. *Khvost* in Russian means tail.

¹⁶ "Perepiska Nikolaia," III, 372. The Tsar arrived at Tsarskoe Selo on the morning of October 6, and three days later Khvostov was made Minister of the Interior.

¹⁷ "Pisma Imperatrity," I, 556.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 602.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 617.

²⁰ D. L. Rubinstein, Jewish banker, contractor, secured a controlling interest in the "Novoe Vremia."

Jan. 20, 1916²¹

. . . Lovy, I don't know, but I should still think of Sturmer, [as successor to Goremykin] his head is plenty fresh enough—you see Khvostov a tiny bit hopes to get that place—but he is too young. . . .

March 15, 1916²²

. . . Am so wretched that we, through Gregory recommended Khvostov to you—it leaves me no peace—you are against it and I let myself be imposed upon by them, tho' fr. the very first told Ania that I like his great energy but that too self-love and something not pleasing to me; and the devil got hold of him, one cannot call it otherwise. I wld. not write to you about it last time not to bother you—but we passed through trying times, and therefore wld. have been calmer if, now that you go, something could be settled. As long as Khvostov is in power and has money and police in hands—I honestly am not quiet for Gregory and Ania.²³ . . .

²¹ "Pisma Imperatritsy," I, 632.

²² *Ibid.*, II, 291.

²³ As soon as he came into power, Khvostov proceeded to undermine his colleagues. He tried to get Goremykin out of the way so as to take his place. He turned even on Rasputin and plotted against him, but the plot was exposed and Khvostov was dismissed on March 16, 1916.

CHAPTER XVI

SUKHOMLINOV AFFAIR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Sukhomlinov Affair is another illustration of the way the Empress ran the Government and the way Rasputin governed through her. The Emperor was not convinced that the Minister of War was as black as painted but he yielded to the double pressure of public opinion and Headquarters and dismissed Sukhomlinov. The Empress seemed to approve. She got a certain satisfaction out of it by laying his ruin to "his adventurer wife" whom she detested. When it came to politics the Empress was no match for Madame Sukhomlinov. She got Rasputin and Badmaev interested in the case and after Rasputin had spoken the Empress changed her mind and from that time on she defended Sukhomlinov until she had him free. This disgusted the public and injured the reputation of the Government.

I. LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR¹

December 11, 1914

. . . I do not wish Sukhomlinov harm, on the contrary, but his wife is really most mauvais genre & has made every body, the military especially, angry with her.

June 25, 1915²

. . . I saw Mme Hartwig yesterday—she told me many interesting things when they left Lvov—& sad impressions of soldiers being depressed & saying that they wont return to fight the enemy with empty fists—the rage of the officers against Soukhomlinov is quite colossal—poor man—his very name they loathe & yearn for him to be sent away—well for his sake too, before any scandle arises, it would be better to do so. It is his adventurer wife who has completely ruined his reputation—because of her bribes he suffers & so

¹ "Pisma Imperatrity," I, 410.

² *Ibid.*, 465.

on;—one says it is his fault there is no ammunition wh. is our curse now et. I tell you this to show you what impressions she brought back.—

2. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH ³

May 12, [1915]

. . . I called on the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo. In our conversation we touched on the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov. . . . At the conclusion the Tsar said that he believed deeply in Sukhomlinov, that the Minister of War was without doubt an honest and trustworthy man. I remarked that I was very glad to hear that, for I, too, was of this opinion, and felt there was a deep plot against the man. Every one is jumping on him, which is quite unjust, for after all he has done a great deal for the army. I turned to the Tsar and inquired whether he had heard of the plot: "Whom do you ask this? I know only too well, but they shall not hurt him. Before it comes to that I shall stand up for him. They shall not touch him. . . . Many people are jealous of him. They have tried to drag him into the Miasoedov ⁴ affair but they shall not succeed."

This brief conversation is very interesting. Many have said that the Emperor is displeased with Sukhomlinov and would soon drop him. This apparently is not so. On the contrary, the Emperor is for him. It is strange that Grand Dukes Alexander and Sergei Mikhailovich have not hesitated to say in public that Sukhomlinov is a criminal. Why they do this is not at all clear to me. May it not be due to the fact that the war has shown how poorly we are provided with artillery, and the Grand Duke Sergei [in charge of this department] is trying to draw attention away from himself, and therefore accuses Sukhomlinov? This is quite unjust. I know from documents that Sukhomlinov has more than once called attention to these [artillery] questions, but because of personal enmity all his attempts were frustrated. . . .

3. TSAR'S LETTER TO SUKHOMLINOV ⁵

Headquarters, June 24, [1915]

Vladimir Alexandrovich:

After long deliberation I have come to the conclusion that for the good of Russia and the army your resignation is necessary at this

³"Andrei Vladimirovich," 31-2.

⁴Miasoedov, an intimate friend of Sukhomlinov, was accused, convicted and executed as a German spy.

⁵Polivanov; "Memuary," 117-8.

time. My talk with Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich has confirmed me in this opinion.

I am writing you so that you may first learn the news from me. I am pained to have to tell you this, the more so because it was only yesterday that I saw you. We have worked together many years and during all that time there was no misunderstanding between us. I thank you for having put in so much strength and labor for our army.

Impartial history will be kinder than the judgment of contemporaries.

Hand over the duties of your office to General Vernander [A. P]. May God bless you.

Respectfully yours,
NICHOLAS

4. WHY SUKHOMLINOV WAS NOT PUNISHED

LETTERS OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR⁶

March 17, 1916

. . . I saw by the papers you have said Sukhomlinov is to be judged,—thats right,—have his aiguillettes been taken fr. him. One says there will come out bad things against him,—that he took bribes,—thats her for sure,—its so sad. . . .

March 28, 1916⁷

. . . Is it true that things are going very bad with Sukhomlinov—Igor had heard as tho' he wld. have to be shot—but I don't know where he got the news from. Certainly he had his great faults—but his successor [Polivanov] is yet a greater traitor to my mind. . . .

May 8, 1916⁸

. . . Our Friend told Ania about one having shut up Sukhomlinov that "it is a bit not well." . . .

May 15, 1916⁹

. . . So I asked him [Sturmer] to speak again to Khvostov [A. A., Minister of Justice] whether one could not keep Sukhomlinov in another place at least, not there. . . .

⁶ "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 295.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 310.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 335.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 341.

May 31, 1916¹⁰

. . . let him [Sturmer] know to bring Sukhomlinov's journal & letters to his wife, wh. are compromising, better you should see for yourself & judge rightly & not only go by their words. . . .

June 22, 1916¹¹

. . . One more thing I was to tell you, that Gen. Selivanov is the judge of Sukhomlinov & one says he cannot be unbiased as he had formerly been discharged by Sukhomlinov from Siberia and that it would be better to appoint the member of the Council of the Empire, General Shumilov. I only tell you this as He [Rasputin] wished me too, but I told Ania I doubt yr. mixing in this affair. . . .

July 27, 1916¹²

. . . do say about Sukhomlinov being let home, the Drs. fear he will go mad if kept shut up any longer—do this act of kindness of your own sweet self. . . .

October 5, 1916¹³

. . . Then our Friend said: General Sukhomlinov should be set free, so that he should not die in jail, otherwise things will not be smooth, one should never fear to release prisoners, to restore sinners to a life of righteousness—prisoners until they reach jail become through their sufferings in the eyes of God—nobler than we—more or less His words. . . .

October 9, 1916¹⁴

. . . Protov. [opov. Minister of the Interior] has asked to see you—wont you tell him to let Sukhoml. out. . . .

October 10, 1916¹⁵

. . . Speak to Pr. about: Sukh., order to find a way to get him out. . . .

October 27, 1916¹⁶

. . . Prot. saw Sukh.—so happy— . . .

November 13, 1916¹⁷

. . . our Friend begs you absolutely to have Sukhomlinov's story stopped, otherwise Gutchkov & others have prepared nasty things to say—so do it at once, wire to Sturmer, I think it concerns him first? telegraph this:

¹⁰ "Pisma Imperatrity," II, 343.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 359.

¹² *Ibid.*, 379.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 418.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 423.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 425.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 430.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 437.

"Having got acquainted with the data of the preliminary investigation in the case of the former Minister of War, General Sukhomlinov, I find that there are absolutely no grounds at all for the charges, and therefore the case should be discontinued." . . .

*November 22, 1916*¹⁸

. . . Now one calls Mme. Sukhomlinov before judgement on Friday & therefore I wired asking you to have the Sukhomlinov case at once stopped through Senator Kuzmin.—Its vengeance because one let the poor old man out of prison. So horribly unfair! . . .

*November 23, 1916*¹⁹

. . . Thanks for Sukhomlinov,—here is a letter fr. S. to you. . . .

*December 23, 1916*²⁰

. . . I enclose a letter from Sukhomlinov to our Friend, please read it through, as there he explains all clearly about his affair, wh. you must send for & not all to go to the Council of the Empire as then there will be no saving of poor Sukhomlinov.—He writes so clearly everything—do read it through & act according—why shld. he suffer & not Kokovtzev (who wld. not give the money). . . .

5. DR. BADMAEV TO NICHOLAS II ²¹

May 5, 1916

. . . Sukhomlinov is in disgrace. It is said he himself is to blame . . . whether true or not true I cannot make out, but I do know. . . that in any case . . . he was a loyal and useful subject of your Majesty. He made a serious mistake, but your Majesty will, of course, judge this mistake from the loftiness of your throne and will not hand him over to be devoured.

The Earthly Tsar, the anointed of the Heavenly Tsar, will always find a way to save him, even if he were guilty. . . .

¹⁸ "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 445-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 446.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 458.

²¹ "Za Kulisami Tsarizma, Arkhiv Tibetskogo Vrachy Badmaeva," 25. Zamsaran Badmaev was born in Eastern Siberia in 1851 and was of Buriat origin. He was baptized into the Orthodox church, became agent for the government in the Far East, and was brought in contact with the royal family. In the capital he was known as the Tibetan doctor and prescribed for Protopopov, the crown prince, and other distinguished persons. He was an intimate friend of Rasputin and other celebrities.

PART V

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In reading the diaries and letters of the Romanov family one is saddened by the tragic family situation. One member distrusted the other and all united in hating the Empress who paid them back in their own coin. Alexandra Fedorovna was always on the defensive. She suspected Grand Duke Nicholas of scheming to get the throne. Purishkevich assures us that Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna desired that same throne for her son Cyril Vladimirovich. There were no doubt other members of this loving family who could have been persuaded to assume the burdens of the State.

When the course steered by the Empress in 1916 seemed to take the ship towards the rocks, the Grand Dukes became frightened and raised the cry of alarm. But as she suspected their motives, she paid no attention to their warnings, kept her course, and wrecked the ship.

CHAPTER XVII

DIARIES AND LETTERS

I. DIARY OF ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH¹

Petrograd, September 6, 1915

During the last few days there has been much talk of the Emperor's taking command of the army and sending Nicholas Nicholaevich to the Caucasus. . . . On this question there are two opinions. One is that the Emperor should not be at the head of the army because it would take him away from State affairs; the other that it is a good thing for him to be at the head but on condition that Nicholas Nicholaevich remain where he is. On this last point almost all are agreed. Indeed, Nicholas Nicholaevich came into his position purely by accident, after the Council of Ministers at the beginning of the war persuaded the Emperor not to take the chief command. In order to raise the prestige of Nicholas Nicholaevich, a special prayer was made for him in the church service. The Emperor showered upon him favors and as a result Nicholas Nicholaevich came to be known all over Russia, and his popularity did not suffer even on account of the continued reverse in the war when our army had to retreat. This brilliant result brought about by the efforts of the Tsar, did not please A. [Alix, the Empress]. This is the reason why Nicholas Nicholaevich is ordered to the Caucasus. Thoughtful people believe that this step will cause general ill feeling and discontent and serious consequences. . . .

I paid a visit today to Aunt Minny [mother of the Tsar] on Elagin Island. I found her in a terribly worried state. She was especially excited over the question of Nicholas Nicholaevich. She thinks that his removal will be the ruin of N. [Nicholas II] because it will never be forgiven him. She exonerated Niki in all this and laid all the blame on Alix. When Niki came to see her before going off she [mother] begged and begged him to think over everything carefully and not lead Russia to ruin. To her pleas he replied that everybody deceived him, that he must save Russia, that it was his

¹ "Andrei Vladimirovich," 75-8.

duty. It was in vain that she pleaded with him that he was poorly prepared for this hard task and that State affairs required his presence at Petrograd. He remained unpersuaded and would not even promise to deal kindly with Nicholas Nicholaevich.

While they [mother and son] were talking, Alix was in another room with Xenia [sister of the Tsar] who asked whether it was true that Nicholas Nicholaevich, who was so popular, would be displaced.

"Again about Nicholas, everybody talks only about him," answered Alix. "I am tired of hearing about him. Niki is much more popular than Nicholas. He has commanded long enough; let him now go to the Caucasus."

Aunt Minny, as she related to me all this, was so excited, so stirred up, that I was frightened. She kept repeating the question: "What are we coming to, what are we coming to? That is not at all like Niki—he is lovable, he is honest, he is good—it is all her work."

I asked aunt whether there was any hope that Nicholas Nicholaevich would remain. "Not the least. It is all settled—Alix has just telegraphed me"—and she read me the telegram: "All went on brilliantly, the change is done, leaving in two days." So it's done. Niki also telegraphed that he arrived and was content with the meeting. Tomorrow we will probably read all about it in the papers. One thing is not clear—Niki is returning here on September 14. Who will command the army in the meantime? Nobody knows. To my question aunt replied: "I can't understand anything any more." Aunt Minny told me also that Uncle Alex [Prince Alexander Petrovich of Oldenburg] had been to see her and begged her to dissuade Niki from going to the army. He predicted terrible consequences, including popular uprisings. Uncle was in a frightful state. "He rolled on the floor," said Aunt Minny.

The dismissal of Dzhunkovski² and Vladia Orlov,³ two most loyal men of whom Niki always spoke in warmest terms, made her

² I was at mother's today [August 30, 1915] and learned that Niki [Emperor] has written to the Minister of the Interior, Prince Scherbatov, ordering the immediate dismissal of General [V. F.] Dzhunkovski. . . .

The reason for this act may be traced to Rasputin, who is trying to get even with the General because he . . . reported to the Emperor . . . some of the evil doings of Rasputin at Moscow. Rumor has it that Rasputin, while drunk, boasted that he drove Nicholas [Grand Duke] from his position, that he will drive the Oberprocurator of Our Holy Synod, Samarin, Dzhunkovski, and the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fedorovna [sister of Empress]. Whether this rumor is true or not it is difficult to say. . . . ("Diary of Andrei Vladimirovich," 74.)

³ Prince V. N. Orlov, the Emperor's executive officer, was a friend of the Grand Duke and that made him *ipso facto* persona-non-grata to the Empress.

quite sad. "It is not my dear boy; he is too good to do such a thing; he liked them both very much. It is all she [Empress]; she alone is responsible for all that is happening now. It is too awful. Who will now be near him; he will be quite alone with that awful 'Kuvaka' [Voeikov].⁴ Not a single devoted friend at his side. I understand nothing. I cannot understand . . . it is too awful for words."

When mother called on her, Aunt Minny said that it reminded her of the time of Paul I, who began in the last year of his reign to drive away all his loyal subjects. She pictured to herself, in all its horrors, the tragic end of our ancestor.

What will Russia say to this? How are you going to explain to the army and people that Nicholas Nicholaevich, on whom the Tsar showered all kinds of favors, is suddenly dismissed? It will naturally be asked what he did to deserve such harsh treatment. . . . When no satisfactory answer is given, it will be said that the Grand Duke is a traitor, or, what is worse, the guilty party will be sought for higher up. . . .

Petrograd, September 19 [1915] ⁵

A few days ago Alix with her two oldest daughters had a cup of tea with mother at Tsarskoe Selo. It is worthy of note that this is the first time in twenty years that Alix alone, without Niki, has called on mother. The most interesting of all was the conversation. Alix bitterly complained that everything she does is found fault with, especially in Moscow and Petrograd. Everybody is against her and in this way tie her hands. "Just now," she continued, "there came from Germany Red Cross sisters. For the good of the cause I should receive them but I cannot do that knowing that it will be used against me." Mother asked whether it is true that she [Empress] and the whole court are moving to Moscow. "Oh, even you have heard of it! No, I am not moving and will not move but 'they' hoped for it so that 'they' might move here." (It was clear that by "they" the Empress meant Grand Duke Nicholas and the Montenegrins [wife and sister-in-law of the Grand Duke.]) "But [continued the Empress] fortunately we learned about this in time and the necessary measures were taken. 'He' [Grand Duke Nicholas] is now going to the Caucasus. It was not possible to put up with it longer. Niki knew nothing about the war. 'He' told him nothing, wrote him

⁴ General V. P. Voeikov, commandant of the palace. He put on the market a mineral water known as "Kuvaka."

⁵ "Andrei Vladimirovich," 81-2.

nothing. Niki's power was torn from him on all sides. They took from him everything that was possible to take. This is intolerable. At a time when a strong and firm hand is necessary in the midst of this breaking up of authority. I begged Niki not to put away Goremykin at this time. He was a true and loyal man, with firm convictions and steadfast principles. It is not right to deprive himself of people who are devoted to him, who would be left to stand by him." . . .

In regard to Niki's being at the head of the army, she [Empress] said that he is now in excellent spirits. Knowing what is going on has put new life and new enthusiasm into him. . . .

This episode in our family life is very important because it gives us the opportunity to understand Alix. During the whole time that she has been with us [in Russia] she was enveloped in a kind of misty impenetrable atmosphere through which the personality of Alix was obscured. No one really knew her, understood her, and this explains the puzzles and the guesses which grew into all kinds of legends in the course of time. Where is the truth in this matter it is difficult to say. It is a pity, the person of the Empress should shine on the whole of Russia; she should be seen and understood. Otherwise she falls into the background and loses the necessary popularity. Of course, the above conversation with mother can not repair the loss of twenty years, but I must say that for us, personally, the conversation is very important. We see her in a new light; we see that many of the legends about her are not true; we see that she is on the right path. If she said no more, if she did what she did, we must assume that she had good reason. But it is all very clear that she was boiling over with grief and the need of letting some of it escape forced her to come to mother.

2. LETTERS OF NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH

(a) NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR ⁶

May 11, 1916

. . . Regarding the popularity of Nicholas [Nicholaevich], I will say this: His popularity was masterfully prepared at Kiev by Militsa, [wife of N. N.] quite gradually, during a long period of time, and by making use of all means, such as distributing to the people pamphlets, all kinds of booklets, pictures, portraits, calendars, etc.

⁶ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 68-9.

Thanks to this well-planned preparation, his popularity did not go down after the loss of Galicia and Poland, and rose again after the victories in the Caucasus.

From the very start of the campaign, I repeatedly wrote to your dear mother, warning her of these Kiev intrigues, but I could not write to you, without infraction of discipline, while I was attached to the staff of Adjutant-General Ivanov.

Now I am speaking freely. I said, when you personally took the Supreme Command of the armies, and I repeat now, that Militia is not asleep in the Caucasus.

I make bold to assure you, from a deep conviction, that this popularity frightens me, in a dynastic sense, especially in the excited state of our public opinion, which appears to take more and more definite shape in the provinces.

This popularity does not contribute in the least to the benefit of the Throne or the prestige of the Imperial family, but only to the advertising of the husband of the Grand Duchess—a Slav woman, [Montenegrin] and not a German—as well as of his brother and nephew, Roman. In view of the possibility of all kinds of troubles after the war, one has to be watchful and observe closely every move in support of this popularity.

You are aware of my boundless devotion to your late father, your mother, yourself, and your line, for which I am ready at any moment to lay down my life, but I do not recognize any other possibilities, in the dynastic sense, nor shall I ever recognize any. . . .

Sincerely yours,

NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH]

(b) NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR ⁷

August 8, 1916

Grushevka (Kherson Gubernia)

. . . I want to call your attention to still another circumstance, in view of the fact that much is liable to change after the war and it is best to reckon beforehand with all symptoms of impending events in the life of Russia. I don't know from what motives you dismissed S. D. Sazonov, but here is what has happened. Almost the entire press (with the exception of the "Novoe Vremia" and "Zemshchina") has put him on a pedestal, like a super-patriot; all the zemstvos, public organizations, Unions of Cities, War Industries Commit-

⁷ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 75-9.

tees, and so on, have sent him their condolences on the occasion of his departure and have made a hero of him, which he could hardly have been had he continued as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This I regard as *a very dangerous symptom*, and here is my reason: Now, during war, such things are possible and even somewhat natural in the general nervous excitement; but after peace has come, it will be necessary to take measures in good time to prevent such a situation. It is hardly desirable that, after several years of bloodshed, there should occur a break between the Government and the public, or what is usually called the public opinion of Russia (from Metropolitan Pitirim⁸ to Chelnokov,⁹ and from Boris Vasilchikov¹⁰ to Guchkov¹¹). Ce n'est pas pour blaguer, mais vraiment le fait que je vous signale à propos de la retraite de Sazonov est bien curieux et instructif.

(c) LETTER OF GRAND DUKE NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE
EMPEROR¹²

You said more than once that you wish to carry the war to a successful finish. Are you certain that with the present conditions in the rear, this can be done? Are you acquainted with the internal situation, not only in the interior of the Empire, but on the outskirts (Siberia, Turkestan, Caucasus)? Are you told all the truth, or is some of it concealed from you? Where is the root of the evil? Allow me to tell you briefly the essentials of the case.

So long as your method of selecting ministers [with the aid of Rasputin] was known to a limited circle only, affairs went on somehow, but from the moment that this method became generally known, it was impossible to govern Russia in that way. Repeatedly you have told me that you could trust no one, that you were being deceived. If that is true, then the same must be true of your wife, who loves you dearly, but is led astray by the evil circle that surrounds her. You trust Alexandra Fedorovna, which is easy to understand, but that which comes out of her mouth is the result of clever fabrication and not the truth. If you are not strong enough to remove these influences from her, at least guard yourself against this steady and systematic interference by those who act through your beloved wife. If your persuasion is ineffective, and I am certain

⁸ Metropolitan of Petrograd.

⁹ M. V. Chelnokov, Mayor of Moscow.

¹⁰ Prince Boris Vasilchikov, Member of State Council.

¹¹ A. I. Guchkov, a public-spirited citizen who denounced the court clique.

¹² "Riech," No. 58, March 22, 1917.

that you have more than once fought against this influence, try some other means, so as to end with this system once and for all. Your first impulses and decisions are always remarkably right and to the point, but as soon as other influences come in, you begin to hesitate and end up by doing something other than what you originally intended. If you should succeed in removing this continuous invasion of the dark forces, the rebirth of Russia would take place at once, and the confidence of the great majority of your subjects would return to you. All other matters would soon settle themselves. You could find people who under different conditions, would be willing to work under your personal leadership. At the proper time, and that is not far distant, you could, of your own free will, grant a Ministry which would be responsible to you and to constitutional legislative institutions. This could be done very simply, without any pressure from outside, and not as was the case with the act of October 17, [30] 1905. I hesitated a long time before venturing to tell you this truth, and I finally decided to do so after being urged by your mother and sisters. You are at the beginning of a new era of disturbances; I will go further and say at the beginning of an era of attempts at assassination. Believe me that in trying to loosen you from the chains that bind you, I do it from no motives of personal interest, and of this you and Her Majesty are convinced, but in the hope and in the expectation of saving you, your throne, and our dear country from the most serious and irreparable consequences.¹³

3. LETTER OF EMPRESS TO EMPEROR ¹⁴

November 17, 1916

. . . Warmest thanks for yr. dear letter just received. I read Nikolai's & am utterly disgusted. Had you stopped him in the middle of his talk & told him that, if he only once more touched that subject or me, you will send him to Siberia—as it becomes next to high treason. He has always hated & spoken badly of me since 22 years & in the club too (this same conversation I had with him this year).—but during war & at such a time to crawl behind yr. Mama & Sisters & not stick up bravely (agreeing or not) for his Emperor's Wife—is loathsome & treachery. He feels people count with me, begin to understand me & are for my opinion & that he cant bear. He is the

¹³ This letter was written about November 14, 1916.

¹⁴ "Pisma Imperatritsy," II, 441-2.

incarnation of all that's evil, all devoted people loathe him, even those who do not much like us are disgusted with him and his talk.—And Fred[ericks] old & no good & cant shut him up & wash his head & you my Love far too good & kind & soft—such a man needs to be held in awe of you—He & NIKOLASHA [Grand Duke Nicholas] are my greatest enemies in the family, not counting the black women [Montenegrin princesses]—& Sergei [Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich]—He simply cld. not bear Ania [Vyrubova] & me—not so much the cold rooms, I assure you. I don't care personal nastiness, but as yr. chosen wife—they dare not Swetty mine, you must back me up, for your & Baby's sake. Had we not got Him [Rasputin]—all wold. long have been finished, of that I am utterly convinced.—I am seeing Him a moment before STURMER. Poor old man may die fr. the vile way his spoken to & of at the DUMA—MILIUKOV'S Speech [November 14] yesterday when he quotes BUCHANAN'S words that STURMER is a traitor & Buch to whom he turned in the box—held his tongue—vile behavior. We are living through hardest times, but God will help us through, I have no fear. LET them scream—we must show we have no fear & are firm. Wify is your staunch One & stands as a rock behind you. I'll ask our Friend whether He thinks it advisable I go in a week's time, or, as you cant move—whether I shld. remain here to help the “weak” minister. They have again chosen RODZIANKO & his speeches are quite bad & what he says to the ministers.

I hope Sweetheart's [Crown Prince Alexei who was with the Tsar] leg will soon be better. And ALEXEEV ill—all worries at one time—but God will not forsake you & our beloved Country through the prayers & help of our Friend.—Am glad you arranged a place for Obolensky [Prince A. N.]

4. THE VLADIMIR LINE

PURISHKEVICH'S DIARY ¹⁵

December 9 [1916]

. . . Toward noon some one called up from the palace of Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich to say that he would like to see me this afternoon . . . in regard to an important matter.

I replied that I would come . . . though Cyril as well as his two brothers have always filled me with disgust. I feel no more

¹⁵ Pourichkevitch, V.; “Comment J'ai Tué Raspoutine,” 56-8.

kindly toward their mother, the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna, whose name has been hateful to me at the front from the very first day of the war. I feel that these dukes and their mother have remained German and are at heart Germanophil, that they do much harm to our troops at the front, that they set traps for the Emperor while proclaiming their devotion to Russia.

They have not given up the hope that some day the crown would pass to their line. I shall never forget the story of Ivan Grigorevich Scheglovitov, former Minister of Justice. He said that one day Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich asked him whether the descendants of the Vladimir line have any legal rights to the throne and if not, why not?

Scheglovitov . . . told him that the Grand Dukes had no rights whatsoever because their mother continued in the Lutheran faith even after marriage.

Boris left him but came back sometime later with a paper showing that the Grand Duchess had given up her Protestant religion and had embraced the Orthodox.

At two o'clock I presented myself at the Palace . . . and five minutes later was shown into the Grand Duke's office. . . .

He expected me to give him the point of view of the circles which I frequented. He wanted to know in particular whether I was opposed to the Imperial Government or did my opposition go further. . . . In leaving the palace . . . I carried an impression . . . that he, together with Guchkov and Rodzianko, schemed something against the Emperor. . . .

5. LETTER OF GRAND DUKE GEORGI MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR ¹⁶

November 24, 1916
Berdichev

Dear Nicky:

. . . Next, after long talks with the brave Adjutant-General Brusilov,¹⁷ who is exceptionally devoted to you, I consider it my duty to write you about the unhappy state of affairs I have had occasion to observe, not only in the rear, but even here.

Positively every one is worried about the rear, *i.e.*, the domestic situation within Russia. They say frankly that if things continue in

¹⁶ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 122-4.

¹⁷ Commander of the Southwest Front.

Russia as they have been thus far, we shall never be able to end the war with a victory, and if this really happens, then it means the end of everything. Hatred for Sturmer is extraordinary.

I tried to find out precisely what measures might cure the disease. On this subject, I can say that the general clamor is for the removal of Sturmer and the establishment of a responsible ministry to protect you from the deceit of various ministers.

This is considered the only measure that can avert a general catastrophe. Had I heard this from people on the Left and various Liberals, I should have paid no attention to it. But as I have been told it, and am being told here, by men who are deeply devoted to you and wish with all their hearts for nothing but the happiness of yourself and of Russia, inseparably, I have decided to write it to you.

I confess that I never expected to hear here, in the army, the very thing I had heard everywhere in the rear. This means that it is a general desire—the voice of the people is the voice of God—and I feel confident that the Lord will help you to meet the general wish and to prevent the storm that threatens in the interior of Russia.

Forgive me for writing so frankly, but my conscience compelled me to write from the army itself, for I have heard this from the lips of men who are most loyal to you, and thoroughly honorable and brave, and I have written this letter as a loyal subject and as a man who loves you dearly. May the Lord help you in all things. . . .

GEORGI.

6. LETTER OF ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR ¹⁸

January 7, 1917.

Dear Nicky:

On January 4, you were pleased to allow me to express my opinion on a certain subject, and I had to touch, at the same time, upon nearly all the subjects that disturb us. I begged permission to speak as frankly as at the confessional, and you granted it.

I take it that, since I have said so much, I am bound to say more.

You may unconsciously have thought, while listening to me: "It is easy for him to talk, but how about me, who must see my way through the existing chaos, and make decisions on the various measures that are being suggested to me from all sides."

¹⁸ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 117-22.

You should understand that I, like all who are grieved by the whole course of events, often ask myself what I would do in your place, and so I want to let you know what my heart suggests, since I am convinced that it speaks rightly.

We are going through the most dangerous moment in the history of Russia: the question is, Shall Russia be a great State, free, and capable of developing and growing strong, or shall she submit to the iron German fist? Every one feels this—one with his mind, the next with his heart, still others with their souls—and this is the reason every one, with the exception of the cowards and the enemies of their country, offers up his life and all his possessions.

And at this solemn time, when we are, as it were, being tested as men, in the highest sense—as Christians—certain forces within Russia are leading you, and, consequently Russia, to inevitable ruin. I say deliberately, You and Russia, because Russia cannot exist without a Tsar; but it must be remembered that the Tsar alone cannot govern a country like Russia. This should be realized once and for all, and, therefore, it is absolutely indispensable that the ministries and the legislative chambers should work together. I say legislative chambers because, although the existing organs are far from perfect and are not responsible, they ought to be responsible and should bear the whole burden of responsibility before the people. The existing situation, with the whole responsibility resting on you, and you alone, is unthinkable.

What do the people and the public want? Very little: an authority (I am not using hackneyed, meaningless words) that is firm, a strong authority (for a weak authority is no authority), a wise one, meeting the popular needs—and the opportunity to live freely and to let others live freely.

A wise authority should be composed of persons who are, in the very first place, clean, liberal, and devoted to the monarchist principle—by no means those of the right or, worse yet, the extreme right, because for this kind of person “authority” means to “govern” with the aid of the police, to give the public no opportunity for free development, and to grant liberties to our, in most cases, good-for-nothing clergy. “The President of the Council of Ministers should be a person in whom you have absolute confidence. He selects and is responsible for all the other ministers, and they, all together, represent a single purpose, one mind and one will, while each, in his special field, promotes the common policy and not his own, as is the case now. No minister should have the right to give you his opinions as

to general policy; he should merely report in his own special, narrow field. However, if you wish to know his opinions as to general problems, he may express them, but only in the Council of Ministers, with you personally in the chair. With a united ministry, it is unlikely that you would hear any contradictory opinions, but, of course, there might be various shades of opinion, in connection with the work entrusted to each of them separately, and it is necessary for you to hear them.

In principle, I am opposed to a so-called responsible ministry, *i.e.*, responsible to the Duma. This should not be permitted. It must be remembered that in our country parliamentary life is in an embryonic stage. With the best of intentions, ambition for power, fame, and position would play not a minor, but a major, part, especially where the parliamentary régime is not clearly understood, and individual envy, and other human frailties would cause even more changes of ministers than now, though this may be hard to imagine.

The President, as well as all the ministers, should be chosen from persons who enjoy the confidence of the country, and whose activities are known everywhere. Of course this does not exclude members of the Duma. Such a ministry would meet with general sympathy in all well-disposed circles. It should present to you a detailed program of those measures which are necessary to the principal task of the present, *i.e.*, victory over the Germans, and should include such reforms as can be introduced at the same time, without harm to the main object, and for which the country is waiting.

This program, being approved by you, would have to be submitted to the Duma and State Council, which, without doubt, would approve it and give it their full support, without which the work of the Government is impossible. Then, when you are supported by the chambers, and have gained a firm foothold and a feeling that the country is back of you, all movements by the left elements of the Duma should be suppressed. I do not doubt that the Duma itself would manage this; but if not, the Duma would have to be dissolved, and such a dissolution of the Duma would be acclaimed by the country.

The main principle is that the program, once established, shall in no case be altered, and the Government shall feel confident that no outside influences can sway you, and that you, with all your unlimited power, will support your own Government. At present, we see the exact reverse. No minister knows what tomorrow may bring forth. They are all isolated. Outside people, who enjoy no confidence what-

ever, are appointed as ministers, while they themselves probably wonder how they ever came to be named. But since, generally speaking, there are not many honest people, these persons lack the courage to admit to you that they are unfitted for the positions to which they are appointed and that their appointments only hurt the general good. Their actions border on the criminal.

January 14, 1917

I wrote the first part of this letter in the car, on the way to Kiev. Until today I have been so busy that I had not a minute to spare.

The appointments made since then show that you have definitely resolved to pursue a domestic policy that runs absolutely against the wishes of all your faithful subjects. This policy only plays into the hands of the left elements, who look on the situation as "the worse, the better." The unrest grows; even the monarchist principle is beginning to totter; and those who defend the idea that Russia cannot exist without a Tsar lose the ground under their feet, since the facts of disorganization and lawlessness are manifest. A situation like this cannot last long. I repeat once more,—it is impossible to rule the country without paying attention to the voice of the people, without meeting their needs, without considering them capable of entertaining opinions of their own, without a willingness to admit that the people themselves understand their own needs.

Try as I may, I cannot understand what it is that you and your advisers are fighting against, striving after. I have had two long talks with Protopopov. He kept talking about a strong authority, about the impossibility of concessions to public opinion, about how the Zemstvo and City Unions, as well as the War-Industry Committees are revolutionary organizations. Had his words been really true, there could be no salvation, but fortunately that is not so. Of course, it cannot be denied that people of the left do exist in these organizations, but the mass are not revolutionary, and yet, by prohibitive measures of all kinds, by restrictions and suspicions, those who are in doubt are now being artificially driven to the left.

One would think that some invisible hand was steering the whole policy on a course to make victory unattainable. That same man, Protopopov, told me that it would be possible to rely on the industrialists, upon capital. What a mistake! To begin with, he forgets that capital is in the hands of foreigners and Jews, to whom the downfall of the monarchy is desirable, because there would then be no obstacles in the way of their predatory appetites, and, again, that

our commercial class is not what it used to be—it is enough to recall 1905.

You could in a few words, by a stroke of the pen, quiet every one and give the country what she wants: a ministry of confidence, and the public organization the opportunity to develop, under control, to be sure. If you were to do that, the Duma would, like one man, stand behind such a Government; there would be a tremendous enthusiasm; all the nation's forces would come to the front; and the victory would be won. It is painful to feel that there are no men whom you trust, men who understand the situation, but only those who insinuate themselves into positions they know nothing about.

7. ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH TO THE TSAR ¹⁹

February 7, 1917

As you see, a month has passed and still I have not mailed my letter—I have been hoping all the while that you would follow the road pointed out to you by people who are loyal to you and who love Russia from the bottom of their hearts. Events show, however, that your counsellors are still leading Russia and you to sure perdition. To keep silent under the circumstances is a crime against God, against you, and against Russia.

Disaffection is spreading very fast and the gulf between you and your people is growing wider. (When I say "people" I mean those who understand the wants of the nation, and not those who represent a mere herd that will follow the man who knows how to sway a crowd.) People love you and believe firmly that complete victory and domestic reorganization are possible without any upheavals with a Government composed of men who are clean and enjoy the confidence of the country. Without this, there is no hope of saving the throne and, with it, our native land.

Look at what is happening among our Allies. They have summoned the most capable men, irrespective of their convictions, to help govern their countries. Every one realizes that, at a moment when the fate of the world is at stake, and when their very existence as free states depends upon a victorious issue of the war, there can be no room for personal feelings or for considering the interests of this or that party. There is only one thing to do—to summon the more capable people to work for the salvation of their country, yes,

¹⁹ "Nikolai II i Velikie Kniazia," 117-22.

the salvation of the country, for it is a question of the very existence of Russia as a great, powerful State.

Actually, in the whole history of the Russian State, there have never been more favorable political conditions. We have on our side our ancient enemy, England, our recent enemy, Japan, and all the other states which appreciate all our power and at the same time witness the wholly inexplicable spectacle of our complete domestic chaos, which grows worse every day. They see that it is not the best, but the worst elements who are ruling Russia at a moment when mistakes committed today will affect our whole history, and they are compelled to begin to have some doubts about us. They see that Russia does not understand her own interests and problems, *i.e.*, of course, not Russia, but those who rule her.

Such a situation cannot last. You have probably read the address presented to you by the Novgorod nobility. One speaks in this fashion only when deeply conscious of the abyss on which we are standing, and I assure you that all persons really loyal to you feel exactly the same way.

One is in utter despair at seeing that you do not want to hear those who know Russia's situation and counsel you to take the steps that would extricate us from the chaos we are in today.

You probably believe that the measures the Government has taken will lead Russia out to the bright path, the path to victory and complete regeneration, and you assume that all of us with the opposite view are wrong. But, to test it, just glance behind you, and compare the situation in Russia at the beginning of the war with that of today. Is it possible that such a comparison does not convince you as to which side is right?

In conclusion I want to say that, strange though it may be, the Government itself is the organ that is preparing the revolution. The nation does not want it, but the Government is doing everything to make as many malcontents as possible, and is succeeding perfectly. We are witnessing the unparalleled spectacle of revolution from above, and not from below.

Your faithful SANDRO,

February 17, 1917.

BOOK II—THE NEW RÉGIME

PART VI

THE DUMA AND THE SOVIET

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The revolution which few people in Russia desired but which many anticipated, was proclaimed at Petrograd on March 12, 1917. Every one in the capital was on the lookout for it and when an insignificant crowd came out in the street begging for bread, it was hailed as the long expected guest. The mob denied the identity, claimed to be a pauper and not a prince, but in the end allowed itself to be convinced of its importance, to be crowned, worshiped and feared. One can but wonder whether there would have been a revolution had there been less talk about it. . . . To this day we do not know who the leaders of the mob were or what their object was. We do know that the men who assumed the leadership on March 12 did not just then plan a revolution. There is reason for believing that the mentally unbalanced Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, instigated the uprising in order to put it down. The movement got away from him and when he could no longer control it he called it revolution and ran. He was followed by the other Ministers, and the extreme reactionaries in general, leaving the Liberals and Socialists to clean up the mess.

The Liberals were dazed by the passing events. They wrung their hands and repeated "I told you so." When they came to, they found the Socialists busily at work. Though equally taken by surprise the Socialists were the first to recover. They were the only people who really visualized and desired a revolution and had some idea what to do with it. They had their 1905 experience, the revolutionary manuals and Socialistic programs to guide them.

Of still greater importance was their understanding of the masses. Many of the Socialists had either come from the prole-

tariat or had been closely associated with it in the labor movement. They used slogans familiar to the man in the street though not always understood by him. Young and enthusiastic, the Socialists put their whole heart and soul into their work of building up the Russia of their dreams. Against them the moderate, scholarly, legalistic, cautious Liberals had no chance at all.

One can imagine the feeling of the men of this older generation as they saw the ideal of a constitutional monarchy of the English type vanish before their eyes. Their attitude toward the revolution and its leaders is strikingly portrayed in the pictures drawn by Shulgin. Between the scholarly, stylishly dressed Shulgin and the ignorant, unwashed workman there was not only a social and intellectual gulf but a mountain of distrust. Somewhat similar barriers divided the Miliukovs and Rodziankos from the Kerenskis and Chkheidzes. In the days of the Duma the former regarded themselves as statesmen and the latter as street-corner agitators. After the disappearance of the monarchy, the tables were turned and the leaders of the revolution did not wholly conceal their opinion of the Council of Elders of the Duma. In studying the political fights that took place between March and November, 1917, one must not wholly lose sight of the fact that memories of personal slights and injuries added to the bitterness.

On March 12 the Committee of the Duma was formed. After hearing the order to adjourn, the members of the Duma did not at first know what to do. To obey, with the Ministers in hiding, meant to leave the ship of State to drift without the guidance of even the sailors; not to obey meant to side with the revolution. As might have been expected, they compromised by forming the Committee of the Duma, which had for its main object to mark time until the Tsar made up his mind. On the evening of that same day a body of men met and organized, on the model of 1905, the Soviet of Workers Deputies for the definite purpose of uniting the revolutionary forces and of depriving the Tsar of any choice of action.

During the first four months (March-July) of the revolution these two political forces struggled for control of the government. On March 13, 14 and 15 each side tried to attract allies. But while the Committee worked half-heartedly, not knowing the Emperor's

mind, the Soviet struck out boldly. Both sides appealed to the Army and in the end the Committee got the officers and the Soviet the soldiers. The Committee won over the employers of labor, the middle class, the Allied Governments: the Soviet attached itself to the workers and the radical intelligentsia, at home and abroad. On March 16 came the first test of strength in connection with the abdication.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FIRST WEEK OF THE REVOLUTION

I. SHULGIN'S MEMOIRS¹

I awoke. It was nine in the morning. The telephone rang and rang. "Hello!"

"Is that you, Vasil Vitalevich?" asked Shingarev. "It is time to go to the Duma. It has begun."

"What are you talking about?"

"It has begun. There is an order to dismiss the Duma, the city is in an uproar. Let's hurry. They are occupying the bridges. We may never get there. An automobile has been sent for me. Come at once to my place, and we will go together."

"I am coming."

This happened on the morning of March 12, 1917. During the last few days we have been living, as it were, on a volcano. Petrograd was without bread—transportation had broken down because of the unusually heavy snows, frosts, and principally, of course, the war. There were street disturbances. It was not, of course, a question of bread. It was the last straw. The trouble was that in that large city it was impossible to find a few hundred people who felt kindly toward the Government. That's not all. The Government did not feel very kindly toward itself. There was not a single Minister who believed in himself or in what he was doing. . . . There was not one who could bang his fist on the table. . . . Lately the Ministers even stopped coming to the Duma. . . .

As we were driving Shingarev said: "That's the answer. Until the last I continued to hope that they would somehow see the light and make concessions. But no; they dismissed the Duma. That was the last opportunity. Any agreement with the Duma, no matter what kind, was the last chance to escape revolution."

"Do you think this is the beginning of a revolution?"

"It looks like it."

"Then this is the end."

"Perhaps the end. Perhaps the beginning."

¹ Shulgin, V. V., "Dni," 102.

"No, but I cannot believe this. If it is revolution then it is the end."

"You may be right. Unless we believe in miracles—but there may be a miracle. In any case the Duma stood between the Government and the revolution. If the Duma is brushed aside then we are face to face with the street. If we could have held on two months longer."

"Until the offensive?"

"Yes. Had the offensive failed we should have had a revolution anyway . . . had it succeeded . . ."

"Yes, had it succeeded all would have been forgotten."

We reached Kamenostrovski boulevard. Though it was early for Petrograd yet the streets were full of people. It gave the impression that the factories were on strike. Perhaps also the high schools, and, who knows, the universities. As we approached the Neva the crowd increased and finally became so thick that the automobile came to a standstill.

"Automobile go back; there is no passage!" Shingarev put his head out of the window and said: "We are members of the Duma. Let us pass, we must get there."

A student ran to the window. "Are you Mr. Shingarev?"

"Yes, I am Shingarev, let us pass."

"Immediately."

He jumped on the foot-board. "Comrades, make way! These are members of the State Duma—Comrade Shingarev." The crowd opened up and we moved on, with the student still on the foot-board. He kept shouting that "Comrade Shingarev" was in the car, and we got through. At times the mob shouted back: "Hurrah for Comrade Shingarev." The student accompanied us for a short time only, until we came to the Troitski Bridge. Here the road was blocked by a company of soldiers.

"You tell them," said the student, "that you are going to the Duma," and with those words he disappeared. In his place appeared an officer, and when he learned who we were he very politely apologized for the delay.

"Open up. These are members of the Duma." As we hurried across the deserted bridge, Shingarev remarked: "The Duma still stands between the 'people' and the 'Government.' So far both banks [of the Neva]² recognize her."

² On the left bank, the Wiborg side, were the factories, the workmen's quarters, and on the right, the stores, banks, palaces, Duma.

On this bank [right] all was as yet quiet. We hurried along the quay, but all the familiar places looked queer. . . . On the Shpalernaia we came up with a funeral procession. It was the funeral of M. M. Alekeseenko, member of the Duma; To Pity or to Envy him?

Others came to the Duma. One told the other the news. "The workmen have assembled on the Wiborg Side. Their headquarters are, seemingly, the station. Some kind of an election is going on . . . hands are raised. A regiment has revolted. Apparently the Volynski. They killed their commanding officer. The Cossacks have refused to shoot—they fraternize with the people. There are barricades on the Nevski. No one knows anything about the fate of the Ministers. It is said that the police is being murdered. . . . It was reported that a mob of about thirty thousand people made up of workmen, soldiers, and "all kinds" is on the way to the State Duma.

S. I. Shidlovski assembled the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc. We found ourselves in the same room, No. 11, where we always met and made our decisions. There were present Shidlovski, Shingarev, Miliukov, Kapnist 2nd, Lvov, [V. N.], Polovtsev, Efremov, Rzhnevski, I and a few others. All who, during the last years, have led the Duma . . . and led it to . . . The meeting opened—opened with the knowledge that a mob of thirty thousand is approaching. What should be done? I do not remember what was said. But I remember that no one proposed anything worthy of attention. What could be proposed? Were these people fit to direct a revolutionary mob, to dominate it? Under the protection of its spears we could call the Government all kinds of mean and dirty names, carry on a "constitutional," *i. e.*, wordy war, and thereby hold the masses in check. To talk in order that the country should be still—that the army knowing that the Duma is on the watch, would do its duty at the front and the workman in the rear. . . . But now this war of words is over. It has failed in its purpose—it has not averted the revolution. Perhaps it has even hastened it. Hastened or postponed?

Not all felt powerless. Some thought that we could even now do something, now that the masses have begun "to act."

Of course, we came to no decision in room No. 11.

Later there was a meeting in the office of the President of the Duma—a meeting of all the leaders of the political groups, not only those of the Progressive Bloc. Rodzianko presided. The question was

what to do? We were caught between the Emperor's order to adjourn and the approaching storm. Not to obey the order and continue in session meant revolution—it meant that the Duma raised the flag of revolt and would have to lead this revolt regardless of consequences.

Neither Rodzianko nor the overwhelming majority of those present were capable of this act. We were first of all loyal. We respected the throne—and protested against the policy followed by the Emperor, for we knew that it led to the ruin of the dynasty. In the Duma we attacked the Ministers—and did not touch the Monarchy.

I do not recall what was said, but remember the decision “to obey the Imperial order, to consider the Duma as not in session [to call] on the members of the Duma not to go away but to meet at once for an informal conference.” To emphasize the fact that it is an “informal conference” and not a session of the Duma, we decided not to meet in the White Hall but in the Semicircular Hall.

This place was hardly large enough to hold us—for the whole Duma was present. Rodzianko and the Council of Elders sat around the table and the rest of us sat or stood, or leaned against each other as best we could. We were excited, alarmed, clinging, as it were, spiritually to one another. Even opponents of long standing felt the presence of a new element, equally dangerous, threatening, repulsive to all. This new element was the . . . mob. . . . It was approaching, its breath was already felt. At that time very few thought about it, but judging from their paleness and beating hearts, a great many undoubtedly felt unconsciously that death, surrounded by the mob, was on the march. . . .

Rodzianko explained the situation and asked “What should be done?”

From all sides, from the right and the left, excited speeches were made, recommending that something should be done.

What? I do not know. Some one, it seems, proposed that the Duma should declare itself as the Government . . . declare that it will not disperse . . . will not obey the order . . . declare itself a Constituent Assembly. This proposition did not receive, could not receive, support. . . . Some one demanded that the Duma should say whether it is with the old Government or with the people, the very people now on the way, and to whom an answer must be given.

Just then there was a commotion at the door, loud voices . . . and an officer rushed into the room.

He interrupted the meeting with his loud, shrill voice:

"Gentlemen of the Duma. I implore your protection! I am the head of the guard, your guard, the guard of the Duma. Some unknown soldiers have forced their way in. They have severely wounded my assistant. They tried to kill me. I barely escaped. . . . Help me!" Rodzianko tried to pacify him, to tell him that he was in no danger.

At this moment Kerenski spoke up: "That which has just happened proves that we must not delay! I am constantly receiving information that the troops are agitated. . . . They are coming out on the street . . . I am now going to visit the regiments. It is necessary that I should know what to say to them. May I tell them that the State Duma is with them, that it assumes all responsibility, that it will stand at the head of the movement?"

I do not recall whether he received an answer . . . probably not, but from that minute his figure stood out. He spoke with positiveness as one having authority. His words and gestures were sharp, to the point, his eyes flashed. . . .

"He is their dictator," I heard a whisper near me.

It was at this time, or perhaps a little before that, that I asked to be allowed to say a word. I had the feeling that we were going down, down . . . and unconsciously prepared for death . . . and I, it seems, wished to write an epitaph for all of us, to say that we died as we lived.

"When we talk of those who are coming here we should, first of all, know who they are. Friends or enemies? If they come here in order to continue our work, the work of the State Duma, of Russia; if they come here in order to pledge their new strength to support us in our cry 'all for the war,' then they are to be received as friends, and we are with them. But if they come here with other thoughts, then they are the friends of the Germans, and we should tell them firmly and clearly: 'You are enemies; we are not for you but against you.'"

It may be that my words made some impression, but in any case they brought no results. Kerenski said something more. He stood there determined, ready to depart, uttering sharp, almost contemptuous words. He grew on the mud of the revolution, mud on which he was in the habit of jumping and running at a time when we could not even walk.

The mob of thirty thousand with which we were threatened in

the course of the warning was not a myth, but a fact. It came like a cloudburst, like a flood. It is said (I did not see it myself) that Kerenski attempted to turn the first mass of soldiers, which appeared at the Taurida Palace, into the "first revolutionary guard."

"Citizen Soldiers," he said, "on you falls the great honor of guarding the State Duma. . . . I declare you to be the 'First Revolutionary Guard.'" But this guard did not last a minute . . . it was swept away by the mob. . . .

This constant outpouring of humanity brought in sight new faces but, no matter how many there were, they all had a kind of stupid, animal, even devilish appearance. God, how ugly it looked! So ugly that I gritted my teeth. I felt pained and helpless and bitterly enraged.

Machine guns! That's what I wanted. I felt that only the tongues of machine guns could talk to the mob, and that only machine guns and lead could drive back into his lair the frightful beast. This beast was no other than His Majesty the Russian people. That which we feared, tried to avoid at all costs, was before us. The revolution had begun.

From that time on the Duma practically ceased to exist. Even physically . . . for the mob took possession of the building . . . for sometime [only one room] the so-called "Rodzianko Cabinet" was at our disposal. All the other rooms and halls were filled with people. In the Rodzianko Cabinet we, Committee of the State Duma, continued to meet.

Above the roar of the human sea sounds of brass instruments penetrated into the Rodzianko Cabinet. . . . It was the Marseillaise

Aux armes, citoyens!
Formez vos bataillons!
Marchons, marchons qu'un sang impur
Abreuve nos sillons.

Whose "impure blood" has to flow? "Hurrah." These noises continued without end and without limit until the air became black and thick. More "hurrahs," more speeches and more blowing of trumpets:

Entendez-vous dans les campagnes
Mugir ces féroces soldats:
Ils viennent jusque dans vos bras
Egorger vos fils, vos compagnes.

If we only had machine guns. But we could not have any. Our great stupidity and irreparable mistake was that we had not prepared any real force. If we had had even a single regiment on whom to

depend, a single general with determination, the situation might^s . . . been different. But we had neither the one nor the other . . . what's more we could not have either. At this time Petrograd . . . no dependable troops left or perhaps it had not had any as yet. . . the Officers! We will talk about them later. At this time, no one evenⁿ thought of looking to "officers' companies" for support. Besides . . . besides, although I was not the only one to feel that this is the end . . . to feel bitter hatred toward the revolution from the very first day (I was quite prepared to hate her . . . I hated her unto death in 1905) . . . although, as I said I was not the only one, yet there were not very many of us who felt that way. Nearly all the others did not understand . . . they were in a state of dizziness. . . .

Police? Yes, if you please. But who of us was fit to handle such an instrument? What did we understand? . . . We were powerless. We did not even know how to go about such things. . . .

Kerenski alone, accustomed to such things, knew how to dance on the revolutionary bog . . . and he grew with each minute. . . .

The revolutionary mud of humanity which poured over us had a few "lumps of support." One could not stand on them but could jump across. These lumps were the revolutionary contacts which Kerenski had. They were people who belonged not to some organization, but who recognized his authority. This explains why during the first period of the revolution (without taking into consideration his personal qualities, for he was a first-class actor) Kerenski played such a prominent part. There were people who listened to him. . . . Perhaps it would be better to say that there were armed people who listened to him. In time of revolution only those who have guns count. It is true that these "armed people of Kerenski" were not organized companies—they were merely "lumps of support." But such as they were he had them, and that was a great deal more than all the rest of us together possessed.

For example, to whom could I issue orders? To the members of the Duma? But they were not armed. Supposing even they were, what could one have done with a battalion of old lawmakers. . . .

Interestingly enough, some such idea passed through the brain of the Cossack Karaulov, a member of the Duma. He conceived the idea of "arresting everybody" and making himself dictator, but when he raised the subject in a speech before one of his "most dependable" companies, he got such a look that he concluded if he did not drop the subject quickly something might drop on him. . . .

Kerenski had these tiny contacts. You could not do anything big with them, but they gave the illusion of power. For an actor like Kerenski . . . it was quite enough. Groups of armed men forced their way through the human mess in the Duma to Kerenski to ask him what to do, how to "defend liberty," whom to seize. Kerenski felt himself at once of those "who command." His whole appearance became different . . . the tone of his voice changed.

I do not know whether it was by Kerenski's orders, or the idea just came of itself, that volunteer police ran all over the city "arresting." With a student at the head followed by armed workmen and soldiers, they ran here and there, breaking into this and that apartment, grabbing "officials of the old régime" and dragging them to the Duma.

One of the first to be brought was Scheglovitov. This was Kerenski's first chance to shine. With a look of inspiration he faced the old tsarist statesman and said:

"Ivan Grigorevich Scheglovitov, you are arrested. . . . Your life is spared. . . . Know that the Duma does not shed blood!"

What magnanimity! It was beautifully done. This was Kerenski—actor to the very bone, but a man who was honestly opposed to the shedding of blood. "*Ecclesia abhorret sanguinem*," said the old inquisitors as they burned their victims. This was Kerenski. He burned Russia on the altar of freedom, while pronouncing the words—"The Duma does not shed blood."

No matter how you interpret it, the fact remains that this slogan, uttered in a decorative-dramatic manner, impressed itself on the hearts and minds. How many lives it then saved!

I became hungry . . . and started to move toward the buffet. Every room was crowded to the limit. . . . I moved with the stupid mob, and was carried along to the hallway which leads to the restaurant. Suddenly some one standing near me said something. I looked up and saw a soldier.

"Do you happen to have it in the Duma?"

I thought at first that he wanted a cigarette, but when I looked at him I realized that it was something else.

"Have what? What is it that you want?"

"Officers."

"What kind of officers?"

"Oh, any kind who will do."

I looked bewildered—"Any kind who will do."

He continued: "I told our fellows that it won't do to be altogether

without officers . . . they are angry with those we have . . . but how can we get along without them? It is not right. For order's sake there must be officers. . . . Perhaps you have some in the Duma who will do?"

I shall remember this soldier as long as I live. He came to the Duma for officers "who will do." He did not find them . . . they were not to be found . . . the Duma did not have them. Ah, if it had them! . . . Even if only to the extent of the mobilized "opposing side." . . .

The opposing side was not asleep. Throughout the city in every barrack and factory, elections were going on. . . . One for every thousand . . . for the workers' and soldiers' deputies. . . . The mass "organized;" in other words it was organized so that it could be used.

And we? We had a very poor idea of what was going on. In any case we did not know how it was done. We had no plan and no idea how to oppose it. . . .

Towards evening, I think, it became generally known that the Old Government was no more. The Ministers ran home without putting up a fight of any kind. On this day, if I remember correctly, not a single Minister was arrested. The Ministers left, seemingly, much sooner than was necessary.

The troops had also disappeared, that is to say, they had gone over to the "people who had risen." But at the same time it seemed to be understood that the troops "stood by the Duma." There was a misunderstanding. It appeared as if the Duma had "risen," that it was the "center of the movement." This was not true. The Duma had not "risen." But the soldiers in their "pilgrimages" to the Duma gave the other impression.

The pity of it all is that this flow of good-will toward the Duma, which was rather touching at times, could not be made use of, could not be depended upon . . . because we did not know how, because it was to the Duma as a symbol of the revolution and not to the Duma *per se*, because a hostile hand was at work against strengthening the Duma, which stood on a basis of patriotism. This was the hand of the future Bolsheviks, undoubtedly, even then, guided by the Germans. There was still another reason. These troops were no longer disciplined soldiers but armed bands, without order and almost without officers . . . nevertheless . . . when it became evident that there was no longer a Government, it also became evident that the

country could not even, for a moment, be without a Government. Therefore the Committee of the State Duma was forced to take the Government upon itself. Rodzianko hesitated long. He could not decide whether this would mean rebellion or not.

"I have no desire to revolt," he said. "I am not a rebel. I made no revolution and do not intend to make one. If it is here, it is because they would not listen to us. But I am not a revolutionist. I shall not raise a hand against the Supreme Power, have no desire to do so. But, on the other hand, there is no Government. I am torn to pieces by all sides; the telephone never stops ringing; every one wishes to know what to do. What shall I do? Wash my hands and step aside, leave Russia without a Government? But after all it is a question of Russia. We have obligations toward our native land. What shall I do? What shall I do?"

The reply, which I gave, surprised even myself:

"Take the responsibility, Michael Vladimirovich. It is not a rebellion. Take it as a loyal subject. Russia can not be without a Government. If the Ministers have deserted their posts some one must take their places. Have they run away or have they not?"

"Yes, they have run away. No one knows where the President of the Council of Ministers is to be found. The same is true of the Minister of the Interior. They are all gone."

"Under the circumstances, there is nothing else for you to do but take over the power. The situation is this. There are two possibilities. The trouble may blow over, the Emperor will appoint a new Ministry to whom we can hand back the power, or if the trouble does not blow over then some one must take over the Government. If we do not take it, then the others, those who selected certain scoundrels in the factories, will take it. What in the devil can we do when the Tsarist Ministers have so hidden that even the dogs cannot find them!"

I was working myself into a passion. If we are no good, what about our Ministers. Look what their obstinacy has led to, and when it came they ran away and left us to face the hundreds of thousands of revolted soldiers, in addition to the other riffraff. This was the Ministry of a Great Empire, mollicoddles and not men. From that moment I felt a change in me. I began to search for a way out . . . any kind of an exit.

Until late in the night we had the same thing over and over again: meeting in the Duma, flow of the mob through the halls,

coming of military units, playing the Marsellaise, ringing of telephones, tens, hundreds of excited people inquiring what to do, groups of armed men bringing in people arrested. To these should be added the "calls" of the Committee of the State Duma, Rodzianko's long distance conversation with Headquarters, demanding immediate decision as to what to do, how to act.

It is only later that it became known that the Empress telegraphed to the Emperor that "concessions are necessary."

This telegram was a year and a half late. She should have given him that advice in the autumn of 1915. "Concessions" should have been made for the retreat "without ammunition." A majority of the Fourth Duma proposed that this should be done. But at that time they refused to pay for the loss of twenty guberniias. Now—now it is apparently too late. What kind of concessions can one make to satisfy this stormy sea?

That night, if I remember correctly, the Duma made some kind of an attempt to arm by creating the post of Commandant of the State Duma. We slept in chairs . . . woke from time to time with the thought "how to find a way out."

It was clearly apparent to me then as now, and as it has always been, that Russia cannot be without a monarchy. The question that ran through my head was "how to save the monarchy?" In that sleepless night the idea probably passed through my mind, whether good or bad history alone can tell—that by sacrificing the Monarch it might be possible to save the Monarchy—to bring about the abdication of Nicholas II in favor of the young heir—of course, this idea came also to the minds of others.

That very night, if I am not mistaken the "Ispolkom Sovdepa" occupied one of the rooms (room of the budget commission). This name, which had such a wild sound at that time, stood for "Ispolnitelnyi Komitet Sovieta Soldatskikh i Rabochikh Deputatov."

What a nightmare of a night! Where are we? What is actually happening? . . . What about Russia? the Army? . . . How will they receive the news? What will happen?

We must have a center. We must, at all cost, pull off some kind of a trick. Without that all will go to pieces . . . and there will be complete anarchy. . . . Above all we must save the army. . . . If the breakup begins there . . . and it will begin at once if the Army has no one to obey . . . then all is lost. The Army must be given a definite decision. . . . Let the soldiers believe that the Government

is in the hands of the Duma. . . . It will take them some time to understand that the Duma as it stands cannot possess such power. . . . The "State Duma" is a good slogan for them and for Russia. . . . It will be good for at least several days . . . and by that time the question of the Emperor will be settled.

The Emperor—there is the rub. Can he reign? Can he? How can we find out? No, he cannot. . . . After all that has passed who will stand up for him? He has no one, no one. . . . Rasputin has eaten up all the friends, all the love for the Tsar . . . there are no more truly loyal subjects . . . there are make-believe loyal subjects, and declared rebels; the latter will openly come out against him, and the former will go in hiding. He is alone, worse than alone, for the shadow of Rasputin clings to him. . . . The cursed muzhik! I told Purishkevich not to kill him—Rasputin dead does more harm than Rasputin alive. If he were alive he could be killed now, and that would give some outlet to the feeling. But who should now be killed? Who? This damn riffraff must kill somebody, will kill somebody. The question is "Whom?" Of course. . . . It is clear. . . . But, no, this must not be allowed. We must save, save. In order to save . . . one must either turn the guns on this dirty mob (and on us too) or abdicate from the throne. . . . Yes, abdication is the price to pay for saving the life of the Emperor . . . and the Monarchy. . . .

Nicholas I hung five Decembrists and if Nicholas II could save Russia by shooting 50,000 "Februarists" it would be a cheap price to pay. That would mean that we have a real Tsar, a real Government. . . . But if it fails? If for this purpose no regiments or regimental leaders can be found? Then—of course—abdication. . . . The young Tsarevich will reign under the regency—of Michael Alexandrovich. . . . The Supreme Commander-in-Chief will be Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich—and the Government? . . . Who will be the Government? Nobody in sight . . . we sparred . . . and broke a lance—for whom? For no one in particular. Miliukov and Shingarev will, of course, be included in the Ministry . . . then Kerenski . . . yes, we must have Kerenski. . . . He is the most active . . . just now. . . . Actor? Yes . . . but a talented actor . . . we must have him, at least at first. They listen to him . . . and in any case we must have him because of the left parties. Rodzianko could occupy only the post of Prime Minister, but the premiership is not for him because the left parties, even the Cadets, will not permit it. . . . Let

him remain President of the Duma. . . . Will there be a Duma? Not likely. . . . We are actually prisoners. . . . The damn riffraff. . . . Is it possible that we shall have to go through the same nightmare tomorrow? Let's try and sleep, even if only for a minute, while they are away. . . . They? The revolutionary rabble, I mean, the people. His Majesty, the People. Oh, how I detest it!

March 13

The second day was even more of a nightmare. . . . "The revolutionary people" again overflowed the Duma. . . . So that it was impossible to move. Added to this were the bands or orators, the beastly "hurrahs," the hateful Marseillaise, and the "deputations." Frenzied mobs of people from numberless organizations, institutions, societies, unions . . . desired to see Rodzianko and in his person greet the State Duma and the new Government. All made speeches, repeating the words "people and freedom." . . . Rodzianko replied, emphasizing "Country and Army." . . . One phrase does not necessarily go with the other, but the mob shouted "hurrah" just the same. They shouted "hurrah" to the speeches of the radicals . . . who used a different vocabulary: "dark forces of reaction, tsarism, the old régime, revolution, democracy, power of the people, dictatorship of the proletariat, socialistic republic, land to the toilers," and again "svoboda, [liberty] svoboda, svoboda" until one felt sick at the stomach. . . . To all these various speeches the mob belched out "hurrah." Some are beginning to greet the "Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies." Its Executive Committee is in session along side of us. . . . We feel that this is a second Government. . . . Kerenski and Chkheidze are elected also into that body. . . . They are a bridge between these two heads. . . . Yes, one feels that there is something with a double head but it is not a double headed eagle. . . .

As before, companies of soldiers are coming . . . to pay their respects. They call for Rodzianko. . . . He goes out to them . . . and makes speeches in a loud voice, and they shout "hurrah,"—play the Marseillaise until one's nerves are on the edge. . . .

Rodzianko is just the man for that kind of thing: he has the figure, the voice, the presence and the enthusiasm. . . . Notwithstanding all his shortcomings, he loves Russia and does all that he can, that is to say, shouts with all his might, to defend the country. . . . He gets everybody enthusiastic and they shout "hurrah." But

immediately following him there jumps up some kind of a Caucasus monkey [Chkheidze] or somebody even worse and says all kinds of defeatist stuff, arouses passion and greed. . . . Their every other word is: "Landholders, Tsarist clique, Rasputin, serfs, police." These speakers are also greeted with "hurrah."

The days passed as a nightmare—no beginning, no ending, no middle, all jumbled together. Deputations from regiments, continuous telephone ringing, endless questions "What to do". . . sending of members of the Duma to different places, discussions among ourselves, long-distance telephoning by Rodzianko, growing conflict with the Ispolkom of the Soviet.

What could we do? At the very moment when a three-hundred-year-old Government collapsed a thirty thousand mob deluge broke over the heads of a few men who might have been able to do something.

March 14

I worked my way to Rodzianko's office. What has happened? "They" are here. Where are "we"?

The Committee of the State Duma has moved to other quarters. These other quarters are two small rooms, facing the library at the end of the hall. . . . It is from this place that Russia is going to be governed in the future. . . . Here I found our crowd. They sat around a table covered with green velvet. At the head was Rodzianko, around him all the others, except Kerenski, who was absent. I did not finish my report about Petropavlovskaja [Shulgin had been sent to that fortress to restore order], when the doors flew open and Kerenski "dramatically" stepped in. He was followed by two armed soldiers and between them was a man holding a bundle. Kerenski took it from him and said:

"You may go."

The soldiers faced about in a military manner, the official of the bundle turned around, and all three went out.

Kerenski then looked at us, and threw the package on the table.

"Our secret treaties with the Allies. . . . Hide them," and disappeared as dramatically as he appeared. . . .

"Gentlemen, what are we going to do with them," said Shidlovski; "we have not even a cupboard."

"What's all this nonsense?" shouted Rodzianko. "Where did he get it?"

Before he had time to get real angry his own secretary rushed

in . . . announcing that sailors have come . . . to see the President of the Duma.

"To hell with them! When am I going to do my own work? There ought to be an end to this sometime."

"Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich is with them," said the Secretary.

"You had better go," suggested some one.

Rodzianko grumbled and went . . . made a speech . . . about the country . . . about "not allowing the enemy, the damned Germans, to destroy our Mother Russia". . . and the auditors shouted "hurrah." One could stand this kind of thing once, twice, thrice, but when it continued without end . . . it became unendurable. . . .

What to do with the secret treaties. . . . There was no closet, not even a drawer in the table. . . .

Some one got an idea:

"Throw them under the table; no one will see them—look," and with these words the documents were kicked under the table. . . .

Some time passed and . . . again Kerenski, again with soldiers, again with a bundle.

"You may go."

The soldiers departed.

"Here are two million rubles . . . brought from some Ministry. . . . This can't go on . . . we have got to appoint Commissars [to act temporarily as Ministers]. Where is Michael Vladimirovich? [Rodzianko]"

"Outside."

"Shouting hurrah? Enough of hurrah. Let's get down to work—members of the Committee."

Off he went. . . .

We threw the two millions under the table to join the secret treaties.

For the hundredth time Rodzianko returned. . . . He was all excited; nay more, he was in a rage. . . . He dropped into his chair.

"What happened? What's the matter?"

"What's the matter? These scoundrels."

He took a look around.

"You can talk, they are not here."

("They," that is, Chkhaidze and others of the left.)

"What scoundrels! Everything went along nicely. . . . I made them a speech. Their greeting could not have been better. I gave them a patriotic speech. . . . They shouted 'hurrah.' I looked around

—their spirit was all that could be desired. But just as I ended, some one from them began.”

“From whom?”

“Oh, from them . . . how do you call them . . . those sons-of-a-dog deputies . . . from the Soviet Executive Committee . . . you know, that riffraff.”

“What was it they said?”

“Here is what they said:

“The President of the State Duma calls on you, comrades, to save the Russian land. This is easy to understand, comrades. Mr. Rodzianko has something to save. He has a considerable piece of that Russian land in Ekaterinoslav Guberniia. And what land! It is possible he may have land elsewhere. For example, in Novgorod? It is said that you can drive there through forest and when you ask whose it is, you are told that it belongs to Rodzianko. You see, Rodzianko and the other landowners of the State Duma have something to save—their estates, princedoms, counties, and baronies. They call this Russian land. They are calling on you, comrades, to save it. Suppose you ask the President of the Duma if he would be as concerned in saving the Russian land, if this Russian land of the landowners became yours? The beasts!”

“What did you answer?”

“What did I answer? I do not remember what I answered. The scoundrels!”

He banged on the table with such force that the secret treaties jumped.

“The scoundrels! We offer up the lives of our sons, and that riffraff thinks that we begrudge our land. Damn the land! What good is it to me if Russia perishes? Dirty scum! Take my shirt but save Russia. That’s what I told them.”

By this time his voice became so shrill that we had to quiet him.

It took him some time to calm down. Then . . . he explained the course of events. He is in constant communication by direct wire with Headquarters and General Ruzski. He tells Headquarters what is taking place . . . that the situation is getting worse, that the Ministers have disappeared, that the Duma has temporarily taken charge of the Government, but that its power is very shaky because (1) the troops have revolted, and will not obey their officers, and even threaten them; (2) alongside of the Committee of the State Duma there has grown up a new institution, namely the “ispolkom,” which strives to get all the power for itself and undermines the power of

the Duma; and (3) owing to the general demoralization and the growing anarchy something out of the ordinary must be done. It was believed at first that a responsible Ministry would satisfy the clamor, but with each hour's delay the situation grows worse. It became quite clear yesterday that the Monarchy itself is in danger. The idea seems now to prevail that only the abdication of the Emperor in favor of his son can save the dynasty. . . . General Alexeev is also of this opinion.

"This morning," continued Rodzianko, "I planned to go to Headquarters to see the Emperor, to report to him that abdication is the only way out. But 'they' learned of my intentions . . . and when I got ready to depart they informed me that they had given orders not to give me a train. . . . Think of it! They declared that they would not allow me to go alone, that Chkheidze, and some others, would have to go with me. But, your humble servant is not going to the Emperor with them. . . . Chkheidze was to be accompanied by a battalion of 'revolutionary soldiers.' Imagine what they would have done there? With that cattle I. . . ."

Just then some one called me out. . . .

[On my return] I found the Committee greatly excited . . . Rodzianko was bellowing, "Who wrote this? Of course, they, the scoundrels. This was done purposely to help the Germans . . . traitors. . . . What will happen now?"

"What is the matter?"

"Here, read this."

I took the piece of paper . . . and as I began to read a mist came over my eyes. . . . It was the famous Order No. 1.

"Where did you get it?"

"It is stuck up all over the city . . . on all the walls!"

I felt as if . . . this was the end of the army. . . .

It must have been toward four o'clock in the morning when Guchkov came in [from the street] a second time. He was greatly aroused. Prince Viazemski, who sat in the automobile with him, had just been killed . . . by a shot fired at the "officer" from some barracks. . . .

At this moment all the members of the Committee were not present. Rodzianko, Miliukov and I were there; the others I do not recall. . . . But I do remember that neither Kerenski nor Chkheidze were on hand. Our own crowd was there, and consequently Guchkov talked quite openly. Here is the substance of his remarks:

We must come to some decision. The situation grows worse every minute. Viazemski was killed because he was an officer and for no other reason. . . . Similar acts take place elsewhere . . . if not today . . . then tomorrow. On my way to this place I noticed officers in the rooms of the Duma—they are hiding—they pray us to save them. We must do something. . . . We must above all save the Monarchy. . . . Russia cannot be without a Monarchy. . . . It is evident that the present Tsar can no longer reign. . . . Any command that he might give would not be obeyed. . . . If that is so, the time is not far distant when this revolutionary riffraff will take matters into its own hands and try to find a way out. . . . It will settle the question of the Monarchy in its own way. . . . This is inevitable if we allow the initiative to slip out from our hands."

Here he was interrupted by Rodzianko.

"I intended to go to the Emperor this morning . . . but I was prevented. . . . They informed me that I could not have a train and demanded that I should be accompanied by Chkheidze with a battalion of soldiers."

"I knew it," said Guchkov, "and for that reason it is necessary to proceed in a different manner. . . . We must act quickly and secretly. If we work with 'them' the results will be less advantageous for us. . . . We must put them before a *fait accompli*. . . . We must give Russia a new Emperor and rally around his banner all the forces for resistance. . . . For that purpose we must act quickly and firmly. . . ."

"To be more specific—what do you have in mind?"

"I propose that some one should go at once to the Emperor and bring about an abdication in favor of the crown prince."

"Ruzski has telegraphed me," said Rodzianko, "that he has already spoken to the Emperor on the subject. . . . Alexeev has sent a query on the same subject to the commanders of the front. A reply is awaited."

"I think that some one should go," added Guchkov. "If you will agree to it and will authorize me to do so I will go. But I should like to have some one to come with me."

We looked at each other . . . and after a moment I said:

"I'll go with you."

We exchanged a few words more. I tried to summarize and clarify our ideas: The Committee of the State Duma is of the opinion that the only way out of the present difficulty is the abdication of the

Emperor. It authorizes the two of us to report this to His Majesty, and if he should agree, to bring the act of abdication to Petrograd. The abdication should be in favor of the heir, Alexei Nicholaevich. The two of us are to go together and in secret.

I fully realized what we were doing. I felt that the abdication was unavoidable, that it would not do to have the Emperor face to face with "Chkhaidze" [revolution]. The abdication was to be handed over to the Monarchists for the sake of saving the Monarchy. . . .

At five in the morning Guchkov and I got into the automobile . . . and reached Guchkov's home, where he wrote out a few words. It was a poor attempt, but I was quite unable to improve on it. I was completely exhausted.

March 15

It just began to get light when we drove up to the station. . . . The revolutionary people were still asleep. . . . Guchkov introduced himself to the Station Master and asked for a train to Pskov. . . . In twenty minutes a train, made up of one locomotive and one car, was ready. . . .

Ten o'clock at night we arrived. . . . We stepped out on the platform. . . . Some one came up to say that the Emperor was waiting. He led us across the tracks . . . into the car of the Emperor. He appeared in a few minutes. . . . We bowed. . . . He shook hands with us in a friendly way . . . motioned us to a seat. Guchkov began to speak. . . . He was quite excited. . . . He related what was taking place at the capital. . . . He painted things as they were in Petrograd. The Emperor sat there quite composed. . . .

When Guchkov had finished, the Emperor said in a calm and matter-of-fact manner:

"I have decided to abdicate from the throne. . . . Until three in the afternoon I thought that I would abdicate in favor of my son Alexei. . . . But at that time I changed my mind to abdicate in favor of my brother, Michael." . . .

We did not expect this. It seems to me that Guchkov raised some objections . . . that I asked for a quarter of an hour to advise with Guchkov . . . but it did not take place . . . we agreed. . . . What else could we do?

The Tsar rose . . . and we all stood up. . . . Guchkov handed

him his outline of the abdication act which the Emperor took and walked out.

After a little while he returned with the text of the abdication, which he handed to Guchkov.

It was then twenty minutes before midnight. The Emperor bid us good-bye, shaking us by the hand . . . and his attitude was, if anything, warmer than when we arrived.

We returned to our car . . . and in the morning [March 16] reached Petrograd.

2. PROROGATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE STATE DUMA³

By virtue of Article 99 of the Fundamental Laws of the state, we command:

The work of the State Duma and State Council shall cease March 11 of this year, and the term for its renewal shall be not later than April, 1917, depending upon extraordinary circumstances.

³ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 1, March 12, 1917. During the first week of the revolution the regular newspapers did not appear and the only news the public had was from a news sheet issued by a committee of Petrograd journalists and scattered throughout the city. This paper was known as "Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli." There were ten issues, 1-10, between March 12 and 18. On March 13 there appeared the first number of the Soviet "Izvestiia." In the course of the following months, until the Government was moved to Moscow, this paper changed its name a number of times, as follows:

March 13-14, Nos. 1, 2—Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov.

March 15-August 13, Nos. 3-131—Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

August 14-October 11, Nos. 132-183—Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

October 12-November 8, Nos. 184-207—Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovietov Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

November 9-January 6, 1918, Nos. 208-260—Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

January 10-March 3, Nos. 261-303—Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovietov Krestianskikh, Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

March 5-10, Nos. 304-309—Izvestiia Vserossiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovietov Krestianskikh, Rabochikh, Soldatskikh i Kazachikh Deputatov i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov.

On March 12 the paper appeared at Moscow under the name of "Izvestiia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovietov Krestianskikh, Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov." This name it bears today. In this book the Izvestiia Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli is referred to as "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," and the various issues of the Soviet Izvestiia as "Izvestiia."

The Governing Senate shall not fail to make proper disposition for the execution of the present act.

The original is signed in His Imperial Majesty's Own hand,

NICHOLAS

At the Imperial Headquarters,

March 10.

Countersigned:

President of the Council of Ministers,

PRINCE NICHOLAS GOLITSYN

March 12.

RESOLUTION OF THE STATE DUMA ⁴

[*March 12, 1917*]

The Senior Council,⁵ having met in special session and acquainted itself with the decree of prorogation, has resolved:

The State Duma shall not disperse. All Deputies shall remain in their places.

3. TELEGRAMS OF RODZIANKO TO THE TSAR ⁶

FIRST TELEGRAM, MARCH 11

The situation is serious. The Capital is in a state of anarchy. The Government is paralyzed; the transport service is broken down; the food and fuel supplies are completely disorganized. Discontent is general and on the increase. There is wild shooting on the streets; troops are firing at each other. It is urgent that some one enjoying the confidence of the country be entrusted with the formation of a new Government. There must be no delay. Hesitation is fatal. I pray God that at this hour the responsibility may not fall upon the monarch.

SECOND TELEGRAM, MORNING OF MARCH 12

The situation is growing worse. Measures should be taken immediately, as tomorrow will be too late. The last hour has struck, when the fate of the country and dynasty is being decided.

⁴ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 1, March 12, 1917.

⁵ Leaders of the political parties.

⁶ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 1, March 12, 1917.

4. TELEGRAM OF MEMBERS OF THE STATE COUNCIL TO THE TSAR¹

On the night of March 12-13, the undersigned members of the State Council sent the following telegram to the Tsar:

"Your Imperial Majesty, We, the undersigned members of the State Council by election, realizing the danger that threatens our country, turn to you in fulfilment of our conscientious duty before you and Russia.

"Owing to the complete collapse of transportation and the consequent inability to bring in the necessary materials, factories and mills have shut down. This forced unemployment, combined with the acute food crisis, brought on by the said breakdown of the transport, has driven the popular masses into despair. This situation has been accentuated by the feeling of detestation and grave suspicion of the authorities which has sunk deeply into the hearts of the people.

"All these factors have brought on a popular uprising, which the army has joined. Never having had the confidence of Russia and now thoroughly discredited, the authorities are quite powerless to handle the dangerous situation.

"Your Majesty, the further keeping of the present Government in power means the complete breakdown of law and order and will bring with it inevitable defeat in war, ruin of the dynasty, and great miseries for Russia.

"We think that the last and only remedy is for Your Imperial Majesty to make a complete change in the internal policy and, in agreement with the repeated requests of the popular representatives, classes, and public organizations, call together at once the legislative chambers; dismiss the present Council of Ministers; and ask some one who has the confidence of the people, to submit to you, for confirmation, a list of names for a new cabinet capable of governing the country in complete harmony with the representatives of the people. Every hour is dear. Further delay and hesitancy may bring on uncountable miseries.

"Your Imperial Majesty's faithful subjects, members of the State Council.

"DIAKOV,

"PRINCE DRUTSKOI-SOKOLINSKI,

"GLEBOV,

"SAVITSKI,

"SHMURLO,

"SHUMAKHER,

¹"Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13, 1917.

"GRIMM
 "GUCHKOV,
 "IUMASHEV,
 "KOMSIN,
 "LAPTEV,
 "MARIN,
 "MELLER-ZAKOMELSKI,
 "OLDENBURG,

"STAKHEEV,
 "STAKHOVICH,
 "COUNT TOLSTOI,
 "PRINCE TRUBETSKOI,
 "VAINSTEIN,
 "VASILIEV,
 "VERNADSKI,
 "ZUBASHOV."

5. FORMATION OF COMMITTEES OF THE STATE DUMA

(a) THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE DUMA ⁸

On March 12, exactly at midnight, there was definitely organized the Executive Committee of the State Duma, with the following membership:

MICHAEL VLADIMIROVICH RODZIANKO	I. I. DMITRIUKOV
A. F. KERENSKI	V. A. RZHEVSKI
N. S. CHKHEIDZE	S. I. SHIDLOVSKI
V. V. SHULGIN	N. V. NEKRASOV
P. N. MILIUKOV	V. N. LVOV
M. A. KARAULOV	COLONEL ENGELHARDT
A. I. KONOVALOV	

(b) PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF STATE DUMA ⁹

At half past two in the afternoon, a conference of the members of the State Duma was held in the Semicircular Hall, under the chairmanship of M. V. Rodzianko. It deliberated on the question of organizing a Provisional Committee for maintaining order in Petrograd and establishing contact with various institutions and individuals. In view of the fact that this meeting was too crowded, the choice of the Provisional Committee was entrusted to the Senior Council.¹⁰

Following the conference of the State Duma, the Senior Council held a meeting in M. V. Rodzianko's cabinet, at which the members of the Provisional Committee of Members of the State Duma were selected.

⁸ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13, 1917.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 1, March 12, 1917.

¹⁰ Leaders of the political parties.

*The Committee of the State Duma for Maintaining Order in
Petrograd and Establishing Contact with Institutions
and Individuals*¹¹

The following persons were made members of the Provisional Committee:

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. M. V. Rodzianko | 7. V. V. Shulgin |
| 2. N. V. Nekrasov | 8. S. I. Shidlovski |
| 3. A. I. Konovalov | 9. P. N. Miliukov |
| 4. I. I. Dmitriukov | 10. M. A. Karaulov |
| 5. A. F. Kerenski | 11. V. N. Lvov |
| 6. N. E. CHKHEIDZE | 12. V. A. Rzhevski |

FIRST STEPS OF THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE STATE DUMA¹²

At two o'clock on the morning of March 13, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma issued the two following calls:

I

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma appeals to the inhabitants of Petrograd, in the name of the general good, to protect State and public institutions such as the telegraphs, water-supply stations, electric-power houses, street railways, and Government office-buildings. The Committee of the State Duma also asks the citizens to look after mills and factories, whether working for the army or for society in general. It is necessary to bear in mind that spoiling and destroying institutions and properties benefit no one and cause enormous harm to State and society because all stand in equal need of water, light, etc. Needless to say, attempts upon the life, limb, and property of private persons cannot be tolerated. Such acts blacken the conscience of those committing them and bring much suffering upon the entire population of the capital.

The President of the State Duma,
MICHAEL RODZIANKO

II

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma has found itself compelled under the difficult conditions of internal chaos brought on

¹¹ This Committee was originally created to guide members of the Duma but when it became evident that the Government had broken down the Committee assumed the additional functions of maintaining order and establishing contact. (Shulgin, "Dni," 112.)

¹² "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13, 1917.

by the old Government, to take into its own hands the restoration of State and public order. Conscious of the vast responsibility it has assumed, the Committee feels assured that the civilian population and the army will assist in the difficult task of forming a new Government in accordance with the desire of the population, and worthy of its confidence.

The President of the State Duma,
MICHAEL RODZIANKO

March 12, 1917

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA APPEALS TO THE ARMY ¹⁸

In the morning of March 13, P. N. Miliukov was invited by the officers of the First Reserve Regiment (Novo Cherkasski), which is stationed in the Okhta section, to come to the barracks of the regiment.

P. N. Miliukov arrived at the Officers Club, where he was met by all the officers of the regiment, with the commander at the head.

In the course of the conversation P. N. Miliukov declared that there existed at the present moment only one authority which all should obey—the Provisional Committee of the Imperial Duma. There can be no dual authority.

The task of the Committee is the restoration of order and the organization of the authority which has fallen from the hands of the old Government. For this purpose the Provisional Committee needs the coöperation of the military powers, which must not act disjointedly, but in that organized state in which he is gratified to see this regiment.

The officers of the regiment unanimously expressed their consent and perfect readiness to acknowledge the authority of the Provisional Committee and of the person in charge of the military section of the Committee.

After this, P. N. Miliukov went out to the drill grounds, where the regiment was drawn up. In the center, a high platform had been erected, from which the Deputy addressed the soldiers. He stressed the importance of coöperation between privates and officers, who will go hand in hand with the Imperial Duma, at the present moment.

Miliukov was carried on their hands across the drill grounds to the automobile.

¹⁸ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13, 1917.

*Miliukov's Speech to the Life-Guard Grenadiers*¹⁴

When the power fell out of the hands of our enemies, it was necessary to take it into our own. This has to be done at once; it has to be done today, for we know not what tomorrow may bring forth.

What then must be done today; what must be done to take power into our own hands? We must first of all be organized, united, and subject to one authority. This authority is the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. One should be subject to it and to no other, for in two authorities lies danger and division of strength.

I saw yesterday the first regiment that came here in full order, with its officers, and recognized the authority of the Duma. Remember that our strength lies in organization. Only together, with your officers, will you be strong. A disorganized mob does not represent much power. If the whole army should become a disorganized mob, it could be put to flight by an organized handful of the enemy. It is necessary to organize today, and to do what the regiment did which first appeared here. Find your officers, who are under the orders of the Duma, and put yourselves under their orders.

*Speech of M. V. Rodzianko to the Life-Guard Grenadiers*¹⁵

. . . Thank you for coming here to help us to restore order. I hope that you are the brothers of those who are now shedding their blood in the cold trenches for the honor of our native land. Uphold the tradition of the glorious Russian regiment, which I, as an old soldier, love and respect.

Listen to your officers, for without officers the military unit becomes a mob unfit to restore order. The officers who brought you here see eye to eye with the members of the State Duma. You should help us to organize a Government that will have the confidence of the whole country. Long live dear Russia! Give a cheer for Mother Russia. (Loud hurrahs filled the Catherine Hall.)

You will in a moment receive orders from your officers. I ask you that, in agreement with them, you return quietly to your barracks and do there what they ask you to do. I am happy that there is complete understanding between us. Thank you once more for coming here.

¹⁴ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 2, March 13, 1917.
¹⁵ *Ibid.*

(c) OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
BY ENGLAND AND FRANCE ¹⁶

The French and English ambassadors have officially notified the presiding officer of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, that the Governments of France and England are entering into *de facto* relations with the Provisional Executive Committee of the State Duma, the spokesman of the true will of the people, and the only legal Provisional Government of Russia.

(d) RESOLUTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS ¹⁷

On the evening of March 12, there was a meeting of representatives of public organization,—the War-Industry Committee, Zemstvo and City Unions, Petrograd Duma, sanitary and charitable organizations, etc.

After a short discussion, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

"The representatives of the public organizations, meeting in conference on March 12, greet the resolution of the Duma not to disperse and its decision to take the power in its hands.

"The Provisional Committee made up of members of the State Duma, drawing its strength from the intelligent part of the army, workers, and inhabitants, will have the support of public organizations and will, in the end, give Russia complete victory over the external and internal foe."

(e) APPEAL BY THE CENTRAL WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE ¹⁸

CITIZENS!

The war goes on. The army needs ammunition and food. Every lost hour weakens us, strengthens and emboldens our enemy.

A German victory would threaten us with the restoration of the old power. By providing for defense, the army and people can save the freedom which they won in a few days, and establish a power based on the will of the people. But just now for the defense of the Country, it is necessary to have a single provisional power, having

¹⁶ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 4, March 14, 1917.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 3, March 14, 1917.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 6, March 15, 1917.

the strong confidence of the inhabitants and the army. Such a government can come only from the State Duma, which alone can at this present moment command authority in the eyes of the whole free Country, the army, and our glorious Allies.

In the full realization of the great responsibility that rests on each of us for the future of our Country, which is living through an historical moment of tremendous importance, we invite all citizens, all institutions and organizations, retaining complete calm and continuing their productiveness, to offer their services to the State Duma.

This is not the time for bickering, quarreling, and trouble-making. Remember that only in union of purpose and in harmony lies the safety of the Country, and in disunion her ruin.

Germany is not asleep. Her offensive goes on with new strength. Supply the army with all its necessities. Do not betray your brothers in the trenches.

THE CENTRAL WAR-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE

(f) THE OFFICERS, SOLDIERS, AND PEOPLE ¹⁹

Officers who are in Petrograd and who are in sympathy with the people, held a meeting at the suggestion of the Executive Committee of the State Duma. Realizing that for a triumphant ending of the war it is most urgent that, at the earliest moment, order should be restored and friendly collaboration take place in the rear, they unanimously resolved to recognize the authority of the Executive Committee of the State Duma in the government of the Russian Empire, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly.

A true copy.

PAUL MILIUKOV

Member of the Provisional Committee

A. F. KERENSKI

Member of the Duma and Minister of Justice

M. A. KARAULOV

Member of the State Duma

6. FORMATION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES ²⁰

During the day [March 12, 1917], representatives of workers and soldiers, and several public leaders, assembled at the building of

¹⁹ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 7, March 16, 1917.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 1, March 12, 1917.

the State Duma. A Soviet of Workers' Deputies was organized which resolved to issue a call to the people.

PROCLAMATIONS OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolved to address the following proclamations to the inhabitants:

I

CITIZENS: The representatives of the workers, soldiers, and inhabitants of Petrograd, meeting in the State Duma, announce that the first session of their representatives will take place at seven o'clock tonight in the building of the State Duma. All those troops that have joined the side of the people should immediately elect their representatives, one for each company. Factory workers should elect one deputy for each one thousand. Factories with less than one thousand workers should elect one deputy each.

THE PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES.

II

CITIZENS: The soldiers who have joined the side of the people have been in the streets since morning without food. The Soviet of Deputies, workers, soldiers, and inhabitants are making every effort to feed the soldiers. But it is hard to organize the food supply at once. The Soviet appeals to you, citizens, to feed the soldiers as best you can.

THE PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES

March 12, 1917

(a) SOVIET APPEALS TO SOLDIERS AND WORKMEN

To the Soldiers ²¹

Soldiers! The people and all Russia thank you for rising in the cause of liberty.

Eternal Glory to those who fell in the great fight!

Soldiers, some of you still hesitate to join your own comrades who revolted. Soldiers, recall your hardships in the villages, factories, and mills when the Government always oppressed you. Unite with

²¹ "Izvestiia," No. 1, March 13, 1917.

the people and the people will give you and your families freedom and happiness.

Soldiers, if you have lost contact with your units, go to the State Duma where you will find your comrades and with them share your joys and sorrows.

Soldiers, do not shoot wildly on the streets. Aim seldom, but hit the mark!

On the roofs of houses and in certain apartments, there are still the remnants of the police, Black Hundreds ^{21a} and other scoundrels. Get them by a sure shot or regular attack.

Soldiers, observe good order wherever you are. Keep your military formation and observe army regulations as in the presence of the enemy. . . .

Soldiers, do not allow hoodlums to abuse peaceful citizens; do not allow the plundering of stores or homes. . . .

Stand firm in your determination to fight for liberty to the end. Let us swear even to die rather than surrender liberty to the enemy. Russia will ever remember your sacrifices, services, and manliness. Long Live Liberty!

*To the People of Petrograd and Russia from the Soviet
of Workers' Deputies* ²²

The old régime has brought the country to ruin and the population to famine. It was impossible to bear this longer, and the inhabitants of Petrograd came out on the street to express their dissatisfaction. They were greeted by a volley of bullets. In place of bread, the Tsar's Ministers gave them lead.

But the soldiers would not act against the people and turned against the Government. Together with the people they seized guns, arsenals, and important governmental institutions.

The fight is still on and must go on to the end. The old power must be completely crushed to make way for popular government. In that lies the salvation of Russia.

In order to succeed in this struggle for democracy, the people must create their own governmental organ. Yesterday, March 12, there was formed at the capital a Soviet of Workers' Deputies, made up of representatives of factories, mills, revolted troops, and democratic and socialistic parties and groups. The Soviet, sitting in the

^{21a} Reactionary organizations.

²² "Izvestiia," No. 1, March 13, 1917. Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

Duma, has set for itself as its main task to organize the popular forces, and to fight for the consolidation of political freedom and popular government.

The Soviet has appointed commissars to establish the people's authority in the wards of Petrograd. We invite the entire population of the capital to rally at once to the Soviet, to organize local committees in their wards and take into their hands the management of local affairs.

All together, with our forces united, we will fight to wipe out completely the old Government and to call a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

*The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet*²³

The Executive Committee was elected at the very first meeting of the Soviet, March 12. On the same day the first meeting of the Executive Committee took place. No minutes of this meeting have been found. The following items were on the agenda: 1. The make-up of the Executive Committee; 2. the organization of the city wards; 3. the arming of the workers; 4. selection of representatives to the Military Commission of the Committee of the State Duma.

At the second meeting of the Executive Committee, on the morning of March 13, only one question was decided, *i.e.*, the order of the day for the plenary session of the Soviet set for that day. The Soviet discussed the report of the Executive Committee and confirmed the personnel of the Executive Committee, chosen the day before, and decided to add to it "persons of left tendencies."²⁴ After the meeting of the Soviet, the third session of its Executive Committee took place at which the question of organizing the soldiers was discussed. The next session of the Executive Committee was held on March 14, when the text of Order No. 1 was accepted. The fourth session was on March 15.

At the session of March 16, the Executive Committee appointed a number of commissions, and at the session of March 27, it selected a special Bureau, composed of seven members, to prepare all business for the plenary sessions and conduct all current business. On April 25, the Executive Committee was completely reorganized, and all current affairs were turned over to the sections, which were wholly autonomous, within the limits provided by the Executive Commit-

²³ "Petrogradskii Soviet Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov, Protokoly," 287-8. To be referred to as "Protokoly."

²⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 2, March 14, 1917.

tee. Matters of great importance, or such as required solution as a matter of policy, were transferred to the Bureau, which was composed of representatives of the sections, chosen directly by the Executive Committee. Questions of national importance were settled by the plenary meeting of the Executive Committee, but nothing could be submitted to the Executive Committee without its first going through the Bureau. The decisions of the Bureau were subject to the confirmation of the Executive Committee.

*To Officers—Socialists*²⁵

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies has decided to form a militia of workmen in the different wards of Petrograd. In view of this, the Soviet asks officers who are Socialists to come to the aid of the working class, to organize and drill it.

To Workmen

The working class is greatly in need of guns. The success of the fight is closely bound up with the organization and arming of the workers. Therefore, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies asks all comrade-workers who have guns, to hand them over to the commissars appointed by the Soviet for the different wards of the capital. If for some reason this is not possible, then deliver them to the Soviet which meets in the building of the State Duma.

Comrade-Workers! Keep in mind that in order to make a success of the popular cause it is necessary to arm, to secure ammunition, and not to waste it. He who fires in the air without reason creates a panic among the inhabitants and wastes precious fighting material.

Comrades, Arm!

*Greetings to Revolutionary Officers*²⁶

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies send fraternal greetings to the revolutionary officers who came out courageously in defence of the people.

Having full confidence in the determination of the officers to fight to the end for Russian freedom, the Soviet holds out its hand to them, and calls on them to organize, with the people.

²⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 2, March 14, 1917.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 3, March 15, 1917.

(b) SOVIET IS SUPPORTED BY SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONISTS

From the Petrograd Inter-Ward Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party and the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists ²⁷

Proletariat of the World, Unite!
In struggle will you find your rights!
Comrade-Soldiers!

The great and decisive hour for action has come. The hard life [at home] and the countless victims on the field of battle in the interests of the capitalists and the Government should not be allowed without some benefit to the people. The events of March 12 showed that the army understood this and, in close union with the laboring masses, took definite measures to destroy the shameful régime and to put an end to the butchery.

Comrade-Soldiers!

This is the first day that the army and laboring classes have come out in the street. We are as yet weak and the foe is still strong. We must see to it at once that all those who have not joined the people do so immediately and march with them, hand in hand.

We can not retreat! Liberty or death!

The enemy is merciless and will destroy every one who betrays [?] the revolted people. ORGANIZE, comrades! Know that the object of the people will be attained not through pogroms and drunkenness, but only by the revolutionary struggle. Organize, secure arms, stand your watch day and night! The organized and revolutionary people and the army will crush the bloody Government and put a stop to the international slaughter.

What should the soldier do now?

He should seize the telegraph, telephone, electric, and railway stations; he should secure possession of the State Bank and the Ministries. He should not now go to the barracks or leave the city, but wait for instruction leaflets. Elect your representatives for the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Long live the Second Revolution! Long live the Provisional Revolutionary Government! Long live the Revolutionary Army and People!

THE PETROGRAD INTER-WARD COMMITTEE OF THE
RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY AND
THE PARTY OF SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONISTS

²⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 1, March 13, 1917.

To the Revolutionary Students of Petrograd ²⁸

In the City Duma there is being organized a citizen militia to guard the capital, and the students are invited to join it. The spokesman of the revolutionary proletariat, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, has decided to combine the central organ of the workers' commissars with this Duma organization. For that reason we call on all comrade-students to sign up for this guard duty.

Keep in mind that in taking part in this militia you are doing it on the authority of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Keep in mind that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is your highest authority.

STUDENT GROUP OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

STUDENT GROUP OF THE SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONISTS

STUDENT GROUP OF THE BUND

March 13, 1917.

(c) ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET

Number of Deputies in the Soviet ²⁹

In accordance with the resolution of the Provisional Executive Committee of March 12, the representation of workmen in the Soviet was one for every thousand, and for soldiers, one for every company. At this rate the number of deputies quickly reached 3,000, of whom more than 2,000 were soldiers. It became necessary to reconstruct the Soviet, for as it stood there was not room enough in the Duma and too many representatives to accomplish anything. Nothing came of the various projects of the Executive Committee, and the reduction of the number of delegates was brought about by a stricter verification of credentials. In this way the number of deputies was cut down to half.

List of Members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies ³⁰

President—N. S. CHKHEIDZE

Vice-Presidents—M. I. SKOBELEV and A. F. KERENSKI

Executive Committee Bureau:

N. S. CHKHEIDZE

N. IU. KAPELINSKI

IU. M. STEKLOV

P. I. STUCHKA

V. O. BOGDANOV

P. A. KRASIKOV

K. A. GVOZDEV

²⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 2, March 14, 1917.

²⁹ "Protokoly," 292.

³⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 27, April 11, 1917.

Executive Committee Members:

G. M. ERlich	M. I. GOLDMAN (LIEBER)
N. D. SOKOLOV	K. K. KROTOVSKI
N. N. GIMMER (SUKHANOV)	K. S. SHEKHTER (GRINEVICH)
M. N. KOZLOVSKI	V. M. SKRIABIN (A. MOLOTOV)
V. M. ZENZINOV	I. V. DZHUGASHVILLI (K. STALIN)
A. R. GOTZ	A. G. SHLIAPNIKOV (A. BELENIN)
V. B. STANKEVICH	I. I. RAMISHVILLI
L. M. BRAMSON	I. G. BARKOV
N. V. CHAIKOVSKI	A. N. PADERIN
V. N. FILIPOVSKI	A. D. SADOVSKI
G. G. PANKOV	IU. A. KUDRIAVTSEV
V. A. DMITRIEVSKI	V. I. BADENKO
SOKOLOVSKI	F. F. LINDE
P. A. ZALUTSKI	A. P. BORISOV
G. F. FEDOROV	VAKULENKO
N. V. SVIATITSKI	KLIMCHINSKI
I. G. TSERETELLI	

In addition to the above, the following have the right to attend the meetings of the Executive Committee and to be heard:

The factions of the Social Democrats of the Four Dumas; five representatives of the Soldiers' Commission working with the Executive Committee; two representatives of the Central Bureau of Trade Unions; representatives of the Ward Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Editorial Staff of the *Izvestiia* of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the Commissars.

7. CALL TO THE FARMERS, MERCHANTS AND WORKERS ³¹

CITIZENS:

A great event has taken place. The old régime which ruined Russia has fallen to pieces.

The Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies took upon themselves provisional authority, the establishing of order and the governing of the country. Their present problem is to supply the military and civilian population with food. They have organized a food commission which has charge of this matter. It has inherited very little bread from the old Government, and it is therefore necessary to make haste and prepare some.

³¹ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 7, March 16, 1917.

Citizens of Russia, agriculturists, landowners, merchants, railway officials, and laborers, help the country. The army and civilian population must be fed. The war still goes on. Let all, as one man, no matter what their rank or position may be, come to the aid of the country in these trying days. Let not even one hand remain idle. Let no one refuse to fulfil his civic duty; let each man's conscience tell him what to do. Sell your grain quickly to the authorized parties; give up as much of it as you can. Haul it quickly to the railways or docks, load it quickly and send it to its destination. The Fatherland awaits your friendly help. Give bread to her fighters, workers, and servants. Time does not wait. Every hour is precious. Do not delay.

Citizens, come to the aid of your country with your bread, with your labor.

Chairman of the Committee of the State Duma,

M. RODZIANKO.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND
SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

CHAPTER XIX

ABDICATION OF THE ROMANOVS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The following pages give the more important documents relating to the abdication and the setting aside of the Romanov family. By March 15 the leaders of the Duma, as well as the commanders of the Armies, came to the general conclusion that only the abdication of the Tsar could save the Monarchy. With that in mind Guchkov and Shulgin were secretly hurried to Headquarters to get the Act of Abdication in favor of the young crown prince with his uncle Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich as regent. It was the old Palace Revolution plan. Kerenski and Chkheidze were not let into the secret for fear they would oppose the idea. It was proposed to face them and the revolutionists as a whole with a *fait accompli*. While these two men were speeding toward Pskov, Miliukov let out the secret. This news raised such a furor that he had to throw his words overboard to quiet the storm. When on the day following (March 16) the two emissaries returned with the abdication act it was too late. The revolutionary democracy would have nothing more to do with the Romanovs. They would have them neither on the throne, nor in the army, nor in any other position of trust. After deliberating a few hours Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich decided not to accept the throne. In this first clash the Soviet won and after this it assumes a more and more aggressive attitude.

I. TELEGRAM FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE CAUCASUS ARMY, GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS NICHOLAEVICH¹

The President of the Executive Committee of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, received the following telegram:

¹ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 6, March 15, 1917.

"General-Adjutant Alexeev agreeing, I have just now appealed, with the prayer of a faithful subject, to His Imperial Majesty, for the sake of saving Russia and for the victorious ending of the war, to act on the measure which you regard as the only issue from the fatal situation.

Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus Army, General-Adjutant,

NICHOLAS

Tiflis, March 15, 1917, 12.47 P. M."

2. MILIUKOV'S SPEECH OF MARCH 15, 1917²

. . . I am very sorry that in answer to that question [program of the Provisional Government] I cannot read to you the paper having the program. The only copy of it, which was discussed until late last night with the representatives of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, is at this moment in their hands for final examination. I trust that in the course of the next few hours you will learn something about the program. Of course, I can give you right now some of the more important points. (*Shouts: "How about the dynasty?"*)

You ask me about the dynasty. I know in advance that my answer will not please all of you. But I will give it to you anyway. The old despot who has led Russia to the brink of ruin will either voluntarily abdicate, or will be set aside. (Applause.) The power will go to the regent, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. (Continued noise, applause, more noise.) The heir to the throne will be Alexei. (*Shouts: "That's the old dynasty."*) Yes, gentlemen, that's the old dynasty, which you may not like, and which I may not like. But the question just now is not what one likes. We cannot leave unanswered the question of the form of government. We have in mind a constitutional monarchy. It is possible that others have something else in view, but if we stop to quarrel about it now, we will come to no decision, Russia will drift into a civil war, and we shall have a ruined country. This we have no right to do. It does not mean that we have made a final decision [in the form of government]. In our program, you will find an article which provides that just as soon as the danger is past and order is restored, we will proceed to prepare for the

² "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 6, March 15, 1917. On the afternoon of March 15, after the Provisional Government had been formed, Miliukov addressed a large crowd in front of the Duma. He called on the soldiers and officers to work together, and named the different ministers. When he had about concluded, some one shouted, "How about the program?" The speech that follows begins at this point.

calling of a Constituent Assembly (applause), on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. The freely elected popular representatives will determine whether we, or our opponents, more truly represent the public opinion of Russia. (Applause, shouts: "Publish the program.") These shouts remind me of another important question, the answer to which depends on the Soviet of Workers' Deputies who control the printers. . . .

I trust that beginning with tomorrow the organs of the press will appear regularly in, what is to be from now on, free Russia.

MILIUKOV FORCED TO MODIFY HIS STATEMENT REGARDING THE REGENCY ³

By the end of the day [March 15] the announcement of P. N. Miliukov regarding the regency of the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich aroused a great deal of feeling. Late in the evening a large crowd of overexcited officers made their way to the Taurida Palace and declared that they could not return to their units, if P. N. Miliukov did not take back his words. In accordance with their request, P. N. Miliukov gave out that "his statement regarding the provisional regency of Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich and the succession of Alexei was his own personal opinion." This was, of course, not true, for the announcement which P. N. Miliukov had made had been agreed to [by the Provisional Committee].

3. SHALL THE ROMANOV DYNASTY REMAIN? ⁴

The revolutionary people should carry through to the end the revolution and the democratization of its political and social organization. To return to the old is unthinkable. The revolutionary people should organize the State in the way that will best satisfy its interests, strength and great zeal, and will make impossible a new attempt on its rights and liberty. This can be done by handing the power over to the people, that is to say, by forming a democratic republic, in which the officers of government are elected by universal equal, secret, and direct suffrage. All the revolutionary elements in Russia, who have made tremendous sacrifices in the fight and the forging of freedom, should strive for such a government.

If the power were entrusted to a monarch, even a constitutional one, with his responsible ministry, the latter might make an attempt

³ P. N. Miliukov; "Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii," I, 52.

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 3, March 15, 1917.

on the liberty of the people and bind it with chains of slavery. Then again, in a constitutional monarchy there is the right of succession which again creates the possibility of rulers of the type of Nicholas, the Last.

In a constitutional monarchy, the army serves not the people, but the monarch, giving him great power, which he could use to harm the people.

The Romanov dynasty is now overthrown. . . . There must be no going back to it. The revolutionary people will find enough strength to form a new republican government, which will guarantee its rights and freedom.

4. ABDICATION OF NICHOLAS II ⁵

Deputy Karaulov appeared in the Duma and announced that the Tsar, Nicholas II, had abdicated the throne in favor of Michael Alexandrovich. Michael Alexandrovich in his turn abdicated the throne in favor of the people.

At the Duma, there were large meetings and ovations. The enthusiasm was beyond description.

MANIFESTO OF NICHOLAS II ⁶

March 15, 1917.

In the midst of the great struggle against a foreign foe, who has been striving for three years to enslave our country, it has pleased God to lay on Russia a new and painful trial. Newly arisen popular disturbances in the interior imperil the successful continuation of the stubborn fight. The fate of Russia, the honor of our heroic army, the welfare of our people, the entire future of our dear land, call for the prosecution of the conflict, regardless of the sacrifices, to a triumphant end. The cruel foe is making his last effort and the hour is near when our brave army, together with our glorious Allies, will crush him.

In these decisive days in the life of Russia, we deem it our duty to do what we can to help our people to draw together and unite all their forces for the speedier attainment of victory. For this reason we, in agreement with the State Duma, think it best to abdicate the throne of the Russian State and to lay down the Supreme Power.

⁵ "Izvestiia," Extra Supplement to No. 4, March 16, 1917.

⁶ "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 8, March 16, 1917.

Not wishing to be separated from our beloved son, we hand down our inheritance to our brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, and give him our blessing on mounting the throne of the Russian Empire.

We enjoin our brother to govern in union and harmony with the representatives of the people on such principles as they shall see fit to establish. He should bind himself to do so by an oath in the name of our beloved country.

We call on all faithful sons of the Fatherland to fulfil their sacred obligations to their country by obeying the Tsar at this hour of national distress, and to help him and the representatives of the people to take Russia out of the position in which she finds herself, and to lead her into the path of victory, well-being, and glory.

May the Lord God help Russia!

NICHOLAS.

March 15, 1917, 3 P. M.

City of Pskov.

*Countersigned by the Minister of the Imperial Court,
Adjutant-General, COUNT FREDERICKS.*

5. ABDICATION OF GRAND DUKE MICHAEL ALEXANDROVICH⁷

A heavy burden has been laid on me by my brother who has passed over to me the imperial throne of Russia at a time of unprecedented war and popular disturbances.

Animated by the thought which is in the minds of all, that the good of the State is above other considerations, I have decided to accept the supreme power, only if that be the desire of our great people, expressed at a general election for their representatives to the Constituent Assembly, which should determine the form of government and lay down the fundamental laws of the Russian Empire.

With a prayer to God for His blessings, I beseech all citizens of the Empire to subject themselves to the Provisional Government, which is created by and invested with full power by the State Duma, until the summoning, at the earliest possible moment, of a Constituent Assembly, selected by universal, direct, equal, and secret

⁷ "Izvestia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 9, March 17, 1917.

ballot, which shall establish a government in accordance with the will of the people.

MICHAEL

March 16, 1917

Petrograd

6. ARREST OF NICHOLAS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ROMANOV DYNASTY⁸

[*Minutes of the Petrograd Soviet, March 16, 1917*]

"Resolved:

1. That the Workers' Deputies be informed that the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved to arrest the dynasty of the Romanovs, and to propose to the Provisional Government that it make the arrest, together with the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. In case of a refusal, to inquire what the attitude of the Provisional Government will be if the Executive Committee itself makes the arrest. The reply of the Provisional Government to be discussed at a later meeting of the Executive Committee.

2. As regards Michael, to make an actual arrest, but formally to declare him to be subjected only to the actual surveillance of the revolutionary army.

3. As regards Nicholas Nicholaevich, in view of the danger of arresting him in the Caucasus, first to summon him to Petrograd, and to establish strict surveillance over him on the way.

4. The arrest of the women of the house of Romanov to be made gradually, depending upon the part played by each one in the activities of the old régime.

The question of how to make the arrests, as well as the organization of the arrests, is to be turned over to the military commission of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies for further elaboration. Chkhaidze and Skobelev are instructed to communicate to the Government the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."

THE ARREST OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY⁹

On March 20, the Provisional Government, yielding to the pressure of the Executive Committee, resolved:

⁸ "Protokoly," 9.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 289-90.

1. To consider the abdicated emperor, Nicholas II, and his consort as being under arrest, and to bring the abdicated emperor to Tsarskoe Selo.

2. To instruct Adjutant-General Alexeev to give to the Duma Deputies Bublikov, Vershinin, Gribunin, and Kalinin, who have been commissioned to go to Mogilev,¹⁰ a detail of soldiers to guard the abdicated emperor.

However, in view of the fact that the Provisional Government, at the same time that it resolved upon the arrest of Nicholas II, also entered into negotiations with the British Government about the former imperial family's going to England, the Executive Committee was again compelled to take up the question of Nicholas II's fate. . . .

As a result of renewed negotiations between the Executive Committee and the Provisional Government, the following agreement was reached:

1. The former imperial family will be permitted to go abroad only by agreement between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

2. The former imperial family is to be kept under arrest at Tsarskoe Selo until a new place of confinement has been agreed to between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

3. A special commissar of the Executive Committee is to take part in all matters relating to the guard over the prisoners, and other special measures.

7. THE TSAR'S MINISTER AND THE "MOST AUGUST" COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ¹¹

. . . Democracy should demand from the Provisional Government that it announce clearly and without equivocation that it does not recognize the validity of Nicholas II's appointment of Prince Lvov. Failure to do this is *ipso facto* evidence of its monarchistic sympathies, and goes to show that it is unworthy of the Provisional Government set up by the revolutionary people. The Revolution does not need the approval of the former monarch. It is announced in

¹⁰ The movements of these four deputies' and an account of the Tsar's last day at Headquarters may be found in "Izvestiia," No. 11, March 23, 1917.

¹¹ "Izvestiia," No. 17, March 19, 1917.

the papers that in addition to the "appointment" of Prince Lvov, Nicholas has also named Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, Commander-in-Chief. This rumor is not yet confirmed, but if true, is even less admissible [than the Lvov appointment]. . . . The Commander-in-Chief is subject to the new [Provisional] Government and it, only, has the right to select him. An appointment by the old Government is of no force and the new Government should at once set it aside.

There is still another reason why Nicholas Nicholaevich can not now hold a responsible position. He is a member of the old dynasty. . . . Should the Provisional Government leave him in charge of the army, it would be failing in its duty before the revolutionary people which has put it in power. . . .

Democracy should demand from the Provisional Government the removal of all officers (especially those in high positions), who belong to the old dynasty. . . .

8. THE ARREST OF NICHOLAS ROMANOV¹²

In view of information received, that the Provisional Government has decided to permit Nicholas Romanov to depart for England, and that he is at present on his way to Petrograd, the Executive Committee has resolved to take extraordinary steps, immediately, for his detention and arrest. An order has been issued that our troops shall occupy all railway stations, and commissars with extraordinary powers have been despatched to the stations of Tsarskoe Selo, Tosno and Zvanka.

It has been further decided to broadcast wireless messages to all cities, with instructions to arrest Nicholas Romanov and take extraordinary measures in general.

At the same time, it has been decided to inform the Provisional Government at once that it is the determination of the Executive Committee not to permit the departure of Nicholas Romanov for England, and to arrest him. It has been decided to confine Nicholas Romanov in the Trubetskoi Bastion of the Peter and Paul Fortress, changing its commanding personnel for this purpose. The arrest of Nicholas Romanov is to be made at all costs, even at the risk of a severance of relations with the Provisional Government.

¹² "Protokoly," 29.

9. GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS NICHOLAEVICH¹⁸

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Prince Lvov notified Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich that he was relieved from his duty as Commander-in-Chief. For the present and until the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, the duties of that office are to be performed by General Alexeev.

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 13, March 25, 1917.

CHAPTER XX

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

With the Romanovs and the Monarchy out of the way, the question of a temporary and permanent form of government came up for discussion. It was one of the tenets of the Russian revolutionists that the permanent form of government as well as other fundamental State questions, such as land ownership, should be determined by a Constituent Assembly. Of course, it was taken for granted that such an assembly would vote for a republic. The Liberals, after the miscarriage of their abdication and constitutional monarchy plans, fell in with the idea of a Constituent Assembly in the hope that the people would decide in favor of a constitutional monarchy. Both sides knew just what they wanted, both sparred for time, for both needed time to prepare.

In view of the fact that the Constituent Assembly could not be called at once it was necessary to make some arrangement for a provisional government to "(1) prepare for the Constituent Assembly and (2) govern the Country until the Assembly meets."

The Committee of the Duma took that responsibility upon itself. During March 14 and 15 Miliukov and some of his associates had been preparing a list of available candidates for submission to Grand Duke Michael in case he should become Emperor. After his abdication the same list was put forward. All the persons named in the list were members of the Duma; all but two belonged to the bourgeois parties. These two were Socialists. Chkheidze was now President of the Soviet and Kerenski, the idol of the revolutionary crowd, one of the vice-presidents of the Soviet.

Before accepting the offer, the two Socialists asked the authorization of the Executive Committee of the Soviet. This body

refused to grant it on the ground that the revolution before them was not a proletarian but a bourgeois revolution and therefore the bourgeoisie should take the reins of government and be held responsible. Responsible to whom? To the Soviet, of course, said the Socialists. They, especially the Marxians, argued that the relation between the Soviet and Provisional Government was similar to that of Parliament and the English Ministry. The Provisional Government would not for a moment accept such a relationship but at the same time the ministers were not quite clear in their own minds as to whom they were responsible and by what authority they were in office. Neither the Soviet nor the Provisional Government could make out a good constitutional case.

Chkhaidze yielded to the judgment of the Executive Committee and declined the offer of the Ministry of Labor. Kerenski, on the other hand, being less bound by socialistic theory, appealed from the Executive Committee to the Soviet as a whole. In a very dramatic speech he explained that he had already accepted the post, outlined his great plans, and asked for approval of his acceptance. It was given him most enthusiastically.

This act of the Soviet was interpreted differently by the Executive Committee and the Duma leaders. The last named looked upon Kerenski's entry into the Ministry in the light of a coalition with the Soviet and therefore reasoned that the Soviet was bound to approve all acts of the Provisional Government. The Socialists would not for a moment admit this point of view. Kerenski, they said, represented no one but himself. In so far as the Provisional Government was concerned the Socialists "would stand behind it . . . in so far as it carries out the socialistic program." To make sure that this was done the Soviet appointed a

" . . . Contact Commission . . . to keep the Soviet informed regarding the intentions and acts of the Government; to keep the latter, in turn, informed regarding the demands of the revolutionary people; to exert influence upon the Government for the purpose of satisfying these demands; and to exercise constant control over its actions."

The Provisional Government was in a helpless and humiliat-

ing position. It had responsibility but no power, or, what amounted to the same thing, it thought it had no power. It had little confidence in itself and was awed by the activities and resolutions of the Soviet which gave the ministers the impression of an intelligent directing force against which it was useless to struggle. The poor Provisional Government found itself in an intolerable position which led to conflicts, ill-will, and finally to an open break.

1. ATTITUDE OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIET ON QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

*From the Minutes of the Session of the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies on March 15¹*

Before the meeting, there was an informal conference with the deputies of the soldiers who had become members of the Soviet. They were informed what had been done on March 14. While this conference was on, word was received of trouble in the Life-Guard Regiment. Ten men from those present were instructed to proceed at once to the different regiments to quiet them and explain to them Order No. 1.

The conference ended with a speech by N. S. Chkheidze, who greeted the revolutionary army in the name of the laboring class. . . .

In the regular order of business, there was taken up the report of the Executive Committee on its negotiations with the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, on the subject of the formation of a provisional government and the attitude of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies towards such a government. The Executive Committee declined to participate in the Provisional Government and submitted the following demands:

1. Complete and immediate amnesty for all charged with political, religious, terroristic crimes, military uprisings, etc.

2. Political freedom in all its forms: freedom of speech, press, unions, meetings, and strikes; this freedom to apply equally to the army.

These two articles were accepted by the Duma Committee. It did not accept the proposition that:

3. The army should be organized on the basis of self-government.

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

It was the opinion of the Duma Committee that it was impossible, in time of war, to introduce a system which had not been tried out by any other army in the world. After considerable discussion, the Duma Committee did agree that while on duty, the soldier should be subject to strict military discipline, but when off duty, he should have the same rights enjoyed by other Russian citizens.

4. The organization of a citizen militia to enforce order; this militia to be subject to the local authorities, elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

5. To remove all class, nationality, and religious restrictions.

6. The garrison of Petrograd not to be removed from the city and not to be disarmed.

All the above were accepted by the Duma Committee.

The proposition to establish at once a democratic republic was set aside on the ground that the form of government for the Russian Empire was a matter for the decision of the Constituent Assembly, and that the Provisional Government would call such a body in the very near future.

A. F. Kerenski was offered the office of Minister of Justice, and N. S. Chkheidze that of Minister of Labor, but the Executive Committee did not give them its sanction to accept these offices.

The Executive Committee recommended that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies take note of the intended declaration of the newly formed Government, to appeal to the inhabitants to organize, to cease disorder, and to support the Provisional Government in so far as it followed the lines marked out in the above articles.

Following the report of the Executive Committee, Kerenski, in a strong and ardent speech, appealed to the Soviet, as a whole, to approve his action in accepting the duties of Minister of Justice in the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

In the debate that followed, two points of view were brought out, one against contact with the Duma Committee and for a provisional government of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers Deputies; and the other in favor of sending representatives of the Soviet Deputies into the Provisional Government. . . .

After a lively discussion, all the recommendations of the report of the Executive Committee were accepted with the following corrections:

1. The Provisional Government should proceed to carry out the indicated measures, notwithstanding the fact that the country is in a state of war.

2. The Manifest of the Provisional Government should be signed both by the Government and M. Rodzianko.

3. To include in the program of the Provisional Government an article giving cultural and national self-determination to all nationalities.

4. To form a committee of representatives from the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers Deputies to watch over the acts of the Provisional Government.

All the corrections were accepted by an overwhelming majority vote. The session lasted about seven hours. The next session was set for six o'clock on the evening of March 16.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF A. F. KERENSKI IN THE SOVIET OF WORKERS'
DEPUTIES ²

March 15, 1917

After the organization of the new Government, the Minister of Justice, A. F. Kerenski, appeared at the meeting of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and asked special permission to say a few words. It was granted, and this is what he said:

"Comrades! Do you believe in me? ('We believe, we believe!') I speak from the bottom of my heart, and I am ready to die if need be. (Cheers, applause, and prolonged ovation.) In view of the formation of the new Ministry and the offer that was made me to accept the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, I was obliged to give an immediate answer without waiting for your formal approval. (Noisy applause, general enthusiasm.) Comrades, the representatives of the old Government were in my hands and I could not make up my mind to let them out of my hands. (Cheers and shouts: "That's right.") I accepted the offer made me and entered the new Government as Minister of Justice. (Cheers, applause, and shouts: "Bravo!") My first official act was to give an order to free all political prisoners, without exception, and to bring from Siberia, with special honor, our fellow deputies, the Social-Democrats [of Second and Fourth Duma]. (Loud applause, general enthusiasm.)

Considering the fact that I took upon myself the duties of the

²"Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 7, March 16, 1917. The person reporting Kerenski's speech in the "Izvestiia," says, "It is difficult to describe the enthusiasm which seized the audience. The few voices, which here and there protested against Kerenski's acting without the formal approval of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, were drowned by the shouts of the great majority who approved what he had done. Such a stormy ovation had probably never before been seen in the walls of the Taurida Palace."

Ministry of Justice before having received your formal sanction, I resign from the office of Vice-President of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. But I am ready to accept this honor at your hands again, if you desire it. (Stormy applause.) Comrades, in going into the new Ministry, I am as I have always been, a republican. (Loud applause.) I gave notice to the Provisional Government that I am in its midst as representative of democracy, the exponent of democratic demands, that it must take into consideration my opinions, which I shall present as the spokesman of the democracy which has overthrown the old régime. Comrades, time does not wait; every moment is precious; and I call on you to organize, to establish discipline, to support us, your representatives, ready to die for the people and to give their whole life for the people."

2. FORMATION AND PROGRAM OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT³

Citizens, the Provisional Executive Committee of the members of the Duma, with the aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has triumphed over the dark forces of the Old Régime to such an extent as to enable it to organize a more stable executive power. With this idea in mind, the Provisional Committee has appointed as ministers of the first Cabinet representing the public, men whose past political and public life assures them the confidence of the country.

PRINCE GEORGE E. LVOV, *Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.*

P. N. MILIUKOV, *Minister of Foreign Affairs*

A. I. GUCHKOV, *Minister of War and Marine*

M. I. TERESCHENKO, *Minister of Finance*

A. A. MANUILOV, *Minister of Education*

A. I. SHINGAREV, *Minister of Agriculture*

N. V. NEKRASOV, *Minister of Transportation*

A. I. KONOVALOV, *Minister of Commerce and Industry*

A. F. KERENSKI, *Minister of Justice*

VL. LVOV, *Holy Synod*⁴

The Cabinet will be guided in its actions by the following principles:

³ "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

⁴ I. V. Godnev, Comptroller.

1. An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts, military revolts, agrarian offenses, etc.

2. Freedom of speech and press; freedom to form labor unions and to strike. These political liberties should be extended to the army in so far as war conditions permit.

3. The abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions.

4. Immediate preparation for the calling of a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal and secret vote, which shall determine the form of government and draw up the Constitution for the country.

5. In place of the police, to organize a national militia with elective officers, and subject to the local self-governing body.

6. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage.

7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary movement shall not be disarmed or removed from Petrograd.

8. On duty and in war service, strict military discipline should be maintained, but when off duty, soldiers should have the same public rights as are enjoyed by other citizens.

The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention of taking advantage of the existence of war conditions to delay the realization of the above-mentioned measures of reform.

President of the Duma, M. RODZIANKO

President of the Council of Ministers, PRINCE LVOV

Ministers MILIUKOV, NEKRASOV, MANUILOV, KONOVALOV, TERESCHENKO, VL. LVOV, SHINGAREV, KERENSKI.

3. SOCIALISTIC SUPPORT OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ⁵

The Petrograd Socialists-Revolutionists, having met in conference on March 15 to consider the present political situation, resolved:

1. In view of the fact that the danger of a counter-revolution is not yet passed, and that the question of the moment is to make fast the political revolutionary conquests already attained, this Conference believes that it is urgently necessary to stand behind the Provisional Government, in so far as it carries out its announced

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 5, March 17, 1917.

political program, consisting of amnesty, personal freedom, removal of class, religious, and nationality restrictions, and preparation for the Constituent Assembly. This Conference, however, reserves to itself the right to change its attitude toward the Provisional Government, should it decline to live up to its programs. At the same time, the Conference realizes the urgent need to fight every attempt to interfere with the organized work of the Provisional Government in the realization of its proposed political plans.

2. Believing that control by the laboring mass of the actions of the Provisional Government is necessary, the Conference welcomes the entrance of A. F. Kerenski into the Provisional Government as Minister of Justice. It looks upon him as the defender of the people's interests and freedom. His line of action during the revolutionary days shows that he understands the significance of the moment, and the Conference fully approves everything that he has done.

3. In order to consolidate the political conquests already made, and to reach out for more social-political rights for the people, the Conference calls on all members of the Socialists-Revolutionists Party to take active part in the organization of the popular masses by participating in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, by forming peasants' unions and other organizations having for their object the defense of the interest of the people.

4. In addition to supporting the Provisional Government in the realization of its political program, the Conference regards it as of greatest importance to make energetic efforts to prepare for the Constituent Assembly, and by means of propaganda to spread the idea of a republican form of government and the adoption of all the social-political demands which the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists regards as a minimum in its program.

4. CONTACT COMMISSION⁶

Resolution adopted by the Soviet, March 20.

FIRST.—Pursuant to the decision of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and in conformity with the general policy laid down by the same, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies finds it necessary to adopt immediate measures to keep the Soviet informed regarding the intentions and acts of the Government; to keep the latter, in turn, informed regard-

⁶ "Protokoly," 26-7.

ing the demands of the revolutionary people; to exert influence upon the Government for the purpose of satisfying these demands; and to exercise constant control over its actions.

SECOND.—To carry out this resolution, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elects a delegation composed of the following comrades: Skobelev, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filipovski, and Chkheidze; and instructs them to enter at once into negotiations with the Provisional Government.

THIRD.—After the result of these negotiations becomes known, a delegation shall be elected for the establishment of permanent relations with the Council of Ministers, as well as with individual ministers and government departments, for the purpose of carrying into effect the demands of the revolutionary people.

5. FIRST DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT¹

March 20, 1917

FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Citizens of Russia:

A great event has taken place. By the mighty assault of the Russian people, the old order has been overthrown. A new, free Russia is born. The great revolution crowns long years of struggle. By the act of October 17, [30] 1905, under the pressure of the awakened popular forces, Russia was promised constitutional liberties. Those promises, however, were not kept. The First State Duma, interpreter of the nation's hopes, was dissolved. The Second Duma suffered the same fate, and the Government, powerless to crush the national will, decided, by the act of June 3, [16] 1907, to deprive the people of a part of those rights of participation in legislative work which had been granted.

In the course of nine long years, there were taken from the people, step by step, all the rights that they had won. Once more the country was plunged into an abyss of arbitrariness and despotism. All attempts to bring the Government to its senses proved futile, and the titanic world struggle, into which the country was dragged by the enemy, found the Government in a state of moral decay, alienated from the people, indifferent to the fate of our native land,

¹ "Vestnik Vremennago Pravitelstva," No. 2 (47), March 20, 1917.

and steeped in the infamy of corruption. Neither the heroic efforts of the army, staggering under the crushing burdens of internal chaos, nor the appeals of the popular representatives, who had united in the face of the national peril, were able to lead the former Emperor and his Government into the path of unity with the people. And when Russia, owing to the illegal and fatal actions of her rulers, was confronted with gravest disasters, the nation was obliged to take the power into its own hands.

The unanimous revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, fully conscious of the gravity of the moment, and the determination of the State Duma, have created the Provisional Government, which considers it to be its sacred and responsible duty to fulfil the hopes of the nation, and lead the country out onto the bright path of free civic organization.

The Government trusts that the spirit of lofty patriotism, manifested during the struggle of the people against the old régime, will also inspire our valiant soldiers on the field of battle. For its own part, the Government will make every effort to provide our army with everything necessary to bring the war to a victorious end.

The Government will sacredly observe the alliances which bind us to other powers, and will unswervingly carry out the agreements entered into by the Allies. While taking measures to defend the country against the foreign enemy, the Government will, at the same time, consider it to be its primary duty to make possible the expression of the popular will as regards the form of government, and will convoke the Constituent Assembly within the shortest time possible, on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, also guaranteeing participation in the elections to the gallant defenders* of our native land, who are now shedding their blood on the fields of battle.

The Constituent Assembly will issue the fundamental laws, guaranteeing to the country the inalienable rights of justice, equality, and liberty. Conscious of the heavy burden which the country suffers because of the lack of civic rights, which lack stands in the way of its free, creative power at this time of violent national commotion, the Provisional Government deems it necessary, at once, before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to provide the country with laws for the safeguarding of civic liberty and equality, in order to enable all citizens freely to apply their spiritual forces to creative work for the benefit of the country. The Government will also undertake the enactment of legal provisions to assure to all citizens, on the

basis of universal suffrage, an equal share in the election of local governments.

At this moment of national liberation, the whole country remembers with reverent gratitude those who, in the struggle for their political and religious convictions, fell victims to the vindictive old régime, and the Provisional Government will regard it as its joyful duty to bring back from their exile, with full honors, all those who have suffered for the good of the country.

In fulfilling these tasks, the Provisional Government is animated by the belief that it will thus execute the will of the people, and that the whole nation will support it in its honest efforts to insure the happiness of Russia. This belief inspires it with courage. Only in the common effort of the entire nation and the Provisional Government can it see a pledge of triumph of the new order.

March 19, 1917.

6. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND SOVIET

(a) CIRCULAR TELEGRAM OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF GOVERNORS AND VICE-GOVERNORS⁸

Prince Lvov, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, sent on March 18, the following telegram to the presidents of the Guberniia Zemstvo Boards [Gubernskia Zemskia Upravy]: "The Provisional Government finds it necessary to remove the governors and vice-governors from their places, and therefore depends on you, as Guberniia Commissars of the Provisional Government, to assume the duties of that office with all the rights that legally belong to it, retaining, at the same time, the administration of the Guberniia Zemstvo Boards. Chairmen of the Uiezd Zemstvo Boards assume the duties of Uiezd Commissars of the Provisional Government, retaining, at the same time, the administration of the Uiezd Zemstvo Boards. It is necessary to reorganize the police into a militia, and this work is to be undertaken by the local self-government."

WHAT ARE THEY WAITING FOR?⁹

The Prime Minister's circular telegram of March 18, recognizes the need of removing the governors and vice-governors; handing

⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 7, March 19, 1917.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 8, March 20, 1917, Editorial.

over, temporarily, their functions to the chairmen of Guberniia and Uiezd Zemstvo Boards, and organizing the police into a militia.

We know the worth of these gentlemen, chairmen of Guberniia and Uiezd Zemstvo Boards. We know who these appointees of the noble-landowners are. We remember that they are the very people who were the first to come to the aid of Tsarism in 1905-1906, when the masses for the first time took up arms against the old power.

It is only quite recently that the nobility has come out against "the dark forces," and even then very cautiously. Nevertheless, the substitution of these people for the appointees of the old Government is a step in advance, but it is not what democracy demands. The local representatives of the Government should be chosen from those public men who are well-known for their fight against the principles of the old régime, and their appointment should be made in agreement with the local Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

But that is not enough. We should ask the Provisional Government the following question: Why does it wait to liquidate the old régime, in the persons of its most conspicuous and therefore most harmful representatives?

(b) RODZIANKO AND CHKHEIDZE¹⁰

On March 28, there came to the State Duma in full military equipment, and with music, the reserve battalion of the Life-Guards of the Semenovskii regiment with their commander, Colonel Nazimov, at the head. It had a large red flag with the words, "Free Semenovtsy." There were other flags with such words as, "Guard Freedom in the Victory over William," "Soldiers to Your Trenches, Workmen to Your Benches," "War to a Victorious End," "Land and Liberty," "Long Live Free Russia," "Long Live the Republican Form of Government."

In the Catherine Hall, the Semenovtsy were addressed first by N. S. Chkhaidze, who among other things told them of the Appeal of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the workers of all the world, and in particular to the German proletariat.

In continuing his political speech, Chkhaidze called for a cheer for the Constituent Assembly and a democratic republic. The Semenovtsy gave it with a will. After this, the elected commander of the battalion congratulated the State Duma because it had waged the fight against the old and cursed régime, and, thanks to its efforts, the people had been able to overthrow the hated régime.

¹⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 17, March 30, 1917.

About twenty members of the Duma, with M. V. Rodzianko at the head, came out to greet the Semenovski regiment. The appearance of the President of the Duma called forth a great ovation. He turned to the Semenovtsy and said:

"Thank you, brave comrade-Semenovtsy, for coming here to show your strength and readiness to stand guard over the happiness and freedom of our dear mother Russia."

Rodzianko's speech, which concluded with the appeal to the army to fight with Russia's fiercest foe, the Germans, brought forth great enthusiasm throughout the hall.

After Rodzianko's speech, N. S. Chkheidze, member of the Duma, suggested to the soldiers that they ask Rodzianko's opinion on the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, a democratic republic, and in particular on the land question. These words were taken up by one of the soldier-orators, who made a long speech on them and told the soldiers to believe neither Rodzianko nor the State Duma. The President of the Duma followed him immediately with this speech:

"*Gentlemen:* The State Duma and I are doing our very best to summon the Constituent Assembly at the earliest possible moment. We will allow no one to block this Constituent Assembly, which will represent the actual will of the free people and determine who shall govern Russia. All of us will submit to, and defend with all our might, whatever form of government the will of the people may decide upon. As to the land question, I say to you in the name of the State Duma that, if the Constituent Assembly should decide that the land should go to all the people, that decision will be carried out without opposition. Do not, fellow-Semenovtsy, believe all those who tell you that either I or the State Duma will stand in the way of the happiness and freedom of Russia. It is not true, we will do everything that we can that the Russian people may live as it desires."

These words made a deep impression on all present. There was loud and long applause. The soldiers carried the speaker, with loud hurrahs, through the hall.

The attempts of unknown speakers to spoil this effect were not successful.

(c) POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ¹¹

The Provisional Government has two tasks: (1) To prepare for the Constituent Assembly; (2) to govern the country until the Assembly meets. The first task requires no discussion, but the second

¹¹ "Izvestia," No. 24, April 7, 1917, Editorial.

needs some explanation. The point is that the Government has in its hands a tremendous financial and administrative power and it can, if it so desires, exert great influence on the elections for the Constituent Assembly. It can do even more. It can bring about a state of affairs which the Constituent Assembly, when it meets, must face as accomplished facts, such, for example, as the conclusion of peace, declaration of war, cancellation of commercial agreements, etc. This tremendous power in the hands of the Provisional Government raises the questions (1) whence comes so much power, and (2) how to prevent its use for evil purposes.

First of all, it is important to state most emphatically (and it is for the Provisional Government to say it) that it was not the abdication of Nicholas, and after him Michael Romanov, that called to power the Council of Ministers with Prince Lvov at its head. The Provisional Government was called to power by the will of His Majesty, the Revolutionary People, and no one else. Its power and composition were agreed to by the Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The last named, the real incarnation of the revolution, did not, for weighty reasons, take upon itself the executive power, but handed it to the Council of Ministers, with the understanding that it would carry out immediately certain named reforms.

In addition to these reforms, the Soviet reserved to itself the right of active control over the carrying out of the said reforms.

Does the Provisional Government have executive power over the country? Yes, it has. Does it have full and unlimited power? No, it has not. We have not overthrown one autocrat in order to have twelve. What then limits the power of the Provisional Government?

In the first place, the vigilant and ever wakeful control of the whole nation, organized and meeting freely. It can always stop, instantly, those measures of the Provisional Government which threaten popular liberty. In the second place, the actual control by the organs of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Now let us examine the forms of control over the actions of the Government. We would say here that first in order comes the unlimited right of free discussion, which we now enjoy and which far exceeds the freedom of speech in England and France. The Government hears all opinions and the voice of the people on all matters, such, for example, as the aims and problems of the war. *This should*

continue in the future. The history of English public meetings teaches us that this is a very effective means [of control].

But we live at a time when everything is done at once. Under certain conditions, when the interests of liberty require it, the revolutionary people through its organ, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, may and should have a say in the affairs of the Provisional Government. For example, it could not allow Nicholas Romanov to be taken out of the country, and the Executive Committee of the Soviet was right when it took steps to keep the ex-autocrat at Tsarskoe Selo. Such measures should, of course, be taken only after mature deliberation and tactfully, for it is not our purpose to shake the power of the Provisional Government.

How to avoid similar conflicts in the future? It is essential that there should be some kind of tie between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Deputies, that the Soviet should be kept informed, in good time, of the more important steps of the Provisional Government, and that it should, in turn, report to the Government its more important activities. There are bound to be clashes, but with mutual good-will and understanding of the State problems of the moment, they are not very dangerous. On some questions, an agreement has already been reached; on others, the Constituent Assembly will act. Until the meeting of that body, the Provisional Government will have to adjust itself as best it can to a certain amount of inconvenient revolutionary control.

AGAINST THE SOWERS OF DISCORD¹²

The bourgeois public accuses us of standing in the way of rational unity, of bringing about the destructive "Dual Government," of inciting the soldiers against the officers, and thereby interfering with the successful course of the war. At the same time, the bourgeois press does not cease to tell us of the great dangers that threaten Russia from Germany, and lays the blame for military failures on our internal situation.

All these charges and complaints have two specific objects. One is to persuade the soldiers that it is necessary to go on with the war, and the other to sow discord between the soldiers and the workers.

As long as the workers and soldiers march hand in hand, the interests of the working population are safe from all attacks of the

¹² "Izvestiia," No. 27, April 11, 1917, Editorial.

ruling classes. But if the attempt to divide them should succeed, the cause of the people would be lost, and the bourgeoisie would rejoice in their victory.

Comrades, do not listen to these sowers of discord among you. Remember that in unity there is strength.

DUAL GOVERNMENT¹⁸

Attacks against the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies go on.

The bourgeois papers and the bourgeois assemblies make some serious charges against the Soviet.

The Soviet harms the prestige of the Government. The Soviet makes for dual government in the country. The Soviet, a haphazard organization containing a large number of members, can not govern the country.

These accusations remind us of the good old days when the Octobrist-Black Hundred State Duma met in the Taurida Palace. In those gloomy days, the country was governed by an "irresponsible" bureaucracy, actually by the Romanov family and a crowd of the more prominent landowning nobility. The bourgeoisie and part of the landowners in the Duma protested against such a state of affairs and tried to bring the Government under its control, just as today the Soviet establishes its control over the Provisional Government. Let us recall what the Black Hundred said about the attempts of the State Duma. They said: "The Duma is injuring the prestige of the Government. The Duma is trying to bring about a dual government. The Duma, a haphazard organization containing a large number of members, can not govern the country." All the charges now made against the Soviet were at one time made against the Duma. This is not a mere coincidence. It is always true that the group in power desires to have all the power. The group in power always regards as an attack on its power every attempt made by the inhabitants to control it. All such attempts at control are called by the frightful name of dual government and anarchy.

These are empty scares. Without control there can be no confidence. Control does not injure prestige. Control may weaken or lessen the importance of certain individuals in power, but it improves the Government of the country.

The representatives of the bourgeoisie understood this very well

¹⁸ "Izvestia," No. 27, April 11, 1917.

so long as they were in the opposition, but they quickly forgot these simple truths as soon as they assumed power. They forgot where they got the power. They forgot that the Provisional Government was created by the revolution and assumed its duties with the consent of the Petrograd Workers and Soldiers. They forgot that the people is the highest source of power and that to the people, represented by its elected organs, belongs the right to control all government. The Proletariat remembers this.

Life has changed. In the Peter-Paul fortress, where formerly the fighters for freedom were oppressed, now sit the old Ministers. The Taurida Palace, which was formerly occupied by representatives of landowners and capitalists, is now the meeting-place of workmen and soldiers. In the Mariinski Palace, in the place of the old Ministers, are now the members of the bourgeoisie Provisional Government. A tremendous change! But in the future the change will be still greater. The Proletariat will face it boldly, and will not let its banners out of its hands. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will not resign what it regards as its right and duty,—the control of the activities of the Government.

CHAPTER XXI

CLASH BETWEEN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND SOVIET OVER FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The first open break between the Provisional Government and the Soviet was over a question of foreign policy. Most of the members of the Government were ardent patriots, nationalists and imperialists, at least to the extent of desiring Constantinople. A great many members of the Soviet were patriots, all of them were more or less internationalists and strong anti-imperialists. They regarded the war as a struggle between capitalists at the expense of the proletariat, and therefore agitated for a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible moment and a peace of understanding. While they were arguing this policy, the representatives of the Allies made it clear to the Provisional Government that it would have to live up to the various agreements and fight the war to a victorious end. Miliukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was caught between the two fires. He accepted the point of view of the Allies because it was also his own.

On March 18 he issued a statement that Russia

. . . will remain mindful of the international engagements entered into by the fallen régime . . . and will fight by their [Allies] side against the common enemy until the end. . . .

This note deeply offended the Socialists of the Soviet. So far as the foreign policy was concerned, they could see no difference between the old and the new Government. To them the revolution was not merely a change of Ministers but a change in world outlook. They felt that one of the first tasks of the revolution was to stop the shedding of blood. They tried to bring it about through the Provisional Government, but failing there and having no confidence in England and France, the Soviet on March 27 ap-

pealed over the heads of the bourgeois Ministers to the People of the World. It called upon them

. . . to take into their own hands the question of war and peace . . . to refuse to serve as an instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers. . .

This call was followed up by rather pertinent editorials in the "Izvestiia," the official organ of the Soviet.

Pressure was also brought to bear on the Provisional Government to modify its attitude on war aims. On April 10 the Government made a declaration. It was addressed to the Russian people and not to the Allies. In this declaration the Government said that Russia was fighting a war of defense, that "the purpose of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples."

This declaration cheered the so-called revolutionary democracy. On April 25 it published a resolution, promising that

. . . The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will support with energy all the efforts of the Provisional Government along this line.

It looked as if the two bodies had come to an agreement. But a week later this understanding was torn all to pieces.

The Allies were greatly displeased with the declaration of April 10 and the resolution of April 25, both of which were out of harmony with the Miliukov note of March 18. England and France inquired just where Russia stood. On May 1 Miliukov issued another note which attempted to answer their questions. It contained many fine phrases for home consumption, but between these nebulous phrases he told the Allies what they wished to hear:

. . the Provisional Government while safeguarding the rights of our own country, will, in every way, observe the obligations assumed toward our Allies. Continuing to cherish the firm conviction of the victorious issue of the present war, in full accord with our Allies, the Provisional Government feels also absolutely

certain that the problems which have been raised by the present war will be solved in a spirit that will afford a firm basis for a lasting peace. . . .

After six weeks of discussion Miliukov and the Soviet were just as far apart as ever. This new note aroused a great deal of feeling. There were popular demonstrations which led to street fights. The Soviet issued a call to the population to remain calm and promised to take up the question with the Provisional Government. After prolonged conferences between these two bodies, the Provisional Government issued an Explanation which appeared on May 5. The Explanation is merely a repetition of the Declaration of April 9. In referring to the Miliukov document it said:

It is, of course, understood that when the note speaks of a decisive victory over the enemy, it has in mind the attainment of those objects named in the Declaration of April 9. . . .

The Soviet accepted the Explanation, but it no longer had great confidence in the Government. It called on the "revolutionary democracy of Russia to rally closer and closer around their Soviets." It issued another CALL but whereas the first one (March 27) was to the Peoples of the World, the second one (May 15) was to the Socialists of All Countries. The Soviet was becoming more and more class conscious. In its second appeal *the Soviet made it clear that it stood for a*

. . . peace without annexation and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples. . . . It furnishes a platform on which the toiling masses of all countries—belligerent and neutral—could and should come to an understanding in order to establish a lasting peace. . . .

About this time President Wilson decided to send a mission to Russia with a message in the hope of reconciling the views of the Soviet with his own and the Allies. He failed in his purpose. To the Russian Socialists in the Soviet, Wilson and Root were representatives of the capitalists and could not be trusted to defend the interest of the proletariat.

1. ALLIED PRESSURE ON PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT¹

After the Grand Duke Michael's renunciation of the crown, our only possible policy was to strengthen the hands of the Provisional Government in their struggle with the Soviet. The latter was ruining the army with its socialist propaganda, and though the majority of its members professed themselves in favor of continuing the war, those on the extreme left advocated peace at any price. The speedy recognition of the Provisional Government was, therefore, in my opinion, necessary; but when, on March 18, Miliukov broached the subject to me, I told him that before acting on the authorization already given me, I must have the assurance that the new Government was prepared to fight the war out to a finish and to restore discipline in the army. Miliukov gave me this assurance, but said that they were obliged to proceed cautiously on account of the extremists, and that his own position was a difficult one. He was regarded with suspicion for having supported the Grand Duke Michael's claim to the crown and he must either make some concessions or resign. Which course, he asked, would I prefer him to take? The former, I unhesitatingly replied.

MILIUKOV'S NOTE ON POLICY OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT²

[*March 18, 1917*]

By an act dated from Pskov, March 15, Emperor Nicholas renounced the throne for himself and his heir, Grand Duke Alexis Nikolaievich, in favor of Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. In reply to a notification which was made to him of this act, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, by an act dated Petrograd, March 16, in his turn, renounced assumption of supreme power until the time when a Constituent Assembly, created on the basis of universal suffrage, should have established a form of government and new fundamental laws for Russia. By this same act, Michael Alexandrovich invited the citizens of Russia, pending a definite manifestation of the national will, to submit to the authority of the Provisional Government. The composition of the Provisional Government and its political program have been published and transmitted to foreign countries.

This Government, which assumes power at the moment of the

¹ Sir Geo. Buchanan; "My Mission to Russia," II, 90-1.

² A. J. Sack; "The Birth of the Russian Democracy," 246-8.

greatest external and internal crisis which Russia has known in the course of her history, is fully conscious of the immense responsibility it incurs. It will apply itself first to repairing the overwhelming errors bequeathed to it by the past, to insuring order and tranquillity in the country, and, finally, to preparing the conditions necessary in order that the sovereign will of the nation may be freely pronounced as to its future fate.

In the domain of foreign policy, the Cabinet, in which I am charged with the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will remain mindful of the international engagements entered into by the fallen régime, and will honor Russia's word. We shall carefully cultivate relations which unite us with other friendly and allied nations, and we are confident that these relations will become even more intimate, more solid, under the new régime established in Russia, which is resolved to be guided by the democratic principles of respect due to both small and great nations, to the freedom of their development, and to good understanding among nations.

But the Government cannot forget for a single instant the grave external circumstances under which it assumes power. Russia did not will the war which has been drenching the world with blood for nearly three years. But, victim of premeditated aggression prepared long ago, she will continue, as in the past, to struggle against the spirit of conquest of a predatory race, which has aimed at establishing an intolerable hegemony over its neighbors and subjecting Europe of the twentieth century to the shame of domination by Prussian militarism. Faithful to the pact which unites her indissolubly to her glorious Allies, Russia is resolved, like them, to assure the world, at all costs, an era of peace among the nations, on the basis of stable national organization, guaranteeing respect for right and justice. She will fight by their side against the common enemy until the end, without cessation and without faltering.

The Government of which I form a part will devote all its energy to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, and will apply itself to the task of repairing as quickly as possible the errors of the past, which hitherto have paralyzed the aspirations and the self-sacrifice of the Russian people. I am firmly convinced that the marvelous enthusiasm, which today animates the whole nation, will multiply its strength in time, and hasten the hour of the final triumph of a regenerated Russia and her valiant Allies.

2. POLICY OF THE SOVIET

(a) CALL BY THE PETROGRAD SOVIET TO THE PEOPLES
OF THE WORLD^{*}

March 27, 1917

Comrade-proletarians, and toilers of all countries:

We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, send you warmest greetings and announce the great event. The Russian democracy has shattered in the dust the age-long despotism of the Tsar and enters your family [of nations] as an equal, and as a mighty force in the struggle for our common liberation. Our victory is a great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The chief pillar of reaction in the world, the "Gendarme of Europe," is no more. May the earth turn to heavy granite on his grave! Long live freedom! Long live the international solidarity of the proletariat, and its struggle for final victory!

Our work is not yet finished: the shades of the old order have not yet been dispersed, and not a few enemies are gathering their forces against the Russian revolution. Nevertheless our achievement so far is tremendous. The people of Russia will express their will in the Constituent Assembly, which will be called as soon as possible on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And it may already be said without a doubt that a democratic republic will triumph in Russia. The Russian people now possess full political liberty. They can now assert their mighty power in the internal government of the country and in its foreign policy. And, appealing to all people who are being destroyed and ruined in the monstrous war, we announce that the time has come to start a decisive struggle against the grasping ambitions of the governments of all countries; the time has come for the people to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace.

Conscious of its revolutionary power, the Russian democracy announces that it will, by every means, resist the policy of conquest of its ruling classes, and it calls upon the peoples of Europe for concerted, decisive action in favor of peace.

We are appealing to our brother-proletarians of the Austro-German coalition, and, first of all, to the German proletariat. From the first days of the war, you were assured that by raising arms

^{*} "Izvestiia," No. 15, March 28, 1917.

against autocratic Russia, you were defending the culture of Europe from Asiatic despotism. Many of you saw in this a justification of that support which you were giving to the war. Now even this justification is gone: democratic Russia cannot be a threat to liberty and civilization.

We will firmly defend our own liberty from all reactionary attempts from within, as well as from without. The Russian revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and will not allow itself to be crushed by foreign military force. But we are calling to you: Throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule, as the Russian people have shaken off the Tsar's autocracy; refuse to serve as an instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners, and bankers—and then by our united efforts, we will stop the horrible butchery, which is disgracing humanity and is beclouding the great days of the birth of Russian freedom.

Toilers of all countries: We hold out to you the hand of brotherhood across the mountains of our brothers' corpses, across rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the wreckage of the treasuries of civilization;—we appeal to you for the reestablishment and strengthening of international unity. In it is the pledge of our future victories and the complete liberation of humanity.

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

(b) SECRET DIPLOMACY⁴

Without even looking into the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, each of us can say with confidence that the secret diplomacy of Nicholas Romanov, Grigori Rasputin, Protopopov, Sturmer, Sukhomlinov, Izvolski, Miasoedov, and other officials, high and low, of the fallen Government, was not helpful to the people. They were for the interest of the gang of Tsarist bandits, the most dishonorable, untruthful, and plundering in the world.

You cannot pour new wine into old bottles. The new Government created by the revolution must, in the field of foreign politics, cut loose completely from the traditions of Izvolski and Sturmer. But it can change our diplomacy only if it comes out before the whole world against the traditional policies of conquest.

The revolutionary people has already expressed its will in the Call to the Peoples of the World by the Soviet of Workers' and

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 18, March 31, 1917, Editorial.

Soldiers' Deputies on March 27. In that now historical document, the revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary army have renounced in a loud voice all conquests and oppression of other peoples. Only on the foundations of a new foreign policy can a new diplomatic system be built, answering to the principles of freedom, and worthy of such a people.

Clean dealings require clean hearts.

(c) Two POSITIONS *

The Call of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, of March 27, clearly and without double meaning stated the thought and will of the Russian proletariat and revolutionary army. Its attitude toward the war differs at its very roots from that of the bourgeois parties and that part of the democracy which has joined them.

Yet, in spite of this, the bourgeois press and the democrat defencists pretend that nothing has happened—they try to conceal the fundamental differences between the position of the Soviet and that of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, and continue as before to shout for "War to a victorious end." It is time, once for all, to put an end to this confusion, to differentiate clearly, and contrast the two positions toward the war.

One position is that on which all bourgeois imperialist parties of all the belligerents and, unfortunately, some of the representatives of democracy, have stood, and still stand.

The official phraseology and declarations of the champions of this first position, which justifies the "war to a victorious end," is something like this:

The bourgeois press in England, Russia, France, and Italy assure us that Germany and Austria desired to bring the whole of Europe under their influence, to extend their dominions, and to subject to the German "mailed fist" the free democracies of Europe, England, France, and Belgium. From this point of view a victory of the Austro-German Coalition over the opposing coalition would mean "economic slavery" and the loss of the former freedom enjoyed by the latter. Under the circumstances, it is a matter of self-defense to gain a victory over the Austro-German Coalition. In order to protect themselves against a possible Austro-German attack in the future, there must be "a decisive victory," that is to say, complete ruin of the enemy and the destruction of his war power.

* "Izvestiia," No. 18, March 31, 1917, Editorial.

The German and Austrian press and their allies in the democratic camp (the party of Scheidemann and others) assure us, on the other hand, that "treacherous England," "barbarous Russia," "degenerate France," and "traitorous Italy" have set for themselves as a goal the wiping of the Austro-German States from the face of the earth. Consequently in self-defense, there must be a clean-cut victory over England, France, Russia, and Italy.

These points of view on the war ("chauvinism") have been preached regularly in the bourgeois press of both belligerent camps, day in and day out. Other points of view were not permitted by the war censorship and could appear only in underground leaflets. In the same way, no one was allowed to criticize this "chauvinism," and those who tried it were immediately charged with being "traitors to the country." Thanks to this special situation the chauvinists were enabled to impress their views on the masses of the population, who in their ignorance and darkness have not been able to detect the lies and hypocrisies they contained.

This lie and hypocrisy becomes evident when the principal position of chauvinism is uncovered. It is this. The present war is due to the rivalry of the ruling classes of the European states, which attempted to seize and bring under their control lands and people that did not belong to them. During the last twenty or thirty years, these attempts have become more and more vigorous and, as neither side would give in, both armed. Due to this increase in armaments in the last ten years (since the Japanese war) and the obstinacy of both sides, there were several occasions in recent years when it seemed as if war would break out. In the spring of 1914, on the very eve of this war, Russia adopted "a large war program," greatly strengthening her military power. This was an important move toward war. From the point of view of Germany and Austria, it was better to fight now than to wait until Russia carried out her "large war program."

We have no doubt whatsoever that the Austro-German Coalition has conquests in mind. But this is equally true of Russia and her Allies. Russia would like to get Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Galicia, Armenia; to regain freed Poland. The English imperialists have seized, and intend to keep, the German colonies and plan to get hold of Mesopotamia. France demands Alsace-Lorraine, Germany to the Rhine, Syria, and part of Asia Minor. Italy is asking for Tyrol and Trentino and certain territories in the Balkans.

When the chauvinists talk of "a victorious end" over the opponent, they mean the possession of these territories.

The second position in regard to the war is the one taken by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It is the position which was taken at Zimmerwald and Kienthal.⁶ Conferences by the representatives of the Socialist parties in Europe, by the left wing of the Labor parties in Russia, France, England, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Balkan States, Rumania, and certain of the Bulgarian and Serbian Socialists. Until now, the working masses have had no opportunity to make their voices heard. As far as we can judge from information that reaches us, the workers in all belligerent countries are with each month of the year going over more and more to the side of the opponents of war.

The main point of this second position was made clear in the Call of March 27. The Call came out against conquests, and declared war against war. The Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies called on the people of Europe to compel their governing classes to renounce conquests and to come out for self-determination of nations.

We are striving not to take territory from other peoples, but to help them attain liberty, especially the nationalities living in Russia. We will oppose, with arms in hand, everything that stands in the way of this liberty.

This explains our attitude toward the Austro-German Coalition. We are striving for a final victory not over Germany, but over her rulers. Just as soon as the people of the Austro-German Coalition compel their rulers to lay down their arms and to give up the idea of conquests, we will also lay down ours.

It is therefore evident that our attitude toward war is altogether different from that of the bourgeoisie. No matter how hard the bourgeois press may try to minimize these differences, the popular masses will never again fall under this chauvinistic agitation. The poisonous fog of chauvinism will disperse before the light of the free word, which has been won and guaranteed.

3. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND WAR AIMS

April 10, 1917⁷

CITIZENS: The Provisional Government, having considered the military situation of the Russian State, and being conscious of its

⁶ Zimmerwald, September, 1915; Kienthal, April, 1916.

⁷ "Riech," No. 73, April 10, 1917.

duty to the country, has resolved to tell the people directly and openly the whole truth.

The overthrown government has left the defense of the country in an utterly disorganized condition. By its criminal inactivity and inefficient methods, it disorganized our finances, food supply, transportation, and the supply of the army. It has undermined our economic organization.

The Provisional Government, with the active and vigorous assistance of the whole nation, will make every effort to remove the dire consequences of the old régime. But time does not wait. The blood of large numbers of the sons of our fatherland has been flowing without limit during these two and a half years of war, and still the country remains exposed to the blows of a powerful enemy, who has seized entire provinces of our country, and is now, in the days of the birth of Russian freedom, menacing us with a new, determined assault.

The defense of our own inheritance by every means, and the liberation of our country from the invading enemy, constitute the foremost and most urgent task of our fighters, defending the nation's liberty.

Leaving to the will of the people, in close union with our Allies, the final solution of all problems connected with the World War and its conclusion, the Provisional Government considers it to be its right and its duty to declare at this time that the purpose of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase its world power at the expense of other nations. It has no desire to enslave or degrade any one. In the name of the loftiest principles of justice, it has removed the shackles from the Polish people. But the Russian people will not permit their fatherland to emerge from this great struggle humiliated and sapped in its vital forces.

These principles will be made the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which is unswervingly executing the will of the people and defending the rights of our fatherland, fully observing at the same time all obligations assumed towards our Allies.

The Provisional Government of free Russia has no right to withhold the truth from the people. The State is in danger. Every effort must be made for its salvation. Let the answer of the nation to the truth here revealed be, not fruitless despair, not discouragement, but

a concerted effort to create a single national will. This will give us fresh strength to carry on the fight, and will lead us to salvation.

In this hour of severe trial, let the whole nation find within itself the strength to consolidate the freedom it has won, and work tirelessly for the welfare of free Russia. The Provisional Government, which has taken a solemn oath to serve the people, firmly believes that, with the general and unanimous support of each and every one, it will be enabled to do its duty to the nation to the end.

Prime Minister, PRINCE G. E. Lvov

April 9, 1917

4. SOVIET AND WAR AIMS ⁸

I. ON THE WAR

Resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

In the call to the people of the world on March 27, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies declared in clear words that in the sphere of foreign policy the Russian democracy intended to bring about the same ideas of freedom and right that it had adopted for domestic life.

Numerous meetings of workers, soldiers, and citizens throughout Russia have approved this stand and have expressed the will of the people, that while defending its personal freedom it would not allow the revolutionary enthusiasm of the nation to be used to oppress other peoples, in the form of either open or concealed seizures of territory, or indemnities.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies took up the question with the Provisional Government and pointed out that it was necessary for free Russia to make a public statement renouncing the plans of conquest of the tsarist government. On April 10, the Provisional Government published a declaration to the citizens of Russia. It said, "that the purpose of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase its world power at the expense of other nations. It has no desire to enslave or degrade any one."

⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 38, April 25, 1917.

The Russian democracy attaches tremendous importance to this act of the Provisional Government, and sees in it a step in the direction of the realization of democratic principles in foreign policy. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will support with energy all the efforts of the Provisional Government along this line. They [Soviets] call on all the peoples, both Allied and enemy, to bring pressure to bear on their Governments to give up their plans of conquests. In addition to this, each nation, in both coalitions, should insist that its Government persuade its allies to make a general renunciation of annexation and indemnity. On its part, the Executive Committee emphasizes the necessity for the Provisional Government to enter into discussion with the Allies for the purpose of working out a general agreement along the line indicated.

Russia's revolutionary people will continue to do its best to bring about, as soon as possible, peace on the basis of the brotherhood and equality of free nations. An official renunciation of all ideas of conquest by all the governments would be a most powerful means to bring the war to an end on these terms.

As long as these conditions do not exist, as long as the war continues, the Russian democracy realizes that the weakening of the army and a decline in its fighting efficiency would be a most serious blow to the cause of freedom and to the life interests of the country. For the purpose of most energetically protecting revolutionary Russia from all outside attacks and forcefully defending her against all attempts to interrupt the progress of the revolution [on the inside], the Conference of All-Russian Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies calls on the democracy of Russia to mobilize all the living force of the country in all branches of the national life in order to strengthen the rear and front. This is the imperative demand of Russia of the moment; this is necessary for the sake of the success of the revolution.

The Conference of All-Russian Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies calls on all laborers in factories, mills, railways, mines, post and telegraph, and all other enterprises for the army and the rear, to work with the greatest zeal. The economic conquest by the working classes and the hope for additional reforms require that the workers' efforts should not be lowered, but that production should increase, so as to provide the civilian population and the army with its necessities.

The Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies calls the attention of all citizens, especially those engaged in agriculture and transportation, to the danger of a food crisis, an inheritance

of the old régime, and appeals to them to exert all their energies to ward it off.

The Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies sends its greetings to the revolutionary soldiers and officers who are defending free Russia from its foes at the front and at home.

5. MILIUKOV'S NOTE ON WAR AIMS⁹

May 1, 1917

On May 1, the Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the Russian representatives with the Allied Powers to transmit the following note to the Governments to which they are accredited:

"On April 9 of the present year, the Provisional Government issued a declaration to the citizens, containing the views of the Government of free Russia regarding the aims of the present war. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate to you the contents of the document referred to, and to make at the same time the following comments:

"Our enemies have been striving of late to sow discord among the Allies, disseminating absurd reports alleging that Russia is ready to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. The text of the attached document will most effectively refute such falsehoods. You will note from the same that the general principles enunciated by the Provisional Government are in entire agreement with those lofty ideas which have been constantly expressed, up to the very last moment, by many eminent statesmen in the Allied countries, and which were given especially vivid expression in the declaration of the president of our new Ally, the great republic across the Atlantic.

"The Government under the old régime was, of course, incapable of grasping and sharing these ideas of the liberating character of the war, the establishment of a firm basis for the amicable existence of the nations, of self-determination for oppressed peoples, and so forth. Emancipated Russia, however, can now speak in a language that will be comprehensible to the leading democracies of our own time, and she now hastens to add her voice to those of her Allies. Imbued with this new spirit of a free democracy, the declaration of the Provisional Government cannot, of course, afford the least excuse for the assumption that the revolution has entailed any slack-

⁹ "Riech," No. 91, May 3, 1917.

ening on the part of Russia in the common struggle of the Allies. Quite to the contrary, the aspiration of the entire nation to carry the world war to a decisive victory has grown more powerful, thanks to our understanding of our common responsibility, shared by each and every one. This striving has become still more active, since it is concentrated upon a task which touches all and is urgent,—the task of driving out the enemy who has invaded our country. It is obvious, as stated in the communicated document, that the Provisional Government, while safeguarding the rights of our own country, will, in every way, observe the obligations assumed toward our Allies.

"Continuing to cherish the firm conviction of the victorious issue of the present war, in full accord with our Allies, the Provisional Government feels also absolutely certain that the problems which have been raised by this war will be solved in a spirit that will afford a firm basis for lasting peace, and that the leading democracies, inspired by identical desires, will find the means to obtain those guarantees and sanctions which are indispensable for the prevention of sanguinary conflicts in the future."

MILIUKOV AND CONSTANTINOPLE ¹⁰

(From Miliukov's Speech at the Congress of the Cadet Party on May 22, 1917)

At the present time I am not a member of the Provisional Government, but a free citizen and can, therefore, permit myself the liberty, just as N. V. Nekrasov has done, to talk straight, and at the same time to meet his wishes.

I admit quite frankly, and stand firmly by it, that the main thread of my policy was to get the Straits for Russia. I fought, unfortunately in vain, against those who favored the new formula [no annexation, and no indemnity, and the right of self-determination], and that Russia should free the Allies from their obligations to help her secure sovereign rights over the Straits. I would say, and say it proudly, and regard it as a distinct service to the country, that until the last moment that I was in office, I did nothing which gave the Allies the right to say that Russia has renounced the Straits.

6. THE SOVIET ON MILIUKOV'S NOTE OF MAY 1 ¹¹

On May 3, there was a special session of the Soviet. After a speech by Chkhaidze explaining the reason for the meeting, those

¹⁰ "Riech," No. 109, May 24, 1917.

¹¹ "Izvestiia," No. 46, May 4, 1917. Editorial.

present approved his suggestion not to take any action on the Miliukov note of May 1, until after the Executive Committee had had its talk with the Council of Ministers on the evening of May 3 in the Mariinski Palace. [After the meeting] members of the Soviet went back to the wards of the city to which they were assigned to quiet the inhabitants. The speakers of the various party groups agreed with the opinion expressed by Chkheidze.

CALL OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS'
AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES TO ALL CITIZENS¹²

CITIZENS!

At the moment when the fate of the country is being decided, every rash step is dangerous. The demonstrations against the Government's note on foreign affairs have led to fights on the streets. There are wounded and dead. In the name of saving the revolution from the trouble that threatens it, we appeal to you and beg you, *Be Calm, Keep Order, and Observe Discipline.*

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is deliberating on the situation. Believe that the Soviet will find a way agreeable to you. In the meantime, let no one disturb the run of peaceable life in free Russia.

COMRADE SOLDIERS!

In these exciting days let no one come out on the street armed, unless called out by the Executive Committee. Only the Executive Committee has the right to give you orders. Every order for the military to come out (except as a matter of routine) should be on a written blank of the Executive Committee, stamped with its seal, and signed by at least two of the seven men herein named: Chkheidze, Skobelev, Binasik, Filipovski, Skalov, Goldman, Bogdanov.

Confirm every order by telephoning to No. 104-06.

COMRADES, WORKMEN, AND MILITIA!

Your guns are for the protection of the revolution. You do not need them for demonstrations or meetings. On such occasions they are dangerous for the cause of freedom. When you go to meetings or demonstrations, leave your arms behind.

The Executive Committee calls on all organizations to help it in keeping peace and order.

No form of force by one citizen against another can be permitted in free Russia.

¹² "Izvestiia," No. 47, May 5, 1917.

Disturbances help only the enemy of the revolution, and he who brings them on is an enemy of the people.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE S. W. S. D.

May 4, 1917

7. EXPLANATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ¹³

In view of the misunderstandings that have arisen over the interpretation of the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to accompany the Provisional Government's Declaration of April 9, to the Allied Governments, the Provisional Government feels that it should make an explanation.

1. The note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was considered carefully and at some length by the Provisional Government, and its contents unanimously approved.

2. It is, of course, understood that when the note speaks of a decisive victory over the enemy, it has in mind the attainment of those objects named in the Declaration of April 9, which are expressed in the following terms:

The Provisional Government considers it to be its right and its duty to declare at this time that the purpose of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend to increase its world power at the expense of other nations. It has no desire to enslave or degrade any one. In the name of the loftiest principles of justice, it has removed the shackles from the Polish people. But the Russian people will not permit their fatherland to emerge from this great struggle humiliated and sapped in its vital forces.

3. By the words in the note of May 1, "guarantees and sanctions" for a lasting peace, the Provisional Government had in view the limitation of armaments, an international tribunal, etc.

The above explanation will be handed to the diplomatic representatives of the Allies by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

8. RESOLUTION OF THE SOVIET ON FOREIGN POLICY ¹⁴

May 4, 1917

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies congratulates most heartily the revolutionary democracy of Petrograd. Its meetings,

¹³ "Izvestiia," No. 47, May 5, 1917.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

resolutions, and demonstrations have focused attention on questions of foreign policy and the danger that this policy might follow the channels of the old imperialism.

The whole-hearted protest of the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd have made it clear to the Provisional Government, and to the nations of the world, that the revolutionary democracy of Russia will never agree to a return of the tsarist foreign policy, and that it [Russian democracy] is working and will continue to work for international peace.

As a result of these protests, the Provisional Government has made a new explanation which has been published for general information and which has been handed to the ministers of the Allies by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This explanation puts an end to the possibility of interpreting the note of May 1 in a spirit foreign to the demand and interests of the revolutionary democracy. The fact that the question of renunciation of forcible annexation has been brought forward for international consideration should be regarded as a great victory for democracy.

The Soviet is determined to continue to fight for peace along this line, and it calls on the revolutionary democracy of Russia to rally closer and closer around their Soviets. It firmly believes that the peoples of all the belligerent countries will break the opposition of their governments and compel them to begin peace discussion, on the basis of no annexation and no indemnity.

9. DEMOCRATIC PEACE

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE OF
BOLSHEVIKS ¹⁵ AT PETROGRAD ¹⁶

May 7-12, 1917

The present war is an imperialistic struggle between the capitalists of all the belligerents for world domination, for markets, for financial control, for the subjugation of weak nations, etc. Each day of war enriches the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and impoverishes the proletariat and the peasants of all the warring countries, and also neutrals. In Russia, there is the additional danger that a prolongation of the struggle may harm the revolution and stop its further development.

¹⁵ At this Conference there were 151 delegates, representing about 79,000 members.

¹⁶ Piontkovski, S. A.; "Khrestomatiia Po Istorii Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii," 87-90.

The passing of State power into the hands of the Provisional Government, a government of landowners and capitalists, has not and cannot change the character and purpose of the war, so far as Russia is concerned. This new Government not only has failed to publish the secret agreements, concluded between Nicholas II and the capitalistic governments of England, France, etc., but, without asking the people, has confirmed these secret understandings which give Russian capitalists a free hand in China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc. By the concealing of these treaties, the Russian people is being deceived as to the true character of the war. For this reason, the party of the Proletariat cannot support either the present war, or the present Government or its loans, without breaking completely with internationalism,—that is to say, with the fraternal solidarity of the workers of all lands in the war against capitalism. No reliance can be placed in the promises of the present Government to renounce annexations, that is to say, conquests of foreign territory, or forcible retention within the confines of Russia of this or that nationality. Capitalists, who are bound together by thousands of threads of banking capital, would no more renounce annexations than they would give up the billions of profits they make from investments, concessions, and war orders. After the new Government had declared against annexation in order to deceive the people, Miliukov, on April 22 at Moscow, said that the Government did not give up annexation. In the note of May 1, and in its explanation of May 5, the predatory policy of the Government was confirmed. The Conference warns the people against these empty capitalistic phrases. A difference should be made between annexation in word and in deed. If in deed, then all the secret, plundering treaties should be published at once, and all the nationalities should at once be given the opportunity to vote freely whether they wish to be independent States, or a part of some other State.

In regard to the most important question, how to bring this war to an end as soon as possible and how to bring about a real, democratic, not an enforced peace, the Conference takes this stand. It is not possible to end the war by the cessation of war activities by the soldiers of only one of the belligerents. The Conference protests again and again against the calumny spread by the capitalists against our party, that it favors a separate peace with Germany. The German capitalists are as bad as the Russian, English, French, et al, and Emperor William, as big a crowned robber as Tsar Nicholas and the kings of Italy, England, Rumania, etc.

With patience and perseverance, our party will explain to the

people that wars are conducted by Governments, that they are always bound up with the interests of certain classes, that this war can be brought to an end by a democratic peace, only by the passing of power, at least in some of the belligerent countries, from the hands of the State authorities directly to the proletariat and semi-proletariat class which is really capable of putting an end to the yoke of capitalism.

If the revolutionary class were to get control of the government of Russia, it would take measures to break the economic domination of the capitalists, and destroy their political power. It would immediately and openly offer to all peoples a democratic peace, on the basis of complete renunciation of every kind of annexation and indemnity. Such measures and an offer of peace would establish full confidence among the workers of the warring countries, and would inevitably lead to the uprising of the proletariat against those imperialistic governments that stood out against the proposed peace.

Until the revolutionary class in Russia gets complete control of the government of Russia, our party will consistently support those proletarian parties and groups abroad that are actually, in this war, opposing their imperialistic governments and bourgeoisie. Our party will particularly encourage the already-begun fraternization of the soldier masses on the fronts of all belligerents, with the object of transforming this unconscious solidarity of the oppressed into a conscious and organized movement, leading to the taking over by the revolutionary proletariat of all powers of government in all belligerent countries.

10. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE¹⁷

At the session of the Executive Committee on May 8, the following resolution was adopted:

1. The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies takes upon itself the initiative of calling an International Socialist Conference.

2. All parties and factions of the proletariat International [that are ready to accept the platform which was adopted by the Soviet on March 27 in its Call to the people of the world] should be invited.¹⁸

¹⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 51, May 10, 1917.

¹⁸ At the meeting of the Soviet on May 9, the resolution was carried, but the Bolsheviks (90) abstained from voting. In the final draft, that part of Article 2 which is in brackets was left out. "Izvestiia," No. 52, May 11, 1917.

3. The Executive Committee considers an essential condition of the conference, the possibility for all socialist parties and factions without exception to come to the place of meeting. The Executive Committee calls this to the mind of the governments and most categorically demands from the majority factions an open and energetic insistence that their governments should allow the minority delegates to come to the conference.

4. The place of the conference should be in a neutral country.

5. To prepare for the conference and to lay out a program, a special body, "The Commission for the Calling of the Conference," is being organized, in connection with the Executive Committee. This commission is made up of members of the Executive Committee, and representatives of parties who are members of the International and, at the same time, members of the Executive Committee.

6. A call should be issued at once to all peoples, and in particular to the socialists of the Allied countries, on the question of peace and the conference.

7. A special delegation of the Executive Committee should be sent to neutral and Allied countries to establish contact with the socialists of these countries and with the delegation at Stockholm for the purpose of making preparations for the conference.

APPEAL BY THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS'
DEPUTIES TO THE SOCIALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES ¹⁹

TO THE SOCIALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES

May 15, 1917

Comrades:

The Russian Revolution was born in the fire of the world war. This war is a monstrous crime on the part of the imperialists of all countries, who, by their lust for annexations, by their mad race in armaments, have prepared and made inevitable the world conflagration.

Whatever the vicissitudes of military fortune may be, the imperialists of all countries are equally the victors in this war; the war has yielded and is yielding them stupendous profits, concentrates in their hands colossal capital, and endows them with unheard-of power over the person, labor, and the very life of the toilers.

Just because of this, the toilers of all countries are equally losers

¹⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 55, May 15, 1917.

in this war. On the altar of imperialism they lay many sacrifices,—their lives, their health, their liberty, their property; on their shoulders rest unspeakable burdens.

The Russian Revolution, the revolution of the toilers, workers, and soldiers, is not only a revolt against tsarism, but also against the horrors of the world butchery. It is the first outcry of indignation, from one of the detachments of the international army of labor, against the crimes of international imperialism. It is not only a national revolution,—it is the first stage of the world revolution, which will end the baseness of war and bring peace to mankind.

The Russian Revolution, from the very moment of its birth, realized clearly the international problem that confronted it. Its empowered organ, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, in its appeal of the 27th of March, called upon the peoples of the whole world to unite for the struggle for peace. The Russian Revolutionary Democracy does not want a separate peace, which would free the hands of the Austro-German Alliance.

The Revolutionary Democracy of Russia knows that such a peace would be a betrayal of the cause of the workers' democracy of all countries, which would find itself tied hand and foot, impotent before the world of triumphant imperialism. It knows that such a peace might lead to the military destruction of other countries, and thus strengthen chauvinistic and *revanche* ideas in Europe, leaving it an armed camp, just as after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, thus inevitably precipitating a new bloody conflict in the near future.

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy desires a general peace on a basis acceptable to the workers of all countries, who do not seek annexations, who do not stand for robberies, who are equally interested in the free expression of the will of all nations, and the crushing of the might of international imperialism. Peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of peoples is the formula adopted without mental reservations by the proletarian mind and heart. It furnishes a platform on which the toiling masses of all countries—belligerent and neutral—could and should come to an understanding, in order to establish a lasting peace and, with concerted effort, heal the wounds caused by the bloody war.

The Provisional Government of Revolutionary Russia has adopted this platform. The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals first to you, Socialists of the Allied countries. You must not permit that the voice of the Provisional Government should remain a lone voice

among the Allies. You must force your Governments to state definitely and clearly that the platform of peace without annexations and indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples, is also their platform. By doing this, you will add weight and strength to the stand of the Russian Government. You will give our Revolutionary Army, that has inscribed on its banner, "Peace among peoples," the assurance that its bloody sacrifices will not be used for evil purposes. You will enable it to carry out, with all the fervor of revolutionary enthusiasm, the war tasks that are falling to its lot. You will strengthen its faith, if you enable it to realize that while defending the conquests of the Revolution and our freedom, it is at the same time fighting for the interests of International Democracy, and thus coöperating in the hastening of the desired peace. You will put the Governments of the enemy countries in such a position that they will be forced either to repudiate irrevocably their policy of annexation, robbery, and violence, or else openly to confess their criminal projects, thus bringing upon themselves the full and just indignation of their peoples.

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals to you, Socialists of the Austro-German Alliance: You cannot allow the Armies of Your Governments to become the executioners of Russian liberty. You cannot permit the Governments of your countries to take advantage of the exultant spirit of liberty and fraternity with which the Russian Revolutionary Army is imbued, to move their troops to the West, in order to crush, first, France, next Russia, and, finally, you and the international proletariat in the grip of world imperialism.

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals to the Socialists of the belligerent and neutral countries and urges them to prevent the triumph of Imperialism. Let the work for peace, started by the Russian Revolution, be brought to a conclusion by the efforts of the international proletariat.

In order to unite these efforts, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has decided to take the initiative in calling for an international conference of all the Socialist parties and factions in every country. Whatever the differences of opinion which have disrupted Socialism for a period of three years of war may be, not a single faction of the Proletariat should refuse to participate in the general struggle for peace, which is on the program of the Russian Revolution.

We believe, comrades, that all Socialistic groups will be represented at this conference. A united stand by the proletariat inter-

national will be the first victory of the toilers over the imperialist international.

Proletarians of the world, unite!

II. THE UNITED STATES, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE SOVIET

(a) WILSON'S MESSAGE TO RUSSIA ²⁰

June 9, 1917

. . . But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payments for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical coöperation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase: it must be a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

COMMENT ON PRESIDENT WILSON'S MESSAGE ²¹

. . . President Wilson is mistaken if he thinks such ideas can touch the heart of the Russian revolutionary people. The Russian

²⁰ Scott, James Brown; "President Wilson's Foreign Policy, Messages . . . Papers, etc." 104.

²¹ "Izvestiia," No. 78, June 12, 1917, Editorial.

revolutionary democracy knows that the only way to attain the longed-for universal peace is through a union of the laboring classes of the world, against world imperialism. It is no use trying to confuse it with foggy and high-flown words.

(b) ROOT'S ADDRESS TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, PETROGRAD ²²

June 15, 1917

The Mission for which I have the honor to speak is charged by the Government and the people of the United States of America with a message to the Government and the people of Russia.

The Mission comes from a democratic republic. Its members are commissioned and instructed by a president who holds his high office as chief executive of more than one hundred million free people, by virtue of a popular election in which more than eighteen million votes were freely cast and fairly counted, pursuant to law, by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

For one hundred and forty years our people have been struggling with the hard problems of self-government. With many shortcomings, many mistakes, many imperfections, we have still maintained order and respect for law, individual freedom, and national independence.

Under the security of our own laws we have grown in strength and prosperity, but we value our freedom more than wealth. We love liberty, and we cherish above all our possessions the ideals for which our fathers fought and suffered and sacrificed, that America might be free. We believe in the competence and power of democracy, and in our heart of hearts abides a faith in the coming of a better world, in which the humble and oppressed in all lands may be lifted up by freedom to a heritage of justice and equal opportunity.

The news of Russia's new found freedom brought to America universal satisfaction and joy. From all the land, sympathy and hope went out towards the new sister in the circle of democracies; and this Mission is sent to express that feeling. The American democracy sends to the democracy of Russia, greeting, sympathy, friendship, brotherhood, and Godspeed.

Distant America knows little of the special conditions of Russian life, which must give form to the government and to the laws which

²² Elihu Root; "The United States and the War, the Mission to Russia." Political Addresses, collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, 98-101.

you are about to create. As we have developed our institutions to serve the needs of our national character and life, so we assume that you will develop your institutions to serve the needs of Russian character and life. As we look across the sea we distinguish no party and no class. We see great Russia as a whole; as one mighty striving and aspiring democracy. We know the self-control, the essential kindliness, the strong common-sense, the courage and the noble idealism of Russian character. We have faith in you all. We pray for God's blessings upon you all. We believe that you will solve your problems; that you will maintain your liberty, and that our two great nations will march side by side in the triumphant progress of democracy until the old order has everywhere passed away and the world is free.

One fearful danger threatens the liberty of both nations. The armed forces of military autocracy are at the gates of Russia and her Allies. The triumph of German arms will mean the death of liberty in Russia. No enemy is at the gates of America, but America has come to realize that the triumph of German arms means the death of liberty in the world; that we who love liberty and would keep it must fight for it, and fight now when the free democracies of the world may be strong in union, and not delay until they may be beaten down separately in succession.

So America sends another message to Russia; that we are going to fight, and have already begun to fight, for your freedom equally with our own, and we ask you to fight for our freedom equally with yours. We would make your cause ours, and our cause yours, and with common purpose and the mutual helpfulness of firm alliance, make sure the victory over our common foe.

You will recognize your own sentiments and purposes in the words of President Wilson to the American Congress, when, on the second of April last, he advised the declaration of war against Germany. He said:

"We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government [the German Government], following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and

its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."

And you will see the feeling toward Russia with which America has entered the great war in another clause of the same address.

President Wilson further said :

"Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great generous Russian people have been added in all their naïve majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor."

That partnership of honor in the great struggle for human freedom, the oldest of the great democracies now seeks in fraternal union with the youngest.

The practical and specific methods and possibilities of our allied coöperation, the members of the Mission would be glad to discuss with the members of the Government of Russia.

(c) ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT WILSON, WELCOMING BORIS A.
BAKHMETEFF, THE NEW RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR,
TO THE UNITED STATES

July 5, 1917²³

Mr. Ambassador: To the keen satisfaction which I derived from the fact that the Government of the United States was the first to welcome, by its official recognition, the new democracy of Russia to the family of free States is added the exceptional pleasure which I experience in now receiving from your hand the letters whereby the Provisional Government of Russia accredits you as its ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United States and in according to you formal recognition as the first ambassador of free Russia to this country.

For the people of Russia the people of the United States have entertained friendly feelings, which have now been greatly deepened by the knowledge that, actuated by the same lofty motives, the two Governments and peoples are coöperating to bring to a successful termination the conflict now raging for human liberty and a universal acknowledgment of those principles of right and justice which should direct all Governments. I feel convinced that when this happy day shall come no small share of the credit will be due to the devoted people of Russia, who, overcoming disloyalty from within and intrigue from without, remain steadfast to the cause.

The mission which it was my pleasure to send to Russia has already assured the Provisional Government that in this momentous struggle and in the problems that confront and will confront the free Government of Russia, that Government may count on the steadfast friendship of the Government of the United States and its constant coöperation in all desired appropriate directions.

It only remains for me to give expression to my admiration of the way in which the Provisional Government of Russia are meeting all requirements, to my entire sympathy with them in their noble object to insure to the people of Russia the blessings of freedom and of equal rights and opportunity, and to my faith that through their efforts Russia will assume her rightful place among the great free nations of the world.

²³ The Official Bulletin, Washington, July 6, 1917.

PART VII

FIRST COALITION PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

When the storm raised by the Miliukov note had spent itself, it became quite evident that things could not go on as they were. Russia had two Governments, one working against the other, and the result was demoralization in the front and rear. One or the other had to abdicate or the two combine. It was with this idea in mind that Prince Lvov wrote to Chkheidze asking the Soviet "to participate in the responsible work of government." If the Soviet was going to criticize, it should also assume responsibility. On May 12 the question of forming a coalition with the Provisional Government was debated by the Executive Committee and lost by the narrow margin of one vote. The day following Guchkov resigned and that created more confusion. By this time the Executive Committee became split into two groups, one favoring coalition and the other the taking over of all power by the Soviet. On May 14 the question of coalition was reconsidered and this time, thanks to the eloquence of Kerenski, the coalitionists won. When the question was brought before the Soviet on the 15th it was carried.

In agreeing to a coalition, it was understood that the Provisional Government would accept the Soviet's internal and foreign policy. This meant that Miliukov would have to give up his post, which he did on May 16. On the 17th, the Ministry was constituted and on the 18th issued its program.

CHAPTER XXII

FORMATION OF A COALITION MINISTRY

1. LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER, PRINCE G. E. LVOV TO N. S. CHKHEIDZE ¹

My dear Nicholas Semenovich:

In the statement published by the Provisional Government on May 9, it is pointed out, among other things, that the Government will renew its efforts to widen its circle by asking to participate in the responsible work of government those actively creative elements of the country who have not until now had direct part in State administration.

In view of this statement, I ask you, in the name of the Provisional Government, to be good enough to bring this matter to the attention of the Executive Committee of the parties represented in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, of which you are President.

Respectfully yours, *Prime Minister*, PR. Lvov.

2. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET

On the evening of May 14, there was a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, under the chairmanship of Chkheidze, to deliberate on the present situation.

Minister of Justice, Kerenski, made a report. His speech made a deep impression on the Executive Committee. After he had spoken, there was a general discussion; most of the speakers expressed themselves in favor of once more looking into the question of a coalition ministry.² But before taking final action, it was decided to allow each faction, composing the Executive Committee, to meet and act separately. A recess was taken during which the factions met.

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 52, May 11, 1917.

² On May 12, the Executive Committee, by a vote of 23 to 22, came out against coalition. But the resignation of Guchkov on the following day, and the new situation it had created, forced the Executive Committee to reconsider its stand. (See Miliukov, "Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii," I, 108-9.)

When the Executive Committee again went into session, the question of a coalition ministry was put to vote. The Executive Committee came out in favor of the principle of coalition. On the first ballot, forty-four were in favor, nineteen opposed, and two abstained from voting. On the final ballot, forty-one were in favor, eighteen opposed, and three did not vote.

The Labor group [trudoviki], National Socialists, Social-Revolutionists, and Mensheviks (except the Internationalists) voted in favor. The Bolsheviks and International Socialists voted against the motion. The Bolsheviks announced that they were in favor of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies taking over all the power.³

On the evening of May 15, there was a special session of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to act on the question whether representatives of democracy should go into the Provisional Government. The Executive Committee put the fundamental question: Shall the official representatives of the revolutionary democracy enter the Government? I. G. Tseretelli took the affirmative, and gave the point of view of the Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks, Zinoviev and Kamenev, took the negative, and criticized the decision of the Executive Committee as ruinous to the revolution. Voitinski, Lakson, Avksentiev, and others took the floor to take issue with the Bolsheviks, and to defend the Executive Committee. A vote was taken, and an overwhelming majority supported the stand of the Executive Committee to allow its representatives to enter the Government, and empowered the Executive Committee to continue negotiations with the Government, as to the basis on which the coalition government should be formed.⁴

(a) FORMATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT⁵

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has come to the conclusion that it is necessary for representatives of the Soviet to join the Provisional Government.

The question of the so-called "coalition" government has recently occupied a prominent place in the newspaper columns. The Prime Minister himself brought it to the front in his letter to Chkhaidze. As it was composed, without the participation of representatives of democracy, the Provisional Government could not govern, could not save the State from threatened ruin.

³ "Riech," No. 101, May 15, 1917.

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 56, May 16, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Editorial.

The country is indeed in a dangerous position. Three years of war have exhausted her strength. Finances are disorganized; railways are broken down; there is a lack of raw materials and fuel, a need of bread at the front and in the cities,—all these have brought on discontent and mental unrest which tsarist tools are ready to make use of. The army is breaking up. In certain places, a disorderly seizure of land is going on, a destruction of livestock and implements. Discontent is growing. No one pays any attention to the authorized agents of the Government. Large masses have no confidence in the Government, which feels itself powerless and helpless. Only a strong revolutionary government, enjoying the confidence of the people, can save the country, hold on to the conquests of the revolution, put an end to the split in the army, and keep it on a war footing.

The Government finds itself in such an unenviable position that A. I. Guchkov hastens to abandon the sinking ship, and lays down his title of Minister of War and Navy. But it is not only the Government, but the country itself, that is in a desperate situation.

The Executive Committee took all this into consideration. It realized that the Russian revolutionary democracy, having carried the load of the revolution on its shoulders, could not calmly look on, as its own work perished. It had to take upon itself the responsibility for the safety of the country.

The Soviet cannot take the Government into its own hands. Such a step would alienate from the revolution and throw into the arms of the partisans of the old régime large numbers of people who can so far accept the revolution and democracy. Democracy has enough enemies without adding more. . . .

It is necessary to send our representatives into the Provisional Government, and to share the power. . . .

The participation in the Government by representatives of the Soviet can have a salutary effect on the country only if the foreign and internal policy, which the Government has long ago accepted in principle, but has only weakly put into force, is carried out wholeheartedly. Only on these conditions can the representatives of the Soviet join the Government. Only under these circumstances can their participation furnish the Government the backing of the revolutionary democracy, the confidence of the army, and concentrate in its hands the fullness of authority.

This is the reason why the Executive Committee has submitted the terms on which the representatives of the Soviet would join the Provisional Government.

(b) CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS⁶

Between the representatives of the Executive Committee and the Provisional Government, an agreement was reached on the subject matter to go into the declaration which the new Government should make. . . .

[The next question was] the new Government and the distribution of portfolios. This question brought forth much disagreement among the different party groups. . . .

Twice, on May 16 and 17, the Soviet met to settle definitely the question of a coalition government, . . . but nothing was settled.

(c) MILIUKOV RESIGNS

On the morning of May 15, with the participation of Ministers P. N. Miliukov and A. I. Shingarev, who had hurriedly returned from Headquarters, and A. A. Manuilov, who had come from Moscow, a discussion began of the program [submitted by the Soviet] of the [new] Government. P. N. Miliukov expressed himself against coalition, and objected to the proposed program because of its vagueness, because it contained the seeds of future conflicts, because the part referring to foreign policy (which was clear) was not acceptable, and, finally, because it did not come out for one Government, which should have the full confidence of the revolutionary democracy. The lack of such a declaration was the cause of the weakness and fall of the first Ministry. On the basis of these objections, a final revision of the text of the declaration of the new Government was undertaken. . . . But before this was finished, A. F. Kerenski told P. N. Miliukov at the evening session, that while he [Miliukov] was absent, seven of the Ministers had decided that in the new Ministry, Miliukov should have the Ministry of Education, in place of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kerenski was to have the Ministry of War and Navy. P. N. Miliukov did not feel that under such a division of portfolios, and with this beginning of Zimmerwald influences in war and foreign policy, he could assume collective responsibility for the acts of a united Cabinet, and he therefore declined the proposition of his colleagues, and left the meeting.⁷

At six o'clock in the evening [May 16], it became known that P. N. Miliukov had definitely left the Provisional Government.⁸

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 58, May 18, 1917.

⁷ Miliukov; "Istoriia Vtoroi Russkoi Revoliutsii," I, 110-1.

⁸ "Riech," No. 103, May 17, 1917.

At two o'clock on the morning of May 17 and 18, an agreement was reached between the representatives of the Executive Committee and members of the Provisional Government [as to the New Provisional Government].⁹

3. THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ¹⁰

Prince G. E. Lvov, *Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior*

A. F. Kerenski, *Minister of War and Navy*¹¹

P. N. Pereverzev, *Minister of Justice*

M. I. Tereschenko, *Minister of Foreign Affairs*

N. V. Nekrasov, *Minister of Transportation*

A. I. Konovalov, *Minister of Commerce and Industry*

A. A. Manuilov, *Minister of Education*

A. I. Shingarev, *Minister of Finance*

V. M. CHERNOV, *Minister of Agriculture*¹²

M. I. Skobelev, *Minister of Labor*¹²

I. G. Tseretelli, *Minister of Post and Telegraph*¹²

A. V. Peshekhonov, *Minister of Food*¹³

Prince D. I. Shakhovskoi, *Minister of Social Welfare*

V. N. Lvov, *Oberprocurator of the Synod*

I. V. Godnev, *Comptroller*

May 18, 1917

On May 18, the Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov, officially notified the Provisional Committee of the State Duma of the composition of the new Provisional Government. The Provisional Committee gave its approval.

(a) DECLARATION OF THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ¹⁴

May 18, 1917

Reorganized and strengthened by the new representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, the Provisional Government declares that it will resolutely put into practice the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, under the banner of which the great Russian Revolution came into being. The Provisional Government is particularly united in the following fundamental principles for its action in the future:

⁹ "Izvestia," No. 58, May 18, 1917.

¹⁰ "Riech," No. 105, May 19, 1917.

¹¹ Social-Revolutionists.

¹² Social-Democrats.

¹³ National-Socialists.

¹⁴ "Riech," No. 105, May 19, 1917.

1. In matters of foreign policy, the Provisional Government, in harmony with the people, spurns the idea of a separate peace, and proclaims openly that it is its aim to bring about, at the earliest possible date, a general peace, without either imposing its domination over any nation, or taking away any nation's possessions, or forcibly annexing foreign territory, *i. e.*, we wish peace without annexations, without indemnities, and on the basis of self-determination of peoples. Firmly convinced that with the overthrow of the Tsar's régime and the establishment of democratic principles in our domestic and foreign policies there was created for the Allied Democracies a new factor making for a permanent peace and the brotherhood of peoples, the Provisional Government is taking the preliminary steps towards effecting an understanding with the Allies on the basis of the declaration made by the Provisional Government on April 9.

2. Believing that the defeat of Russia and her Allies would not only be the source of the greatest calamity for the people, but would retard and make impossible the conclusion of a general peace on the basis of the above-mentioned principles, the Provisional Government trusts that the Revolutionary Army of Russia will not allow the German troops to crush our Allies in the West, and then turn against us. To strengthen the democratization in our Army, to organize and strengthen its fighting power for both defensive and offensive operations, is the most important task now before the Provisional Government.

3. The Provisional Government will relentlessly and resolutely fight the economic disruption by extending further state and social control over production, transportation, exchange, and distribution of products, and, in necessary cases, will also resort to the organization of production.

4. Measures concerning the fullest possible protection of labor will be developed further in the most energetic way.

5. Leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to decide the question of transfer of land to the toilers, and making the requisite preparations for this, the Provisional Government will take all necessary measures to secure the greatest production of grain in order to satisfy the needs of the country, and to regulate the utilization of land in the economic interests, of the country and the toiling population.

6. Desiring to effect a gradual reorganization of our system of finances on democratic principles, the Provisional Government will pay special attention to the increase of direct taxation of the

property-owning classes (inheritance tax on excess war-profits, property, etc.).

7. The work of introducing and strengthening the democratic organs of self-government will be continued with determination and speed.

8. The Provisional Government will, in like manner, make every effort to convoke the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd as soon as possible.

Considering it its object to put the above-mentioned program into practice without hesitation, the Provisional Government categorically declares that its work can bear fruit only on condition that the revolutionary people place their fullest and unconditional faith in the Government and enable it to exercise in reality its full power, which is so indispensable in the matter of safeguarding the achievements of the Revolution and their further development.

The Provisional Government urgently appeals to all citizens to preserve the unity of power in its hand, and announces that it will take the most energetic measures to save the country from all counter-revolutionary and anarchistic attempts, unlawful acts of violence, disorganization of the country, and preparation for counter-revolution. The Provisional Government believes that on this road it will meet with the full support of all those to whom Russia's liberty is dear.

(b) NOTE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT¹⁵

June 15, 1917

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tereschenko, transmitted to the Allied Governments the following note:

The Russian Revolution is not only a change in the internal system of Russia, but a mighty movement of ideas which expresses the will of the Russian people in their aspiration for equality, freedom, and justice, both in the internal life of the State and in the realm of international relations. The Russian revolutionary government gets its authority from this will, and to carry out this will is its duty and object.

While defending in the foreign struggle the great principles of liberty, Russia is striving to secure a general peace on a basis which would exclude every kind of violence, regardless of its source, and all imperialistic intentions, no matter under what guise they are

¹⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 82, June 16, 1917.

presented. Russia has no designs of conquest whatsoever, and emphatically protests against any attempts in this direction. True to these principles, the Russian people has firmly decided to struggle against open or secret imperialistic intentions of our enemies in the political, as well as in the financial and economic fields.

Should there arise differences of opinion as regards war aims between us and the Governments of the Allies, we have no doubt that the close union between Russia and her Allies will insure complete mutual agreement on all questions, on the basis of the principles proclaimed by the Russian revolution.

The Russian democracy remains steadfastly loyal to the cause of the Allies, and welcomes the decision of those of the Allied Powers which expressed readiness to meet the desire of the Russian Provisional Government to reconsider the agreements concerning the ultimate aims of the war. We suggest that there be called for this purpose a conference of representatives of Allied Powers, to take place as soon as conditions are favorable for it. But one of the agreements, the one which was signed in London on September 5, 1914, which has been published since then, and which excludes the possibility of the conclusion of a separate peace by one of the Allied Powers, must not be a subject of discussion at this conference.

(c) RESOLUTION OF THE SOVIET, MAY 18, 1917¹⁶

WHEREAS, the renewed Provisional Government, invigorated by the representatives of the revolutionary democracy, is in harmony with the will of democracy and its way of solving the problems of strengthening the conquests and the further development of the revolution, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, resolves:

1. That representatives of the Soviet should join the Provisional Government.

2. That until the formation of the All-Russian Soviet, those representatives of the Soviet who join the Provisional Government should consider themselves responsible to the Petrograd Soviet, to whom they must account for their acts.

3. The Soviet expresses its fullest confidence in the new Provisional Government, and calls on the democracy to give to this Government its support and the full power necessary for the strengthening of the conquests and the further development of the revolution.

¹⁶ "Izvestia," No. 59, May 19, 1917.

(d) TROTSKI'S SPEECH IN THE SOVIET¹⁷*May 18, 1917*

News of the Russian Revolution found us in New York, but even in that great country, where the bourgeoisie dominates as nowhere else, the Russian Revolution has done its work. The American laborer has had some unfavorable things said about him. It is said that he does not support the revolution. But had you seen the American workman in February, you would have been doubly proud of your revolution. You would have understood that it has shaken not only Russia, not only Europe, but America. It would have been clear to you, as to me, that it has opened a new epoch, an epoch of blood and iron, not in a war of nations, but in a war of the oppressed classes against the domineering classes. (Tumultuous applause.) At all the meetings, the workers asked me to give you their warmest greetings. (Applause.) But I must tell you something about the Germans. I had an opportunity to come in close contact with a group of German proletarians. You ask me where? In a war-prison camp. The bourgeois English Government arrested us as enemies and placed us in a war-prison camp in Canada. (*Cries: "Shame!"*) About one hundred German officers and eight hundred sailors were here. They asked me how it happened that we, Russian citizens, became prisoners of the English. When I told them that we were prisoners, not because we were Russians, but because we were Socialists, they said that they were slaves of their Government, of their William. . . .

This talk did not please the German officers, and they made a complaint to the English commandant that we were undermining the loyalty of the sailors to the Kaiser. The English captain, anxious to preserve the allegiance of the German sailors to the Kaiser, forbade me to lecture to them. The sailors protested to the commandant. When we departed, the sailors accompanied us with music and shouted "Down with William! Down with the bourgeoisie! Long live the united international proletariat!" (Great applause.) That which passed through the brains of the German sailors is passing through in all countries. The Russian Revolution is the prologue to the world revolution.

But I cannot conceal that I do not agree with everything. I regard it as dangerous to join the Ministry. I do not believe that

¹⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 60, May 20, 1917.

the Ministry can perform miracles. We had, before, a dual government, due to the opposing points of view of two classes. The coalition government will not remove opposition, but will merely transfer it to the Ministry. But the revolution will not perish because of the coalition government. We should, however, keep three precepts in mind: 1. Trust not the bourgeoisie. 2. Control our own leaders. 3. Have confidence in our own revolutionary strength.

What do we recommend? I think that the next step should be the handing over all power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Only with the authority in one hand can Russia be saved. Long live the Russian Revolution as the prologue to the world revolution. (Applause.)

CHAPTER XXIII

FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

"Whom does the Provisional Government represent?" and "Whom does the Petrograd Soviet represent?" were questions heard on all sides. It was claimed by partizans of the Provisional Government that Petrograd is not Russia and that the Petrograd Soviet represented only the Petrograd proletariat and had no right to speak for any one else. This was a just criticism and was met by the Petrograd Soviet by calling an All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to meet at Petrograd in the middle of June.

It was at this Congress that the two important wings of the Socialists, the moderates (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists) and extreme radicals (Bolsheviks and Internationalists) gripped each other for what proved to be a death struggle. Tseretelli and Kerenski were spokesmen for the one and Lenin for the other. In foreign affairs the moderates advocated a revision of the treaties, abandonment of all forms of imperialism, coöperation with the Allies for a democratic peace by a collective agreement if possible, by a collective attack if necessary. A similar policy of coöperation with the bourgeoisie was advocated for the internal administration. They stood by the idea of coalition and were opposed to "experiments dangerous to the revolution."

Lenin was against all compromise and coöperation with the capitalists and their Governments, whether in or outside Russia. These half-measures, in his opinion, gave "rise to numerous misunderstandings, conflicts, divisions. . . . One of the two: either a bourgeois or a Soviet government." He advocated the seizure of power by the Soviet, the overthrow of the capitalistic class in Russia, to be followed by an appeal to the workmen of the other belligerent countries to overthrow their capitalistic Governments. Such an overflow would, *ipso facto*, bring the war to an end.

After several days of warm debating each of the contending

groups presented resolutions and that of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists was adopted by a vote of 543 to 126.

I. CALLING AN ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES¹

*To all Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
and Army Committees:*

The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved to call, June 14, an All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and army organizations at the front.

To this Congress, all the existing Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and army organs are asked. Selections should be made according to the regulations laid down by the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

Soviets numbering from	25,000 to	50,000	have 2	delegates
	50,000 to	75,000	" 3	"
	75,000 to	100,000	" 4	"
	100,000 to	150,000	" 5	"
	150,000 to	200,000	" 6	"
	Over 200,000		" 8	"

Delegates from the front should represent armies and not regiments, etc. It would be best if the delegates were selected at the army congresses. . . . Each army is entitled to no more than 8 delegates. . . .

Soviets having less than 25,000 members should combine. . . .

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

Composition of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies²

Total number of delegates	1090
Full voting rights	882
Socialist-Revolutionists	285
Mensheviks	248
Bolsheviks	105
Internationalists	32

¹"Izvestiia," No. 61, May 22, 1917.

²"Riech," No. 136, June 26, 1917.

Socialists not belonging to parties	73
United Social Democrats	10
Bund	10
Edinstvo (Plekhanov's followers)	3
National Socialists	3
Trudoviks	5
Anarchist-Communist	1

Number of Soviets and other organizations participating, including peasant organiza- tions	305
Number of ward and regional Soviets . . .	53
Number of delegates from the army (repre- senting 8 units in rear, and 5 in front) .	21

2. CLASH BETWEEN MODERATE-SOCIALISTS AND BOLSHEVIKS

(a) TSERETELLI'S SPEECH ³

June 17, 1917

. . . In taking upon itself the fight for universal peace, the Russian revolution has also to take over the war, begun by other governments, the end of which does not depend on the efforts of the Russian revolution alone. . . .

In order that it may succeed in its object, the Provisional Government must say clearly and emphatically . . . that it has broken with the old imperialist policy, and must propose to the Allies that the first question in order of importance is to re-examine on a new basis all agreements made until now. . . . [so that] this general platform of war and peace may be given out, not only in the name of the Russian revolution, but in the name of all those who are allied with us. . . . We are moving in that direction. . . . We should do nothing which would break our ties with the Allies. . . . The worst thing that could happen to us would be a separate peace. It would be ruinous for the Russian revolution, ruinous for international democracy. . . . A separate peace is both undesirable and impossible. Should we bring about a situation that would break relations with the Allies and necessitate a separate peace, the Russian revolution would be obliged, immediately afterwards, to take up arms on the

³ "Izvestiia," No. 84, June 19, 1917.

side of the German coalition. Even if we brush aside the talk of a possible attack by Japan . . . picture to yourself the condition of the Russian revolution after the conclusion of a separate peace, while the rest of the world goes on fighting. Her economic and financial ties with the powers with which she is now united would be severed. . . . Under the circumstances, can there be any doubt that the German coalition, continuing with the war, would force the weaker side to give military support? . . . He who talks about a separate peace talks about Utopia. . . .

We come to the question of taking the offensive, the actions of the Minister of War, Comrade Kerenski, and the whole Provisional Government, in their efforts to strengthen the front and the army. It is said that due to pressure from the imperialist circles, the Provisional Government, and the Minister of War in particular, are taking steps to bring about immediate action at the front, in order thereby to put an end to the political campaign for universal peace, which this same Provisional Government is carrying on. . . . We believe that the measures taken by Comrade Kerenski tend to strengthen the cause of the revolution and prepare the way for the success of our object in the field of international relations and universal peace. It is clear to us that now, when our country is threatened from the outside, the Russian revolutionary army should be strong, able to take the offensive. . . . Comrades, this inactivity which has been going on at the front does not strengthen, but weakens and disorganizes our revolution and army. . . .

I should like to paint in a few strokes a picture of our internal situation. . . . The Russian revolution has taken over the burdensome inheritance of the three years' war and the ten years' reaction of June 16.⁴ The economic disorganization, the crushing financial difficulties, the food chaos which threatens to bring the country into a state of famine—all these are the inheritance of the old régime. We firmly believe that we can solve these problems, but we know that they can be solved only if the Russian democracy will make unheard-of sacrifices and self-denials. The most radical and extreme fiscal measures could not at the present moment altogether liquidate the financial crisis and bring the finances of the country into a normal condition. A country that spends sixteen milliards and has a net income of not more than half that amount cannot be saved by mere financial reforms, by fundamental reorganization. Only great self-sacrifice and mighty efforts can help at this moment.

⁴ Electoral law of June 16, 1907.

. . . All classes of the population should be called upon to make these sacrifices and self-denials. . . . We are charged with not having done anything so far [in economic regulation] but laws alone will not benefit Russia. . . . Even that revolutionary organization⁵ which criticizes the acts of the Government and demands a speeding up, has nothing better to offer than declarations and principles. Time is necessary to put these into acts. . . .

As to the land question—we regard it as our duty at the present time to prepare the ground for a just solution of that problem by the Constituent Assembly. We believe that the question of the passing of the land into the hands of the laboring class can be and should be definitely settled by the Constituent Assembly. . . .

At the present moment, there is not a political party in Russia which would say: Hand the power over to us, resign, and we will take your place. Such a party does not exist in Russia. (*Lenin*: "It does exist.") . . . They [the Bolsheviks] say: When we have a majority, or when the majority comes over to our point of view, then the power should be seized. Comrade Lenin, you said that. At least the Bolsheviks and you with them say it in their official statements.

Gentlemen, until now, there has not been a single party in Russia which has come out openly for getting for itself all power at once, although there have been such cries by irresponsible groups on the Right and the Left. . . . The Right says, let the Left run the Government, and we and the country will draw our conclusions; and the Left says, let the Right take hold, and we and the country will draw our conclusions. . . . Each side hopes that the other will make such a failure, that the country will turn to it for leadership.

But, gentlemen, this is not the time for that kind of a play. . . . In order to solve the problems of the country, we must unite our strength and must have a strong Government . . . strong enough to put an end to experiments dangerous for the fate of the revolution, . . . experiments that may lead to civil war. . . .

This, gentlemen, is our policy. . . .

(b) LENIN'S SPEECH⁶

June 17, 1917

. . . The first and fundamental question which we have to answer is: What are these Soviets which are meeting in this All-Russian

⁵ The Bolsheviks.

⁶ Piontkovski, S. A.; "Khrestomatiia Po Istorii Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii," 133-41. Also, "Izvestiia," No. 84, June 19, 1917.

Congress? What is this revolutionary democracy about which so much is said? To speak of revolutionary democracy before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and to keep silent about its formation, its class character, its rôle in the revolution, at the same time pretending that we are democrats, is a strange state of affairs. We had presented to us a program of a bourgeois parliamentary republic, a program of reform, which is accepted by all bourgeois governments, including our own; and, at the same time, we are told of a revolutionary democracy. To whom do they say this? To the Soviets. I ask you, is there any bourgeois, democratic, republican country in Europe where an institution similar to the Soviet exists? Of course, you will say no. It does not exist and cannot exist, because it is either a bourgeois government, with these "plans" of reform which are presented to us, and which have been presented numerous times, and have remained on paper; or this institution—this new type of "government" which the revolution has created, and which has appeared before in history, at a time of a great revolutionary enthusiasm, for example, in France in 1792 and 1871,—in Russia in 1905. The Soviet is an institution that does not exist in any bourgeois parliamentary government, and cannot exist alongside a bourgeois government. The Soviet is that new, more democratic type of government which we called, in our party resolutions, peasant-proletariat, democratic republic, and in which the whole authority belongs to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It is vain to think that it is a theoretic question, vain to imagine that it can be passed over, vain to pretend that some other kind of institution can exist together with the Soviet. Yes, they exist together. But it gives rise to numerous misunderstandings, conflicts, and divisions. . . . One of the two: either the ordinary bourgeois government [or the Soviet]. A bourgeois government would make the Soviets unnecessary. They would either be dispersed by the generals, the counter-revolutionary generals who hold the army in hand, who pay no attention to our eloquent Minister of War, or they would die an inglorious death. There is no other alternative. We cannot stand still. We must either go forward or backward.

The [Soviet] is the form of government which is not a child of the Russian brain, but which the revolution itself brought forth. Without it the revolution cannot conquer . . . the Soviets cannot go on as they are now. . . . We are told that the first Provisional Government was bad. At that time, when the Bolsheviks said: "Do not support, do not have any confidence in that Government," we

were overwhelmed with charges of anarchism. Now everybody admits that the Government was bad. In what respects is this coalition-government of almost-socialistic ministers better than its predecessor? Let us stop discussing programs, projects, and let's do something. . . . We are asked, is it possible to establish Socialism in Russia immediately, to reorganize the State from top to bottom? . . . Nowhere in the world in time of war can you go from pure capitalism to pure Socialism, but there should be something between, something new, unheard-of, because hundreds of millions are dying in this criminal war of the capitalists. It is not a question of reforms in the future—these are empty words—but of doing something which is needed to be done now. If you wish to appeal to the “*revolutionary*” democracy, then differentiate between it and the “*reform*” democracy in a capitalist ministry. . . . That which is proposed is a transition to reform-democracy in a capitalistic government. It may be excellent, and looks well from the point of view of Western Europe. But just now a whole series of countries are on the brink of ruin, and those practical measures which are, seemingly, so complicated that it is necessary to work out, as we were told by the previous speaker, the Minister of Post and Telegraph, [can be put into force now?]. These measures are very clear. He [Tseretelli] said that there is not a political party in Russia which would say that it is ready to take all the power into its hands. I say there is. Our party is ready at any minute to do that. (Applause and laughter.) Laugh all you want to. . . . Our program in relation to the economic crisis is this—to demand the publication of all those unheard-of profits, reaching to 500 to 800 per cent, which the capitalists make—on war orders; to arrest 50 or 100 of the more important capitalists, and in this way break all the threads of intrigue. Without such a step, all this talk of peace without annexation and indemnity is worthless. Our next step would be to announce to all the nations, separate from their Governments, that we regard all capitalists—French, English, all—as robbers.

Your own “*Izvestiia*” has become confused. In place of peace without annexation and indemnity, it proposes the status quo. [We believe] that the Russian Republic should not oppress a single nation—neither the Finns, nor the Ukrainians, with whom the Minister of War is now quarreling. . . . We cannot make a peace without annexation and indemnity until we are willing to give up our own annexations. It is really funny, this play! Every workman in Europe is laughing at it. He says: They are calling on the people to over-

throw their bankers, while they, themselves, send their bankers into the Ministry. Arrest them; lay bare their schemes; find out their intrigues. But you will not do this, although you have the power. . . . You have lived through 1905 and 1917. You know that revolution is not made to order; that in other countries it was brought about through bloody uprisings, but in Russia there is no group or class that could oppose the power of the Soviets. Today or tomorrow, let us propose peace to all the peoples by breaking with all the capitalistic classes, and in a short time the peoples of France and Germany will agree to it, because their countries are perishing. . . .

If Russia were a revolutionary democracy, not merely in words, but in deeds, she would lead on the revolutionary movement and not make peace with the capitalists; she would not talk so much of peace without annexation and indemnity, but would put an end to all forms of annexation in Russia, and would announce that she considers every annexation as robbery. If she were to do that, an imperialistic military offensive would not be necessary. . . .

You can write on paper what you please. But as long as the capitalists are in majority in the Government, it makes no difference what you say, and how well you say it; the fact is that the war remains an imperialistic one. . . . It is easy to write, peace without annexations, but see what has happened in Albania, Greece, and Persia since the coalition government was formed. . . . The only way to end the war is by going on with revolution. . . . If you were to take power into your own hands, if it were used against the Russian capitalists, then the laborers of other countries would believe you, and you could offer them peace. . . . The question is: Shall we advance or retreat? In revolutionary times, you cannot stand still. A military offensive now is a setback for the revolution; it means the continuation of the imperialistic butchery of millions. . . . The taking over of the power by the revolutionary proletariat, with the help of the poorest peasant, is the taking over of the revolutionary fight for peace . . . and gives assurance that power and victory will be given the revolutionary workmen in Russia, and in the whole world.

(c) KERENSKI'S SPEECH ⁷

Comrades:

June 17, 1917

You have been told of 1792 and of 1905. How did 1792 end in France? It ended by the fall of the republic and the rise of a dictator.

⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 85, June 20, 1917.

How did 1905 end? With the triumph of reaction. And now, in 1917, we are doing that which we could have done earlier. The problem of the Russian Socialist parties and the Russian democracy is to prevent such an end as was in France—to hold on to the revolutionary conquests already made; to see to it that our comrades who have been let out from prison do not return there; that Comrade Lenin, who has been abroad, may have the opportunity to speak here again, and not be obliged to fly back to Switzerland. (Applause.) We must see to it that the historic mistakes do not repeat themselves; that we do not bring on a situation that would make possible the return of reaction, the victory of force over democracy. Certain methods of fighting have been indicated to us. We have been told that we should not fight with words, not talk of annexation, but should show by deeds that we are fighting against capitalism. What means are recommended for this fight? To arrest Russian capitalists. (Laughter.) Comrades, I am not a Social-Democrat. I am not a Marxist, but I have the highest respect for Marx, his teaching, and his disciples. But Marxism has never taught such childlike and primitive means. I dare say that it is likely that Citizen Lenin has forgotten what Marxism is. He cannot call himself a Socialist, because Socialism nowhere recommends the settling of questions of economic war, of the war of classes in their economic relations, the question of the economic reorganization of the State, by arresting people, as is done by Asiatic despots. . . . Every Marxist who knows his Socialism would say that capitalism is of an international character, that the arrest of a few capitalists in a certain State would not affect the iron law of the economic development of a given period. . . . You [Bolsheviks] recommend childish prescriptions—"arrest, kill, destroy." What are you—Socialists or the police of the old régime? (Uproar. *Lenin*: "You should call him to order.")

This gathering of the flower of the Russian democracy understands its problems. Such prescriptions do not excite it, but among the masses such words will be taken seriously. We do not cater to the mob; we are not demagogues. What we say now, we said ten years ago. We are warm defenders of the autonomy of Finland and the Ukraine. We say this: Members of the Provisional Government have not and do not desire to have absolute power, and until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, they have no right to declare the independence of this or that part of Russian territory. . . .

As to fraternization—why is it that while German officers fraternize in our trenches, they do not fraternize on the French front?

Why is it that while our front is inactive, the German forces attack the English? . . . Why is it that this policy of fraternization falls in so well with the plan of the German General Staff on the Russian front? . . .

I can understand that there are people who are naïve enough to believe that an exchange of a piece of bread for a glass of vodka by a Russian soldier brings the kingdom of Socialism nearer, but we, who have borne the brunt of the old régime on our shoulders, cannot afford the luxury of such a naïveté. . . .

You [Bolsheviks] recommend that we follow the road of the French revolution of 1792. You recommend the way of further disorganization of the country. . . . When you, in alliance with reaction, shall destroy our power, then you will have a real dictator. It is our duty, the duty of the Russian democracy, to say: Don't repeat the historic mistakes. You are asked to follow the road that was once followed by France, and which will lead Russia to a new reaction, to a new shedding of democratic blood.

3. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

(a) RESOLUTION OF THE MENSHEVIKS AND SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONISTS ⁸

June 21, 1917

The Congress, having listened to the report of the Executive Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionists and Social-Democrats, agree that:

1. In view of the situation brought about by the first ministerial crisis, it would have been a hard blow to the revolution to have handed over the power to the bourgeoisie alone; and

2. That it would have greatly weakened and threatened the revolution to have handed over all the power, at this time, to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for such an act would have alienated certain elements of the population that are still able to serve the cause of the revolution.

For these reasons, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies approves the action of the Petrograd Soviet during May 3 and 4, in forming a coalition government

⁸ "Izvestiia, No. 87, June 22, 1917.

on a definite democratic platform, both in foreign and domestic affairs.

Having heard the explanations of the comrade-ministers on the general policy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and having expressed full confidence in them, the All-Russian Congress agrees that this policy answers the interests of the revolution.

The Congress calls on the Provisional Government to carry out resolutely and systematically the democratic platform which has been adopted, and in particular

a. To strive persistently for the earliest conclusion of a general peace without annexation, indemnity, and on the basis of self-determination;

b. To continue further the democratization of the army, and to increase its fighting power;

c. To undertake, with the direct participation of the toiling masses, the most energetic measures for combating the financial-economic disruption and disorganization of the food-supply, produced by the war and made acute by the policy of the propertied classes;

d. To conduct a systematic and resolute fight against counter-revolutionary attempts;

e. To bring about the speediest realization of the measures affecting the questions of land and labor, in accordance with the demands of the organized toiling masses and dictated by the vital interests of public economy, greatly undermined by the war;

f. To aid in the organization of all forces of the revolutionary democracy, by means of rapid and radical reforms on a democratic basis in the systems of local government, and self-government and the speediest introduction of zemstvos and municipal autonomy, where there is none as yet:

g. Particularly does the Congress demand the speediest convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

The Congress is of the opinion that, in order to carry out the indicated program more speedily and determinedly, and to unite all the strength of the democracy and make its will felt in all State affairs, it is necessary to form one organ with full power to represent all the revolutionary democratic organizations of Russia. This organ should have representatives of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Congress of Peasant Deputies.

The Socialist-ministers should be responsible to such an All-Russian representative organ for all the domestic and foreign politics of the Provisional Government. Such a responsibility will assure the country that as long as the minister-socialists are in the Provisional Government, it carries out the will of the democracy and is therefore entitled to full power and the support of all the democratic strength of the country.

The Congress calls on all the revolutionary democracy of Russia to gather around the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' and Peasant Deputies, and to support the Provisional Government energetically in all its efforts to strengthen and broaden the conquests of the revolution.

This resolution . . . was accepted by a vote of 543 to 126 (52 not voting), but all other resolutions were voted down by large majorities.

(b) FIRST RESOLUTION OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON
THE WAR⁹

The present war was brought on by the ruling classes of all countries in their imperialistic attempts to get new markets and bring small and weak states under their economic and political control. This conflict is leading all countries and peoples to economic exhaustion and the Russian revolution to ruin. The destruction of millions of lives and milliards of property threatens to increase the disorder left by the old régime, drives Russia to famine, and prevents the carrying out of the necessary measures for strengthening the revolution.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets realizes that an early end of the war is the most important object of the revolutionary democracy. It is needed for the sake of the revolution and for the sake of the laboring classes of all countries. They must reestablish the fraternal union and work together for the full freedom of humanity.

The All-Russian Congress resolves (1) That to end the war by the destruction of one group of belligerents would merely lead to new wars, would intensify the hate between peoples, would lead to complete exhaustion, famine, and ruin; (2) That a separate peace would strengthen one of the belligerents, make possible a victory over the other, encourage the predatory ambitions of the ruling classes, would not free Russia from the clutches of world imperialism, and would make difficult the international union of labor. For

⁹ "Riech," No. 136, June 26, 1917.

this reason the Congress is categorically opposed to all attempts aiming to bring on a separate peace or a separate truce.

In view of the fact that war can be brought to an end only through the united efforts of the democracies of all countries, the Congress regards as essential (a) that the Russian revolutionary democracy, through its organ, the All-Russian Soviet, should address itself to the democracies of all States, asking them to join in the rallying cry: "Peace without annexation and indemnity, and on the basis of self-determination of peoples"—and try to influence their governments along these lines; (b) that it [Russian democracy] should make every effort to reestablish the revolutionary international and call together an international Socialist Congress to reestablish the international labor solidarity, to work out definite peace terms, and means to put them into force; (c) that it should call to the attention of the democracies of all warring countries that their failure to contradict with sufficient energy the last declarations of their governments on the question of war aims puts the Russian revolution in a very difficult position and stands in the way of international labor union.

In order to accomplish these tasks, a mission should be dispatched at once to the Allied and neutral States to invite them to send to Russia representatives of the different Socialist groups. The Congress firmly protests against the obstacles placed in the way of Socialist delegations by the imperialist governments.

Realizing that the Provisional Revolutionary Government has made the foundation of its foreign policy the carrying out of the democratic program of peace, the Congress urges the Government to do all that it can . . . to persuade the Allies to accept this program.

The Congress urges that the Government should now do all that it can to have a reexamination of the treaties with the Allies with a view to abandoning the policy of conquests. In order to hasten this step, it is necessary to change the diplomatic and foreign office personnel, with a view to making it more democratic.

The Congress takes the stand that until the war is brought to an end by the efforts of the international democracy, the Russian revolutionary democracy is obliged to keep its army in condition to take either the offensive or defensive. The destruction of the Russian front means defeat for the Russian revolution and a heavy blow to the cause of international democracy. The question whether to take the offensive should be decided from the purely military and strategic point of view.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE LAND QUESTION AND THE FIRST ALL- RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

"Land and Liberty" was the slogan of the Russian revolutionists from the very beginning of their organized existence. As soon as they had won liberty, they proceeded to secure the land for the peasants. They had in mind taking it from the landowners without compensation and handing it over to the toilers. There were differences of opinion as to just how this should be done. The Bolsheviks were for outright seizure, but the moderate Socialists favored legalizing it through the Constituent Assembly. The bourgeois parties naturally fell in with the latter view, for it gave them a fighting chance.

Though feeling quite certain that the Constituent Assembly would work on the principle of "All the land to all the laboring people," the Socialists were determined to leave as little as possible to chance. In March and April they began to organize the peasants. In May they brought them together at Petrograd in an All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies. At that time the new Minister of Agriculture was Victor Chernov, a Socialist-Revolutionist. He heartily advocated the giving of the land to the toilers, but being a member of the Government, he could not carry out his ideas in an official capacity, and therefore worked through the peasant organizations. He suggested that the peasants organize local land committees to study the land question and prepare recommendations for the Constituent Assembly. "This," said Chernov, "will be a training school." They took the hint and in their resolution on June 7 came out for "the transfer, without compensation, of all lands now belonging to the State, monasteries, churches and private persons into the possession of the nation, for equitable and free use by agricultural workers."

What the Peasants' Deputies had in mind was to face the Constituent Assembly with a situation and not a theory. When Chernov and some of his associates were charged with doing this very thing they said that in forming the land committees they hoped to solve the problem legally and do away with lawless seizure of land. Toward the end of July, Chernov succeeded in having the Provisional Government pass a decree aiming to put a stop to the transfer of land and indicating that the Constituent Assembly would pay no attention to land transactions after March 1.

As the spring passed into summer and the country became more and more demoralized, the peasants ignored committees, soviets, and the Provisional Government, and listened more to the advice of the Bolsheviks (which fell in with their own inclinations) to help themselves to the land. This procedure made matters worse and agriculture sank lower and lower.

The peasants' organizations were at first largely dominated by the Socialist-Revolutionists. Between the left wing of the Cadet Party and the right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionists there were no great differences. They had enough in common to make it possible to work together. The Socialist-Revolutionists theorized less and compromised more than the Social-Democrats.

When the two All-Russian Congresses of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers', and of Peasants' Deputies, came to a close they left Executive Committees to watch over their interests and that of the country as a whole. On July 1 the two Executive Committees united for common action, against both the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks.

1. RESOLUTIONS OF THE PEASANTS' UNION ¹

1. The meeting of the Peasants' Union in the Morskoi Korpus on April 8, 1917, in which three thousand citizens, peasants, and soldiers participated, resolved:

That it is necessary to go on with the war for freedom, but that the Russian people has no need of conquests; that the Russian

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 27, April 11, 1917. An editorial note says that the resolution was called to the attention of the Provisional Government with the comment of the authors that the peasants should abstain from any high-handed seizure of land of any kind.

people, after freeing the areas ruined by the belligerents, needs a peace in the interest of the laboring classes of the world. Having taken into consideration the Call of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the people of the world, a call which guarantees liberty and self-determination to all peoples and opposes new conquests, the meeting greets the Minister of Justice, Kerenski, and empowers him to defend before the Provisional Government questions of war and peace and to strive to persuade the Provisional Government to renounce, at once, all aims of conquest.

2. The meeting of the Peasants' Union thinks that the Russian people, having thrown off the yoke of the autocracy, desires neither a limited nor an unlimited tsar government, but a democratic republic.

3. The meeting of the Peasants' Union believes that the land should be handed over to the workers, and that each person who tills the soil with his own hands has the right to the use of it.

4. The meeting greets the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and all Socialist parties . . . in their fight for land and freedom.

5. To make it possible at once to plant the idle fields no matter to whom they belong.

2. INTERVIEW AND SPEECH BY CHERNOV

(a) INTERVIEW ²

The former [First Provisional] Government was a creation of the revolution and should have guided it in the right course. It did not do so, because it did not lead, but trailed the revolution. We, Socialists, have been called to carry out this task. . . . We should lead, and in the right direction. This is the reason why we joined the new Government. . . . As regards my own ministry, I ought to say that we have before us three important problems. The first is to prepare the land question for the Constituent Assembly. We must so prepare as to have full and exhaustive information on all questions that might be raised. The second problem is to settle the local land conflicts. It is no secret that the Constituent Assembly, in solving the land question, will work on the principle, "all the land to all the laboring people." That this is the solution to the problem is recognized even by those who do not approve of it. We would,

² "Izvestiia," No. 61, May 22, 1917.

therefore, not be usurping the authority of the Constituent Assembly if, in settling the local conflicts, we were guided by this principle. The third problem is to organize all over Russia, Soviets of Peasant Deputies and local land committees, made up not only of elected statisticians and others of the more educated population, but also of the agriculturists, so that the representatives of the peasants at the Constituent Assembly might have a clear understanding of the problem, and a program.

(b) SPEECH OF CHERNOV, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ³

June 6, 1917

"Allow me to report to you some of the new phases in the land question. The most important problem just now is to guard the reserve of land which the Constituent Assembly will dispose of. In order to keep it intact, I, as Minister of Agriculture, will propose to the Provisional Government a law dealing with buying, selling, and mortgaging of land."

The Minister commented on the value of the new law about to be published, regarding the new volost and uiezd zemstvos. He went on to say that, from the moment of its publication, all local land questions will be put into the hands of the organized inhabitants. The Provisional Government, though it has Socialist Ministers in it, does not undertake to prepare the land reform for the Constituent Assembly, but hands over all these questions to the toilers themselves. He asked his hearers to bear in mind that the elections for the volost and uiezd zemstvos and land committees give the people an opportunity to take part in the preparation for the land reforms. This will be a training school. The first real practice will be in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. . . .

3. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

June 7, 1917 ⁴

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies announces to the entire Russian peasantry that henceforth not only the final solution of the agrarian problem in the Constituent Assembly, but all the

³ "Riech," No. 120, June 7, 1917. This Congress was in session from May 17 to June 10, 1917.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 121, June 8, 1917.

preparatory work to be done by the local and central land committees passes into the hands of the working people themselves. For this reason, the first, most important, and most responsible task of the more progressive part of the peasantry is the organization of elections to the volost and uiezd zemstvos, and the establishment of land committees in connection with these zemstvos. The work of these committees in the preparation of land reforms is to be based on the following principles: The transfer, without compensation, of all lands now belonging to the state, monasteries, churches, and private persons into the possession of the nation, for equitable and free use by agricultural workers.

Firmly believing in the growing strength, organization, and intelligence of the toiling peasantry, the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates is deeply convinced that private ownership of land with its forests, water power, and mineral resources will be abolished by the National Constituent Assembly, which will establish a fundamental law as regards the land, the conditions of its transfer to the workers, and its distribution for use.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies is also convinced that in all land committees, from that of the volost to the Central Committee, the working peasantry, taking advantage of the elective system, will see to it that all the preparatory work for the agrarian reform shall be carried out with the object of emancipating the land from the bonds of private property, without any compensation.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies expects the Provisional Government to assist, as far as it lies within its power, in the free expression of the working people's opinion on the important problem of reorganization, now confronting Russia, and to prevent all attempts at interference with this work by persons who put their personal and party interests above those of the country.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies urges the Provisional Government to issue an absolutely clear and unequivocal statement which will show that on this question the Provisional Government will allow nobody to oppose the people's will.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies resolves that:

The necessity of settling the food-supply crisis, and of a successful struggle with the economic disorder throughout the country, in this hour of an oppressive and exhausting world war, imperatively demands that all private and party interests yield to the higher interests of the whole people and the State.

In view of this, all land, without exception, must be given over

to the land committees, which should have the power to issue regulations for cultivation, sowing, harvesting, haying, etc.

Because of the drafting for war service of an enormous number of workers, and their extreme scarcity in the harvest season, it is necessary that all able-bodied workers, voluntary agricultural organizations, artels, and war prisoners be put at the disposal of the above land committees, and be distributed not to the advantage of individuals, but in the interests of all the toiling population.

Because of the lack and the worn condition of the agricultural machinery, most energetic measures are necessary for the requisitioning and putting to use on a public and a coöperative basis of all agricultural machines and tools which Russia can make available, and for inviting technical men to run them. Also, in view of the number of peasants' horses requisitioned and the extreme scarcity of live farm stock, it is necessary to utilize the live stock to be found outside of farms.

Haying, harvesting, storing of grain, fishing, preparation of timber, firewood and other forest materials must be put under the control of the land committees and other authorized public organizations, in order to prevent individual hoarding of the greatly needed supplies or exploiting the natural resources of the land.

The fixing of land rents and payments, the fixing of wages for agricultural labor, and similar questions must be given over entirely to the local land committees. In disputed cases, the rent is to be kept in the local State treasury.

Until the putting into force of national reforms, the local land committees shall be allowed complete freedom of initiative and activity in all the above-mentioned land questions. With this in mind, all interference on the part of guberniia and uiezd commissars must be removed. One-sided selection of staffs, from among the land-owning class, must also be done away with.

In order to preserve intact the amount of land available for the coming land reform, it is necessary [to pass a strict law] to be enforced by the land committees, prohibiting the buying, selling, willing and mortgaging of land, until the Constituent Assembly.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies is of the opinion that only under such arrangements is it possible to prepare, for the land reform, without too many disturbances, lawless seizures, civil dissensions, and other illegal acts. Only under such arrangements is it possible to bring to life a new agrarian order, worthy of free Russia, able to unite in one fraternity, one State, all toilers of the land, with-

out distinction of nationality, religion, and condition—Great Russians and Little Russians, Christians and Mohammedans, peasants and Cossacks, natives of Russia and of outlying regions. . . . Each of these groups will feel the beneficial results of the great reform, and will bless it.

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies invites the whole peasantry to remain peaceful, but to work with determination and steadfastness for the realization in a legal manner of the cherished thoughts and hopes of the agricultural laborer, which have long since found expression in the motto, so dear to each peasant, "Land and Liberty."⁵

The Congress decided in favor of the following special appeal to the population:

The All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies appeals to the peasants and the whole wage-earning population of Russia to vote, at the elections to the Constituent Assembly, only for those candidates who pledge themselves to advocate the nationalization of the land, without reimbursement, and on principles of equality.

This was followed by a few remarks by Rivkin . . . who called attention to the bands of deserters, and pointed out that all the efforts to organize committees and soviets would be of no value, if they were to live in fear of these armed bands. It was necessary, he said, to form a committee of self-defense, and to arm the population; otherwise they could have no assurance that they would live long enough to see the Constituent Assembly.

4. DECREE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT⁶

July 25, 1917

For the purpose of stopping land speculation, preventing fictitious transactions, mortgages, sales to foreigners, and other such land deals which may impede the free disposition of the available lands by the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government has decreed:

⁵ The resolution was almost unanimously adopted; two voted against, and one delegate refused to vote.

⁶ "Vestnik Vremennago Pravitelstva," No. 104 (150), July 27, 1917.

First.—The execution of deeds for the vesting or transfer of the right of ownership, mortgage, or other title in rural lands used for agricultural purposes or under standing timber, must in each separate case be authorized by the local provincial land committees and confirmed by the Minister of Agriculture.

Second.—The validity of the present decree shall not interfere with the confirmation of deeds concerning immovable properties mentioned in Section One, which were executed prior to March 1, 1917.

Third.—In all cases of landed properties put up for sale by public auction, notice shall be given to the Ministry of Agriculture, which shall have the right, upon consultation with the local provincial land committees, to withdraw them from the auction and turn them over for temporary economic management to the branch of the Peasant Land Bank and the State Land Bank of the Nobility, and to the Administration of the National Domains, with a transfer to the State of the current interest payments on mortgage loans, pending the final disposition of such lands by the Constituent Assembly.

Fourth.—The Minister of Justice shall be authorized to put the present decree into effect telegraphically, pending its publication by the Governing Senate.

A. KERENSKI, *Prime Minister*
CHERNOV, *Minister of Agriculture*

July 25, 1917

FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ⁷

The Provisional Government considers it necessary to point out that any kind of title deed executed after March 1, 1917, in voluntary transactions as well as in forced sales, by whomsoever executed and concerning whomsoever, affecting the vestment or transfer of property rights, mortgages, or any other right to rural lands used for agriculture or under standing timber, cannot be construed to restrict the freedom of action by the Constituent Assembly and cannot serve as a basis for extending any exemptions and privileges to such lands and to persons who will be parties to such acts, during the settlement of the land question.

July 25, 1917

⁷ "Riech," No. 102, May 16, 1917.

5. LAWLESS LAND SEIZURES

(a) REPORT OF LANDOWNERS ⁸

Delegates, representing landowners in the guberniias of Simbirsk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Samara, Saratov, Tver, Kharkov, Poltava, Kursk, Kherson, and Ekaterinoslav, submitted the following report to the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

In the full consciousness of the great moral responsibility before the country, imposed upon us by the Provisional Government, namely, the duty to produce food and fodder for the army and the population, we proceeded to carry out the obligation imposed upon us, totally oblivious to our own interests. However, at the very first steps in this direction, we met with the strongest opposition from village committees and commissars, who are acting illegally and carrying out undisguised propaganda for the abolition by every possible means of private landownership in these guberniias. A situation has thus been created which will compel the above named guberniias, which serve the needs of the largest sugar factories and are for this reason engaged in intensive farming, to cease producing cereals, vegetables, and sugar. The general situation in these guberniias at the present time is as follows:

1. Public organizations and their representatives, contrary to the law, fix the rent on land so low that it does not even cover the necessary payments due on the land.

2. Land is forcibly taken from its owners and handed over to the peasants. In some cases, the land thus seized either remained fallow or was speculated with by being leased to a third party at a higher rate.

3. Wages for labor are arbitrarily set, interfering with freedom of labor and freedom of contract.

4. The sanctity of the home is being violated by searches and by confiscation of movable property. Landowners and their managers are deprived of liberty, without due process of law, for refusing to obey the unlawful demands of the committees and commissars.

5. The committees and their agents usurp the functions of courts, and, contrary to the express provisions of Article I of the Civil Statutes, examine conflicts relating to land and labor.

If the above situation continues, Russia, notwithstanding its rich

⁸ "Riech," No. 102, May 16, 1917.

black earth, will in the very near future become a wilderness covered with weeds, a country with a population poverty-stricken, both morally and materially, with an insignificant amount of low-grade grain, insufficient even for the needs of its cultivators. Her highly efficient agriculture will be ruined, and there will be a total destruction of the starch, syrup, and sugar-beet production, and pure-bred stock.

Russia's economic ruin is unavoidable. We, the representatives of the guberniias named above, consider it our moral obligation to call this condition to the attention of the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies.

Landowners: LIEUTENANT B. A. IUST, COLONEL K. V. MOLOSTOV, V. N. KUKOL-IASNOPOLSKI.

(b) LETTERS FROM VILLAGES *

After arriving home (Podolskaia guberniia), I was elected to the volost committee. In our village there is no order. People live as they did before the revolution. They make moonshine and sell it for two rubles a bottle. Drunkenness and robbery are on the increase.

The Cossacks who live in the neighborhood steal from the landholders and peasants and insult the women. They do not even respect the church. In one village the store of the Consumers' Society was looted, and in another the home of a very popular doctor. . . .

With the landlords, it is not as it should be. They have planted sugar-beets, and to harvest them they offer labor one and one-half rubles per day, which is not enough to pay for board.

Livestock for the army has been bought in the villages at the rate of eleven rubles the pud. It was driven on the land of a certain landholder where many have perished from hunger. . . .

Committees are organized in the villages but have no idea where their authority begins or ends. Can the committee dismiss a worthless priest? Can a landowner sell a piece of timber land without the authorization of the committee? . . .

The cost of living and profiteering are on the increase. Speculators buy up bread and sell it later for five rubles the pud. There are those who have on hand one thousand or more puds of grain and yet buy more for speculative purposes. Merchants hide manufactured goods and allow only a limited amount on the market, for which they charge high prices. There is an abundance of money in the village

* "Izvestiia," No. 120, July 31, 1917.

and with it, dissipation and debauchery. For the first time in the history of the village we have a house of ill-fame.

The military unit which was sent here to protect, robs the people of their cattle, fowl, and bread, and insults the women. . . .

(c) DIVIDING THE LAND ¹⁰

Village of Teliash, Orlov Guberniia:

Each year the peasants rented their land from the landholder. This year they went to him as usual and he asked the usual rent. The peasants refused to pay it, and without much bargaining went home. There they called a meeting and decided to take up the land without paying. They put the plows and harrows on their carts and started for the field. When they arrived, they got into an argument as to the division of the land because it was not all the same quality. When they had quarreled for a time, one of the party proposed that they proceed to the landholder's warehouse, where some good alcohol was kept. They broke into the place, where they found fifty barrels. They drank and drank, but could not drink it all. They became so drunk that they did not know what they were doing and carelessly set the place on fire. Four burned to death; the ninety others escaped. A few days later they returned to the field and once more quarreled. It ended in a fight in which thirteen were left dead, fifteen were carried off badly injured, and, of these, four died.

Soon after that a quarrel started over the rich peasants. In the village there were eighteen farmers who had from twenty-five to thirty desiatins of land. They had a reserve of grain of various kinds. About thirty of the villagers seized this reserve. Another village meeting was called. A few of the more intelligent peasants came out strongly against this act of robbery. It ended in another fight in which three were killed and five badly wounded. One of these peasants, whose son was killed, shook his fist and shouted, "I will make you pay for my son."

Three days later one of the village houses caught fire. People came running and asking, "How did it get on fire?" Some one suggested that the man who a few days ago threatened to get even was the incendiary. The mob started for his place and killed him. When that was done, it was learned that the fire was due to the carelessness of the housewife. On that day (April 24) a strong wind was blowing straight down the street, and one hundred thirty-two homes were burned.

¹⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 121, August 1, 1917.

On June 7 there was a village meeting. There were present two students (from Malo-Archangel) and thirteen soldiers. The soldiers and students were quite friendly. At the gathering one of the church readers made a speech, calling on those present to plunder the landholders and rich peasants. He was applauded and carried around. When quiet was restored, one of the students took the floor and pleaded, especially with the old men, not to believe what the psalm reader said. He reminded his hearers of what had come out of the last attempt at plundering. He was not allowed to finish, for from the crowd shouts came, "Kick him out. He is a burzhui." The student continued, but the audience left him.

6. UNION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES WITH THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES ¹¹

Realizing the need of uniting all the activities of the revolutionary democratic organizations to protect and extend the conquests of the revolution and to carry on active warfare against counter-revolutionary undertakings, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies regards it as very necessary to unite at once with the Executive Committee of the Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Together they will decide all current political questions, act on an equal footing, and in the name of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants', Workers', and Soldiers' Deputies. . . .

¹¹ "Izvestiia," No. 95, July 1, 1917.

CHAPTER XXV

THE ARMY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Russian army which was falling to pieces under the monarchy continued to disintegrate under the revolution and for more or less the same reasons. These were German propaganda, Bolshevik agitation, economic want, physical suffering, war weariness, lack of coöperation between the military and civil authorities, and lack of confidence of the lower ranks in their leaders.

In the tsarist army the ignorant and coarse soldier was treated as an inferior. He had few rights which his superior was bound to take into consideration. Between the two men there did not exist the loyalty and respect found in many of the more democratic armies.

When the Petrograd garrison found that its unwillingness to fire on the crowd brought on a revolution, it was greatly frightened. Some of the soldiers dared not return to the barracks, but fled to the Duma and the Soviet for protection.

Being occupied with other things and eager to quiet the soldier, the Soviet issued Order No. 1 with the object of defining the mutual relations of soldiers and officers. It took authority from the officers and gave it to soldiers' committees.

Some of the leaders of the Soviet believed that if the common soldier were treated as a self-respecting citizen and put on his honor and manhood, he would make a better man and fighter than under the fist system. No doubt many soldiers rose to the occasion, but the great mass of them were too far down to be raised quickly to the standard in the minds of the idealists. Self-government by committees broke down and the soldiers, finding themselves without control, became a mob. In many cases they attacked and drove out their officers. The Soviet pleaded with the soldiers, and Kerenski argued with them, but they listened only to those who approved their wild acts and told them to go home.

The failure of the July offensive showed how low the morale of the troops was. Kornilov went to work to restore discipline but the policy of hesitation pursued by Kerenski made this task difficult. After the collapse of the Kornilov adventure the army situation grew worse. Agitators made use of the affair to incite the soldiers against the officers by telling the ignorant men that it was a plot of officers against the soldiers. In some parts of the country brutal soldiers condemned and executed innocent officers in a beastly way. These murderers went unpunished, because it was neither politically wise nor physically safe to touch them. That there were still loyal and self-sacrificing troops as late as November is evident from the appeals sent out by the First and Nth armies.

I. GERMAN PROPAGANDA ¹

(Reported by the Military Commission)

SOLDIERS:—There is revolution in Petrograd. Don't you see that you are being deceived? Don't you see that the English are leading Russia to ruin? The English have deceived your Tsar and incited him to fight, so that with his aid they may conquer the whole world. In the beginning the English were with your Tsar, but because he did not agree to their selfish demands, they have turned against him. They have cast your God-given Tsar from his throne.

Why has this happened? Because he has realized and made public the cunning and treacherous English schemes. The English are getting countless millions of rubles from Russia for war munitions they supply, and they alone are interested in the continuation of the war. But who is fighting this bloody war? Your own brother, the brave muzhik, who lays down his life without a murmur, not realizing that it is for England that he sheds his blood. Who else is suffering through this bloody war? Your mothers, wives, and children, whose sons and husbands were taken away almost three years ago, and who now live in hunger and destitution, suffering from the high prices and lack of food. How can we explain this want and the high prices? By the fact that profiteers, allied with England, are holding back all foodstuffs and other articles of prime necessity, so as to obtain an even higher price. The English and the speculators grow

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 14, March 27, 1917.

rich on the war. Open your eyes, Russian people! England is responsible for your ruin. England now acts in Russia as if it belonged to her. Soldiers, England has cast your Tsar from his throne. There is revolution in Petrograd. England is your enemy.

2. MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS

ORDER NOT TO TAKE AWAY ARMS ²

In the name of the new commandant of the Nikolaevsk [railway] station notices have been posted on the walls of the station, forbidding the soldiers to take away the officers' arms. Armed officers who arrive in the city are ordered to appear at the Hall of the Army and Navy to receive instructions and credentials. It is stated in the order that the State Duma has issued nothing authorizing the taking of arms from officers.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE PETROGRAD GARRISON ³

On March 14, a rumor spread among the Petrograd garrison that the officers are taking guns from the soldiers. Investigations in two regiments proved that there is no truth in these stories.

As Head of the War Commission of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, I give notice that such acts on the part of officers will not be tolerated. Those found guilty will be severely punished even unto death.

Member of the State Duma, B. ENGELHARDT

3. ORDERS NOS. 1 AND 2 AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

(a) ORDER No. I ⁴

March 14, 1917

To the garrison of the Petrograd District, to all the soldiers of the guard, army, artillery, and navy, for immediate and strict execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for their information:—

² "Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 4, March 14, 1917.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 5, March 15, 1917.

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 3, March 15, 1917.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:

1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons, in the special services of the various military administrations, and on the vessels of the navy, committees from the elected representatives of the lower ranks of the above-mentioned military units shall be chosen immediately.

2. In all those military units which have not yet chosen their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, one representative from each company shall be selected, to report with written credentials at the building of the State Duma by ten o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth of this March.

3. In all its political actions, the military branch is subordinated to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to its own committees.

4. The orders of the military commission of the State Duma shall be executed only in such cases as do not conflict with the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

5. All kinds of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, armored automobiles, and others, must be kept at the disposal and under the control of the company and battalion committees, and in no case be turned over to officers, even at their demand.

6. In the ranks and during their performance of the duties of the service, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and the ranks, in their political, general civic, and private life, soldiers cannot in any way be deprived of those rights which all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing at attention and compulsory saluting, when not on duty, is abolished.

7. Also, the addressing of the officers with the title, "Your Excellency," "Your Honor," etc., is abolished, and these titles are replaced by the address of "Mister General, "Mister Colonel," etc. Rudeness towards soldiers of any rank, and, especially, addressing them as "Thou," is prohibited, and soldiers are required to bring to the attention of the company committees every infraction of this rule, as well as all misunderstandings occurring between officers and privates.

The present order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regiments, ships' crews, batteries, and other combatant and non-combatant commands.

THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

(b) OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS ⁵

Order No. 1 of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, published in the last number of the "Izvestiia," defines in full the mutual relations of soldiers and officers. Nevertheless there are those who, at this critical historical moment, are trying to disturb the unity which has been achieved at the price of so many sacrifices. We have in mind the proclamation, fortunately not widely scattered, signed in the name of the two Socialist parties.

Let us compare the two documents [Order No. 1 and the Proclamation].

The "Order" defines the position of the officers. It gives them authority only in time of military service. When drilling, when on duty, when in war, the soldiers and all lower ranks must observe military discipline. Off duty and off service, the officers have no power over the soldiers. The soldier has become a citizen; he has ceased to be a slave. This is the idea of the "Order":

In the above-mentioned proclamation, we note a strange rage against the officers, without excepting even those who have come out on the side of the people and are actually our friends. . . .

We have no doubt, we firmly believe, that the intelligent comrade-soldiers will pay no attention to these calls and will not follow the advice of the light-minded authors of this leaflet.

(c) ORDER NO. II ⁶

To the troops of the Petrograd district, to all the soldiers of the guard, army, artillery, and navy, for strict execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information:—

In explanation and amplification of Order No. 1, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:

1. Order No. 1 of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies proposed to all companies, battalions, and other military units to elect committees (company, battalion, etc.), appropriate to each particular unit, but that Order did not provide that these committees should elect the officers of each unit. These committees are to be chosen in order that the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison may be organized and

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

⁶ "Protokoly," 296-7.

enabled, through their committee representatives, to share in the general political life of the country and, specifically, to make known to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies their views regarding the necessity for action of any kind. The committees must also attend to the general needs of each company, or other unit.

As regards the question of the limits within which the interests of the military establishment may be compatible with the right of the soldiers to choose their own commanders, it has been submitted for consideration to a special commission.

All elections of officers up to the present time and confirmed, or submitted for confirmation, by the army authorities, must remain in force.

2. Pending the time when the question of elective commanders is definitely settled, the Soviet grants to the committees of the various units the right of objection to the appointment of any officer. Such objections must be addressed to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, by whom they will be laid before the military commission in which representatives of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, together with other public organizations, are participating.

3. Order No. 1 showed the significance of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as an institution directing all the POLITICAL actions of the soldiers of Petrograd. To this elective organ of their own choice, the soldiers are bound to submit in matters of their public and POLITICAL life. As for the military authorities, the soldiers are bound to submit to all their orders that have reference to the military service.

4. To remove the danger of an armed counter-revolution, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies presented the demand that the Petrograd garrison, which won for Russia her political liberty, be not disarmed, and the Provisional Government has assumed the obligation to prevent such disarmament, in accordance with its official declaration. In conformity with this declaration, company and battalion committees are required to see to it that the arms of the Petrograd soldiers are not taken from them, as was indicated in Order No. 1.

5. Reaffirming the demands made under points 6 and 7 of Order No. 1, the Executive Committee notes the fact that some of these are already being carried into effect by the Provisional Government.

The present Order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regi-

ments, ships' crews, batteries, and other combatant and non-combatant commands.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET
OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

This is a true copy of the original:

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

(d) SPEECH OF N. S. CHKHEIDZE⁷

March 15, 1917

Deputy Chkheidze, in a fiery speech, greeted the achievement of Russian freedom attained through the united efforts of the proletariat and the revolutionary army. He vehemently protested against the reactionary attempts of the still-living old régime, and among others the scattering of provocative leaflets, with the object of setting the soldiers against the officers,⁸ and signed in the name of the Social-Democratic organization. The deputy appealed for the union of all revolutionary forces, for only through union could the revolution succeed.

(e) CALL OF THE OFFICERS TO THE SOLDIERS⁹

Soldiers, our Comrades in battle! The hour of the liberation of the people has come. The army, fleet, and the people, together with you, have raised the sacred flag of freedom. And we, who have fought with you side by side at the front, who have faced death with you, who have shed and mingled our blood with yours on the field of battle, appeal to you to believe us that the freedom of our country is dearer to us than all. Only a free Russia can crush the German power. Keep in mind that the welfare and victory of Russia depend on our mutual trust and coöperation.

Let the old autocratic system rot forever. For two years it has not been able to bring about a decisive victory over the enemy. United with you, we will give it our curse.

Comrade-soldiers! Don't throw away your guns; take care of them. You need them here just as much as in the trenches. Help

⁷ "Izvestia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 7, March 16, 1917. According to the report of his speech in this paper, Chkheidze said that the leaflets called on the soldiers to kill the officers.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 5, March 15, 1917.

to put an end to plundering; restore order; return to your units to work harmoniously with us. To our great shame some of the officers, just as some of the soldiers, have betrayed the popular cause, and their betrayal has been the cause of many victims among the honest fighters for liberty.

But we will join our efforts in the common cause, bringing about a decisive victory over the enemy, at the front as well as in the interior of Russia.

Long live great free Russia!

YOUR COMRADE-OFFICERS

[Assembled in the] State Duma

(f) FROM THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES ¹⁰

Comrade-Citizens:

The new Government, formed from the moderate elements of society, has today announced the reforms which it binds itself to carry out, some of them while still fighting the old régime, and others at the end of the fight. Among these reforms are political freedom, the preparation for the Constituent Assembly, civil liberties, and the abolition of nationality restrictions, which should meet with the hearty approval of the large democratic circle. We would say that in so far as the new Government works in the direction of carrying out these obligations and makes a determined fight against the old Government, democracy should give it her support.

Comrades and citizens! Complete victory of the Russian people over the old régime is near. But to attain this victory tremendous efforts, patience, and determination are needed. There must be no disunion and anarchy. There must be an end to lawlessness, robbing, breaking into private homes, stealing and spoiling all sorts of property, and aimless seizure of public buildings. Decline in discipline and anarchy will ruin the revolution and popular liberty.

The possibility of a military movement against the revolution is not yet removed. In order to prevent such an event, it is exceedingly important to have coöperation between soldiers and officers. Officers to whom the freedom and progressive development of Russia are dear, should use all their efforts to bring about a working agreement with the soldiers. They should respect the soldier, as a man and a citizen, and treat him in an honorable manner. On their side,

¹⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 4, March 16, 1917.

the soldiers should remember that the army is strong only when soldiers and officers are united, that one should not blame all the officers for the bad behavior of a few. For the sake of the success of the revolutionary struggle, it is necessary to be patient and to forget the sins against democracy committed by some of the officers, who have since joined in the determined and decisive fight which you are leading against the old régime.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOLDIERS' AND
WORKERS' DEPUTIES

PROCLAMATION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
PETROGRAD SOVIET ¹¹

Comrades—Soldiers!

The old Russia no longer exists. There is a New, Free, Revolutionary Russia. But the old régime is not yet dead. It has been captured only to an insignificantly small extent. The task of forming a new régime is not yet done. It may even be said that the most difficult part of the task is yet before us,—to preserve and consolidate the liberty achieved.

Comrades! We must not forget this task for an instant. Let us guard and strengthen our conquests. We succeeded in overthrowing the old monarchical régime only because we joined our forces. And we must not now disrupt them. We must remember that any dissension divides our strength and aids those who are already organizing a campaign against liberty. These old forces are taking every expedient to carry strife into our ranks. They stop at nothing. Be on your guard.

At this moment they are trying to sow dissension between you and the officers who have joined the revolution. Do not fall into the traps of the *provocateurs*; remember that the revolutionary officers are now our comrades. Fights and insults which are without basis, or are based solely on dark rumors, are inadmissible and dangerous. Do not believe these rumors; take no rash steps against our comrades, the officers. Only in case of indisputable evidence, report immediately to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Do not believe speakers who are not authorized to represent the Executive Committee.

¹¹ "Izvestiia," No. 6, March 18, 1917.

4. RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER ¹²RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC MEETING OF THE SOVIET OF
SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES*March 22, 1917*

I

Soldiers enjoy all the rights of citizens.

1. Every soldier has the right to be a member of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organization or union.
2. Every soldier has the right to utter freely and publicly, by word of mouth, writing, or print, his political, religious, social, and other views.

Note: Obligatory public religious service is done away with, together with other restrictions on religious freedom.

3. Soldiers, like officers, have the right to wear civilian dress when off duty.
4. All censorship on letters and telegrams, except those strictly military, is now abolished.
5. All publications, without exception, whether appearing regularly or irregularly, should be delivered immediately, without discussion, to the persons addressed.

II

Officers should address soldiers, and soldiers, officers, in a manner becoming citizens.

The office of orderly is abolished.

III

Soldiers have the right of internal organization.

IV

Without any exception.

3. Corporal punishment is abolished. Not a single case of corporal punishment, whether in the rear or at the front, should remain unpunished. Every officer who, after the publication of this Order, is

¹² "Izvestiia," No. 15, March 28, 1917. Many of the articles in this document have not been translated because they are repetitions of Orders No. 1 and No. 2.

found violating it, should be at once handed over for trial . . . regardless of his rank, and removed from duty. If found guilty, the court should sentence him to a punishment not less heavy than degradation to the ranks. . . .

5. ARMY DEMORALIZATION

(a) KERENSKI'S SPEECH BEFORE THE CONGRESS OF DELEGATES FROM THE FRONT

*May 11, 1917*¹⁸

It is two months since the birth of Russian freedom. I did not come here to congratulate you. We sent you our felicitations a long time ago, when you were in the trenches. Your sorrows and your hardships were among the reasons for the revolution. We could no longer bear the reckless and senseless way in which the old Government shed your blood. During these two months I believed, and still believe, that the only power that is able to save the country and lead her out into the light is the conscious realization that each one of us, without exception, is responsible for each word and act. I cannot conceal from you, representatives of the front, that I am disturbed. I am alarmed. I shall talk to you openly, regardless of the consequences. . . .

The time for the isolated State is gone. The world is one united family which, though its members often fight among themselves, is nevertheless bound together by cultural, economic, and other ties. To tear out one State from its unit, to separate it from the outside world, means to cut it loose from its living members, to send it to its death from the loss of blood, as it were.

Just now we are celebrating our new ideals and the creation of a new democratic State in Europe. This puts us in a position to play a colossal rôle in world history—if we can force other people to go our way, if we can compel our friends and enemies to respect our freedom. But for this, time is needed—time to see that it is impossible to fight the ideas of the Russian democracy. We can pass through this period only as an organized, strong, and united body, commanding respect. If we, like unworthy slaves, will not organize

¹⁸ "Riech," No. 100, May 13, 1917.

a strong State, then a dark and bloody period of mutual distrust will come on us, and our ideas will be crushed under the heel by those who believe that might makes right and not that right makes might. Every one of us, from soldier to minister, has a right to do what he pleases, but he should do it with his eyes open and with the thought of the greater good.

Comrades, you have endured in quiet for ten years; you carried out the obligations which the old Government laid upon you, even to firing on the people. Why can you not be a bit patient now? Is it possible that the free State of Russia is nothing more than a State of revolted slaves? (Excitement among the auditors.)

Comrades, I cannot and do not know how to tell the people what is not so, and how to conceal the truth from them.

I have come to you because I find myself losing confidence; I have not the courage I once had. I am not so sure as I once was that before me are not slaves in insurrection but rather conscientious citizens, trying to create a new State worthy of the Russian people.

We are told that we no longer need a front, that fraternization is going on. But is fraternization taking place on two fronts? Is it on the French front? If we are going to have fraternization, let us have it on all fronts. Is it not true that the forces of the enemy have been shifted to the Anglo-French front and that the offensive of our Allies has come to a standstill? We have not a Russian, but a united Allied front.

We are on the way toward peace. I would not be in the Provisional Government if putting an end to this slaughter were not its aim. But there are ways and ways. There are broad, open highways, but there are also narrow and dark trails which lead to destruction. We are anxious to bring this fratricidal war to an end, but to bring this about we must follow the open and clear road. We are not a gathering of tired men—we are a State.

There are ways, complicated and long, requiring calm and endurance. If we propose new war aims, then it is necessary that we be respected by friend and foe. No one respects a weakling.

I am sorry that I did not die two months ago. I could have died then with the beautiful vision that, once for all, a new life had come to Russia, that we could respect one another without whip or club, and that we could govern our State not the way the old despots governed it. . . .

(b) FRATERNIZATION ¹⁴

In yesterday's "Pravda" there is a resolution adopted by the Bolsheviks on the question of fraternization in the trenches. [It reads as follows:]

"The [Bolshevik] Party will especially support the fraternization of the soldiers of the belligerent countries which has begun at the front and which has for its object the transformation of that unconscious solidarity of the oppressed into an understanding and a more organized movement toward taking the power from the hands of the Government of the belligerent countries and handing it over to the revolutionary proletariat."

We think it very important to call this resolution to the attention of our comrades and to warn them that it is dangerous for the defense of the revolution at the front.

We receive resolutions and telegrams on fraternization daily from the front, and their general tenor is that fraternization in the trenches is dangerous and suspicious. Under the guise of fraternization, spying is going on. . . .

(c) GUCHKOV'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION ¹⁵

On May 13, A. T. Guchkov handed the following letter to Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov:

My Dear Prince Lvov: In view of the position which the Provisional Government holds in the country, and in particular the Ministry of War and Navy in regard to the army and fleet, a position which I am unable to change and which threatens to have fatal consequences for the army and fleet and for the freedom and the very existence of Russia, I cannot conscientiously continue longer as Minister of War and Navy and share the responsibility for the capital sin which is being carried out against the country; and I, therefore, ask you to release me from these duties.

A. GUCHKOV

Guchkov's Interview ¹⁵

It is impossible to direct the army and navy when, without your knowledge, orders are given out altogether contrary to those you have issued. . . . It is impossible to direct the army and navy when you give an order, for example, to occupy this or that strategic point,

¹⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 54, May 13, 1917.

¹⁵ "Riech," No. 101, May 15, 1917.

and the soldiers begin to bargain with the officers and demand to know: "Why this force and not another is to take part; why today and not tomorrow; why this point and not another?" . . . At this time, when the enemy is at the gate, it is more than ever necessary to have one strong authority. Only under such a condition can the war be concluded in an honorable manner. Only under such a condition can we develop and make the most of the change that has come into our lives with the overthrow of the old order. Unfortunately, such a fundamental condition is to be found neither in the country nor in the army.

(d) APPEAL OF SOVIET TO THE ARMY ¹⁸

Comrade-Soldiers at the Front!

A heavy burden has fallen to your lot. With the price of your blood you have paid for the criminal act of the Tsar, who has sent you to fight and has provided you with neither guns, ammunition, nor bread. The working class did not need the war; they did not start the conflict. The tsars and the capitalists of all countries are responsible. For the people as a whole, every additional day of war is one more day of sorrow. Having overthrown the Tsar, the Russian people has set for itself, as its first task, the bringing the war to an end just as soon as possible.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to all peoples to bring the war to an end. It has appealed to the French, Germans, and Austrians. Russia awaits the answer to this appeal.

Remember, comrade-soldiers, that our appeal would be worthless if the regiments of William should crush revolutionary Russia before our fellow workmen and the peasants of other countries respond to our appeal. Our appeal would be but a blank piece of paper if the whole might of the revolutionary people did not stand back of it.

The workers and peasants of Russia are striving for peace. But this peace must be universal, for all peoples, and by general consent. What would happen if we should make a separate peace, if the Russian army should today stick its bayonets into the ground and say that it did not wish to fight any more, that it was not concerned with what happened to the rest of the world? This is what would happen: after crushing our Allies on the West, German imperialism would turn on us with all its might; the German Emperor, the German landholders and capitalists would place their heavy heels on

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 55, May 15, 1917.

our neck; they would seize our cities, villages, and land; they would lay a tribute on our people. Did we overthrow Nicholas so as to fall at the feet of William?

Comrade-soldiers! The Soviet calls you to peace by another way. It leads you to peace by appealing to the revolutionary workers and peasants of Germany and Austria to rise; it leads you to peace by the promise of our Government to give up the policy of conquest and to demand that the Allied powers do likewise; it leads you to peace by calling an international conference of the Socialists of the whole world to take a definite stand against the war. Time is needed, comrade-soldiers, to arouse the people of all countries.

But remember, comrade-soldiers, that this time will never come if you do not hold the enemy at the front. . . . Remember that at the front, in the trenches, you are standing guard over Russian freedom. You are defending not the Tsar, Protopopov, Rasputin, wealthy landowners and capitalists, but the Russian Revolution, your brother workers and peasants.

Having sworn to protect Russian liberty, do not refuse to take the offensive if the war situation should demand it. The freedom and happiness of Russia is in your hands.

In defending this freedom, beware of provocation; beware of traps. The fraternization which is now developing at the front can easily become a trap. The revolutionary army should fraternize with a revolutionary army, equally ready to die for peace and freedom. At the present moment there is no such army in Germany and Austria-Hungary, no matter how conscientious and honest certain individuals may be. Over there [Germany and Austria] there is no revolution yet. There the army is still for William, for Karl, for landowners and capitalists, for annexation of other peoples' territories, for plunder and force. There the military staff will take advantage not only of your credulity, but of the blind submissiveness of its own soldiers.

You go to fraternize with an honest thought, and from the enemy trenches there comes an officer from the General Staff, dressed in the uniform of a common soldier. While you are talking frankly with your opponent, his officers photograph the place. You stop firing in order to fraternize; he builds fortifications and moves his artillery and troops, to fight elsewhere.

Comrade-soldiers! Not through fraternization, not through silent and separate understandings concluded at the front by individual companies, battalions, and regiments, will you get peace. Not in

separate peace, not in separate truces, is the salvation of the revolution and the peace of the world. Those who tell you that fraternization is the way to peace, are leading both you and Russian freedom to destruction.

(e) LAWLESSNESS BY SOLDIERS¹⁷

Comrade-Soldiers!

During the last few days there have been disorders on the railways brought about by the soldiers trying to get on the trains.

In certain cases, the soldiers fought for a place in a train. At one station the infantry got into a fight with the sailors as to who should go first. At another station the soldiers put the passengers out of the cars. There have also been cases of the soldiers using force on the railway employees.

Comrade-Soldiers!

Such disgraceful misbehavior fills us with shame and makes the heart ache. It is shameful and painful that men who carry the honorable title of soldier behave in such a manner. From the moment of the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the soldier became protector of the country's freedom. Citizens expect from the soldiers protection and help. Instead of that they behave disgracefully on the railways. Their acts bring about a loss of confidence in the army, disorganize the transport service, and cause much harm to the cause of revolution and liberty.

Put an end to this lawless conduct on the railways!

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND
SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

DISHONORABLE DISCHARGE¹⁸

The Provisional Government has ordered dishonorable discharge of the 45th, 46th, 47th and 52d regiments for refusal to obey orders to go to the front. They were ordered to proceed to relieve other regiments in the trenches but decided to remain in the rear.

* * * *

On June 5 an excited group of soldiers of regiment No. — arrested its commander and seven officers, pulled off their shoulder straps, gave one of the officers several blows in the face, knocked down another, and left him lying in an unconscious state.

¹⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 59, May 19, 1917.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 78, June 12, 1917.

KILLING OF OFFICERS¹⁹

The Provisional War Committee received a report of the happenings at Wiborg [Finland]. It gives a frightful picture of lynch law. The mob dragged out from the guardhouse three generals and one colonel, kicked them off the bridge into the water, and killed them. These men had been arrested just before by the Executive Committee of the Soviet and the army committees of the 42nd Corps, on the charge of being implicated in the Kornilov affair. After these men had been murdered, the mob went after other officers in the regiments. These, too, were thrown into the water and then killed. Altogether about fifteen officers were killed, although it is difficult to give the exact figures because some of the officers escaped. The killing continued until night. . . .

At Helsingfors, the sailors killed four naval officers. . . . At Abo one naval officer was killed.

6. LOYAL UNITS IN THE ARMY APPEAL TO
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTFIGHT OR MAKE PEACE²⁰

Prime Minister Kerenski and the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies received the following telegram from the chairman of the executive committee of the N. army:

"The material and spiritual forces of the army are exhausted. The committee, which has been at work to hold up and raise the efficiency of the army, has come up against insurmountable obstacles which are daily growing higher. It is impossible to make an army fit for fighting when it is naked, hungry, forgotten, when its ranks are not filled, when it is betrayed by its own country. It is impossible to make an efficient army when there is no authority in the rear, when the country is in a state of anarchy, when the peasants hide their food from military requisition, the workers refuse to labor for the defense, the bourgeoisie declines to pay war taxes, and the reserves are unwilling to go to the front. It is impossible to make an army capable of defending freedom and revolution when liberty has become license and revolution has turned into pogroms. We realize that the immediate conclusion of peace, which would provide Russia

¹⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 160, September 15, 1917.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 195, October 25, 1917.

with freedom, is just now impossible, but the continuation of the war under present conditions is equally impossible. In the full consciousness of our responsibility before our native land, we representatives of the N. army declare to the Government that together with its fight for a democratic peace, it should also make it possible to go on with the war. Either put an end to the disorganization in the rear, or declare openly that Russia is crushed and surrenders herself to the mercies of the German Emperor. Either restore the army by restoring order in the rear, or make peace and bow to the victorious German imperialists. There is no other alternative. Here are some things that must be done without the least delay:

"1. Feed, shoe, and clothe the army; get all the necessaries in the rear by merciless requisition.

"2. Put an end to the anarchy which reigns in the rear.

"3. Send reserves to the front. To carry through these measures the Government needs force and we of the N. army offer our services. Moreover, in the name of the revolutionary democracy at the front, we send a last word to the lawless gang in the rear.

"We warn them of our readiness to defend by all means the national property, the lives of peaceful citizens against the unbridled attempts of the mobs, the enemies of revolutionary order."

VILENKIN,

*Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the N. army*

DURITSKI,
Secretary

APPEAL OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE FIRST ARMY ²¹

The German troops are preparing to give us a death blow. We should muster our last bit of strength to ward off the ruin of the country and the slavery of the people. Our strength is exhausted, our soul is torn, the efforts of the committees to raise the fighting efficiency of the army meet with difficulties from the rear. Our determination to defend the country and the revolution is not supported by a majority of the population. It is not supported by the bourgeoisie, it is not whole-heartedly supported by the peasants or the laboring masses. The soldiers in the rear do not wish to go to the front, and they have turned liberty into license and revolution into pogroms. In the midst of the death convulsions, we appeal to you for the last

²¹ "Izvestiia," No. 201, November 1, 1917.

time: give us food, ammunition, reserves to fill our ranks, put an end to lawlessness and pogroms, occupy yourselves only with the salvation of the country and the revolution. Alone, we cannot protect the country and the revolution. We need the assistance of all the people and this assistance we demand. If we are not given bread, shoes, and reserves at once, we, in the name of the revolutionary democracy at the front, appeal to the Provisional Government. Either provide us with our necessities and we will save the country and the revolution and will lead the land to a peace on democratic principles, or say: "We are not in a position to do this and you had better throw yourself on the mercy of the victor." We realize that you, too, have insurmountable obstacles, but know! That having appealed for the last time we place ourselves at your service; we are ready by means of force to make the rear come to our aid, and to compel the conscious or unconscious foes of the revolution to grant our requests. At the same time we appeal to all true defenders of the country and the revolution, to those who are in the trenches that stretch from the Baltic to the Black Sea, to those on the Caucasus front, and to those in the fleet, to be patient, to wait with us for the answer to this cry of torn and bleeding souls. Gather your last forces and hold off the treacherous enemy, deprive him of the possibility of striking us a final blow while we are gathering in strength. Let history be our judge, let all the world know that we are loyal defenders of our suffering mother country and revolution, and if we are fated to die, let the curse not be on those who at the fatal moment called for help, but on those who refused to give it.

CHAPTER XXVI

GENERAL ALEXEEV

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the World War General Alexeev was, next to Grand Duke Nicholas, the best known Russian army officer. The documents that follow throw sidelights on the man. It should be said that Rodzianko's opinion of Alexeev was held by many other prominent men.

1. GENERAL ALEXEEV'S ORDER¹

General Alexeev has telegraphed the following order:

As a result of a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Western Front, to the effect that a deputation of fifty men from the new Government is traveling from Velikie Luki in the direction of Polotsk, and disarming the gendarmes, an inquiry on this subject was addressed to the President of the State Duma, who replied that no deputation whatever had been sent. It seems, therefore, that purely revolutionary, disorderly gangs are beginning to arrive from Petrograd, trying to disarm the gendarmes along the railways. Later they will, of course, also try to seize power on the railways, as well as in the rear of the army, and will probably attempt to invade the army itself. The most vigorous measures must be adopted; surveillance must be established over all railway junction points in the rear; and such stations must be guarded by reliable troops under the command of dependable officers. Wherever such self-appointed delegations make their appearance, it is desirable that they should not be driven off but arrested, court-martialed on the spot, if possible, and their sentence executed at once.

ALEXEEV

March 16, 1917, No. 1925

¹ "Izvestia," No. 9, March 21, 1917. Gen. Alexeev was born in 1857 and died in 1918.

*Comment on General Alexeev's Order*²

This is a remarkable document. Many naïve people think of General Alexeev as a liberal and a friend of the new order. But the above order shows the real character of his liberalism. He regards disarming of the gendarmes as a capital crime. The seizure of power by the revolutionists, even in the rear, he looks upon in the same light. . . .

General Alexeev is worthy of his overthrown master, Nicholas II. The spirit of the bloody Tsar lives in the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. By signing the above order, General Alexeev has signed his own condemnation in the eyes of all true partisans of the new order. Fortunately for the Russian people, and unfortunately for General Alexeev, he will not find "reliable troops" that will be willing to wash their hands in their brothers' blood. After the happenings of the last few days, there may not even be found very many "dependable officers" to carry out the orders. It would seem that the lessons of the last few days have been lost on General Alexeev. . . .

2. RODZIANKO'S ESTIMATE OF ALEXEEV

LETTER TO PRINCE LVOV³

April 1, 1917

Dear Sir, Prince George Evgenevich:

From my conversation yesterday with the Minister of War, A. I. Guchkov, I became convinced that the Government intends to place General Alexeev, formerly Chief-of-Staff, at the head of the active army, as Supreme-Commander-in-Chief. His appointment will not lead to a successful ending of the war. I am very much in doubt whether General Alexeev has the necessary talent, will power, ability, the broad grasp of the present political situation in Russia and in the army.

Recall the fact that General Alexeev was constantly opposed to the measures which the rear proposed and regarded as of immediate need. General Alexeev was always of the opinion that the army should command the rear, should lay down the law to the people, should include within itself the government and its measures. Recall the charge which General Alexeev made against the national representatives. He openly stated that one of the parties largely

² "Izvestiia," No. 9, March 21, 1917, Editorial.³ "Krasny Arkhiv," II, 284-5.

responsible for the approaching catastrophe was the Russian people itself, in the person of its national representatives. Do not forget that it was Gen. Alexeev who insisted on an immediate formation of a military dictatorship. In my eyes General Alexeev is worthy of the highest respect; he is a brilliant and loyal soldier who will be faithful to the cause, but will lead it closely along his ideas. But it is just this that makes me think that he has no broad vision, no ability to meet the tremendously complicated conditions of the war. Finally, the name of Gen. Alexeev, perhaps through no fault of his own, is associated with the surrender of all the forts, Warsaw and Poland, and therefore, is not popular and is, besides, little known in Russia.

In my opinion the men to lead the war should be those who have shown themselves capable of understanding the State problems of Russia, both military and non-military. From the last letter of Gen. Alexeev which I, and probably you, received, telling how the army reacted toward the news of the passing events, it is clear to me that the southwest front is the only one that stands out on a high plane. It would seem that there alone discipline reigns, that at the head of that front is a man with ideas, who understands what is going on. I am referring to Gen. Brusilov. My observations on my many journeys to the front lead me to the conclusion that Brusilov is the only general who has the brilliant strategic talent, the broad grasp of Russia's political problems, and who is capable of quickly evaluating the present situation.

Another man with a statesmanlike mind, but perhaps less experienced in war, is General Polivanov.

If these two men were put at the head of our brave army and given, as aides, such wise, able and respected men as Generals Klembovski and Lukomski, they would form the center of a supreme war command which, in my opinion, is the only one capable of leading the army and the country out of the pitiful position into which it has fallen. If in connection with this combination, weekly war councils were held, in which the commanders of the fronts and the above-mentioned staff officers participated; then we would not need to lose hope of a successful issue of the campaign. I am calling these matters to your attention in the hope that it is not yet too late to change the decision made, and that the army may not be left in the hands of a man who is, without doubt, incapable of handling the tasks before him.

Believe me with highest regard and devotion,

M. RODZIANKO

3. SPEECH OF GENERAL ALEXEEV AT THE CONGRESS OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY ⁴

May 20, 1917

Before you begin your work, I should like to say a few words. They will not be particularly happy words, but they will be open and honest, and will express the state of mind of your Commander-in-Chief.

Russia is perishing; she is on the brink of the abyss; another push or two, and she will go over completely. The enemy has seized one-eighth of Russia's territory. You cannot buy him off with such phrases as "peace without annexation and indemnity." He says openly, "with annexation and with indemnity." He says openly that he will not leave our territory. His paw is reaching out even into places where no enemy soldier has ever been. . . .

What are we going to do about it? . . . Let us be frank. The war spirit of the Russian army is fallen. Only yesterday it was mighty and threatening; today, it stands a pitiful weakling before the enemy. The former tradition of devotion to the country has changed to a desire for peace and rest. Instead of doing something, there has been aroused in each warrior the primitive instinct of self-preservation. If you look toward the interior you ask, where is that strong power which could compel each citizen to do his duty by his country? You will be told that it will come soon. For the time being, it does not exist. Where, gentlemen, is patriotism? Where is love of country? On our banners is inscribed the big word "fraternity," but it is not inscribed on hearts and minds. Class hatred reigns among us. Whole classes, that were honestly doing their duty by the country, are kept under suspicion. . . .

REMOVAL OF GENERAL ALEXEEV ⁵

General Alexeev, whose speech on the foreign policy of the Provisional Government aroused a great deal of alarm among the democracy, was removed from command by the Minister of War.

General Brusilov was named in his place.

⁴"Riech," No. 108, May 23, 1917.

⁵"Izvestia," No. 73, June 6, 1917.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE DUMA

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

What the legal status of the Duma was after its prorogation on March 10 is not clear. It never again met as a body for the transaction of business. Some of the members claimed that the Duma continued as a living body until November 7, 1917, when its term expired. On the other hand partizans of the Soviet denied this and said that the Duma was nothing but a corpse. The Committee of the Duma, which pretended to represent the Duma, insisted on its right of being consulted on matters of State policy and changes in the Ministry. On June 22 the All-Russian Congress of Soviets ruled that the Duma did not exist and asked the Provisional Government not to appropriate money for the support of its members. But as the Duma did not recognize the Soviet it ignored its ruling. After the July uprising and the drift of public opinion to the right the four Dumas were invited to the Moscow Conference and made their voices heard. But after the Kornilov plot and the charge that Duma members were implicated, the Provisional Government dissolved the Duma.

I. MEETING OF THE FOUR DUMAS¹

May 10, 1917

SPEECH OF V. V. SHULGIN

I would not say that the Duma as a whole desired revolution, for that would not be true. No, many of us felt strongly that it is dangerous to change horses while crossing the stream. We feared that the revolution would weaken our military strength. But, gentlemen, even if we did not desire it, we made it. The State Duma, by turning strong lights on the Government, brought out in view of the whole

¹ "Riech," No. 98, May 11, 1917.

country all its defects and the impossibility of continuing it in power. Perhaps the conservative parties contributed to that no less than the liberals and radicals, because the attacks of the Left were not taken seriously, but those of the Right carried weight and conviction. For these reasons, gentlemen, we cannot separate ourselves from the revolution. We are tied up with it; we have a moral responsibility.

Two months ago today, the overturn took place, and I cannot hide from you that many of us are filled with doubt. . . . During this time our military situation has grown worse. If you try to account for it, the first thought that comes to your mind is that the Government, the one which is here before us, which we regard as honest and talented, which we should like to see invested with full power, is actually under suspicion. I would not say that it is in the same situation as the old Ministers, who are in Peter Paul fortress, but I would say that it is, as it were, under domestic arrest. It is almost as if a guard had been posted over this Government with instructions: "Keep your eye on them; they are burzhui [bourgeois] and, if they try something, do your duty." Gentlemen, on May 3, you had evidence that the guard knows and honorably does his duty. But, gentlemen, this raises the question whether those who have placed the guard have done the right thing or not. This question applies in general to all Socialist parties. I ask them publicly: Are you, gentlemen, acting as you should, when you put a watchman over the Government? Would it not be better to find some other form of control? This is by no means all that we fear.

The behavior of certain Socialist parties, fortunately only a few of them, recalls the fatal words, now historic, which were asked in this hall on November 14, 1916 [by Miliukov], "What is this—stupidity or treason?" It was put to Sturmer, because he was charged with trying to bring about bad feeling between us and our Allies, particularly England. Let us see what is happening now. A few days ago open and vicious propaganda was carried on in the street against England, trying to show that she is the source of all capitalistic and imperialistic movements, and that Russia should free the world from this monster. I ask you, is this stupidity or treason? (*Voice from the hall*: "Treason!") No, I think it is stupidity. When agitators are sent to the villages who incite anarchy and discord, the only consequences of which will be that Petrograd, Moscow, the army, and the northern guberniias will be without food, I ask you, gentlemen, what is it? I think that, too, is stupidity. Or when our brave soldiers are aroused against their officers, (I

am well aware that there are all kinds of misunderstandings, and that all our officers are not above criticism) against the officers as a class (as it is done against the intelligentsia), which may lead to the ruin of the army, I ask again whether it is stupidity or treason. Gentlemen, this, too, is stupidity. But when they [agitators] put all these together into one and say, "You are on the point of breaking with the Allies; you have no army; you have no food; and therefore you must conclude peace, no matter what the consequences,"—this, I say, is treason. (Applause. Shouts of "Bravo!")

Tseretelli (from his seat)—"Who says this?"

Voice from the left—"Shulgin says it." (Uproar.)

Presiding Officer—"I ask you not to interrupt the speaker."

Shulgin—I will answer the question. Cross over, if you please, to the "Petrograd" side of the city and listen to what is said. I live there and have heard these words many times. Lenin is merely a name for agitators of all kinds, who preach whatever comes into their heads. Please remember, gentlemen, that our people are poorly prepared for political action, and can with difficulty make out what it is all about; and so, that kind of talk has effect on it. . . .

2. COMMENT OF "IZVESTIIA" ON THE MEETING²

On May 10, members of the Four Dumas assembled at the Taurida Palace. In the White Hall, where during the last two months the representatives of the revolutionary democracy, soldiers, and workmen met daily, there appeared the [political] corpses buried by the revolution. Purishkevich, Shulgin, Rodzianko, priests and landholders from the (?) appeared again.

Why did they come to the Taurida Palace? A steady campaign against the Soviet has been carried on lately, abroad. The bourgeois press has announced that the Soviet has arbitrarily seized the power belonging to the State Duma. These [bourgeois] papers have advised the Provisional Government to renew the sessions of the Duma, as that would *ipso facto* put an end to the Soviet.

On May 10, an attempt was made to resurrect the Fourth Duma. But in order to minimize the distance that separates the people from that Duma, the partizans of renewing the sessions of the Duma hit on a plan, turning the rays of glory of the First and Second Dumas on the Fourth. With that in mind, they celebrated the Eleventh Anniversary of the Summons of the First Duma.

² "Izvestiia," No. 53, May 12, 1917, Editorial.

But this first attempt of these revived corpses showed that the renewal of the sessions of the Duma is as impossible as the recall of the tsarist ministers.

He may speak in the name of the people, who has the confidence of the people. The popular masses of revolutionary Russia have no confidence in the State Duma . . . but believe in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. . . . The Fourth State Duma can not silence the voice of the Soviet. It can not even represent the views of those classes which followed it until the revolution. The changes brought about by the revolution have made the Fourth Duma too conservative even for the bourgeoisie.

Not only Shulgin, but Rodzianko in speeches on the tenth talked like people who had been asleep, who had stepped out from the grave. . . .

The Duma is dead forever. This is the lesson of the meeting on May 10.

From now on it should be clear to every one that until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is the only body that has the right to speak in the name of democracy, and in the name of the people.

3. THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS AND THE DUMA ³

RESOLUTION OF THE MENSHEVIKS AND SOCIAL-REVOLUTIONISTS

June 22, 1917

By a vote of 491 to 216 (41 abstaining from voting), the Congress accepted the resolution of the Social-Democrats, Mensheviks, and Socialist-Revolutionists. It reads:

"Whereas: A group of former members of the Duma appeared recently in the name of the Duma and, taking advantage of the position held by that institution during the first days of the revolution, are now attempting to make of it a center for working against the revolution and democracy, the All-Russian Soviet declares that the revolution, in destroying the foundations of the old régime, has, among other things, (a) put an end to the State Duma and the State Council as legislative organs of the State, and (b) done away with the titles granted to the members of these institutions by the old order.

³ "Izvestiia," No. 88, June 23, 1917.

Be it therefore resolved: (1) that the Provisional Government should not in the future make appropriations for the support of the State Duma and State Council as legislative bodies, and (2) that all actions of members of these two institutions have no more importance than actions of any other private group of citizens of free Russia.

4. PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ⁴

At the Taurida palace on September 2, there was an informal meeting of members of the Duma with Rodzianko in the chair. The question discussed was: The State Duma and the Constituent Assembly.

Rodzianko opened the meeting by asking for an exchange of opinion on the position of the Provisional Committee until the expiration of the power [term] of the State Duma. "As you know," said Rodzianko, "the Duma is not dismissed. Until its power expires it remains as it is. There have been suggestions that the Provisional Committee should make its headquarters at Moscow, but I do not think this is possible. In the first place, such a move would stir up a great many wild guesses, and in the second place, the Provisional Committee should remain in the capital. I would ask that some members of the Duma should, by turn, remain right along at Petrograd."

"What is the work that the Provisional Committee plans to do?" asked V. M. Purishkevich.

"The Provisional Committee," replied Rodzianko, "is regarded as the source of power, and is always on the watch that, in case of a crisis, the question of the composition of the Government is not decided without the Committee. As you know, both times when we had crises, the Government turned to us for our approval of its make-up. The Provisional Committee has at its disposal all the sums that are at the disposal of the State Duma. Furthermore, the Provisional Committee takes the place of the conferences of the State Duma, etc."

"How can the Provisional Committee influence the Government," asked Purishkevich, "when the Government anticipates the will of the Constituent Assembly? Is it possible, for example, by revolutionary means, to change the customs of the Cossack army? Such an act

⁴ "Riech," No. 196, September 4, 1917.

would mean anticipating the will of the Constituent Assembly. Is it possible for the Provisional Committee to raise its voice and tell the Provisional Government that it has no right to do this until the Constituent Assembly?"

"The Provisional Committee," replied Rodzianko, "has raised its voice a number of times, and has insisted that it is not permissible to predetermine the will of the Constituent Assembly."

Prince V. M. Volkonski raised the question, when will the full powers of the Duma come to an end? "Now that a Constituent Assembly is being summoned," continued Prince Volkonski, "it would be natural that the full powers of the Duma should not end in October, but never having been dismissed by an act of the Government, the Duma, the only legal assembly, the only legal institution, ("the only source of authority," corrects Rodzianko) should continue to function until the calling [meeting] of the Constituent Assembly."

Rodzianko said that he fully agreed with Prince Volkonski. It should, however, be remembered that the power of the Duma ends November 28 and the meeting of the Constituent Assembly is set for December 11, and, should it meet on time, there would be an interim of only thirteen days. In case, however, the Constituent Assembly should not meet on time, then the Provisional Committee would take up the question of the powers of the State Duma.

COMMENT OF THE "IZVESTIYA" ON THE DUMA MEETING ⁵

The political ghosts are talking again. On the day when our bleeding army heroically opposed the hordes of the German Emperor, when it was forced to retreat from the Dvina, when it received a terrible blow the consequences of which it is yet difficult to estimate, the gentlemen of the State Duma met again in conference to prepare for counter-revolution, to undermine by their speeches the government of revolutionary Russia and the plenipotentiary organs of the revolutionary democracy.

5. THE FOURTH DUMA DISSOLVED ⁶

In accordance with the resolution of the Provisional Government of August 22, 1917, to set November 25 as the date for the election to the Constituent Assembly, and in view of the fact that the preparations for said election are to begin on October 16, the Fourth Duma

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 151, September 5, 1917.

⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 191, October 20, 1917.

is dissolved, and the authority of the elected members of the State Council is void.

COMMENT BY "IZVESTIIA" ON THE DUMA ⁷

The Fourth State Duma has at last ceased to exist. It is not likely that tears will be shed on its grave. It was as incapable of dying betimes and with dignity, as of living with dignity.

RODZIANKO AND THE DUMA ⁸

In conversation with newspapermen, M. V. Rodzianko said that the order of the Provisional Government to dissolve the Duma came as a great surprise to him. Those in authority, he continued, did not think it was even necessary to give me notice. You will agree that this was rather strange—to dissolve an institution and not say a word about it to its chairman. Why this was done is more than I can understand, especially in view of the fact that its term expired anyway on November 7.

In my opinion the State Duma has played a great part in the past. I underline the word "past," for the Duma is not taking part in present affairs and is not responsible for them.

It would seem that the rôle of the Duma had been such that its President might have been notified, as a matter of courtesy, of its dissolution.

⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 192, October 21, 1917.

⁸ "Riech," No. 238, October 23, 1917.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

All parties agreed on the necessity of calling a Constituent Assembly to determine the political, social and economic future of Russia, but they disagreed as to the time when this body should meet. The Duma men asked for sufficient time to make the proper preparations and a thorough study of the subject. Above all they were anxious that nothing should be done which would in any way interfere with the war. The Soviet leaders were eager to have the Constituent Assembly meet as soon as possible for they regarded it pretty much as a matter of form. They had already decided on the way the government and land question should be settled. But even the Soviet men could not hurry matters beyond a certain point. It was necessary to appoint committees and commissions, and to get in touch with the different parts of the vast empire. In this manner one postponement of meeting followed another, which was on the whole bad for the country and gave the Bolsheviks excellent material for attack.

1. PLACE AND TIME OF MEETING OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY¹

It has been reported in the papers that the Provisional Government purposes to summon the Constituent Assembly to meet at Moscow. It is hinted that the President of the Council of Ministers is influenced in this matter by the fact that Petrograd is a "city of office holders." These rumors have caused considerable excitement among the population of Petrograd. It is supposed that the Provisional Government desires to get away from the control of the revolutionary people, the center of which is, at the present time, Petrograd, and to seek the protection of Moscow, the seat of an old, rich, industrial, and

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 13, March 25, 1917.

commercial bourgeoisie, There the revolutionary movement has not developed such extreme forms as at Petrograd, and consequently there does not exist the same high revolutionary spirit as in our city.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY²

On March 26, at the time of the joint meeting of the delegates of the Executive Committee of the Soviet and the Provisional Government, the question of summoning the Constituent Assembly was discussed.

The representatives of the Executive Committee insisted that the Constituent Assembly should be summoned at the *earliest* moment because delay, under the present circumstances, would be harmful to democracy. Members of the Provisional Government agreed in principle, and gave definite assurances that the place of meeting would be Petrograd and the time of meeting as soon as possible.

They stated clearly that the war would in no way interfere with the calling of the Constituent Assembly, unless, of course, unusual war conditions should arise. In any case, according to the proposal of the Provisional Government, the summoning of the Constituent Assembly should be about the middle of the summer. Representatives of the Executive Committee found that this date was a bit too far removed.

Discussions on this point will go on. But it can now be definitely stated *that the army will take part in the elections for the Constituent Assembly*. It can also be said that the exact time of summoning the Constituent Assembly, the questions relating to the election, and the program of the meeting will be determined by agreement between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

2. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY POSTPONED³

In the endeavor to summon the Constituent Assembly as soon as possible, the Provisional Government set September 30 as the date for the election. It was intended that all the work of preparing the lists should fall on the municipal governments and the newly created volost zemstvos. The amount of work necessary to carry on the elections in the local institutions requires a great deal of time. In view of the time required to organize these local institutions on the

² "Izvestiia," No. 14, March 27, 1917.

³ "Riech," No. 186, August 23, 1917.

basis of direct, universal, equal, and secret suffrage, the Provisional Government has set the day for the election to the Assembly, November 25, and the day of the meeting, December 11, 1917.

A. F. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister

ZARUDNI,

Minister of Justice

•
August 22, 1917

CHAPTER XXIX

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The revolution, the dismissal of the old police, the general let-down in watchfulness and the growth of poverty, tended to increase lawlessness. There was at the same time a falling off in production. The new Socialistic theories went to the heads of the uneducated workmen and caused them to make impossible demands in the matter of wages and hours. Some of the agitators preached labor control in the industries and in some cases the managers and employers were driven off. These, as well as other factors, which usually come with the change of political and social systems, brought on demoralization and lawlessness.

I. ROBBERY, DRUNKENNESS

THE APARTMENT OF DEPUTY L. A. VELIKHOV ROBBED ¹

Yesterday a number of unknown individuals, dressed in soldiers' clothes, invaded the apartment of L. A. Velikhov, member of the Duma, and under the pretext of search, cleaned out the place, taking jewels, clothing, and among other things, three hundred visiting cards.

Mr. Velikhov asks us to warn the public against these impostors, in case they try to make use of these cards.

Similar lawless acts have taken place in many other homes, where unknown characters have appeared, made a search, and carried off money and valuables.

TO ALL CITIZENS

Lately there has been an increase in drunkenness in Petrograd, as well as in other parts of Russia. Drunkards are seen in the streets,

¹"Izvestiia of the Committee of Petrograd Journalists," No. 6, March 15, 1917.
²"Izvestiia," No. 67, May 29, 1917.

railways, factories, mills, and barracks. Vodka has made its appearance in the city, and in the villages at the front and in the rear. Drunkenness has brought on lawlessness, fights, pogroms.

In free Russia, alcohol is for use as medicine and for industry, and not to befog the brain. No one has a right either to make vodka or to sell it to others. No one should either buy vodka or drink it.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET
OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

2. RESUMPTION OF WORK—COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS ³

At its meeting of March 18, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies voted, 1170 to 30, that it is now possible to resume work in the Petrograd area, such work to be stopped again at the first call.

This decision was adopted by the Soviet in view of the fact that its first determined attack was crowned with success and has rendered the position of the working class in its revolutionary struggle sufficiently secure, but in a continuation of the strikes there is extreme danger of disorganizing still more the economic forces of the country.

Therefore, the workers of Petrograd should leave the streets, where they have been for a week creating popular freedom, and return to their work-benches and lathes, so as to revive our economic life and bring it back to its normal course.

But even this the workers cannot do successfully, except under certain conditions which are not yet guaranteed to them.

Is it possible to think of productive, energetic work, if the workers of factories and mills are again ignored by the employers who do not observe even the miserable factory laws of pre-war times? Is it possible to work calmly and methodically, when there is no assurance that capital will be bound by collective agreements in its relations with the workers? Is it possible to restore and develop the country's power, weakened by the old régime, when the conditions of labor are almost unchanged?

If not, the comrade-workers in resuming work as a matter of necessity, should bring forward certain questions and ask for an immediate answer.

³ "Izvestiia," No. 8, March 20, 1917.

First of all, they should demand immediate pay for the days they spent outside the factories and mills, conquering freedom for the whole nation. This is their right, and he who dares to deny it covers himself with shame forever. The workers have no savings. They spend what they earn. The champions of liberty cannot be left without bread for themselves, their wives, and their children, simply because they fought tsarism, and so could not work.

They should insist on collective agreements and see to it that they are at once put into force, and that the employers live up to them. This will guarantee to them that no worker is removed by the autocratic will of an employer from the execution of a task appointed by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

For the control of factory and shop administration, for the proper organization of work, factory and shop committees should be formed at once. They should see to it that the forces of labor are not wasted and look after working conditions in the place.

The workers should protect themselves against exhaustive and excessive labor in those industries which are working full time. Shift work will guarantee production and will, at the same time, permit the workers to rest and to take part in public life. In taking their places at the benches, the workers do not cease to be citizens.

In those establishments which are forced to work only part time because of special circumstances, for lack of raw material, etc., the workers should divide the work equally, and so protect their comrades from the horrors of unemployment.

The comrades must not forget that the refusal of an employer, for personal motives, to go on with production cannot serve as a reason for stopping work. In such cases, they must insist resolutely that the work be turned over to them, under the direction of a commissar of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a representative of the trade union involved and the party organization of the district.

The workers must also insist upon the immediate regulation of women's and children's work, which has been exploited with redoubled intensity since the declaration of the war. The weak must find protection with the strong.

Lastly, the workers must bear in mind that tsarism is overthrown, but not completely vanquished. Its followers are still trying, and will continue to try, to harm the people in every possible way by disorganizing whatever is still accessible to their scattered forces. Therefore, the workers must guard the factories and mills with

armed forces, and coördinate such protection with the local militia and the general protective organizations of the capital.

With the observance of all these conditions, work can proceed at full blast. Without these conditions, there will never be any firm ground under our feet.

CARE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY ⁴

Citizens, the old lords are gone, leaving a great inheritance which now belongs to the people as a whole.

Citizens! Take care of this inheritance; take care of the palaces—they will become the palaces of art of the people; take care of pictures, statues, buildings—they are the expressions of your spiritual power and that of your ancestors. Art is that beauty which people of talent have been able to create even under the yoke of despotism, and which testifies to the beauty and power of the human soul. Citizens, do not touch even a single stone. Take care of monuments, buildings, antiquities, documents—all these are your history, your pride. Remember that they are the soil out of which will grow your new art of the people.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

APPEAL OF THE SOVIET TO THE WORKMEN TO THE COMRADE-WORKERS ⁵

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies voted to recommend to all the workers of Petrograd that they return to work on March 19, 1917. With insignificant exceptions, the working class of the capital has shown remarkable discipline, returning to its tasks with the same unanimity with which it abandoned them several days ago, to give the signal for the great revolution. But, according to information in our possession, the resumption of work has been accompanied from the very start by a series of misunderstandings and conflicts. In some of the factories and mills, the workers presented economic demands to their employers and, failing to obtain satisfaction, stopped work again, while in some cases they did not return to work at all.

In adopting its resolution on the resumption of work, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies believed that such sporadic

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 9, March 21, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 10, March 22, 1917.

actions in separate factories would not take place. It was assumed that our comrades, the workers, would not stop work in case of misunderstandings with their employers, but would move in an orderly fashion toward the realization of their demands, with the aid of the factory and district committees, trade unions, and, lastly, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. For this purpose, the Soviet decided to appoint a special commission to prepare a list of general economic demands, to be presented to the manufacturers and the Government on behalf of the working class. Therefore, we urge you, comrades, in every case where hope of settlement is not yet lost, to remain at work, to insist, at the same time, upon the satisfaction of your demands, and to bring them to the attention of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It goes without saying that excesses, such as the damaging of materials, breaking of machinery, and personal violence, are absolutely forbidden, since they harm the cause of Labor, especially at the present dangerous time.

On the other hand, reports are being received of some employers who discharge their workers at the very first presentation of demands, and shut down their establishments. Such an attitude toward those who fought for the freedom of our native country is entirely forbidden, and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will be obliged to fight with the greatest energy against such abuses, which are especially disgraceful in the days we are now passing through. In cases of the closing of factories, the Soviet will be compelled to bring before the working class, the municipality, and the Provisional Government, the question of handing over such enterprises to the municipality, or of turning them over to the workers' organizations.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET
OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

3. THE KRONSTADT REPUBLIC⁶

A delegation of the Petrograd Soviet, with Chkheidze at the head, is going today to Kronstadt. This delegation is to learn the truth of the report which has flown over Russia that the people of Kronstadt do not recognize the Provisional Government.

Whatever the facts are, one thing is true. In some parts of Russia—more so at Kronstadt than elsewhere—there is a tendency to form independent revolutionary principalities. Each principality

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 72, June 3, 1917.

pays no attention to the Provisional Government, nor even to the organ of the united Russian revolutionary democracy which is the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

4. CONSCRIPTION OF WOMEN FOR WAR WORK ⁷

In recognition of the fact that the extraordinary conditions through which our country is at the present moment passing, demand a full accounting and mobilization of all forces that are capable of reviving and increasing the physical and spiritual forces of the nation, I consider it timely to proceed to a solution of the problem of utilizing the ability and capacity of Russian women (whose rights have already been recognized in principle), in concrete, direct form to take the place of male labor in all the central administrative offices and auxiliary organizations of the Ministry of War.

To carry out this task, I order:

1. A special commission organized, under the Principal Bureau of the General Staff, to examine the possibilities and conditions for the employment of women in the Ministry of War.

2. That if the Commission agrees in principle that the conscription of women for work is practicable, it shall at once prepare an appropriate bill for submission to the higher governmental institutions.

3. That representatives of the Union of Women's Democratic Organizations and other women's associations (which have taken the initiative in the matter here discussed), be invited to coöperate with the Commission, as well as representatives of other ministries and public organizations whose participation may be necessary.

4. As the chairman of the Commission, I designate O. K. Nechaeva.

5. The Commission must complete its work in two weeks and submit its report to me for confirmation.

A. KERENSKI,
Minister of War

5. POGROMS, DEMORALIZATION AND LAWLESSNESS ⁸

We get daily reports about pogroms. There is destruction in the cities and in the villages, destruction of stores and landlords' warehouses. Arson, looting, and violence is everywhere.

⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 93, June 29, 1917. ⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 187, October 16, 1917.

These shameful pogroms are due to the widespread discontent of the masses with their condition. Peace did not arrive as quickly as they expected, bread did not become cheaper, there is now just as great a shortage of clothing, shoes, and agricultural tools as before. The revolution, which in its first days gave the impression of a holiday, an easy way to peace, happiness, food, and freedom, has now shown its stern and worried face. Alongside of this news comes other, of the disorganization of the army, of the shameful flight of whole army corps, of bestial acts such as at Tarnopol.⁹

* * * *

The attention of the Government is taken up with lawlessness in the country. At its last meeting the question of the anarchy in the Donetz Basin was discussed. Production [of coal] has fallen so low that the railroads may be forced to stop running. Another bit of sad news was from Kaluga, where a pogrom has been going on four days and, unfortunately, some of the troops are involved. Freight handlers at Moscow are on strike and freight is not moving.¹⁰

THE MILITIA OF THE CAPITAL ¹¹

At the last meeting of the Financial Commission of the city government, the demands of the city militia [police] were considered.

The Commission was against the granting of the demands, and in the course of the discussion it came out that the Petrograd militia was a great joke. The men did not even know what was required of them . . . They had lost the weapons that had been given to them . . . the greater part of these arms fell into the hands of the Red Guard.

THE MOSCOW STRIKE ¹²

Moscow is to have a general strike on the 28th. There was a meeting yesterday of the delegates of the local committee of city employees [clerks and workmen]. Their demands were discussed with one of the members of the city Council, who pointed out that the city treasury was empty, and consequently the demands of the employees could not be granted. The delegates said that the fact that the city had no money did not help them in any way. It was voted to strike. . . . In addition to the presidium, there was selected a committee of twenty-four to direct the strike. The plan for the strike is as follows:

⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 187, October 16, 1917.

¹⁰ "Riech," No. 238, October 23, 1917.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 239, October 24, 1917.

¹² "Izvestiia," No. 197, October 27, 1917.

First in order, the street cars will stop running on the 28th, with the exception of sanitary cars and freight trucks. . . . Factories, shops . . . working for the war . . . will close. . . . Charitable institutions . . . the central heating stations, power houses . . . [will be abandoned by their workmen with few exceptions.]

If the first strike fails to get results within three days, then the second strike will be called. This will take in gas plants, and slaughter houses. If within two days there are still no results, then a third strike will be called in the waterworks, fire department, electric stations, municipal laundry, and city militia. If after all these strikes there are no results, then the strike will take in everything, including the hospitals.

DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT ¹⁸

On October 22 the Bureau of the Central Committee of Soviets was visited by a group of workmen from the Taganrog District. They said that if the Cossacks were not removed from the mining area, there would be a strike.

The Bureau resolved to do what it could to support the demands of the workmen of the Donetz Basin before the Provisional Government, to regulate the question of the Cossacks at the mines, and to delegate some members of the Executive Committee to study the question on the spot and to take the necessary measures. . . .

On October 22 the Minister of the Interior was visited by P. P. Kalmykov, representative of the Don Cossacks. The latter objected to the appointment of the Government Commissar for the Donetz coal mining area. Kalmykov claimed that the Government had no right to do such a thing without first consulting the Cossacks. In reply the Minister said that conditions in the Donetz Basin were so bad that the Government could no longer delay taking definite steps to put an end to the anarchy in that region. But in regard to the authority of the Government commissar, that would be regulated by an interdepartmental commission, with the participation of the Cossacks.

¹⁸ "Riech," No. 238, October 23, 1917.

PART VIII

JULY EVENTS

CHAPTER XXX

THE JULY OFFENSIVE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Chkheidze, Kerenski, Tseretelli and other prominent Socialists were eager to bring the war to an end as soon as possible. They could do it in one of two ways: either by a separate peace with Germany, or by a joint peace with the Allies. In addition to regarding it as dishonorable, these men believed that a separate peace would fail to give Russia the relief predicted by its champions. A separate peace would turn friends into enemies and throw abandoned Russia into the lustful arms of Germany. A joint peace was the only thing to save Russia and the revolution, but in 1917 the Allies were not in the mood for peace on the Soviet formula.

"If you wish peace," said the Allies, "you must fight for it."

"Fight for what object?" asked the Socialists.

"To make the world safe for democracy. Read Wilson's speeches and you will see," replied the Allies.

"If you accept the Fourteen Points, let us abandon the secret treaties and revise the war aims. If we could convince our soldiers that we are continuing in the war for an ideal and not for acquisition of territory we could get some fight into them," pleaded Kerenski.

"This is not the time to discuss such things. While we talk, the enemy acts. Let's fight," urged the Allies.

March, April, May and June passed without either side yielding. All kinds of missions were sent to Russia and to all the pleadings of the Russians for peace and treaty revision the diplomats had but one word: "Fight."

While these conversations were going on the Russian army

was breaking up. The old officers had lost control, discipline was relaxed, and self-government by soldiers' committees was for the time being ineffective. Under these circumstances Kerenski and his associates in the Provisional Government and the Soviet decided to fight. They hoped that success would give Russia more influence in the council chambers of the Allies and that activity would raise the morale of the troops.

At the Congress of Soviets the Moderate Socialists put through a resolution leaving it to the military authorities to take the offensive or not. Immediately after this representatives of the Soviet were sent to the front to put some manhood into the soldiers and get them to fight. On June 29 Kerenski, as Minister of War, issued an order to advance on the Southwest front. His order was supported by an Appeal to the Army, signed by the two Executive Committees.

The first few days of the offensive all went well. The Austrians showed little resistance and the Russian patriotic troops in the vanguard drove them back. But when the enemy rallied and showed fight the demoralized Russian soldiers quit. They killed their heroic officers and comrades who took the lead, threw away their guns, deserted by the hundreds and in their flight robbed and killed civilians. Members of the Soviet who tried to arouse or shame the soldiers into action were roughly treated.

The offensive failed shamefully and Russia was worse off than ever. Her military weakness was disclosed and from now on the Allies were rather indifferent as to whether she stayed in the fight or not. Until now the Allies had been afraid that Russia would leave them, but after this event Russia feared that the Allies would leave her. The failure of the offensive also disclosed how weak the Provisional Government was and thus encouraged attacks upon it from the extreme political right and left.

I. KERENSKI'S ORDER TO THE ARMY AND THE FLEET ¹

June 29, 1917

Russia, having thrown off the chains of slavery, has firmly resolved to defend, at all costs, its rights, honor, and freedom.

¹"Izvestiia," No. 96, July 3, 1917.

Believing in the brotherhood of mankind, the Russian democracy appealed most earnestly to all the belligerent countries to stop the war and conclude a peace honorable to all. In answer to our fraternal appeal, the enemy has called on us to play the traitor. Austria and Germany have offered us a separate peace and tried to hoodwink us by fraternization, while they threw all their forces against our Allies, with the idea that after destroying them, they would turn on us. Now that he is convinced that Russia is not going to be fooled, the enemy threatens us and is concentrating his forces on our front.

WARRIORS, OUR COUNTRY IS IN DANGER! Liberty and revolution are threatened. The time has come for the army to do its duty. Your Commander-in-Chief, beloved through victory, is convinced that each day of delay merely helps the enemy, and that only by an immediate and determined blow can we disrupt his plans. Therefore, in full realization of my great responsibility to the country, and in the name of its free people and its Provisional Government, I call upon the armies, strengthened by the vigor and spirit of the revolution, to take the offensive.

Let not the enemy celebrate prematurely his victory over us! Let all nations know that when we talk of peace, it is not because we are weak! Let all know that liberty has increased our might.

Officers and soldiers! Know that all Russia gives you its blessing on your undertaking, in the name of liberty, the glorious future of the country, and an enduring and honorable peace.

Forward!

KERENSKI,
Minister of War and Navy

2. APPEAL OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES TO THE ARMY²

Soldiers and Officers:

The Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia has called on you to take the offensive. Organized as you are, on the foundations of democracy, welded in the fire of the revolution, you boldly moved forward to fight. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies send their fraternal greetings to you, who are shedding your blood on the field of battle in the cause of the revolution and universal peace.

² "Izvestiia," No. 96, July 3, 1917.

A long time ago the Russian revolution called on the peoples of the world to fight for a general peace. Until now our call has remained unanswered. It is not our fault that the war goes on. Your offensive, organization, and might will add weight to the voice of revolutionary Russia in its call to enemies, Allies, and neutrals, and will bring nearer the end of the war. Our thoughts are with you, sons of the revolutionary army.

In this decisive hour, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies appeal to the country to gather all its strength and come to the help of the army. Peasants—give bread to the army. Workmen—see to it that the army does not lack ammunition. Soldiers and officers in the rear—be ready to go to the front at the first call. Citizens—remember your duty. In these days no one dares to decline to do his duty to the country. The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies will continue to stand guard over the revolution.

Soldiers and officers, let not your hearts be in doubt. You are fighting for the freedom and happiness of Russia, for the universal peace.

Hearty greetings to you, brothers.

Long live the revolution; long live the revolutionary army!

ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

3. BREAKDOWN OF THE OFFENSIVE

(a) TELEGRAMS FROM THE SOUTHWEST FRONT ³

July 22, 1917

The German offensive which began on July 19 at the front of the XI Army is turning into an unheard-of disaster, threatening the very existence of revolutionary Russia. The troops which have recently been brought up to the fighting line were influenced largely by the heroic efforts of a small number of conscientious soldiers, but the enthusiasm of the offensive was quickly exhausted. The majority of the troops are becoming more and more demoralized. No one listens to authority or orders. Persuasion and pleading are in vain, and

³ "Riech," No. 160, July 24, 1917.

are answered by threats and even by shots. In some cases the men deserted their posts at the first shot of the enemy, and in other cases they did not even wait for the enemy to show himself. In some instances military units deserted in a body. Orders for hurried reinforcements were debated for hours at a meeting, and were carried out a day late. For a distance of a hundred versts in the rear one can see deserters on the move, with or without guns, able-bodied, bold, shameless, and fearless of consequences. Commissars and members of the army committees at the front are unanimously agreed that the situation calls for extreme measures and efforts, and that we should stop at nothing to save the revolution. Today the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest front and the Commander of the XI Army, with the consent of the commissars and committees, gave orders to shoot at every one who runs from his post. Let the country know all the truth of what is going on here; let it tremble with rage, and let it find the determination to punish unmercifully the cowards who ruin and betray Russia and the revolution.

[Signed by the commissars and chairmen of the army committees at the front.]

July 24, 1917 ⁴

I, Boris Savinkov, former commissar of the VII Army, and my assistant, Vladimir Gobechia, brought up the VII Army to a point of taking the offensive. The heroes fell in battle, and the army, carried away by their bravery, fought courageously; but now that they are no more, the army is on the run. How can I answer for the blood that is shed if I do not demand that order and discipline be enforced at once with an iron hand, so that cowards may not with impunity leave their posts, open the front, and by so doing sacrifice their comrades, faithful to their duty, and bring disgrace on Russia and the revolution? There is no choice. Death punishment to those who refuse to risk their lives for their country, for land and liberty.

SAVINKOV and GOBECHIA,
*Commissar and Assistant Commissar
of the Southwest Front*

(b) RESTORATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ⁵

July 25, 1917

The shameful behavior of certain military units, both at the front and in the rear, who forgot their duty to their country and thereby

⁴ "Riech," No. 161, July 25, 1917.

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 116, July 26, 1917.

placed Russia and the revolution in a perilous position, has forced the Provisional Government to take extreme measures to restore order and discipline in the army. Fully conscious of its heavy responsibility for the fate of the country, the Provisional Government finds it necessary . . . for the duration of the war, to restore the death penalty for men in the army who are guilty of gravest crimes.

A. KERENSKI,
Prime Minister

F. EFREMOV,
Minister of Justice

(c) LETTER FROM A VOLUNTEER IN THE DEATH BATTALION ⁹

We print today a letter of a son to his mother (the sister of a noted writer) who has sent to the front her two sons as army officers and an only daughter as nurse.

After graduating from the university at the time of the outbreak of the war, the older son joined the army as a volunteer. He was wounded three different times. While he was convalescing from the injuries last received news reached Petrograd of the tragic situation at the front [July disasters in Galicia]. Without telling his mother the young man enlisted in the "Battalion of Death" [made up in large part of young officers] and two days later set out once more for the front. On his departure he left the following letter:

"My Dear Mother:

"You will read this on your return from the station and when the train is bearing me away from you. Why am I writing this? To keep you from being so lonely at home.

"Mother dear, my soul is in this letter, it is now with you, and you are no longer lonely. The purpose of my letter is, first, to tell you this, and secondly, to try again to explain my act.

"Recall, dear mother, the beginning of the war and why I then enlisted as a volunteer. There were two reasons, or, to be more accurate, many reasons, but two stand out: namely, first, to die for my country, to die young, while all ideals are not yet shattered (this seemed to me the best kind of a death); and secondly, to be true to myself. I had marched in all processions, and I felt that it was my duty to seal my words with deeds. These were the main reasons.

⁹ This letter appeared in one of the Petrograd papers, probably the "Novoe Vremia," toward the end of July, 1917. The clipping is in the Hoover War Library, but, unfortunately, has no date on it.

Mingled with these motives was also a desire for novel and thrilling adventures, a thirst for new experiences.

"If you should recall these things, you would find my present step quite consistent, and would understand everything. At the present time I realize, and am trying to get others to realize, that only law and order and a favorable issue of the war can save our country from disgrace and ruin. That these sentiments may not remain mere fine words, I am ready once more to face anything that may be in store for me and to suit the action to the words.

"Mother darling, believe me when I say that it is only this profound conviction that has irresistibly compelled me to act as I have.

"I cannot compromise with my conscience, dear mother, and excuse myself by saying that I am still too weak, too ill to do my duty to my country. Both before and after I was sent back to the rear, to the hospital, I had been thinking of the danger of losing my life at the hands of my own soldiers, and more such thoughts. But by joining the Battalion of Death I know that, God willing, I shall be able to render useful service.

"Darling mother, do not grieve that I have gone away. Men who are far worse in health than I are also going. The more invalid the deeper the impression, the better chance to rally those who have lost courage at this critical moment.

"Believe me, darling mother, that these lines come from the bottom of my heart, and that they are not idle words. I was never fond of lies, and now I have forgotten such things entirely.

"But why all this? Let me tell you frankly that I should have enjoyed immensely going away to the country, to —. But what can a man do when we live in times like these? I feel that now, at this time, all of us ought to try to forget ourselves entirely, and lose ourselves, so to speak, in the common cause. Ah, were it only possible to impress everybody with this! One should not, however, become a hopeless pessimist, and should engrave on his heart and mind these lines from our dear poet:

"Trust, the time will come
For Baal to pass away,
And love will once again
On earth exert its sway."

"This, darling mother, is all I want to write to you in parting. Until we meet again. I kiss you fondly. Be not angry at me.

"Loving you deeply and sincerely, always,

"Your son,

KOLIA."

(d) THE REVAL BATTALION OF DEATH ⁷

The All-Russian Central Committee to Organize a Volunteer Army reports the fate of the Reval Battalion of Death.

Having been given the order to take two lines of trenches, the battalion took four. With a view to fortifying them the battalion asked for reinforcements, but in place of receiving help they were fired on from behind. Being caught between two fires, the battalion began to retreat to its original position. The loss was terrible. Out of three hundred sailors who made up the battalion, only fifteen came out unhurt. Three of the officers committed suicide rather than retreat. The leader of the battalion died from thirteen wounds.

4. ATTACK ON MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET ⁸

June 3, 1917

On June 30, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Congress received telegrams from the Western front asking for delegates to come to the Tenth Army for conference with certain units of the army. In compliance with this request, the Executive Committee delegated R. S. Verbo, A. A. Rosenberg, N. D. Sokolov, and F. G. Iasaitis to this work.

On July 2, this delegation arrived at its destination and had a talk with the Committee of the Front and the Staff. It came out in the conversation that certain units of the army had broken away from the central organs of democratic Russia . . . and had refused to obey orders. . . . They declared that they would not take part in any offensive, or even obey any orders which might prepare for the offensive. They gave as a reason that an offensive contradicts the idea of a defensive war, which the Russian democracy stood for. The Committee of the Front had taken measures to explain to these people the point of view of the Russian democracy. During the last few weeks members of the Committee visited a number of regiments. In most cases the visits were crowned with success, but in others members of the Committee were told that the soldiers would not recognize their authority, the Petrograd Soviet, or the Minister

⁷ "Riech," No. 166, July 31, 1917.

⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 101, July 8, 1917.

of War, and would not go on the offensive. . . . They did not intend to die, when there was freedom in Russia and a chance to get some land. In concluding its report, the Committee emphasized the fact that the situation in regiments 703 and 704 seemed to be quite hopeless. . . . It was also reported that during the period of "fraternization," members of the 703rd and 704th regiments quite often visited the Germans and were visited by them, and that there was reason to believe that a number of Germans were at that very time in the [703, 704] regiments, dressed as Russian soldiers, but it was difficult to get at the real facts, owing to lack of discipline in those regiments. . . .

The Petrograd delegation decided to . . . go to the 703rd regiment. . . . The regiment gathered on the open field . . . toward eight o'clock on the evening [of July 3]. Sokolov talked for an hour, and Verbo followed him for forty minutes. . . . Neither of these speeches was well received but there was order and attention. After delegate Iasaitis had made a few remarks, two of the local orators made short replies, which were applauded. The last of these orators ended his oration with these words: "We had already come to an agreement among ourselves not to take the offensive, and here come these speakers urging us to obey the order of Kerenski. From here they will go to other parts of the front. We must not allow this. Let us arrest them. I shall be the first to do so." Saying this, he took off his metal helmet and hit Verbo over the head . . . knocking him down. . . . He next struck Sokolov. The others, following his example, threw themselves on Sokolov, beating him on the head until he was covered with blood. . . . The question then arose what to do with the delegates.

Some advised drowning; others, shooting; still others, hanging. . . . In the meantime, the four delegates had been dragged into the building of the regimental staff, where the question of what to do with them was again up for discussion. . . . It was decided to lock them up temporarily. . . . These discussions dragged on until two in the morning.

Toward five in the morning, a delegation arrived from the N. regiment, where Sokolov was known. As soon as the N. regiment learned what had happened, it called a meeting and sent word to the 703rd regiment to free the men, or it would come armed and do it. While 703 was deliberating, a similar ultimatum arrived from another regiment, and pretty soon from the whole Seventh Division. Finally a deputation came from the 704th regiment, and on express-

ing its indignation at what had been done, the delegates of the Petrograd Soviet were at once released.

5. COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AGITATION ⁹

Yesterday the Central Executive Committee learned that in a certain printing office Black Hundred proclamations were being prepared . . . [a search was made,] and the following appeal was found set up in type:

"Misfortune has come upon us. The Germans have broken through our front; they have seized Tarnopol; they have captured our cannons, the same which the English gave us. Russia is faced with defeat and humiliation. There are cowards in the army who desert their posts and thereby help the enemy. Formerly the Russian soldier fought like a hero; now he runs. Think it over, and honestly answer to yourself the question: What is the cause of all this misery?

"The army and the rear are one. The restlessness in the rear has made itself felt at the front. At the present time we have no government; some one has stolen it. Who is the thief, who is it that betrays and ruins Russia? The power has been seized by the Central Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It is this body that appoints ministers. Who are these ministers? The greater number of them have been in prison. Among these are Tseretelli, Shingarev, Chernov, and Nekrasov. They selected Kerenski as their chief. He is a good orator, and brave, but after all he is chief of convicts, and agrees with them. . . ."

6. RESTRICTION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ¹⁰

As a temporary measure, the Provisional Government has authorized the Ministry of War and Ministry of the Interior, (1) to close periodical editions which call on the people to disobey military orders, to refuse to do military service, to use force and incite civil war, and (2) to bring action against the editors.

⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 116, July 26, 1917.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XXXI

THE UKRAINE AND THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the very time that the July offensive was so pitifully collapsing the Ukrainian question came up to worry and to break up the Provisional Government. The "right of self-determination" was an old revolutionary cry and as soon as liberty was proclaimed many of the nationalities in the Empire, particularly the Finns, Poles and Ukrainians, began clamoring for independence or autonomy. The Provisional Government took the stand that the future relations of the nationalities with the Empire should be determined by the Constituent Assembly. This view did not please the political leaders and the nationalities who wished to have their status settled at once. The Ukrainian question was complicated by the fact that many thinking people were unconvinced that the Little Russians were any different from the Great Russians. There was reason for believing that Austrian agents were behind the agitation in order to disorganize the Russian Army and to break up the Empire.

Until June members of the Provisional Government exchanged opinions on the Ukrainian question without coming to an understanding. By that time the Ukrainian leaders lost patience and undertook to force the issue. On June 24 they published a "Manifest of the Ukrainian Rada." Five days later the Provisional Government came out with an appeal to the Ukrainians not to act hastily and to wait for the Constituent Assembly. As this appeal failed in its purpose, Kerenski, Tseretelli and Tereschenko were sent to Kiev, and as a result of their efforts a compromise was reached. The Ukrainians gained political advantages but yielded on the military side. When on their return the three Ministers reported the results of their efforts the Cadets in the Cabinet resigned on the ground that the Provisional Government was usurping the rights of the Constituent Assembly.

1. THE MINISTRY OF WAR AND THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS¹

The Main Ukrainian Military Committee calls a congress of Ukrainian army men to meet at Kiev on June 17. The Committee asks the War Ministry to give orders to send delegates of Ukrainian soldiers, sailors, officers, and officials.

The ministry does not look favorably on such a congress, which might disorganize the army. A definite answer will not be given until the return of Kerenski from the front. . . .

2. MANIFESTO OF THE UKRAINIAN RADA²

June 24, 1917.

"Without separating from Russia, and without breaking away from the Russian State, let the Ukrainian people on its own territory have the right to dispose of its life, and let a proper Government be established in the Ukraine by the election of a Ukrainian National Assembly, a Diet, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. Only such an assembly has the right to issue laws which are to establish permanent order in the Ukraine, while those laws which affect the entire Russian State must be issued by an All-Russian Parliament. No one knows better than ourselves what we want, and what are the best laws for us. No one better than our own peasants knows how to manage our own land.

For that reason we wish, after all private, State, Tsarist, Ministerial, and other lands have been handed over throughout Russia to the various peoples, and after a constitution has been drawn up by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, that the constitution and public order in our Ukrainian territories should be entirely in our own hands, that is, in the hands of a Ukrainian Diet. . . . We thought at first that the Central Russian Government would lend us a hand in this work, and that we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, would be able, in coöperation with it, to organize our country; but the Provisional Russian Government has rejected our demands and has refused the stretched-out hand of the Ukrainian people. We have sent out delegates to Petrograd to submit to the Russian Provisional Government our demands, the principal of which are as follows:

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 75, June 8, 1917.

² "The New Europe," Vol. 4, 180-1.

"That the Russian Government should publicly, by a special Act, proclaim that it is not opposed to the national will of the Ukraine and to the right of our people to autonomy.

"That the Central Russian Government should, for the decision of all affairs affecting the Ukraine, have by its side our High Commissioner.

"That the local authority in the Ukraine itself should be vested in the person of a Commissioner elected by ourselves, acting as the representative of the Central Russian authority; and

"That a definite portion of the taxes collected from our people into the State Exchequer should be handed over to us, the representatives of the Ukrainian people, for cultural and national needs.

"All these demands have been rejected by the Central Russian Government, which did not want to say whether it recognized our people's right to autonomy and to dispose of its own life. It has evaded a direct reply by referring us to the future All-Russian Constituent Assembly. It has refused to have by its side our High Commissioner. It has refused to coöperate with us in bringing about a new order in our country, and it has refused to appoint a Commissioner for the Ukraine in order that we may administer our country in harmony and in order.

"The Government further refuses to hand over to us the taxes, collected from our people, for the needs of our schools and our organization, and now the Ukrainian people has compelled us to assume the entire responsibility. . . .

"It is for this reason that we are issuing this Universal Act to our people, proclaiming that henceforth we alone shall regulate our life. . . .

"The Central Rada hopes that the non-Ukrainian peoples living on our land will also concern themselves with the maintenance of law and order in our country, and will, in this grave hour of general political anarchy, coöperate cheerfully with us to organize the autonomy of the Ukraine."

3. APPEAL OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE UKRAINE ³

UKRAINIAN CITIZENS!

June 29, 1917

In these trying days the Provisional Government turns to you in the name of free Russia. Our country is passing through serious

³ "Riech," No. 140, June 30, 1917.

trials to secure freedom, which will give the people happiness and restore to all nationalities their rights.

The conquests of the revolution are in danger. If the external foe crushes Russia, or if the [internal] enemies of freedom get the upper hand, then the common cause of all nationalities living in Russia is lost.

The [Provisional] Government has taken upon itself the task of leading the country through these dangers until the meeting of the National Constituent Assembly. At this gathering all the nationalities of Russia will meet on an equal footing and will express their desires openly and firmly. This is your task, citizens of the Ukraine. Are you not a part of free Russia? Is not the fate of the Ukraine bound up with the fate of all free Russia? Who can doubt that Russia, standing under the banner of popular government, will assure the rights of all nationalities living within her borders?

At the Constituent Assembly the nationalities, through their representatives, can work out such forms of political and economic organization as will best answer their national aspirations.

The Provisional Government is bringing to life the cultural self-determination of the nationalities in Russia; and, feeling as it does very friendly to the Ukrainians, and conscious of its obligation to them, it will strive to wipe out all traces of their oppression.

The Provisional Government has given thought to this question and regards itself as obligated to come to an agreement with the public-democratic organizations of the Ukraine on the temporary measures to be adopted to provide the Ukraine with local self-government in schools and courts. These measures will pave the way to the final form of government which the All-National Constituent Assembly will decide upon.

It is not possible, however, to make over the Russian Government and army while the enemy's guns are directed against us from without and freedom is threatened from within.

Brother-Ukrainians! Do not go on the ruinous road of splitting up the forces of freed Russia. Do not tear yourselves away from our common native land. Do not break up the common army in time of danger. Do not introduce fratricidal quarrels in the ranks of the people at the very time when all our strength is needed to defend the country against the warlike foe and to put an end to internal disturbances. In your impatience to carry through a form of government for the Ukraine, do not inflict a mortal wound on the whole

State and on yourselves. If Russia should perish, you would perish with her.

Let all the nationalities of Russia draw closer together to ward off the dangers threatening the country from within and from without. Let the final solution of all fundamental problems be left to the Constituent Assembly which is to meet in the not distant future, and where the nationalities themselves will determine the fate of Russia and the fate of its parts.

PRINCE LVOV,
Prime Minister.

4. DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION *

July 15, 1917

On the evening of July 15, there was a special secret session of the Provisional Government at the home of Prime Minister Prince Lvov to discuss the Ukrainian question. It was decided to make the following declaration to the Ukrainian Rada:

"After having heard the report of Ministers Kerenski, Tseretelli, and Tereschenko on the Ukrainian question, the Provisional Government has come to the following decision:

"To appoint a General Secretariat as the highest organ for settling of local questions in the Ukraine. The composition of this body will be determined by the Government, in agreement with the Central Ukrainian Rada. It should be supplemented by representatives of democratic organizations of other [than Ukrainian] nationalities living in the Ukraine. All matters relating to the Ukraine and its government will be in the hands of this organ.

"The Provisional Government believes that the national-political form of the Ukraine and the land problem, the way the land should pass into the hands of the toilers, are matters for the decision of the Constituent Assembly. It [Provisional Government] is therefore deeply interested in the plans of the Ukrainian Central Rada for the solution of the above indicated problems, which will be submitted to the Constituent Assembly.

"While the war is going on, the Provisional Government regards it as necessary to preserve the unity of the army. Nothing must be done to destroy the unity of its organization and command, as, for

* "Riech," No. 154, July 17, 1917.

example, the changing of the present plans of mobilization into the immediate formations of territorial units or the commanding by public organizations. At the same time, the Government thinks it possible to coöperate with the efforts to bring the Ukrainians in the army together, or to form special Ukrainian units, in so far as such attempts do not interfere with the efficiency of the army and meet with the approval of the Minister of War.

"In order to work out a plan and to realize the above desire at the present moment, the Provisional Government regards it as feasible to invite, in agreement with the Central Rada, Ukrainian army men to help in this task. These delegates will be attached to the Ministry of War, to the General Staff, and to the Supreme Commander-in-chief.

"As to the local Ukrainian Military Committees, they can carry on their functions on general lines, but in harmony with other public military organizations."

5. RESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE CADET PARTY FROM THE MINISTRY ⁵

July 16, 1917

[At the meeting in Prince Lvov's home] the Cadet-ministers announced that they were not satisfied with the text of the declaration. It was neither clear nor complete. They also raised the point that Tseretelli and Tereschenko were delegated to go to the Ukraine for the exclusive purpose of coming to an agreement with the Ukrainians, but not to conclude a declarative act. As far as the act as a whole was concerned, the Cadet-ministers said that they could not accept it, because it put an end to the authority of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine. It was, they said, for the Constituent Assembly to determine the form of government for the Ukraine, and not for the Ukraine itself, as it appeared in the agreement reached by Tseretelli and Tereschenko. In addition to the enumerated objections, there were others, relating to the land question, national and social problems, etc.

Tseretelli and Tereschenko, supported by all the Socialist ministers, argued that the agreement reached at Kiev was final and no changes could be allowed; that it cost them much labor to get even that much; that there should not be so much fault-finding in regard to details; that it was not a law but a declaration; and that

⁵ "Riech," No. 154, July 17, 1917.

it did not finally settle the Ukrainian question, but simply discussed the limits of the autonomy, etc.

The Cadet-ministers insisted that the settlement of the question belonged to the Constituent Assembly. After this debate, a vote was taken.

The Socialist ministers, Prime Minister Lvov, and Oberprocurator of the Synod, Lvov, voted in favor of accepting, without change, the agreement reached at Kiev. Ministers Shakhovskoi, Manuilov, Stepanov, and Godnev voted against it. They said that they had no objection to the creation of a special regional organ for the governing of the Ukraine until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, but they could not agree to the publication of the document as it stood.

When the objections raised by the Cadet-ministers were overruled, ministers Shingarev, Manuilov, and Shakhovskoi announced that in their opinion the agreement created a chaotic relation between the Government and the organs of government in the Ukraine, opened the door for the Rada to make of the Ukraine, in a legal way, an autonomous state, and that under the circumstances, they could not assume the responsibility, and therefore resigned from the Cabinet. . . .

At one in the morning [July 16], the members of the Cadet party left the meeting place. . . .

CADETS EXPLAIN THEIR RESIGNATION ⁶

The Central Committee of the Party of Popular Freedom, having been obliged to recall its representative from the Provisional Government, considers it to be its duty to explain to the country why this act was unavoidable at this trying moment for the country.

From the very first days of the revolution, the Party of Popular Freedom was of the opinion that the only way to save the freedom won and to drive off the enemy was to form a united national government, resting upon the population as a whole. When, therefore, at the beginning of May, there came a call to form a so-called coalition-ministry, the Party responded in the hope that such a government would follow a middle course and carry out the national will. Unfortunately, it did not work out that way. The fundamental idea of a coalition, an all-national agreement, was not realized in its true form, and that explains why the coalition was incapable of giving the country a united and strong government. In a large number of

⁶ "Riech," No. 155, July 18, 1917.

questions, both foreign and domestic, which touched the principles of unity and power of the Government, the members of the Party of Popular Freedom were left in a minority. The latest and especially striking illustration of this was the approval of the Government of the action of three members of the Government, who went to Kiev for preliminary negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada, but concluded a ready-made agreement, so that it was impossible to make amendments to it. This was done notwithstanding the warnings given by our colleagues as to its possible consequences.

In regard to the Ukrainian question, the Central Committee admits the necessity of preparing a plan for the territorial autonomy of the Ukraine for submission to the Constituent Assembly, and the Committee has even started work on this measure. It is the opinion of the Committee that the immediate creation of a local government, responsible to a local public organization with indefinite authority over an undefined area, and the premature approval of such a project of territorial autonomy by the Government, without even knowing its contents, is inadmissible, because it is a most dangerous precedent and contrary to the oath of the members of the Government, which binds them to leave to the Constituent Assembly the determination of the fundamental question relating to the future State organization of Russia. The Central Committee takes the stand that, in view of the fact that its adherents in the Government were not given an opportunity to influence this act and harmonize it with the State law and the interest of Russia, they should not bear the responsibility and the consequences for it.

The Party of Popular Freedom holds that a united and strong government can be formed either of one group of like-minded people, or of different groups, if they agree for the general good, to compromise and to come to a mutual understanding on national fundamental questions. There can be no strong [coalition] government, when the majority group tries to force its will on the minority.

The Party would like to believe that the Government about to be formed will stand back of the offensive which has just commenced at the front, and will find some way to reestablish normal life in the interior. The Party will support whole-heartedly the Provisional Government in its efforts for the good of Russia and in its fight against the external foes.

The heroic deeds of our army, which is making final, determined efforts to hasten peace by a mighty offensive, should call forth the unconditional and steady support of all the citizens regard-

less of party lines. Today, as heretofore, the Party of Popular Freedom urges all the people to stand together and fulfil their patriotic duty for the sake of Russia's welfare, for the sake of her regeneration and reconstruction on foundations of popular government and social justice.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY OF POPULAR FREEDOM

CHAPTER XXXII

JULY UPRISING

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The utter failure of the military campaign and the resignation of the bourgeois ministers strengthened the radical Socialists who were against the offensive and the coalition. But now that their objections and predictions had been justified they did not know what to do. They, themselves, were not just then strong enough to take over the Government, and to put into life the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" meant placing the power in the hands of the moderate Socialists, who were almost as hateful to the Bolsheviks as the Cadets. Lenin and some of the more brainy Bolsheviks, who had not as yet the influence among their followers they acquired later, held back. But while they hesitated some of the hot-heads of the Bolsheviks and other irresponsible persons got the soldiers and the workmen out on the street shouting for "All Power to the Soviets" and "Down with the Capitalist Ministers." It was only when the movement got under way that the Bolsheviks, as a party, put themselves at the head of it and controlled it as much as they could. It should be remembered that by July they had not acquired the prestige which they enjoyed in November, and that they were by no means all-powerful.

The moderate Socialists and their Executive Committees did their best to stop the demonstration but were unsuccessful. After three days of turmoil, wild shooting, bringing of troops from the front, Petrograd quieted down little by little.

The Bolsheviks were blamed for the uprising. Some of their enemies published documents to prove that many of the Bolsheviks were German agents. Feeling against Lenin and some of his associates ran so high that they hid in Finland to escape arrest.

I. THE "IZVESTIIA'S" ACCOUNT OF THE UPRISING¹

Petrograd is again passing through tragic days, brought on in part by the resignation of the three Cadet-Ministers—Shingarev, Manuilov, and Shakhovskoi—and in part by the agitation of the Bolsheviks.

Early in the morning [July 16], reports reached the Executive Committee that the soldiers of the First Machine-Gun Regiment had decided to come out on the street, armed, to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government. These soldiers worked in groups throughout the city, seized whatever automobiles came in their way, and called on the workers and soldiers to come out on the street. The Executive Committee took immediate action to put an end to this movement. It issued a special appeal and sent its members and members of the Commission on Agitation to different parts of the city. Notwithstanding these efforts, by five o'clock in the afternoon the regiment above named, part of the Moscow, Pavlovsk, and Grenadier regiments, came out, armed, and were joined by mobs of workmen.

Near the Kshesinski Palace

Parts of the First Machine-Gun, Moscow, and Grenadier regiments, in full fighting order, with red banners and signs (the same that they used on July 1) calling for the resignation of the bourgeois Ministers, appeared before the Kshesinski palace, the headquarters of the Bolsheviks, towards eight o'clock in the evening. The wings of the palace were surrounded by machine-guns mounted on trucks and armed automobiles. There was a constant stream of troops from the Field of Mars, across the Troitski bridge, and on the Kamenostrovski Boulevard. . . . The soldiers seemed to be very much in earnest. In answer to questions, they said that they were going in search of the Ministers, especially Kerenski. After a time this mass broke up into smaller units, going in different directions—some to the Mariinski palace, others to the Taurida palace, still others to the Peter and Paul fortress. The two groups, first named, were followed by men and women workers, waving flags and singing songs. They were accompanied by mounted machine-guns.

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 108, July 17, 1917.

At the Taurida Palace

About 10:30 in the evening, the First Machine-Gun Regiment came to the palace, called a meeting, and selected delegates to talk things over with the Central All-Russian Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In place of Chkhaidze, who had a sore throat, Voitinski addressed the men, as follows:

"Comrades, I greet you in the name of the All-Russian Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. I know what brought you here. You fear that liberty is in danger, that our liberty born in blood and pain is threatened by counter-revolution. Comrades, believe me that tomorrow, when we have our meeting, your requests will be taken into consideration. But I must speak to you frankly, and you must listen to the truth. We represent the whole revolutionary democracy, and if we do not agree with you, that means that your requests are only your own requests. I, therefore, call upon you to accept the will of the whole democracy. If, on the other hand, at tomorrow's meeting your idea wins, then all honor and glory is yours, for it means that you foreshadow the thought of all Russia."

After Voitinski, others spoke. The attitude of the men was peaceful.

Attempt to Arrest the Ministers

At 9:40 P. M., there drove up to the home of Prince Lvov an automobile with machine-guns and ten men, six of whom were armed. They asked for all the Ministers in the house, and gave notice that they would requisition all the automobiles of the Provisional Government. At this time the Ministers, Prince Lvov, Tseretelli, Chernov, and Nekrasov, were having a conference, and when they were told what the soldiers had said, Tseretelli offered to go out and speak to them. But by the time he came out, the automobile was nowhere in sight. Exactly at ten o'clock it reappeared, but during the time that it took to call it to the attention of the Ministers, the soldiers ran off with one of the two automobiles belonging to the Provisional Government, which stood in the driveway. When the porter protested and repeated Tseretelli's request not to touch the machine, the soldiers said, "One automobile is enough for them."

Attempt to Seize Kerenski

At 7:45 P. M., six armed automobiles came to the Baltic railway station in the hope of preventing Kerenski from going to the front. He, however, had departed at six o'clock.

On the Corner of the Nevski and Nikolaev Streets

On the corner of these streets, the public stopped four automobiles and took away machine-guns from the soldiers and rifles from the civilians. Those who followed the automobiles, fearing that they too would be disarmed, fired off their rifles and machine-guns in the air, and according to reports, some people were killed and wounded. Farther down on the Nevski, near Ekaterinenski Canal, there was some more shooting. In the panic that ensued, the public ran in all directions, in some cases store windows were smashed in order to get inside [public] buildings, and even in private houses. In a very short time the Soviet posted guards at these broken windows.

Stopping Work at the "Novoe Vremia"

At 11:30 P. M., four trucks with armed soldiers and machine-guns came to the printing offices of the "Novoe Vremia" [newspaper], told the workers to stop work, and threatened "to use more serious measures," if their orders were not obeyed.

On the Nevski

About midnight an automobile, full of soldiers and machine-guns, appeared on the Nevski near the Liteiny. Here was gathered a mob of excited people who demanded that the soldiers should get off and disarm. The soldiers were called names—"inciters, traitors," etc. The soldiers, of course, paid no attention to these demands. While the argument was becoming heated, a shot was fired. Immediately the mob scattered in great disorder. Army officers who happened to be present shouted, "Lie down; they have machine-guns." Sure enough, a moment later there was the crack of a machine-gun. Fortunately, no one was hurt, and the automobile which fired on defenseless people went on its way.

Nikolaevski Station

About 11 P. M., an automobile with machine-guns drove up. Cossacks, who were there, stopped it. All the men in the automobile were drunk.

Demands of the Soldiers

[Among the demands made by the soldiers were these]—Down with the ten bourgeois Ministers; all power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; stop the offensive; confiscate the bourgeois press; nationalize the land; control industrial production. . .

*Cossacks Killed*²

The Cossacks, with light artillery, started for the State Duma at the order of the Commander-in-Chief. Near where the French quay turns into the Liteiny, some one from the Liteiny bridge shot off a gun and later a machine-gun. . . . (Just then a battalion of the First Army came out from Shpalernaia into the Liteiny and thinking that the Cossacks did the shooting, opened fire on them. The armed mob fired from the opposite side, and in this manner the Cossacks were caught in a cross fire.) Six of them were killed, twenty-five wounded. Twenty-nine horses were left dead on the street.

*Taurida Palace*²

About 6 P. M., there was a mass meeting at the Taurida palace. The 176th regiment surrounded the place. Some one fired a shot and although the soldiers were fully armed, they started to run and fire wildly. . . . Fifteen were wounded.

*Total Killed and Wounded*²

According to the best information, 400 people were killed or wounded on July 16 and 17.

2. STALIN'S REPORT ON THE JULY EVENTS MADE AT THE BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS³

August 9, 1917

The end of June and beginning of July were marked by a political offensive. There were rumors of a return to capital punishment,

² "Izvestiia," No. 109, July 18, 1917.

³ Vladimirova, V.; "Revoliutsiia 1917 Goda," III, 307-8.

the breaking up of certain regiments, and the brutal treatment of others at the front. Delegates from the front reported arrests and abuse in their ranks. The Grenadier and Machine-Gun regiments made the same complaints. . . . I am now coming to the part which interests you most, the events of July 16-18.

At three in the afternoon of July 16, there was a general city conference on municipal questions at the Kshesinski palace. All of a sudden two delegates of the Machine-Gun regiment rushed in shouting, "They are trying to disband us; they are scheming against us. We cannot wait longer and have decided to come out on the street; we have sent delegates to the factories and regiments."

The presiding officer of the conference, Volodarski, announced that the [Bolshevik] party had decided not to come out, for to the Central Committee [of the party] it was clear that both the bourgeoisie and Black Hundred were trying to get us to come out, in order that they might throw on us the responsibility for the adventurous [military] offensive. We, on the other hand, had come to the conclusion not be driven, to do nothing while the military operations were on, but to wait until the war offensive became politically offensive in the eyes of the masses, and the Provisional Government was discredited. Volodarski told the delegates that the party had decided not to come out, and that members of the party in the regiment should abide by this decision. The delegates went away protesting.

At four o'clock a meeting of the Central Committee was called at the Taurida palace, which decided not to come out. I was instructed to report our decision to the Central Executive Committee [of the Soviet]. This I did, and reported at the same time what the delegates of the Machine-Gun regiment had told us. I proposed that everything should be done to prevent the demonstration, and at our request this proposition was recorded. The Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, who are now saying that we planned the uprising, seem to have forgotten this fact. At five o'clock, the city conference took a stand against demonstration, and all the members of the Conference returned to their wards and factories, with the idea of keeping the masses in check. At seven o'clock, two regiments, with banners, on which were the words, "All Power to the Soviets," came to the Kshesinski palace. Two of our comrades, Lashevich and Kuraev, spoke to them and asked them to return to their barracks. The soldiers shouted, "Away with them!"—something that had never before occurred. By that time there appeared a crowd of workmen shouting, "All Power to the Soviets!"

It became quite evident that it was impossible to stop the demonstration. There was a hurried conference of members of the party, and it was agreed to participate in the demonstration, to get the soldiers and workers to work in an orderly manner, and go peacefully to the Taurida palace, select delegates, and through them make their demands known. When this plan was announced to the soldiers, they applauded and played the "Marseillaise." At ten o'clock, there was a meeting of the Central Committee and members of the city conference, representatives of the regiments and factories. It was decided to repeal our previous stand, and to take part and control the movement already begun. It would have been criminal just then for the party to wash its hands of the whole affair. Having come to an understanding, the Central Committee went to the Taurida palace, in which direction the soldiers and workers were moving. At that time there was a meeting of the Labor Section of the Soviet. Zinoviev raised the question as to the part it should take in connection with the movement already under way. Considering all the facts in the case, it was proposed that the Labor Section take part and keep the movement orderly, for it was feared that without guidance the mob might get out of hand. This question split the Section. A third of the members were against the motion and left the meeting; the other two-thirds remained, and named a committee of fifteen to act. At eleven o'clock, agitators and delegates reported what was going on in their wards. The question was raised as to July 17. It was moved not to have a demonstration, but the majority voted it down on the ground that it was utopian. The demonstration would take place anyway. . . . Both the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet agreed to have a peaceful demonstration on July 17. . . .

3. LUNACHARSKI'S ACCOUNT OF THE JULY UPRISING⁴

In addition to the lack of a clear plan for action, there was also something vague about the watchword, as was inevitable in the then-prevailing state of affairs. The fact is that, with the exception of a momentary vacillation, we [Bolsheviks] held firmly to the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" at a time when the majority in the Soviet was composed of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists. In practice, therefore, the slogan meant "All power to the party of the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks." It was now even un-

⁴ Piontkovski; "Khrestomatia," 150-1.

certain whether we would join an all-socialist ministry, in case the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists, contrary to our expectations, should consent to drive the capitalist ministers out of the Government.

But what if they should consent? They might do so. What then? It was quite evident at the time that an attempt to seize power by the Bolsheviks was extremely risky and might lead to a temporary, perhaps not very serious, defeat. For such an attempt the time was not yet ripe, at least not in the provinces and at the front, and above all in Moscow.

All these considerations led to vagueness and indecision. When on the morning of July 17, I found myself, together with Lenin and Sverdlov, at the Kshesinski palace, and joined them in encouraging from the balcony the endless files of armed soldiers and workmen passing by, I clearly realized that, after all, no one could predict how the day would end.

Jacob Mikhailovich [Sverdlov], with his stentorian voice, shouted to the various detachments coming to a halt before the balcony to "Demand the expulsion of the capitalist ministers from the Government," and "All Power to the Soviets!" or "We are going to demand of the Soviets that they take the whole power into their own hands. Should they refuse to do that, the situation would become clear. Then wait for further slogans."

We are bound to admit that the Party knew no way out of the difficulty. It was compelled to demand of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists, through a demonstration, something they were organically unable to decide upon, and, meeting with the refusal the Party had expected, it did not know how to proceed further; it left the demonstrators around the Taurida palace without a plan and gave the opposition time to organize its forces, while ours were breaking up; and consequently we went down to temporary defeat with eyes quite open.

METEEV'S ACCOUNT—AT THE TAURIDA PALACE⁵

In serried ranks, we approach the Taurida Palace. . . .

The driveway and the square adjoining the Taurida palace are blocked by the people. We stop in Shpalernaia Street, and we request the crowd to press as close as possible around the platform erected at the main entrance to the palace. On the platform, greeted by the silence of the masses, appears the President of the Central Executive

⁵ Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 151-2.

Committee, Chkhaidze. In a hoarse voice, he tries to calm the masses, promising to consider the demands of the soldiers and workers who have come to the palace, and to do everything that the Central Executive Committee can do.

Chkhaidze's speech is interrupted several times by outcries of protest, the masses demanding a definite answer to the question: Will the Central Executive Committee take the governmental power into its own hands? Chkhaidze, avoiding a direct answer, advises the gathering to disperse to their homes, and to wait patiently for what "their" organ, the Central Executive Committee, will do. But this proposal starts even more noise and protests among the masses. They do not want to listen any longer to the empty phrases about "live forces," "democracy," and so on and so forth, of which they have grown tired during these four months.

The confused "head of the All-Russian revolutionary" organ leaves the platform, which is then taken by representatives of the factories and of the Machine-Gun regiment. The speakers declare that the workers and soldiers have come here to announce to the Central Executive Committee that they can no longer remain calm spectators, while the Government helps the bourgeoisie fill its pockets by trafficking, wholesale and retail, in the blood of the laboring masses.

"We demand peace, bread, liberty!" the orators declare, "the cessation of the war, publication of the secret treaties, organization of workers' control, confiscation of all privately owned lands for the benefit of the peasantry, and the complete removal of the bourgeoisie from power. We demand an end to the exploitation of our strength and the reckless traffic in our blood. To realize these objects, it is necessary, first of all, that the governmental power should pass to the Soviets. . . . All Power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies!"

More and more detachments of men and women workers, and soldiers keep arriving before the palace. Light artillery is also approaching, and its commander announces that all the batteries in his division will join the workers. In other places around the palace, more platforms are quickly put up. Before the masses appears Zinoviev, who wants Chkhaidze to realize at last that the clamor for Soviet rule is that of large masses and not the invention of single individuals. Riazanov makes a speech in which he urges the masses to be firm and not to disorganize their ranks in these days of mighty

events. A number of other men take the platform. Shpalernaia Street is filling with army reservists of the oldest classes, carrying on their banners inscriptions demanding that they be allowed to go home.

4. ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE ORDER

(a) APPEALS OF SOVIETS TO SOLDIERS ⁶

Comrade-Soldiers:

July 17, 1917

Both the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies have agreed that, while the war is on, the Russian army must be strengthened and put in condition either to take a defensive position or to assume the offensive. The workers, soldiers, and peasants, who came from different parts of Russia and of the front, recognized that the place and time of the offensive was a matter for the decision of those in command.

Those in command, acting directly under the orders of our comrade, Minister of War, Kerenski, have given orders to take the offensive. The revolutionary army on the southwest front is heroically carrying out this order, knowing that by so doing, it is serving the cause of freedom, peace, and revolution.

The offensive is on. Our brothers are shedding their blood for the common cause. This is the time for all quarrels to cease. It is the duty of all to help those who are facing the enemy's fire. Not to come to their assistance now is to hand them over to the enemy, to betray the country and the revolution.

Yet there are papers which, by their articles and appeals, trouble the hearts of those who are ready to hasten to the aid of the heroic army, and weaken their enthusiasm to support the soldiers on the Southwest front.

Know, comrades, that these papers, whether they call themselves "Pravda" [Truth] or "Soldatskaia Pravda" [Soldiers' Truth] are not truly representing the will of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, as it was clearly expressed by them at their All-Russian Congresses. Know, comrades, that very often spies and the old police gang make use of these thoughtless articles and appeals to do their dirty work,

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 108, July 17, 1917.

to make you betray your brothers who are sacrificing themselves for the common good.

Comrade-Warriors!

In the name of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, we say to you: Listen only to the calls of the All-Russian Soviets. Obey all the war orders of your military commanders. Be ready to go to the assistance of your brothers at the first call!

Let them know that all revolutionary Russia is back of them!

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIETS OF
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES AND SOVIET OF
PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

July 18, 1917

*Comrade Workers and Soldiers:*¹

Yesterday several Ministers, belonging to the Cadet party, resigned. In view of this, there was a joint meeting of the Executive Committees of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, the fully authorized organs of the revolutionary democracy of all Russia, to act in the crisis. But this work was interrupted, notwithstanding the repeated warnings of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

Certain units of the army came out on the streets with arms in their hands, in an attempt to get control of the city. They seized automobiles, arrested individuals, and acted in a high-handed and threatening manner. At the Taurida palace, they demanded that the Executive Committees should take all power. Having offered power to the Soviets, they were the first to encroach upon it. The All-Russian Executive organs of the Soviets indignantly refuse to yield to force. It is outrageous that a part of the garrison in one city should attempt to force its will on the whole of Russia.

On those who dared to call out an armed uprising lies the blood that was shed on the streets of Petrograd. It is a betrayal of our revolutionary army, which is defending the revolution at the front. He who stirs up trouble in the rear against the organs of democracy and brings about civil war in its ranks, is sticking a dagger in the back of the revolutionary army which is fighting the soldiers of William.

The All-Russian organs of the Soviets protest against these evil

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 109, July 18, 1917.

signs of undermining popular government, even the Constituent Assembly. The All-Russian organs of the Soviet demand that these shameful uprisings in revolutionary Petrograd be put to an end, once for all. The Executive Committees of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies call on all those who stand guard over the revolution and its conquests to await the decision of the fully empowered organs of democracy on this governmental crisis. All those to whom the cause of freedom is dear will accept the decision as the voice of all revolutionary Russia.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIET OF
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES AND SOVIET
OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

(b) APPEAL OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONISTS *

July 18, 1917

IN BATTLE YOU WILL WIN YOUR RIGHT.

To all Socialist-Revolutionists of the City of Petrograd:

At this dangerous moment, when the conquests of the revolution are being threatened, the party calls you to its standards. The Petrograd Committee has resolved that:

All the members of the party must by every means support the measures taken by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. Enough manifestations! Enough wild turmoil! Enough idle and senseless parading in the streets! Enough shedding of brothers' blood! The revolution needs discipline and the firm union of all the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. Every member of the party is duty bound at factory, company, and battalion meetings, at street meetings, and in single groups, to restrain the masses from ill-considered actions, such as have already resulted in a criminal shedding of blood.

No one has the right to refuse to carry out this obligation. All ward committees will establish connection with factories and army units, and maintain constant guard. The members of the party are to report to the ward committees for information and instructions. All Socialist-Revolutionist soldiers and sailors are to report to the ward committees all incitements to trouble, and demand that those so inciting shall produce documents to identify them, and the wards will report to the Petrograd Committee. All available speakers, and

* Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 160-1.

workers and soldiers capable of addressing meetings, must place themselves at the disposal of the Committee.

The party demands of all its members absolute and undivided submission to revolutionary discipline.

The present proclamation is to be made known to workers and soldiers at all gatherings and meetings, partizan as well as public.

THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY OF
SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONISTS

(c) MENSHEVIKS EXPLAIN ⁹

TO ALL MEN AND WOMEN WORKERS:

Comrades!

The sad and sinister events in Petrograd, which have also partly affected the provinces and the front, oblige all of us to consider more seriously the fate of the Russian revolution and the problems of the working class.

What happened in Petrograd during the days of July 16-18?

The armed action of several regiments, led by unscrupulous agitators of the Bolshevik Party, and in some cases simply by adventurers, attracted into the streets, also, a section of the workers. All demanded, in a threatening manner, the overthrow of the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the transfer of all power to the control of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

The Taurida palace, where the Central Executive Committees of the Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies were in session, was besieged with bayonets and machine-guns. Violence was done to individual members of the Committees, and even to Comrade Chernov.

Groups of soldiers, joined by notorious spies and *agents provocateurs*, drove about the streets in stolen automobiles and fired upon the citizens with rifles and machine-guns.

As a result, there are scores of killed, hundreds of wounded, enormous losses through the strike, looted stores and residences, more bitterness against the workers by the petty bourgeoisie, and an alarming consolidation of counter-revolutionary forces.

Those who threateningly demanded the transfer of power to the Soviets proved that they themselves do not respect these Soviets. The Bolsheviks and Anarchists did everything in their power, at first, to undermine confidence in the Soviets, refused to abide by their

⁹ Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 161-4.

decisions, fought them in every way, and then demanded that these same Soviets should seize all the power in the country.

They announced as their watchword, "Down with the capitalist ministers!" but in reality they incited the ignorant masses against the Soviets, which support the Provisional Government, and against the Socialist parties and their leaders.

And now all this is being utilized by the secret as well as open enemies of the revolution, beginning with the Black Hundreds, *agents provocateurs*, and German spies, and ending with the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois press, who are anxious to restrain, stop, and even turn back altogether, the revolution. They attack in one breath the Socialists, the Soviets, and the Provisional Government, where Socialists play such an important part.

And the Black Hundreds and spies, who at first came out with with the slogans of the Leninites and Anarchists, now openly engage in counter-revolutionary, pogrom agitation. And the worst of it is that the ignorant masses are beginning to pay attention to them. The soldiers at the front and the masses in the rear are exhausted by the terrible three-year carnage and by the grave economic chaos. Their patience is almost exhausted, and they listen favorably to every incitement to mistrust, to seizure of power, land, and factories.

The Leninites promised the masses an early peace and bread, and the masses followed them. Today, disillusioned with the Leninites, these masses may turn their wrath on all the Socialists, and begin to listen to those who will, in a similar manner, whisper all kinds of promises in their ears and at the same time put the blame for all calamities and misfortunes upon the entire democracy, the Soviets, and the revolution.

The revolution is in danger, comrade-workers! You have started it, and you must save it, for there is not another class that needs so much the liberties won in the revolution, as the working class.

What threatens the revolution most of all?

It is the war,—the principal cause and source of all the calamities we are now suffering.

But all Russians are agreed that it is impossible to end the war by a separate peace with Germany. Peace must be general. Only such a peace will serve the common interests of all nations. We are not going to secure peace by urging the already launched offensive to stop by disorganizing the army, as the Leninites have done. Their tactics are a direct stab in the back of those who are perishing by the thousands on the battlefields. It has already resulted in

serious military defeats; it will cause mutual bitterness, fratricidal hatreds among the soldiers at the front, disintegration of the revolutionary army, and perhaps, a new invasion by Hindenburg.

No, at this time, when the whole Russian democracy and the Russian Government have come out in favor of peace on a democratic basis, all our incessant appeals should be directed not to our army, which is doing its difficult duty to the revolution, and which we are all bound to aid to the limit of our strength, but to the European democracy, to the workers of the Allied as well as enemy countries, that they may at last compel their governments to accept our basis for peace. . . .

Not fraternizing at the front, but the fraternization of the proletarians of all countries at an international Socialist conference, a common struggle for peace, will end the war. These are the objects to which all our thoughts should be devoted.

The other peril threatening the revolution is our internal chaos, the disruption of our entire economic life, the imminent famine, and unemployment. Will that seizure of power which the Leninites propose help in this case? No, because no seizure whatever will furnish bread to the people; on the contrary, it will merely aggravate the general disorganization, will create a panic, that is, an absurd, senseless fear, mutual distrust, and bitterness. And that slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" which many workers follow, is a dangerous one. The Soviets are supported only by a minority of the population, and we must strive by all means to have those bourgeois elements, which are still able and willing to defend with us the conquests of the revolution, take over with us the difficult legacy which has been left to us by the old régime, and the enormous responsibility for the fate of the revolution, which rests upon us in the sight of the nation.

This is why the conduct of the Cadet Party must be regarded as treacherous and criminal. It refused to submit to the demands of the democracy and deserted the Government, so as to leave the still inadequately organized and struggling revolutionary democracy, but especially the proletariat, to fight alone against chaos and the growing counter-revolution. Equally treacherous and criminal is the conduct of the industrialists, who are secretly contributing to the disorganization of economic life, so as to force the helpless working class to accept their own terms. . . . But what our opponents desire cannot be to our advantage.

While refusing to seize all the power, we must take into consideration the growing economic disintegration, and the bankruptcy

that threatens the State. We must carefully weigh the demands that are to be presented, and we must not act in a disjointed manner, but only under the guidance of our trade unions, so that the struggle with the industrialists may not lead to the destruction of industry itself.

This is why it should be our immediate aim to help the State in its struggle against the economic chaos by means of regulation and control of industry. Mere criticism and shouting, "Down with the Capitalists!" will get us no bread.

Pressure must be exerted upon the organs of the Government, but we ourselves must also show independent action, display creative ability and initiative.

Organization, close rallying around our organizations, around the Soviets, around our elected representatives in the municipal councils, these must be our principal means of combating the chaos.

Lastly, the third peril which endangers our revolution and our freedom is the union of all the dark forces, of all the secret and open counter-revolutionists.

Counter-revolution can derive strength only from mass support; without it, the counter-revolutionists are not formidable. In order that the masses may not succumb to the agitation of the enemies of the revolution and the people, we need incessant educational and organizational activity. The best way to disarm the counter-revolution is to combat and overcome ignorance and darkness in our own ranks by extensive and intensive participation in trade unions, educational organizations, coöperative societies, and, especially, in our own Social-Democratic Party.

We, Menshevik Social-Democrats, warned you continuously, comrade-workers, against the ruinous tactics of the Leninites and Anarchists.

You have convinced yourselves that we were right. Join, then, the ranks of the Menshevik organizations. Only [by being] a large, well-organized and powerful party, shall we be able to save the country and lead it safely to the Constituent Assembly. Only then will the voice of the working class make itself impressively heard and felt in the Constituent Assembly, which will settle the future of Russia for many years to come. To work, comrades! Everybody join the unions and our Party!

Long live the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party!

THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-
DEMOCRATIC LABOR PARTY

(d) PRINCE LVOV EXPLAINS¹⁰

Telegram sent by the Prime Minister to the Gubernia Commissioners on July 17, 1917.

In reply to the alarming inquiries, the Ministry of the Interior notifies you that the rumors of the arrest of the Provisional Governments are without foundation. The report that there was an armed fight between the troops until noon of July 17 is equally untrue. The call to overturn the Government by an armed uprising, and to hand all the power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies came from an irresponsible, radical minority and was received in a hostile manner by the masses of the inhabitants. The Executive Committees have publicly denounced this uprising as inimical to the interest of the revolution. Moreover the Provisional Government, with Prince Lvov at the head, in full agreement with the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, is taking measures to ward off events that might be harmful to the State as a whole. The occurrences of yesterday and today have temporarily interrupted the discussion in regard to the formation of a full government, but just as soon as order is once more restored, the discussions will be renewed with the idea of organizing a ministry of the same political complexion as the former one. This plan has the full approval of the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

PRINCE LVOV

Prime Minister and Minister of Interior.

(e) TROTSKI'S LETTER TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT¹¹

July 23, 1917

Citizen Ministers:

I have learned that in connection with the events of July 16-17, a warrant has been issued for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, but not for me. I should like, therefore, to call your attention to the following:

1. I agree with the main thesis of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, have advocated it in the journal "Vpered" and in my public speeches.

¹⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 111, July 20, 1917.

¹¹ Trotski, L., 1917, I, 165-6.

2. My attitude toward the events of July 16-17 was the same as theirs.

a. Kamenev, Zinoviev, and I first learned of the proposed plans of the Machine-Gun and other regiments at the joint meeting of the Bureaus [Executive Committees] on July 16. We took immediate steps to stop the soldiers from coming out. Zinoviev and Kamenev put themselves in touch with Bolsheviks, and I with the "interward" organization to which I belong.

b. When, however, notwithstanding our efforts, the demonstration did take place, my comrade Bolsheviks and I made numerous speeches in front of the Taurida palace, in which we came out in favor of the main slogan of the crowd: "All Power to the Soviets," but we, at the same time, called on those demonstrating, both the soldiers and civilians, to return to their homes and barracks in a peaceful and orderly manner.

c. At a conference which took place at the Taurida palace late in the night of July 16-17 between some Bolsheviks and ward organizations, I supported the motion of Kamenev that everything should be done to prevent a recurrence of the demonstration on July 17. When, however, it was learned through the agitators, who arrived from the different wards, that the regiments and factory workers had already decided to come out, and that it was impossible to hold back the crowd until the government crisis was over, all those present agreed that the best thing to do was to direct the demonstration along peaceful lines and to ask the masses to leave their guns at home.

d. In the course of the day of July 17, which I spent in the Taurida palace, I and the Bolshevik comrades more than once urged this course on the crowd.

3. The fact that I am not connected with the "Pravda" and am not a member of the Bolshevik Party is not due to political differences, but to certain circumstances in our party history which have now lost all significance.

4. The attempt of the papers to convey the impression that I said that I have "nothing to do" with the Bolsheviks has about as much truth in it as the report that I have asked the authorities to protect me from the "violence of the mob," or the hundred other false rumors of that same press.

5. From all that I have said, it is clear that you cannot logically exclude me from the warrant of arrest which you have made out for

Lenin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. There can also be no doubt in your minds that I am just as uncompromising a political opponent of the Provisional Government as the above named comrades. Leaving me out merely emphasizes the counter-revolutionary high-handedness that lies behind the attack on Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

LEV TROTSKI

PART IX

"SAVE THE REVOLUTION" GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The July offensive, the resignation of the Cadet Ministers, and the uprising greatly weakened the Provisional Government. When, on July 21, Prime Minister Lvov laid down his office, it seemed as if chaos had come to reign. These July events clearly demonstrated that the Provisional Government was defenseless at the front and helpless in the rear. The moderate Socialists on whom fell, from now on, all the burdens of government, were caught between the bourgeois legalists and the Bolshevik theorists. With each day the former grew weaker and the latter stronger, so that it became actually a struggle between two groups of Socialists.

The position of the Cadets and the Socialists had been completely reversed in the course of the four months that had passed. In March the bourgeoisie were in control of the Provisional Government and asked the support of the Socialists who promised it "in so far as" the Provisional Government carried out the program of the Socialists. After July the Socialists controlled the Provisional Government and asked the support of the Cadets, who promised it "in so far as" the Government carried out their program. The program of the Cadets and their associates was to go on with the war to a victorious end and to stand still, at least until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, with fundamental political and social changes. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, insisted that the war be brought to a close at once and urged, as a means to that end, fundamental political and social changes. The Provisional Government tried to steer a middle course but notwithstanding all its efforts it found that the strong revolutionary current was forcing it more and more to the Left. After the May disturbances it had to admit a large number of Socialists into the

Cabinet and swallow Chernov's land committees; after the July uprising it bound itself to "establish a democratic republic, carry out some of the delayed legislation on land, labor, local self-government. . . ." All of these measures, according to the Cadets and Prince Lvov, came under the jurisdiction of the Constituent Assembly and not the Provisional Government.

Kerenski succeeded Lvov as Prime Minister. When the new Premier proceeded to reconstruct his Cabinet, he ran into difficulties. He believed in a coalition government on both theoretical and practical grounds. On theoretical grounds because he feared that, being so very impressionable, the revolution would be led astray by one side or the other; on practical grounds because he realized that the trained men needed to carry on the affairs of government were to be found only in the bourgeois camp. When, however, he invited the Cadets to join the Ministry, they laid down a number of conditions, such as that no fundamental changes be made, that the war be pushed on vigorously, and that neither Provisional Government nor any of its Ministers be responsible to the Soviet. Though favoring a coalition government, the moderate Socialists could not accept these conditions. Unable to move forward, the Ministers one by one, including Kerenski, retreated and resigned. For a moment there was no Provisional Government. This situation frightened the moderate Socialists and Cadets. They came together for a heart to heart talk and, after separating, the Socialists authorized "Comrade Kerenski to form a Cabinet, made up of representatives of different parties which stand by the program adopted by the Provisional Government over which Kerenski presided and proclaimed on July 21"; the Committee of the Duma urged that "all should unite for one purpose—to save the country . . . [and that] all party and class interests and disagreements should disappear" and entrusted Kerenski with the task of forming a Ministry; and the Cadets passed a resolution "to empower A. F. Kerenski to form a Provisional Government, which shall stand on an All-National platform and which shall be made up of men who are not responsible before any organization or committees." In accepting the responsibility Kerenski made one of those declarations which could be interpreted differently by the different parties. On August 6 the Second Coalition Ministry was formed.

CHAPTER XXXIII

STEPS TOWARD ORGANIZATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT

1. JOINT MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ¹

July 17, 1917

Having taken into consideration the crisis brought on by the resignation of the three Cadet-Ministers from the cabinet, the Executive Committees in joint meeting have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in this event that should cause the revolutionary democracy to withdraw its support from the Provisional Government. On the other hand, the resignation of these men gives the democracy a reason for examining its relation to the organized government at this historical moment.

Even in the ordinary course of revolutionary development, such a question would have had to be discussed by the full Executive Committees of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, together with local representatives. This is especially necessary now, in view of the present governmental crisis, when a part of the Petrograd garrison and workers attempted to force the will of the minority upon the governmental organs of the revolutionary democracy, by means of an armed uprising leading to civil strife in the ranks of democracy.

In view of these circumstances, this meeting resolves to call together, in the course of two weeks, a full attendance of the Executive Committees of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, together with local representatives, to act on the question of the organization of a new government, and the temporary filling of vacancies caused by these resignations, which is being done in agreement with the Central Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the Executive Committee of All-Russian Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

Being the guardian of the will of the All-Russian democracy, this meeting takes the stand that until the full attendance of the Execu-

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 111, July 20, 1917.

tive Committees, the carrying on of the affairs of State should be left in the hands of the present Government, which should be guided by the resolutions of the All-Russian Congresses of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. Whether all the power should go to the Soviets can be decided only by the full meeting of the Executive Committees.

2. RESOLUTION OF THE MENSHEVIKS AND SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONISTS ²

July 20, 1917

On the night of July 20, there was a meeting, behind closed doors, of the Central Executive Committee and the Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies. Tseretelli made a report on the condition of the country and on the sad events of July 16 and 17.

After a number of other speeches, the following resolution, proposed by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists, was adopted by a very large majority:

1. The armed uprising against the Provisional Government has caused an abrupt change in the attitude of the masses. This uprising was prepared by the Anarchists and Bolsheviks, but under their flag were also the dark forces, inciters, and Black Hundreds. This situation shows that the country is in a real danger of a counter-revolution. On the other hand, the measures to which the Government and military forces (in agreement with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies) has resorted to to crush the uprising of July 16-18, prepare the ground for the counter-revolutionary demagogues. Just now they call for the restoration of revolutionary order, but they may attempt to establish a military dictatorship.

2. In view of this threatening danger, it is necessary that the safeguarding of revolutionary freedom and order should be taken in hand at once by the Provisional Government, in agreement with the Central Executive Committee, and with the coöperation of the revolutionary democratic organs—political parties, workers' and soldiers' organizations, and organs of local government. Special measures may be taken toward individuals, but not toward political parties, or movements as a whole. In every case, every one should be entitled to legal protection. Only in this way is it possible

² "Izvestiia," No. 112, July 21, 1917.

to reduce to a minimum extraordinary measures, to obviate pogroms and taking the law into one's own hands, and to put an end, in time, to all counter-revolutionary attempts.

3. While taking energetic measures to reestablish revolutionary order, it is necessary to declare that the revolution is in danger, and, without loss of time, to put into life the measures indicated by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, aiming to wipe out all traces of the old régime, establish a democratic republic, carry out some of the delayed legislation on land, labor, local self-government, preparation for the elections of the Constituent Assembly, regulation of the economic life of the country, and, in particular, the food question.

3. DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT *

July 21, 1917

Citizens:

The terrible hour is here. The forces of the German Emperor have broken through the front of the Russian national revolutionary army. In this they were helped by the light-mindedness and blind fanaticism of some, the treachery and betrayal of others. The former, as well as the latter, have been threatening the very foundations of newly freed Russia with ruin and disintegration. At this critical moment, when the counter-revolutionary forces that have been in hiding are in a position to take advantage of the general turmoil, the reorganized Provisional Government fully realizes the responsibility with all its heavy burden which falls upon its shoulders. But the Government has firm faith in the might of the great Russian people; it believes in the rapid recovery of the political life of the country, now that the contagious disease which has undermined the people's constitution has come to the surface and has ended in an acute crisis. The Provisional Government believes that this crisis will lead to life and not to death.

Believing strongly in this, the Provisional Government is ready to act and will act with all the energy and determination that the extraordinary times require. Its first and fundamental task is to concentrate its forces against the external foe and against the anarchists and counter-revolutionists in their attempts to upset the internal order. The Provisional Government will stop at nothing to bring this about. In regard to its foreign policy, the Government wishes to repeat

* "Izvestiia," No. 113, July 22, 1917.

what it has said again and again: that the revolutionary army can go into the battle with the fullest assurance that not a drop of Russian blood will be shed for aims that are against the ideals of the Russian democracy, as openly expressed before the world in its peace formula.

With these objects in mind, and on the basis of the declaration of its foreign policy made on May 19, the Provisional Government plans to propose to the Allies that they have a conference some time in August to discuss their foreign policies, in the light of the principles put forward by the Russian revolution. At this conference, Russia's spokesmen will be not only the diplomats but the representatives of the Russian democracy.

In other fields of State activity, the Provisional Government will likewise be guided by the declaration of May 19.

The Provisional Government will see to it that the elections for the Constituent Assembly take place on time, September 30, and that the preparatory measures be finished in good season, so as to make it possible to have orderly and free elections.

One of the most important internal undertakings of the Government is to work out and put into force as quickly as possible a system of local self-government on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. The Provisional Government attaches great importance to the idea that the local self-government bodies should have the confidence of all the population. For that reason it is now inviting public organizations to form local governments by means of uniting the guberniias into larger units, administered by collegiate organs of government.

In its striving to carry out consistently the principles of civic equality, the Provisional Government will abolish in the near future all class distinction, all ranks, orders of merit, except those earned on the field of battle.

For the purpose of fighting the economic disorganization and taking measures for further protection of labor, it is necessary to form, under the Provisional Government, an economic council and main economic committee to proceed at once to work out a general plan for organizing the national economy and labor, to draw up laws for regulating the economic life and industry, and to work out practical plans for carrying out these laws. There are already worked out, and soon will be published, a number of labor laws dealing with the freedom of labor unions, employment bureaus, and arbitration boards. There are being prepared measures on an eight-hour day, all

kinds of labor safeguards, all kinds of social insurance for all kinds of hired labor.

The agrarian measures of the Provisional Government are now, as formerly, based on the conviction that the principle underlying land reform should be to hand it over to the toilers, which is in accordance with the fundamental needs of our economic life, the often repeated wishes of the peasants, and the programs of all democratic parties. It is with this in mind that a land reform law is being prepared for the consideration of the Constituent Assembly.

The Provisional Government will in the near future proceed with the following measures:

1. Put a complete stop to the former land policy which disorganized and ruined the villages.
2. Enact measures which will give the Constituent Assembly full freedom in disposing of the land-fund of the country.
3. Regulate the land relations with an eye to the national defense and the food question of the country. This can be done by widening the scope of and strengthening the land committees formed by the State. Their power to settle land questions should be defined by law. They should not touch upon the problem of private land ownership, which the Constituent Assembly alone can solve.
4. To remove by this legal land regulation all serious danger to the State, to land reform, and to the principles of the future State plan of land reform, which reform and plan are threatened by illegal seizures and other lawless acts, to satisfy local needs.

In stating its plans the Provisional Government hopes that all live forces will come to its aid in carrying out its heavy and responsible task. The Government demands a readiness to sacrifice all strength, riches, and even life for the great cause of saving the country, which is no longer a stepmother to the nationalities, but is trying to unite them all on the basis of complete equality and freedom.

July 21, 1917

CHAPTER XXXIV

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CABINET

I. PRINCE LVOV LEAVES THE GOVERNMENT¹

On July 20, 1917, after the suppression of the Petrograd armed revolt by the Socialists of the radical wing, the Provisional Government decided to accept, for immediate carrying out, the program proposed by the Socialist ministers.

I can accept only those parts of the program that confirm and develop those principles which the Provisional Government has adopted in previous declarations. But I cannot accept the program as a whole, because it departs from the former non-partizan principles and pursues purely socialistic aims, especially in those parts which were formerly brought before the Provisional Government and against which I stood out. Among these is the immediate proclamation of a republican form of government for the Russian Empire. Such an act is an usurpation of the supreme power of the Constituent Assembly, the only organ for the expression of the popular will. A similar usurpation of the power of the Constituent Assembly is the indicated agrarian program. If I were to agree to it, I would be violating my oath of office. There are also, in the program, articles about the dismissal of the State Duma and State Council, and other secondary matters which in themselves are of no great importance but which seem to have a demagogic purpose, play to the galleries, and sacrifice the prestige of the State for the sake of satisfying the masses.

Though in favor of having the land pass into the hands of the toiling peasantry, I cannot accept the agrarian laws which the Minister of Agriculture has laid before the Provisional Government. They are unacceptable in their contents and unacceptable in their politics. The May 19 declaration of the Provisional Government intended to regulate the use of the land in the interest of the national economy and toiling population. In my opinion, the Minister of Agriculture has not only abandoned that idea, but is introducing laws tending to

¹ "Riech," No. 159, July 22, 1917.

destroy the popular respect for law. These laws not only do not attempt to fight the tendency to illegal seizures, not only do not normalize the land situation, but justify, as it were, these ruinous and high-handed seizures, give the stamp of approval to land already seized, and try to place the Constituent Assembly before an accomplished fact. This is a party program and not a measure that answers the need of the State. Its carrying out will disappoint the expectations of the people and will stand in the way of a [real] State land reform. I regard the land program of the Minister of Agriculture as ruinous for Russia. It will bankrupt her materially and morally, and I greatly fear that it will bring about in the interior of the country a situation similar to the one which the Provisional Government had to contend with in the last few days in Petrograd.

I am not referring here to the numerous differences of opinion between myself and the majority of the Provisional Government over the various State questions with which we have to deal as a government. But I cannot pass over the resolution adopted on July 17 by the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, and in which the Socialist ministers took part. This resolution obligates the whole Provisional Government to be guided in its action by the decision of the All-Russian Congresses of these deputies.

Lately these differences of opinion have been especially noticeable. They have made it clear that it is impossible for me to remain at the head of the Government. Realizing the difficult times our country is going through, I tried until now to find some way of working in harmony and of keeping the ministry together. But in view of the deep differences in our points of view in regard to the questions before the Government, I cannot, in justice to myself and the country, participate in carrying out the program of the Provisional Government.

I leave the Provisional Government and lay down my duties as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

PRINCE Lvov

July 20, 1917

2. KERENSKI SUCCEEDS Lvov ²

The Provisional Government resolved to appoint the Minister of War and Navy, Kerenski, as Prime Minister, allowing him to retain his portfolios of War and Navy.

²"Izvestia," No. 113, July 22, 1917.

FORMING A MINISTRY ³

At a meeting of the Provisional Government on July 26, the question of the reconstruction of the Cabinet was once more discussed. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, a number of the Ministers expressed their willingness to leave to Kerenski the disposition of their posts.

LETTER OF THE CADETS TO KERENSKI ⁴

July 28, 1917

Dear Sir, Alexander Fedorovich:

You were pleased to invite us to join the Provisional Government. We realize that at this difficult moment no one has a right to refuse to share in the labor of the Government, provided conditions are such that results can be attained. After having considered your proposition, we are now ready to indicate the basis on which we can accept your offer.

We recognize that the question of the moment is to form an all-national ministry that has the confidence of all the people and sets for itself the task of saving the country from foreign destruction and internal disintegration. We can join the ministry only on condition that all members of it are independent, and that the cabinet is composed of men who have full confidence in one another and work on a basis of mutual understanding for the good of the country. With this in mind, we consider the following [fundamentals] necessary:

1. That all members of the Government, regardless of their party affiliations, are responsible to their conscience, and that their actions and presence in the cabinet are no reason for interference in the direction of State affairs by any kind of committees and organizations.

2. In matters of internal policy, the Government is to limit itself to guarding the conquests of the revolution and not to undertake measures that might lead to civil strife. Therefore, the carrying out of all basic social reforms and the determination of all questions relating to the form of government are to be left absolutely to the Constituent Assembly.

3. In matters of war and peace, the Government is to be guided by the principles of complete union with the Allies.

4. Steps are to be taken to develop a mighty army by restoring

³ "Riech," No. 163, July 27, 1917.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 166, July 31, 1917.

strict military discipline and putting a definite stop to interference by soldier committees in questions of war tactics and strategy.

5. As a fundamental in internal administration, an end is to be made to the many authorities; order reestablished in the country; a vigorous fight waged on anarchistic, anti-governmental and counter-revolutionary elements; and a stable local administration organized as soon as possible, so that the new, regularly selected local organs of government can begin to function.

6. State courts are to be brought back to a position that will enable them to carry on their procedure in a proper manner. Prosecuting attorneys and judges are not to be interfered with by politicians or other outside influences.

7. Elections for the Constituent Assembly are to be conducted in a manner to enable the people to express the true national will. Elections are to be under the supervision of the legally selected organs of local government or institutions formed by them. They are to guarantee the freedom of electioneering campaigns.

N. ASTROV

N. KISHKIN

V. NABOKOV

July 28, 1917

3. RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ⁵

Unanimously Adopted on the Night of July 30-31

Confirming its resolution about proclaiming the Provisional Government the Save-the-Revolution Government and clothing it with full power, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies resolves:

1. The country and the revolution are in the greatest danger from the threatening military defeat, as well as from anarchistic outbreaks and counter-revolutionary intrigues.

2.

3. Under the circumstances, the only way to save the country and the revolution is to form a strong revolutionary government, clothed with proper authority and wide power to carry out the democratic and social reforms, outlined in the last declaration of the Save-the-Revolution Government, to rouse the army and people to defend the

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 120, July 31, 1917.

country, to avert an economic catastrophe, and to cut the ground from under the feet of both anarchy and counter-revolution.

4. In order to succeed with these objects, the Provisional Government must draw its strength from all the live forces of the country, and should therefore do its best to include in the government those of the bourgeois groups that understand that the condition of the country imperatively demands that all classes who look to the future should guard and strengthen the conquests of the revolution.

5. The passive opposition shown by certain bourgeois circles to the measures of the Provisional Government—by boycotting the government, by trying to prevent the carrying out of the much needed political, agrarian, and financial-economic reforms, and by putting off the calling of the Constituent Assembly—is nothing else than an attempt to get power into their own hands by taking advantage of the difficult situation of the country. Such opposition helps the most reactionary counter-revolutionary elements and leads to the complete disorganization of the country.

6. A working basis on which a coalition Government of the revolutionary democracy and the organized bourgeoisie could be formed would be to accept all the conquests of the revolution; to agree to put into force the delayed labor and agrarian measures; to submit to State control of production, transportation, and distribution; to recognize the necessity of a very definite financial policy; to take all necessary steps to summon the Constituent Assembly on time; and to stand, to the end, by the program proclaimed by the Provisional Government of a universal peace without annexation, without indemnity, on the basis of self-determination.

7. The unavoidable measures of repression which the Provisional Government is taking in its fight against counter-revolution and anarchy are not to be understood as diminishing the rights and the further development of the democratic organization of the toiling peasant, worker, and soldier, in the rear as well as at the front. . . .

4. RESIGNATIONS OF MINISTERS *

Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov, handed in his resignation to enable him, as a private citizen, to defend himself against the rumors that are being spread against him [August 2].

* "Riech," No. 169, August 3, 1917.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereschenko, has handed in his resignation and has turned over his department to the Assistant Minister [August 2].

No agreement has been reached between the Provisional Government and the Cadet Party on the question of members of the Party entering the Cabinet. Negotiations have been broken off.

LETTER OF KERENSKI TO ASSISTANT PRIME MINISTER NEKRASOV ¹

August 3, 1917

"Notwithstanding all my efforts, I have been unable to complete the Provisional Government so that it would answer the needs of the historical moment in which the country is living. I can no longer conscientiously and intelligently carry the responsibility before the State, and I, therefore, ask the Provisional Government to release me from all the positions which I now hold."

A. F. KERENSKI

NEKRASOV LEAVES THE MINISTRY

The letter of Kerenski was followed by the resignation of some other members of the Provisional Government.

Nekrasov announced that it was his turn to resign, because he had accepted his post for two weeks only and the time had expired . . . but he would not do so, for otherwise there would be no Provisional Government to act on Kerenski's letter.

Following Nekrasov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tereschenko, and other ministers declared that they would, for the time being, withdraw their resignations. They voted as a body not to accept the resignation of Kerenski, but to summon at once a conference of representatives of five political parties (Cadets, Radical-Democrats, Labor National-Socialists, Social-Democrats, and Socialist-Revolutionists) and representatives of the three revolutionary organizations (Provisional Committee of the Duma, Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Executive Committee of Soviet of Peasants' Deputies). Almost immediately after this resolution . . . members of the Government went in person to the leaders of the parties and organizations to extend the invitation. . . .

At ten o'clock in the evening [August 3], those invited to the conference began to appear at the Winter Palace, . . . and about

¹ "Riech," No. 170, Aug. 4, 1917.

half an hour later the meeting opened with Nekrasov in the chair. He read Kerenski's letter . . . and announced the decision of the Provisional Government not to accept the resignation. He pointed out that the Government had discussed three ways of getting out of the difficult situation in which it found itself: 1. Hand back its authority to the organ from which it came; 2. Hand the whole authority of the Provisional Government to one person to form a cabinet; or, 3. Appeal to the important political and public groups to express their opinion. The last alternative was adopted.

[Speeches were made by I. V. Godnev, M. I. Tereschenko, I. G. Tseretelli, V. N. Lvov, P. N. Miliukov, I. N. Efremov, A. V. Peshekhonov. A short recess was taken, and at about one in the morning the discussion was resumed . . . Nekrasov impressed upon those present the need of coming to a decision at once, for the country was in the greatest danger. He continued as follows:]⁸

"I am leaving the Government; my political career is ended. This gives me the freedom to tell you, comrades from the Soviet, the truth. You, also, are responsible for that which is now taking place. Did you not always hold over the heads of the Socialist ministers the threat of a vote of lack of confidence? Did you not oblige the Socialist ministers to report to you twice a week every petty detail? When they appeared before you, they were frightened lest they slip, lest they step on a piece of orange-peel and fall. Under the circumstances, the Provisional Government was deprived of that peace of mind so necessary in these responsible days. If one of the ministers should slip, it would inevitably bring on a crisis. You did nothing to make it easier for us.

"Better take all the power in your hands, and with it the responsibility for the fate of Russia. But if you have not the courage to do that, hand over the power to a coalition government and do not interfere with its labor. Tonight there can be no half measures. Either you put full trust in Kerenski and those whom he invites into the Government, or you do not. If not, then form a purely Socialist cabinet, and we hand over the power to you."

Nekrasov was followed by Miliukov [who said that he agreed with Nekrasov]. . . .

⁸ "Riech," No. 171, Aug. 5, 1917.

CHAPTER XXXV

FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT

1. RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES¹

The conference of the representatives of the revolutionary democracy with members of the Provisional Government and central committees of parties, which began at ten o'clock on the night of August 3, at the Winter Palace, came to an end at half-past five on the morning of the 4th. While this conference was on, members of the executive committees of the two Soviets waited at the Taurida palace. At six o'clock the Socialist ministers and representatives of the Socialist parties arrived. [For three hours there was a warm debate in which the Bolsheviks and Socialists attacked each other's policies, and then a vote was taken on the following resolution:]

"The joint meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies declares that it fully entrusts Comrade Kerenski to form a cabinet, made up of representatives of different parties which stand by the program adopted by the Provisional Government over which Kerenski presided, and proclaimed on July 21."

One hundred and forty-seven voted in favor of the resolution, forty-five against it, and forty-two refused to vote. At nine-thirty (A. M.), Chkheidze declared the meeting closed.

2. DECLARATION OF KERENSKI²

Having found it impossible to bring together on a common platform the Socialist and non-Socialist parties, and to form a strong revolutionary government such as the country must have now, I was obliged to resign.

On August 3 there was a conference between representatives of the leading socialistic, democratic and liberal parties. After a long

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 125, August 5, 1917.

² "Riech," No. 171, August 5, 1917.

debate, they authorized me to reorganize the ministry. Considering that the country is threatened by destruction from outside and disorganization from inside, I do not feel that I have the right to decline to assume this heavy burden. I regard it as a command from the country to form, in the shortest time possible and in face of all obstacles, a strong revolutionary government.

The task of saving the country and the republic demands that there should be an end to political strife, that all citizens work in a spirit of self-sacrifice, doing whatever is necessary to carry on the war, put the army in a fighting condition, and reconstruct the country economically.

Having been in the Provisional Government from the moment when the people took over full power, I regard it as necessary in reforming the Government to hold close to the principles which it has worked out, developed, and embodied in its declarations.

At the same time I, as head of the Government, find it necessary to make changes in the order and in the division of labor of the Government so as to enable it to accomplish its task, even if by so doing my responsibility is increased.

A. KERENSKI

August 4, 1917

RESOLUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE DUMA³

On August 4, there was a special meeting of the Provisional Committee of the Duma under the chairmanship of Rodzianko. He opened the meeting by relating what had taken place at the Winter Palace on the night of August 3-4. Considerable discussion followed, and then this resolution was introduced:

"After learning from the President of the Duma what had passed at the Winter Palace on the night of August 3-4, the Provisional Committee of the Duma is convinced that there is no time to be lost in forming a strong government. Time does not wait. All should unite for one purpose—to save the country. In the presence of this patriotic duty at this difficult time, all party and class interests and disagreements should disappear.

"Adhering to its previous stand, the Provisional Committee of the Duma regards it as necessary to entrust Kerenski with the formation of a ministry by inviting to it people who are united in the one thought of saving Russia at all costs."

³ "Izvestiia," No. 125, August 5, 1917.

RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CADET PARTY ⁴

Yesterday, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, the question of members of the party joining the ministry was discussed. At seven o'clock in the evening the following resolution was introduced:

"Being guided by the stand of the Cadet Party at the conference of August 3-4 in the Winter Palace [we declare] that it is necessary to empower A. F. Kerenski to form a Provisional Government, which shall stand on an all-national platform and which shall be made up of men who are not responsible before any organizations or committees.

"Bearing in mind the declaration of the Prime Minister that his fundamental idea in forming a strong Government was to carry on the war, to raise the fighting ability of the army, and to reconstruct the economic power of the State, the Central Committee of the Party of Popular Freedom leaves its comrades at liberty to accept such posts in the Cabinet as Kerenski may offer."

3. COMPOSITION OF THE MINISTRY ⁵

August 6, 1917

- A. F. KERENSKI, *Prime Minister and Minister of War and Navy.*
Assistant Ministers of War and Navy are B. V. Savinkov and Lieutenant V. I. Lebedev.
- N. V. NEKRASOV, *Assistant Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.*
Assistant Minister of Finance, Professor M. V. Bernatski.
- M. I. TERESCHENKO, *Minister of Foreign Affairs.*
- M. I. SKOBELEV, *Minister of Labor.*
- A. V. PESHEKHONOV, *Minister of Food.*
- V. M. CHERNOV, *Minister of Agriculture*
- S. F. OLDENBURG, *Minister of Education.*
- A. S. ZARUDNI, *Minister of Justice.*
- I. N. EFREMOV, *Minister of Social Welfare.*
- P. P. IURENEV, *Minister of Transportation.*
- S. N. PROKOPOVICH, *Minister of Commerce and Industry*
- A. M. NIKITIN, *Minister of Post and Telegraph.*
- F. F. KOKOSHKIN, *State Comptroller.*
- A. V. KARTASHEV, *Oberprocurator of the Synod.*
- N. D. AVKSENTIEV, *Minister of the Interior.*

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 126, August 7, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*

PART X

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TRIES TO LEAN ON THE BOURGEOISIE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

For the misfortunes of July, the Bolsheviks and other extreme radicals were blamed. Immediately succeeding these events public opinion swung toward the Right. Though they did not admit it publicly, both Kerenski and other moderate Socialists were more or less on the defensive for having yielded so much to the clamor of the Left. The Right felt its importance, walked around with the air of "I told you so," and demanded, though not in so many words, that the Provisional Government should completely cut loose from the Soviet and seek its support from "all honest and loyal elements in the country." With that in mind the Provisional Government called an All-Russian Conference at Moscow for the end of August. Moscow was the bourgeois center in the same way that Petrograd was the hot-bed of revolution. It was understood that "to this conference will be invited all responsible organizations, State Dumas, and Municipalities."

This was more than a conference. It was a test of strength, with the bourgeoisie on the offensive and the proletariat on the defensive. More than half of the delegates were by education, tradition, and business connection opposed to socialistic programs.

On the eve of the conference the different groups held caucuses and drew up programs. Each side put forward a champion: the Socialists cheered for Kerenski, the bourgeoisie hailed Kornilov. Former members of the Duma and tsarist generals lashed the Socialists, and their speeches were greeted with applause. But when the representatives "of the revolutionary democracy" attempted to defend themselves they got little encouragement, and Chkheidze's monotonous reading of the long Declaration of the United Democracy called forth groans.

The conference was picturesque, full of dramatic incidents and thrills. It was the last dress parade of the old nobility and intellectual aristocracy and had they known what was ahead of them they would have repeated the words of "Morituri salutamus."

While the Cadets and Socialists were calling each other names and shaking fists at each other inside the hall, the Bolsheviks were haranguing the mob outside. They denounced both groups and called on the "international proletariat . . . [to] make an end of the domination of capital over enslaved humanity."

When the conference was over, Miliukov said: "I should like to believe that the Moscow Conference will not be without results." This was said in a tone of optimism. As we glance back the only result seems to have been to bring out more sharply the wide gulf that separated the Miliukovs, Tseretellis, and Lenins.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE MOSCOW STATE CONFERENCE

I. REASONS FOR CALLING THE CONFERENCE ¹

On July 25, the Provisional Government discussed the serious situation in the country and the need of taking most energetic measures. . . . It came to the conclusion that it was necessary to get the consent and the backing of all honest and loyal elements in the country in carrying out the heavy mission laid upon it. With that in view, the Provisional Government decided to call, in the very near future, a conference at Moscow.

KERENSKI'S SPEECH BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ²

At the All-Russian Conference at Moscow, the Provisional Government has resolved to appeal and demand that it be supported in its great work of saving the country and saving the revolution. To this conference will be invited all responsible organizations, State Dumas, and municipalities. Above all, I appeal to you in the name of the Provisional Government that the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies be present *in corpore* at Moscow, together with the All-Russian Coöperatives, Central Trade Union Soviet, universities, and other organizations.

At this conference we shall with all frankness lay bare the real condition of the State, and show that under the present circumstances Russia must be governed by a coalition ministry, for the time has not yet come when the Russian democracy can take upon itself the responsibility for all power. We believe that all live forces of the State should rally around the Provisional Government. . . .

In the name of the Provisional Government, I give you a most solemn promise that every attempt to establish a monarchical form of government in Russia will be crushed most energetically and unmercifully. . . .

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 116, July 26, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, No. 117, July 27, 1917.

2. POSITION OF THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE³

On July 27, there was a meeting of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, under the chairmanship of Rodzianko. He reported that Kerenski had called upon him, laid before him the program of the Moscow Conference, and invited the State Duma to take part in the conference. To this invitation Rodzianko replied that the Duma, as such, could not take part, because the Government had not as yet a very definite plan, nor was it clear who would compose the conference. . . . Individual deputies of the Duma could attend the conference on the invitation of Kerenski, but the President could not invite them. Rodzianko also told Kerenski that the Government should be formed before the conference, and laid down as an absolute condition of the Duma's participation in the conference that the Provisional Committee of the Duma should take part in the discussion leading to the formation of the Government.

* * *

On August 10,⁴ there was a closed meeting of the Provisional Government with Kerenski in the chair. [Among other things] the question of holding an all-national conference at Moscow was considered. Judging from the discussion, there is not much likelihood of there being a Moscow conference. If called at all, it will not be very soon.

Although a majority of the members of the Government had not given up the idea of calling an all-national conference at Moscow, they believed that the present was not the time for such a meeting.

* * *

The indecision in regard to the calling of the Moscow Conference is at last over. At the meeting of the Provisional Government on August 12 . . . it was decided to call the conference on August 23-4. . . . It will be attended by about two thousand people. . . . It is proposed to invite members of all the four Dumas, representatives of municipalities, zemstvos, Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, and other outstanding public and political organizations.⁵

* * *

Yesterday . . . [August 13] the Provisional Government had a closed meeting at the Winter Palace. Kerenski presided. The ques-

³ "Riech," No. 164, July 28, 1917.

⁴ "Izvestija," No. 130, August 11, 1917.

⁵ "Riech," No. 177, August 13, 1917.

tion of the Moscow Conference . . . was touched upon. Minister Nikitin said that he had received a letter from the Mayor of Moscow, who thought that August 25 would be a convenient day for the conference. By that time Moscow could make the proper arrangements for the meeting. Members of the Government had nothing to say against this proposition.⁶

3. APPROXIMATE NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF THE CONFERENCE⁷

Members of the Four Dumas.....	488
Representatives of Peasants.....	100
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.....	229
Municipalities.....	147
Zemstvos and City Unions.....	118
Commerce, Industry, Finance.....	150
Technical Organizations.....	99
Intelligentsia [teachers, lawyers, etc.].....	83
Army and Navy	117
Clergy.....	24
Nationality Groups.....	58
Food Committees.....	90
Agricultural-Economic Societies.....	51
Coöperatives.....	313
Trade Unions.....	176
Commissars of Government.....	33
War Ministry.....	16
Representatives of Allied Armies.....	3
Judicial Bench of Moscow.....	4
Members of Government and Ministries.....	15

Since August 26, about one hundred more have come.

In round figures, the number of delegates at the conference, judging by the admission tickets, is more than twenty-five hundred.

4. CAUCUSES BY BOURGEOISIE AND PROLETARIAT

CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC MEN⁸

The conference of leaders of public organizations at Moscow passed a resolution. Among other things, it said:

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 132, August 14, 1917.

⁷ "Riech," No. 190, August 28, 1917.

⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 188, August 25, 1917.

[The first part of the resolution paints in dark colors the condition of the country.]

" . . . It is time to acknowledge openly that the country, in following the course it does, is approaching ruin, and the Government, if it realizes its duty, must confess that it has led the State on the wrong road, which should be abandoned at once for the sake of saving the country and freedom. The Government should immediately and definitely put an end to the utopianism which has proved so ruinous in its work. Let discipline be restored in the army, and power to the commanding officers; let there be a resurrection of understanding of the national interests of Russia and the faith of the Allies in her valor; let the Central Government, united and strong, put an end to the system of irresponsible collegiate organs of State administration; let the demands of the separate nationalities be harmonized with law and justice, and not threaten the destruction of the national unity. Let us leave it to the Constituent Assembly to lay down the fundamental principles of the Russian State and bring about the desired reforms. Until then, let no one part of the people claim to speak for all. Only a government that recognizes all these problems as national, and not partizan, can stop the country from drifting on the rocks and with sure hand steer her to safety. The only non-partizan government is one that completely cuts itself free of all dependence on committees, soviets, and similar organizations. . . ."⁹

MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND MOSCOW DEMOCRACY¹⁰

Yesterday there was a very important joint meeting of the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The question of the day was whether the democracy should support the State Conference called by the Provisional Government. In view of the importance of the question, representatives of the ward soviets and labor unions were invited to attend. . . .

The spokesman of the Central Trade Union made an official statement . . . showing that his organization passed a resolution of protest against the conference, which is regarded as a move to strengthen the counter-revolutionary elements. He said, also, that the Central Trade Union is in favor of declaring a one-day strike-protest on Saturday against the conference. This report called forth much discussion. The Bolsheviks supported the stand of the Union and

⁹ This resolution was drawn up by Miliukov and was adopted by a large majority on August 23. "Riech," Nos. 185, 187, August 22, 24, 1917.

¹⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 141, August 24, 1917.

argued against participation in the conference. They also approved the decision of the Union to read its resolution at the conference and then walk out.

Minister of Post and Telegraph, Nikitin, was present at this meeting. In his speech he stated that the Bolsheviks and the Union are pursuing a mistaken policy. He went into the history of the conference, called attention to the fact that the idea of calling such a conference originated with the ministers on the Left, Skobelev and Tseretelli, and that the Cadets fought it. . . .

After a stormy debate, the resolution of the Mensheviks was adopted.

This resolution says that in view of the fact that this conference is not made up of representatives authorized to act in the name of the people, its decisions are not, therefore, of a binding character. The conference should be regarded as a gathering of public organizations for the purpose of exchanging opinions. The revolutionary democracy, taking part in this conference, will strive to have the conference stand on the principles of the program of July 21. The resolution also takes up those points which the revolutionary democracy will insist upon in particular.

1. To call the Constituent Assembly on the date set.
2. To take energetic measures to stop the economic disorganization of the country. For this purpose it is necessary to have control over production, consumption, and taxation.
3. To make a determined fight against the attackers of democratic institutions, in the rear as well as at the front.
4. To carry out, without wavering, all the land projects worked out to this time.
5. To abolish capital punishment.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET ¹¹

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on August 23, the question was raised as to the attitude of the Central Committee toward the Moscow State Conference and the tactics to be pursued. . . .

Mr. Weinstein made a report on the subject, in which he said that the Government, in order to draw support from the people and to widen the platform on which to stand, decided to call a State conference at Moscow. The dark forces have in mind taking advantage

¹¹ "Riech," No. 187, Aug. 24, 1917.

of this event to attack the revolution and the present make-up of the Ministry. For that reason the revolutionary democracy can not decline taking part in the conference. The revolutionary democracy should give national publicity to its program and call on those to make sacrifices who have until now done nothing but enrich themselves out of the war. The revolutionary democracy should indicate to the Provisional Government that it must pursue an active foreign policy to secure peace and not abandon the platform outlined in the declaration of July 21. Weinstein said that the program of the Central Committee was not a class, but an all-national program. He offered the following resolution in the name of the presidium:

"The All-Russian Central Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, standing at the head of the all-revolutionary democracy, accepts the invitation of the Government to take part in the Moscow Conference, in order to defend before the whole country the course pursued by the revolutionary democracy in its efforts to save the weakening country. The Central Executive Committee will show that the only way to save the country and the revolution is for all the live forces of Russia to gather around a strong revolutionary government, carrying on a stubborn defense of the country and fighting for her salvation both in external and internal affairs, on the basis of the all-national platform of July 21. To carry out this program the toiling democracy is ready to make the greatest sacrifices, but demands that the other classes do likewise. Every attempt to use the conference for the purpose of attacking the revolutionary democracy will be regarded by the Central Executive Committee as a direct betrayal of the cause of the people, and it will take all the necessary steps to gather around it all democratic participants at the conference, in order to strike the enemy of the people and the revolution."

After this report of Weinstein's, the Committee went into secret session to hear the declarations of the representatives of the left wing of the Social-Revolutionists. They announced . . . that there were rumors afloat that on the day of the conference there would be two attempts against it: one by the Bolsheviks to call a strike and demonstration on August 25, and the other by the counter-revolutionists, who had something in mind. . . .

B. I. Bogdanov [Menshevik] explained the tactics which the Central Executive Committee had decided to pursue at the conference. . . .

1. At the Moscow Conference members of the Central Execu-

tive Committee take part as delegates of the Central Executive Committee.

2. Member delegates of the Central Executive Committee have no right to speak in their own name, or in the name of any faction, without the permission of the presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

3. Member delegates of the Central Executive Committee cannot sign the declarations of this or that group at the Moscow Conference, without the permission of the presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

4. Only those groups and individuals may be delegates of the Central Executive Committee who accept the three points just indicated.

5. Individuals and groups belonging to the Central Executive Committee who violate its regulations will immediately be deprived of their mandates.

6. The delegation of the Central Executive Committee cannot make a single declaration without a previous preliminary deliberation by the delegation as a whole.

7. The delegation of the Central Executive Committee has all the rights of the Central Executive Committee at the Moscow Conference.

8. In order to attend to current matters needing immediate attention, the Central Executive Committee authorizes a committee of five to act in its name.

9. A general meeting of the Central Executive Committee at Petrograd, during the Moscow Conference, can take place only under point 8.

These points aroused much discussion. The Bolsheviks, Internationalists, and United (Social Democrats) refused to accept them. . . .

The resolution of Weinstein and the points of Bogdanov were adopted by a majority vote. It was also decided that in view of the fact that the Bolsheviks, Internationalists, and United refused to accept the points, they should be kept out of the conference until they had changed their attitude.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ¹²

The meeting of the Provisional Government on August 20 was taken up with the question of the Moscow Conference. A majority

¹² "Izvestiia," No. 138, August 21, 1917.

of the members were of the opinion that the conference was not to have a decisive rôle. It was the hope of the Government that the conference would serve as a means of removing the differences existing between groups and parties and would tend to bring about a feeling of unity.

The Provisional Government will be represented by the following men:

A. F. Kerenski, as Prime Minister and War Minister, will discuss the general problems of the Government and the war situation.

N. D. Avksentiev, as Minister of the Interior, will tell of the internal condition of the country.

S. N. Prokopovich, as vice-chairman of the Economic Conference, will discuss the economic status of Russia.

N. V. Nekrasov, as Minister of Finance, will take up the financial condition and the financial policy of the Government.

The Provisional Government has asked the ministers who are to make reports to submit them for preliminary examination on August 22.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ¹³

This evening there was a meeting, under the chairmanship of Rodzianko, of the members of the four Dumas. Rodzianko gave an outline of the basic points of the speech which he is to deliver. . . .

The attitude which the commercial-industrial group is to take at the conference is not yet clear. The Petrograd and Moscow delegations seem to be unable to agree. . . .

This evening at nine o'clock there was a meeting in the Zimin theater of representatives of democratic organizations. Chkheidze presided. Tseretelli made a long speech. . . . A bureau was organized, made up of the presidiums of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, representatives of municipal and zemstvo self-governments, trade unions, and public organizations.

5. BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE ¹⁴

[*Moscow, August 25*]

The conference opens under rather unusual conditions. Street cars are not running; coffee houses and restaurants are closed. At yesterday's meeting of the Soviet it was resolved to ask the Moscow

¹³ "Izvestiia," No. 142, August 25, 1917.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 143, August 26, 1917.

proletariat not to strike; but the attitude of the Moscow proletariat toward the conference is so hostile that late, at night there was a meeting of the Central Trade Union, attended by delegates of all the wards, representing about 400,000 proletarians. This delegation voted, almost unanimously, to strike. Only the printers and the union of commercial and industrial workers voted against the resolution. Papers will appear tomorrow at Moscow.

At the Bolshoi Theater, where the conference is to have its sessions, large crowds began to gather early in the morning. One may guess there were probably more than 10,000 people on hand. The whole square in front of the theater was occupied by three chains of soldiers and cadet officers. The police, on horse and on foot, kept order. There was no disturbance and no demonstration. All the organizations, including the Bolsheviks, strongly appealed to the workers not to demonstrate.

The delegates, as they made their way to the theater, were received coldly. A few showed approval, but the great majority of the crowd was hostile; some whistled. The scene recalled the day the First State Duma was called at Petrograd.

Among the delegates are all the presidents of the State Dumas: Rodzianko, Guchkov, Golovin, Khomiakov; only the late Muromtsev is missing. One sees, also, the veterans of the revolution—Kropotkin, Breshko-Breshkovskaia, Lopatin, *et al.* Here are also military leaders headed by Alexeev and Brusilov, and captains of industry and finance. The general impression is that the representatives of the so-called "bourgeoisie" predominate over the democratic elements. Breakfast coats, Prince Alberts, and starched shirts are more in evidence than soft collars. But it is impossible to define exactly the composition of the conference. It is particularly difficult to make out the so-called "intelligentsia," representing local and municipal government.

August 25

Kerenski¹⁵ drove from the station to the Kremlin, where he had a brief conference with members of the Provisional Government. He announced that the Provisional Government had no new declaration to make. The one made on July 21 was still good, and there were no changes in it. . . .

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik party published an appeal to workmen. It declared its strong opposition to the confer-

¹⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 143, August 26, 1917.

ence and asked the workers to hold meetings of protest in the factories, but not to come out on the street.

It was learned today that the Bolsheviks who arrived at Moscow with the delegation had decided, contrary to the decision of the Central Executive Committee, to read their declaration and then leave the meeting as a mark of protest. The Bureau which was selected yesterday unanimously agreed to deny them the right to be present at the conference. [There was an exchange of notes on this subject between Nagin, of the Bolsheviks, and Chkheidze.]

August 25, 1917

General Kornilov¹⁶ was expected in Moscow today, but he had not arrived by the end of the session of the conference. He wired to Kerenski asking what he should do. His idea was to address the conference along the line laid down by Savinkov for increasing the fighting power of the army; but now that Savinkov had resigned, Kornilov did not know what to do.

At 4:00 P. M., there was another telegram from General Kornilov, saying that he had difficulty in making up his mind whether to come to the conference, in view of the indefiniteness of the position of the Provisional Government on the army.

At 9:00 P. M., Kornilov left Headquarters for Moscow. It was agreed to let him make a report, but before that, to have a conference with members of the Provisional Government.

6. ACCOUNT OF MOSCOW STATE CONFERENCE¹⁷

The Moscow State Conference opened in an atmosphere charged with alarm and nervous expectation. The caucuses held by the various groups before the opening of the conference showed clearly that a clash between the two camps was inevitable. Certain groups that have, during the course of the revolution, been deprived of the means of coöperating in determining the fate of the country, but who took part in the public movements which brought on the revolution and gave it a national color—have united in an association of public men and have decided to make known loudly their existence and their demands for a national Government. These demands were formulated in the resolution adopted by the Conference of Public Men.

¹⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 143, August 26, 1917.

¹⁷ "Riech," No. 189, August 26, 1917, Editorial.

On the other side are the Socialist parties and groups united in soviets. They, too, have taken quite a definite stand and regard the program, worked out by the soviets, which is embodied in the declaration of the Provisional Government of July 21, as a minimum beyond which they can not retreat. This fundamental stand of the Socialist groups of soviets was formulated at Petrograd and at the meeting at Moscow on the night before the opening of the State Conference. At that time the position was taken that all those who do not accept the declaration of July 21 are to be looked upon as counter-revolutionists. . . .

OPENING OF THE CONGRESS

On the left of the chairman are members of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. . . . On the right are members of the State Dumas with their presidents. . . . In this group one notices, also, the Cadet leaders: Miliukov, Shingarev, Dolgorukov. . . .

Punctually at 3:00 P. M., Prime Minister Kerenski appeared on the scene and was warmly received. . . . His speech was punctuated with loud applause. His remark that the officers were the brains of the army . . . and his statement that he would not tolerate any armed uprising against the Government were applauded in particular. . . .

Judging from the discussions that followed during the recess immediately after his speech, it was evident that Kerenski did not entirely satisfy either the right or the left or the center. . . .

FROM THE BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
[AT PETROGRAD] TO ALL THE REGIMENTAL AND
BATTALION COMMITTEES OF THE GARRISON
OF PETROGRAD AND SUBURBS¹⁸

August 27, 1917

"Moscow informs us: Yesterday there were meetings of various factions, followed by a joint meeting of the delegates of democratic organizations. On our side are the representatives of the soviets, municipalities, public and local organizations, coöperatives, etc.; against us are the union of men decorated with the cross of St. George, Cossacks, members of the Duma, commerce-industry group, etc. The democratic element predominates in the conference. At

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

yesterday's session the democratic group had more than one thousand men.

"Tseretelli spoke for us, and Chkheidze read the declaration, which was based on our program of July 21.

"All is quiet in Moscow."

BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SECOND DAY, [MONDAY, AUGUST 27] ¹⁹

The Bolshoi Theater was today definitely divided in two parts—bourgeois and democratic. . . . This was especially noticeable when the ataman of the Cossacks, General Kaledin, made his fiery speech. Feeling ran so high that the chairman had some difficulty in preventing outbreaks.

Today, as on Saturday, the theater square was surrounded by a large crowd of people and three rows of soldiers. On the whole, there was a smaller and different public. The intelligentsia was very much in evidence, but the common people were not in sight. Today all the factories and mills are working. . . .

At 11:30 A. M., the theater began to fill up. The delegates, in groups, were heatedly discussing yesterday's speeches at the party meetings. All agreed on one thing—there can be no peace between the different groups. Today many of the delegates are in new places, nearer their party brethren.

At 11:15 A. M., General Kornilov drove up and was given a triumphal reception. Flowers were showered upon him, until his automobile was filled with them. . . . At 11:50, he walked into the hall. As soon as he showed himself, the audience began to clap, and when he entered the box, where Generals Alexeev and Kaledin were seated, he was given a long and noisy ovation. . . . He was cheered by members of the Dumas, by the representatives of commerce and industry, by all the bourgeoisie groups and representatives of officers. But the delegates of the soldiers' committees sat quietly, without applauding. When, however, a few moments later, Kerenski with his ministers appeared on the stage, the left side of the theater had its revenge and gave Kerenski an ovation that lasted more than five minutes. This time the right was motionless. Motionless, also, were the representatives of the officers and the generals in their box. . .

The applause died down to break out with renewed strength a second later. Shouts were heard, "Long live Kerenski; long live

¹⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

the Provisional Government." Again the noise subsided; again some one cried out, "Long live the revolution"; and again the house was in an uproar. But the right sat through it all with hands folded, as if it did not concern them.

Kerenski had difficulty in restoring order. He finally made himself heard: "The meeting is now open. I beg you to keep order and to think only of the good of the country. . . ."

[After Nabokov, Semenov, Golovin, and Alexinski had made their speeches] General Kornilov took the floor. It should be said that all kinds of rumors are circulating in the city in regard to the General. There is no doubt that a certain part of the conference is expecting great results from the General's speech. Some invisible hand has pasted all over the city, posters with the General's portrait and biographical sketch. It cannot be said that the General's speech justified the expectations of the right. It gave many facts, but it could hardly be construed as the speech of the future military dictator. It was more like the speech of a general of a republic.

When Kornilov stepped forward, the right gave him a long and noisy ovation, but the left and the soldiers sat still. Shouts were heard: "Stand up, soldiers," but the soldiers never budged. The cries became louder and louder. Kerenski added to the noise by calling, "Please come to order and listen to the first soldier of the army, with the attention due him." This announcement called forth more applause. . . .

[Among other things, Kornilov said:] "The army must be revived at all costs, for without a strong army there can be no free Russia and no salvation of the country. In order to revive the army, it is necessary to accept, at once, the recommendations which I made to the Provisional Government. My report was countersigned, without any reservations whatsoever, by the acting War Minister, Savinkov, and Commissar Filonenko, attached to the Supreme Command." . . .

[Kornilov was followed by a number of other speakers and then came General Kaledin.]

In his speech Kaledin, without any attempt to soften or to mince words, presented the point of view and the hopes of the so-called counter-revolutionists.

He said that he spoke in the name of twelve Cossack divisions, and protested against the accusation that the Cossacks are counter-revolutionists and are engaged in counter-revolutionary plots. He continued by declaring, in a firm voice, that the soviets and army

committees must be done away with. . . . These words were greeted with applause from the right and by shouts of "Never; we will not allow it," from the left.

Kaledin went on and said that there should be soldier committees, but their functions should be limited to the question of supplies. The declaration of the rights of the soldiers should be revised and supplemented with a declaration of the obligations of the soldiers. Discipline should be reestablished; the former disciplinary punishment must be brought back.

This proposition was greeted by applause from the right and by shouts of "counter-revolution" from the left, from the representatives of the soldiers' committees.

Kaledin's speech made a deep impression, especially the direct and uncompromising manner in which he expressed himself. He emphasized each of his points with the exclamation, "The Cossacks demand," etc. The Cossacks demand the dismissal of the Soviets, the call of the Constituent Assembly at Moscow. Just then Kerenski interrupted to tell the speaker to restrain his speech and not to issue any demands, that the conference was called for the purpose of exchanging opinions and not for laying down demands. In reply, Purishkevich shouted from his seat, "We did not come here to be decorations for the Government."

Kaledin finished his speech amidst great applause from the right and shouts of protest from the left.

As if to counter-balance Kaledin, the united democracy put forward Chkheidze, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. His appearance was the signal for a stormy ovation, accompanied by the cries, "Long live the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." Chkheidze began his speech with these words: "Notwithstanding the fact that the speaker who has just concluded demanded the immediate abolition of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and democratic committees, I am here to speak in their name." He followed it by naming the different organizations he represented . . . and by reading a declaration. [He was succeeded by many other speakers, among them Professor Grimm, Guchkov, Shulgin, Rodzianko, Maklakov, Tsereteli, and Miliukov.]

7. DECLARATION OF UNITED DEMOCRACY READ BY CHKHEIDZE ²⁰

August 27, 1917

Russia is now passing through terrible, almost mortal, days. The armies of the enemy are invading the interior of the country, while our army is retreating. The finances of the country are undermined. The railways are completely disorganized. Industry is being ruined and can satisfy neither the demands of the army nor of the population. Famine is creeping up on the cities. And at the same time the disintegration of the army and the anarchistic outbreaks in the rear show that the discontent of the popular masses, exhausted by three years of war, threatens to take forms that endanger the very existence of the State. All the open and secret enemies of the revolution eagerly take advantage of every calamity at the front, of every difficulty and trouble within the country, to gain their own point at the price of Russia's ruin and to turn back the great revolutionary country to conditions that drove her to the brink of perdition and which were unanimously condemned by the nation.

At this terrible and difficult hour, the united organizations of the revolutionary democracy once more declare to the whole of Russia their unshakable determination not to stop at any effort and any sacrifice to save the country and to save the revolution.

From their very inception, these organizations aimed at the unification of all the vital forces of the country for the execution of those tasks which the revolution imposed upon Russia, and for the struggle against the decay and dissolution with which the poison of the autocracy infected every part of the national organism.

The revolutionary democracy, as represented by its Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, did not strive for power and did not seek monopoly for itself. It was prepared to support any authority that might be able to defend the interests of the country and the revolution. Amidst the chaos of destruction, the Soviet strove to organize and discipline the popular masses for creative statesmanship, to direct the elemental forces of the giant nation, that had cast off century-old chains, into orderly channels, to labor for the restoration of the fighting powers of the army, which had been sapped to its foundations by the old régime, to organize the national economy, and, always and in all things, to place the interests of the whole, the

²⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

interests of the nation and the revolution, above the interests of separate classes or groups of the population.

Considering the innumerable difficulties which revolutionary Russia has to overcome, the unbearable burdens from which the popular masses are striving to free themselves, the lack of experience in organized activity, due to the centuries of slavery in which the nation was kept, and in the face of that opposition which the activities of the revolutionary democracy encountered among all those who defend special privileges and selfish interests,—much has been left undone and some things have not been done as well as they might have been. When, however, we turn our eyes from the dissolution in the ranks of the army and the anarchistic outbreaks, both of them fatal legacies of the old régime, to the reconstruction of this immense country, that has been going on during the past five months of the revolution under the fire of the enemy, we are justified in saying that it is due to the organizations of the revolutionary democracy that the creative spirit of the revolution has been maintained and the country saved from dissolution and anarchy. And only with the active coöperation of this democracy is it possible to regenerate the army, reconstruct the country, save Russia and the revolution. Democracy is inseparable from a revolutionary country. In these unprecedented trials that have come to Russia, it is only the self-reliance and intelligence of the people that can save the country which has already breathed the invigorating air of freedom. Only a government that rests upon the many millions of this nation, as represented in its innumerable organizations, is able to extricate the country from its tragic situation and to resist the pressure of the foreign and domestic enemies.

Under these circumstances every attempt to destroy the democratic organizations, to undermine their influence, to dig a trench between them and the Government, and to turn the Government into a weapon to serve the interests of the privileged and propertied classes, is not only treason to the cause of the revolution, but a direct betrayal of our native country, which will perish on the day that it ceases to be watched over by the intelligent, disciplined, self-reliant and organized masses of the laboring people.

In demanding of the Government a more determined and consistent inauguration of the program of July 21, the revolutionary democracy defends not the exclusive interests of any particular class or group, but the common interests of the nation and revolution. The program of July 21 is not the exclusive program of the demo-

cratic classes; it does not embody the totality of their demands. This program is nothing but a further development of that of May 19, on the basis of which the coalition government was created, and which included only such points as are essential for organizing the defense of the country, raising the standard of the national economic life, reconstructing the political life of Russia, and preserving the conquests of the revolution.

In these days, when the very existence of the revolutionary State is jeopardized by foreign invasion, the democracy demands of all citizens and of the Government the exertion of every resource for the organization of the defense of the country against armed conquest.

The Government should bear in mind that it will be able to solve this enormous problem only by relying upon the active coöperation of the democratic organizations in the rear and at the front.

This idea it should impress upon the entire commanding personnel of the army, and it must stop every attempt at reviving, under the pretext of organizing the national defense, those methods which disintegrate the army and inevitably lead to defeat and to a betrayal of our country. It must demand of the army authorities unconditional submission to itself, the supreme power in the State.

The Government should bear in mind that a vigorous continuation of our foreign policy in the spirit of a repudiation of all imperialistic aims, and a striving for the earliest possible attainment of universal peace on a democratic basis, will serve as a powerful instrument for increasing the fighting capacity of the army and the defense of the country. The clear realization that the attainment of such a peace, so imperative for the regeneration of the country, constitutes the sole aim of the Government, will inspire the revolutionary army, which is now shedding its blood, with courage, enthusiasm, and readiness for noble self-sacrifice.

The Government must realize that the organization of the rear, the proper management of the economic life of the country, are imperatively demanded in the interest of the national defense. At a time when the blood of the people is pouring out in torrents, when the wealth of the nation is being squandered, and the democracy is prepared for any sacrifice to save the country and the revolution, the privileged and propertied classes, to whom the very calamities of these three years of war have served as sources of unlimited enrichment, should also yield their interests to the higher interests of the State.

In consideration of all the foregoing facts, the united revolution-

ary democracy finds that the vital interests of the country and revolution imperatively demand the immediate introduction of the following measures:

Food and Supplies

The providing of the army and population with food and supplies we regard as one of the most important problems, and we recognize the necessity of a single and clear governmental policy in this field. We therefore propose:

1. Bread monopoly, set and stationary prices on agricultural products, regardless of the hardships it may impose on the peasants. To return under present conditions to free trade, fluctuating prices on agricultural products, would be ruinous for the country and would lead inevitably to the breakdown of the economic life.

2. This method of providing the army and population with food makes it obligatory, on the other hand, to supply the agricultural population with the products of industry, in so far as that is at present possible. To bring this about, it is necessary to regulate wages and fix prices on industrial products. It is only in this way that fixed prices on agricultural products will not ruin agriculture in these times of the declining value of the ruble.

3. The successful carrying out of this food and industrial policy cannot be thought of without the widest participation, both in the production and distribution of agricultural and industrial products, of the coöperatives under the general guidance of the State food organizations.

4. In addition to the coöperatives, use should also be made of the remaining machinery of private trade, in so far as that is possible, necessary, and for the good of the State. It should be under the strict control of the State food organizations and prevented from becoming speculative.

Commerce and Industry

1. The interest of national defense and the organization of supply demand the most determined measures to put order in the transport service and to raise the productivity of industry.

2. In order to increase industrial production, the State must do the following: Assume control over industry and introduce State participation in the management of enterprises to the point of bringing about State syndicates, trusts, and monopolies.

3. The only way to make this control serve the interest of the country, and not of separate groups, is to have democratic organizations participate on a large scale.

4. An immediate regulation of industry is one of the important factors in increasing production, which has declined, owing to the lack and the worn-out condition of machinery, the breakdown of the transportation, the shortage of raw material, undernourishment of labor, and the mobilization of some of the industrial workers.

5. In so far as the decline in production may be due to indifference and lack of understanding among the working masses, the labor organizations will continue with still greater energy to fight these factors, which tend to bring about a still greater chaotic condition and thereby increase the danger to the cause of the revolution.

6. The Government should not delay to carry out the program of safeguarding labor, which would continue to increase production. It is necessary to create labor bureaus to keep account of and distribute labor. There should be arbitration boards and the right for all kinds of labor to form unions and coalitions.

On their side, labor organizations should strive to increase the productivity of labor, for the sake of saving the country and the revolution. With that in view, they should: (a) Determine the minimum of production in each enterprise, depending on the technical facilities; (b) observe strictly the eight-hour day, but permit overtime when there is no unemployment in the particular industry, and when it is to the interest of the country and the revolution; (c) do their best to avoid labor troubles by means of arbitration, and strike only when all other possible means of settling conflicts have been used up. Labor organizations, while energetically condemning violence on members of the administration of the factory, should turn over to the arbitration boards all personal conflicts between the workers and the administrative personnel; (d) labor organizations should strive with all their might to conclude collective wage-agreements as a normal condition of labor.

7. The above-mentioned regulation of production, supplies, and price-fixing should be accompanied by a regulation of the relations of labor and capital, wages, day's labor, and also, if necessary, labor conscription, which should apply to all classes of society, and which should have as its only object the interest of the country, and under no consideration should assume the form of militarization of labor, which might in the end disorganize the national economy.

8. While doing all that it can to advance the interest of defense,

the Government should at the same time take preparatory measures for the gradual and painless demobilization of the national economy and to reduce as much as possible the inevitable catastrophe of unemployment. There should, even now, be worked out plans for public works having as their object the reconstruction of the economy torn down by the war.

Finance

1. In the field of finance it is necessary to put into force, without any cutting or limitation, the last laws of the Provisional Government relating to tax on income and war profits, to carry out also the reforms in inheritance tax and tax on luxuries and surplus profits.

2. Alongside of these measures, it is necessary to introduce in the near future others of an exceptional character in order to avoid a financial crash. There must be one high capital levy, the only possible source for covering the extraordinary expenditures of the State.

3. If the tax on propertied classes and loans should prove insufficient to meet the extraordinary needs of the State, it would be necessary to increase the tax on articles used by the masses and to raise new taxes. These taxes should be primarily in the form of monopolies, and the coöperatives and other organizations should be asked to participate to a large degree in the distribution of the monopolistic products.

4. To carry out successfully the revised taxation system, it is necessary to reorganize the taxation machinery so that no one should escape paying his just tax.

5. The Government should take decisive measures to make the loan [war] compulsory.

6. With these financial measures, the Government should go slow in issuing paper money and keep it down to a minimum. This can be done by fixing prices on the most important products, by determining wages and profits in connection with the general regulation of the economic life of the country as a whole, by cutting down the outgo of the State treasury, and by doing away with useless expenditures.

7. In order to increase the revenues of the State treasury, it is necessary to take certain steps to attract more money into the State bank, which should be reorganized. It would be exceedingly worth while to encourage the population at large to make deposits. Results might be attained best of all through loan-savings associations and other coöperative organizations and unions.

8. Private credit institutions should be under strict control, so that they would not work against the interest of the State.

9. On its part, the United Democracy thinks it necessary to do its best to support the financial measures of the Government in the successful collection of taxes and placing of a liberty loan.

The Land Question

Land tenure prior to the revolution was not regulated by explicit legislation, and was determined, with the aid of the tsarist government, in the interests of the propertied classes. Until the downfall of the old régime, there was no legal land-regulation of any kind. Because of this, as well as the desire of the toiling peasantry to satisfy its need for land, there has been brought about a situation whereby, in many localities, the peasants have made use of the primitive law of force and have helped themselves. This attitude has complicated the land problem, has brought on conflicts, misunderstandings, and quarrels. It has in addition, affected the supply of articles of prime necessity, and has raised obstacles in the way of an orderly settlement of the land question in the Constituent Assembly. A vigorous, proper, and systematic regulation of the land question is necessary for the period of transition, that is to say, until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. In making this regulation, the following fundamental principles should be kept in view:

1. Repudiation of any kind of seizure of any other person's land, whether by individual persons or groups of persons or associations.
2. Direct settlement of land relationships must be entrusted to the local land committees. They should have jurisdiction, without violating the existing forms of land tenure, over such lands as are of agricultural use, so that they may be better utilized and save the national economy from complete disorganization. With this end in view, the central government must immediately pass laws and issue instructions that will clearly define the rights and duties of the land committees, and provide them with a plan of procedure. These laws and instructions must in every possible way safeguard the interests of the farming population as regards land tenure, as well as the interests of the food supply and agricultural production as a whole.

The Organization of the Army

Believing that the salvation of the country and the revolution at this present moment depend upon a revival of the strength of the army, the Democracy insists upon the following measures:

1. The right and duties of the commanding personnel, commissars, and army organizations should be clearly and definitely indicated.

a. The commanding personnel must have absolute independence in the domain of active operations, and a decisive voice in the domain of drill and war preparation.

b. The commissars must carry out the revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government and watch over revolutionary legality in the army. The work of the commissars must be brought into close relation to the army organizations.

c. The army committees are to be regarded as organs of the soldiers as a whole, as guides in their public and political life. As such, the rights of the committees must be defined by legislation, so as to enable them to play their part in the life of the army.

2. Extraordinary measures of revolutionary compulsion may be taken in extraordinary circumstances, but only in agreement with the commissars, and must never be applied to the sound elements of the army. The abuse of the system of coercion and repression destroys the fighting spirit and fighting power of the army. For this reason the restoration of personal disciplinary authority to commanding officers is inadmissible. In order to enhance the prestige of the commanding personnel, all those who have plainly shown themselves to be counter-revolutionists should be removed from high command, and their places filled with individuals who have come to the front from the ranks of the lower officers and who have, in most cases, shared courageously and self-sacrificingly all the burdens of the war with the soldiers.

3. There should be increased activity in the rear to provide for the needs of the rank and file. It is also necessary, in this connection, that the State and the public recognize their obligations to the disabled war veterans and their families, and make fuller provision, within the limits of financial resources, for the families of all those mobilized for the war.

Self-Government and Local Government

1. An early organization of local self-government and government is necessary, both in the interest of strengthening the revolution and of carrying out systematically some of the measures of the Provisional Government.

2. The organs of local self-government, elected on the basis of

the general election law, should carry out the functions of local State government, and they should not be opposed by any other organs of local self-government. Representatives of the central government should have supervision over the legality of the acts of the local self-government.

3. In connection with this change, it is necessary to work over the old municipal and rural codes and harmonize them with the new militia regulations, and to widen the sphere of competency of local self-government in questions of public order, safety, finance, labor laws, etc.

4. Commissars of the central government, locally elected and confirmed at the center, are the organs of administrative government only for the transitory period of the revolution.

5. As soon as the organs of local self-government are elected, the full powers of the executive committees of public organizations come to an end.²¹

"IZVESTIIA'S" COMMENT ²²

The second day of the conference is over, and the tragic situation in which the country and revolution find themselves stands out clearer than ever. The tragedy does not consist in the fact that the foreign foe is gathering all his forces to crush us and our freedom, that the country is disorganized and has been left in a beggarly condition by the old régime. History can point to other peoples who were down as low as we and yet managed to save their State and their ideals. Our tragedy lies in this: that in face of the great danger that threatens to destroy our land there is no national outburst, no willingness to sacrifice, no readiness to give up class and group interests for the interests of the country as a whole.

Every one shouts, "The country is in danger!" and those who shout the loudest are the men who are using patriotism as a means of increasing their political influence. While repeating these words, they push the country into civil war. Just now we are all talking of counter-revolution, of the attempt of reaction to regain its lost influence. These are not mere words, exaggerated fears, but facts. This in itself is not alarming, but the fact that there are people who, for the sake of the triumph of their class interests, are ready to hand over the country to the first comer, to the blackest reaction.

²¹ The recommendation of the United Democracy on the nationality question is omitted in this translation.

²² "Izvestiia," No. 144, August 28, 1917.

In reading the account of yesterday's events, of the warmth with which certain groups of the propertied classes greeted every counter-revolutionary gesture, every utterance of a possible hero of reaction, like General Kaledin, the reader will understand how little hope there is left of really stirring up an all-national outburst of feeling for saving the country and the revolution. The democracy is now face to face with an exceptional task.

From the very begining, the leaders of democracy have taken the only true course. The fate of the country is bound up with the fate of the revolution, and that which ruins the revolution ruins the country also. The country can be saved only by saving the revolution. But the propertied classes do not accept this point of view; they do not wish to save the country, at the cost of strengthening the revolution. They would save themselves, even if the country went to perdition. The Moscow Conference, called to find a way out of this contradiction, has not done so and may not do so.

The revolutionary democracy must be ready for anything. It should now gather all its strength and rally around the soviets. Should it happen that the propertied classes finally betray the revolution, it will be up to the democracy, by its own efforts, to save the conquests of the people.

THIRD DAY—AUGUST 28²⁸

Moscow has already taken the conference as a matter of course. The Bolshoi Theater is empty. Although today is a holiday, there are few people around the building. It is seldom that the public stops to look at the theater as it passes.

It is drab and gray inside. There are vacant places everywhere, on the floor, boxes, balconies, and stage. Many of the delegates have gone home, some are asleep, others are attending the opening of the All-Russian Church Convocation. . . .

At 10:15, Kerenski appeared and was applauded by the Left. He opened the meeting without any special remarks. . . .

It seemed that after yesterday's open encounter between the leaders of the revolutionary democracy and the bourgeoisie, interest in the State Conference was waning. But this was not quite so. Both camps followed with closest attention today's outcome, to see which course would be followed to save the country and the revolution.

It was evident, even early in the morning, that the victory was not on the side of the bourgeoisie. The only real basis for agree-

²⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 145, August 29, 1917.

ment which the democratic organizations offered in their declaration was warmly received by Salazkin, the delegate of the zemstvos. He opened his speech by saying that he wished the zemstvos to be included in those organizations which Chkheidze represented. "All democratic masses agree heartily with the resolution and desire of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies." This was the first swallow. It summed up the results of the State Conference and showed which side would come out with its position strengthened and which with its hopes shattered.

The first swallow was followed by others. But before looking at them, let us listen to the discussion of a very important question, the rôle of the army committees. . . .

General Alexeev, in a long speech, brought forward the question. In the matter of form, the speech of the former Supreme Commander differed from that of the present Supreme Commander, but in substance it was very similar. His picture of the disorganization of the army was closely followed. . . . He referred to Order No. 1, to the army organizations, and to the committees of one kind or another; he did not come out openly and say that they interfered with military discipline. But he talked about them and looked upon them in the only way that an officer of the former order could look on democratic organizations. He does not see in them the wonderful creative engines which were so glowingly described by Kushin, a representative of the committees.²⁴

The speech of Bublikov, a representative of big industry, clearly emphasized the value of the position assumed by the Russian democracy. He openly and straightforwardly announced: "Yes, we accept the agreement you propose; the hand which you held out to us will not be left dangling in the air," and with these words he stepped down from the platform to where Tseretelli was seated and shook his hand.

It was worth while being in the hall at that moment. Every one stood up, and a tremendous ovation came from the right and the left. It was then quite evident that the revolutionary democracy had won, that the Moscow Conference was not in vain, and that the agreement proposed by the democratic organizations was recognized as the only one which could and should save Russia and the revolution.

When Sokolovski, representing the industry of South Russia, who followed Bublikov, said that notwithstanding all this unanimous demonstration that had just taken place, he did not believe that the

²⁴ Kushin's speech may be found in "Izvestiia," No. 148, September 1, 1917.

unity was general, there came cries from the right and left, "It is! It is!" This reply called forth more cheers. Even Guchkov could not resist this enthusiasm and after a time announced, "Yes, we will work and sacrifice with you for the common cause. We will join you as collaborators, but not as figureheads."

It seemed as if all were over, that these fine words had summed up the results of the conference. The atmosphere of the hall was almost that of a holiday.

Unfortunately, this holiday spirit quickly vanished, owing to a very sad incident brought on by a group of officers in the box of General Kaledin.

When the chairman gave the floor to a Cossack officer, Nagaev, some one in the box called out, "He is no Cossack; he denied it yesterday," etc. . . .

When Nagaev came on the stage, he said that he would answer the questions. He began his speech by stating that he spoke as a representative of the congress held at the front by the seven Cossack army units of the Caucasus and of the Cossack section of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

He commented on the declaration which was read yesterday, and then turning to the box of General Kaledin he said, "I should like to tell General Kaledin . . ."

At this point he was interrupted by the chairman, who informed him that he had to address the assembly as a whole and not individuals. Nagaev continued, "Do not tear the Cossacks from the people. Even in 1905 there were unknown martyrs among our Cossacks, and now you desire to set the Cossacks against the people. We were then loyal servants of tsarism." This remark brought cheers from one side and a commotion in the box of General Kaledin, with shouts, "You will answer for this," and finally, "German mark." This term aroused the audience, and many jumped from their seats. After considerable difficulty, Kerenski restored some order and called "on the person who made the insulting remark to have the manhood to name himself." All eyes turned toward the box. Some of the officers who sat in the front of the box looked back. In the meantime, cries of "coward" were hurled from the floor.

Kerenski then turned to the public with these words, "Nagaev and all Russian people here are satisfied with the silence of the coward."

Just then there stepped forward to the front of the box yesterday's orator, the one-armed Captain Skarzhinski, on whose breast

hung the cross of St. George. "Although," said he, "I did not utter these words, I agree with them."

The chairman considered the incident closed and told Nagaev to proceed. In the interior of the box some one held up a hand, as if desiring to say something, but Kerenski did not notice him. This man, white as a sheet, with a cross of St. George on his coat, dressed in the full uniform of a colonel, came forward to the edge of the box and stood up alongside of Captain Skarzzhinski. . . .

During the recess at eleven o'clock, every one discussed this affair. It was learned that the officer who made the insulting remark started for the main hall but was detained by the commandant in charge. After he had returned to his box, a guard was placed outside of it.

When the session was resumed, Kerenski said, "Before the recess a very sad incident took place. An officer was insulted. The man who did the insulting gave his name, but owing to bad acoustics and distance I could not hear it. His name is Sakharov, a colonel of the general staff. Without considering the present incident, I am glad to have my opinion confirmed that representatives of the Russian army are always ready to answer for their words. . . ."

Sakharov, who stood all this time at the edge of the box, shouted when Kerenski had finished, "I am ready to give satisfaction to Nagaev. . . ."

The Moscow Conference came to an end at 1:30 P. M. with the speech of the Prime Minister. He declared that from this day forth he would govern the country with a strong hand. His one task and aim would be to preserve the country as a whole, to serve all the people of Russia and not any one party.

His statement that "It is necessary to forget the heart when serving the country," made a deep impression and was listened to in deathly silence. One felt himself in the presence of a strong and really revolutionary power, for the Prime Minister declared that to save the State the Provisional Government would fight without mercy, with the anarchy on the left and the counter-revolution on the right. When the Prime Minister had finished his speech, the audience rose and shouted: "Long live the republic! Long live the Provisional Government! Long live Kerenski!"

A little while ago one might have thought that the Government could not count on some groups in Russia, but now one can say that Kerenski in his last speech found a common line of action

which united all parties, with the exception, of course, of those on the extreme right and left.

The Government can now proceed on the road laid out, without glancing to the right or to the left, but looking straight forward to the goal of saving the country and the revolution.

8. THE BOLSHEVIK DECLARATION ²⁵

A mortal danger threatens the cause of the revolution: The landlords and the bourgeois parties are preparing bloody reprisals against the workers, soldiers, and destitute peasants. They are planning the restoration of unlimited oppression and force over the popular masses and the regaining of full power over them.

At such a time, the government that calls itself a "Save-the-Revolution" Government takes no action against the counter-revolution, against the parties which are defending a restoration of the landlord-bourgeois bondage and demanding a continuation of the robber war. On the contrary, it invites notorious counter-revolutionists to the State Conference in Moscow, assures them an overwhelming majority there, intends to come to a definite understanding with them and to rely upon them openly in its future work. The Provisional Government hails publicly the sworn enemies of the people as the saviors of the country and proclaims the grave diggers of the revolution as its life-giving forces. Thus the Provisional Government rounds out its entire policy which has been directed against the workers, their newspapers and their organizations; against the soldiers, by restoring capital punishment; against the peasants, by not giving them land.

The Provisional Government itself has become the tool of the counter-revolution and international reaction. It has summoned the Moscow Conference in order to draw here fresh strength for a new campaign against all conquests of the revolution. Encouraged by this friendly policy, the enemies of the people—landlords, bankers, manufacturers—have rallied around the Cadet Party to save their war profits, estates, and capital. The Moscow Conference affords the counter-revolutionary hangmen the most convenient opportunity to come to an understanding among themselves, the most convenient screen behind which to organize an all-Russian counter-revolutionary

²⁵ Piontkovski; "Khrestomatia," 174-6.

conspiracy. The preliminary Cadet conference has already created a permanent political center for the counter-revolution, which relies upon the armed support of the commanding leaders of the army and of the reactionary section of the Cossacks.

The Moscow Conference represents a crude falsification and distortion of the popular will. While this is being summoned, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which would be the real popular representative body, is again postponed for two months, owing to the machinations of the bourgeoisie, which is going straight after its object, the complete break-up of the Constituent Assembly and its replacement by some other body, in which it will be sure to have a majority.

In addition to undermining the Constituent Assembly, the bourgeois counter-revolution places the Moscow Conference in open opposition to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. With its [conference] help, it [counter-revolution] hopes to deliver decisive blows to these organs upon which the working class has laid the duty of protecting the interests of the revolution, the obligation to fight for peace, for land, for bread. Yet the Socialist-Revolutionist and Menshevik parties, which now have a majority in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, did not oppose the calling of the Moscow Conference, did not attempt to fight against this plot, which is clearly in the interest of the counter-revolution. They could not fight against it, for they stood for agreement, for coöperation with the bourgeois-landlord coalition, for always making concessions to it. They refused to turn over full power to the workers, soldiers, and peasants, and proposed to share power with the bourgeois counter-revolution.

The Moscow Conference demonstrates to the widest sections of the urban and rural poor the need of a vigorous struggle against the counter-revolution. The working class, as the most reliable guardian and bulwark of the revolution, was the first to utter its protest, openly, against the Moscow muster of the forces of the counter-revolution which the Provisional Government is organizing. The general strike of the Moscow proletariat expresses the thought and the will of the whole enlightened proletariat of Russia, which sees through the game of the counter-revolution. To the war cry of the mobilized bourgeoisie, the working class has opposed its watchword of a proletarian and peasant revolution.

We, members of the revolutionary party of the proletariat, came here not to enter into negotiations with the enemies of the revolu-

tion, but for the purpose of protesting on behalf of the workers and poorest peasants against the calling of a counter-revolutionary assembly, and to expose its real nature to the country. But it was decided to shut our mouths, and this decision was taken with the aid of the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks belonging to the Soviet majority. We feel certain, nevertheless, that our voice and our protest will reach the popular masses, who are more and more rallying around us, the revolutionary party of the proletariat. In its name, we declare that the proletariat will not permit the triumph of the bourgeois oppressors. The proletariat will carry the revolution to the end; it will give land to the peasants, and peace, bread, and freedom to the people.

The Russian proletariat, in common with the international proletariat, will make an end of the domination of capital over enslaved humanity.

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE MUNICIPAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE TRADE UNIONS

BOLSHEVIST MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION OF THE
WORKERS' COÖPERATIVE SOCIETIES

BOLSHEVIST REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMITTEES
OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE UNION OF MUNICI-
PAL EMPLOYEES

BOLSHEVIST DELEGATES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY
COMMITTEES

BOLSHEVIST MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION FROM
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS
BARRED FROM THE CONFERENCE

9. RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE ²⁸

MILIUKOV'S OPINION

"Just now it is difficult to say what will be the results of the Moscow Conference. Of course something has been accomplished, the roads run a little closer together, but I fear that this rapprochement is not for long. According to the speeches, it seems as if unity had almost been achieved, but whether it exists in fact is a question. The speeches and declarations of separate groups, Socialist and non-

²⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 146, August 30, 1917.

Socialist, promise concessions. Especially noteworthy was the declaration of I. G. Tseretelli, which holds out compromises. In this declaration there is indicated a real desire for collaboration. How this will actually work out, the near future will tell. I should like to believe that the Moscow Conference will not be without results."

TSERETELLI'S OPINION

"It seems to me that the declaration of the United Democracy formed a bridge between her and the bourgeoisie. The strength of this bridge will depend largely on future events, and on the amount of support the propertied classes will give to the reforms outlined by the Government. The conference gave results in that it laid bare before the country the true situation and united, in so far as that was possible, the living forces of the land."

PRESIDENT WILSON SENDS GREETINGS TO THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE ²⁷

The following telegram has been sent:

President of the National Council Assembly, Moscow: I take the liberty to send to the members of the great council now meeting in Moscow the cordial greetings of their friends, the people of the United States, to express their confidence in the ultimate triumph of ideals of democracy and self-government against all enemies within and without, and to give their renewed assurance of every material and moral assistance they can extend to the Government of Russia in the promotion of the common cause in which the two nations are unselfishly united.

WOODROW WILSON.

²⁷ Official Bulletin, Washington, August 27, 1917.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE KORNILOV AFFAIR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Because of his daring, manliness, honesty, straightforwardness, and devotion to his service, General Kornilov was well known in military circles long before he came to the notice of the general public. He was a soldier first and last, and viewed the world from the military saddle. He did not play politics, was not mixed in the intrigues in or out of court. He was loyal to his Tsar as long as he reigned and when he abdicated Kornilov accepted, at least outwardly, the new state of affairs in the hope that the revolution would go on with the war until Russia was free of the Germans.

The Provisional Government trusted him, and named him Commander of the Petrograd Garrison. When Kornilov found that the Soviet decrees and pacifist propaganda were interfering with his duties and ruining the army, he resigned and went to the fighting lines. He was made Commander of the Southwest front and worked hard to put his army on a war footing. The failure of the July offensive grieved him deeply both as a patriot and as a commander. The cause of the failure was obvious and without paying attention to the feeling of the revolutionists he proceeded to put back the old discipline in the army. He prohibited meetings, made it clear that military commands are not subject to debate, and gave orders to shoot scoundrels without trial. He knew just what to do and did it. Kerenski was pleased and offered to make him Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Before accepting the offer General Kornilov demanded a free hand, and restoration of the old time military discipline both at the front and in the rear, for the civilian population as well as the soldiers. Had these demands been granted Kornilov would have had dictatorial powers and he would have tried to put an end to the Soviets and the

revolutionists. Whether he would have tried to restore the monarchy no one knows. Kerenski and his Socialists, being politicians and revolutionists, could not grant all of Kornilov's demands. They might overlook his acts, but they could not openly come out for a policy which would put them and the revolution in the hands of the militarists. At the same time they could not break with Kornilov, for he seemed to be the only man who might do something with the army.

A month of very precious time was wasted in fruitless conversation, in sending messages and messengers from one to the other. During that month Kornilov grew in popularity with the Duma crowd, the Nationalists, Militarists, and all those who were opposed to the Soviet. At the Moscow Conference they made him their hero, and it is possible that they also tried to make him their tool. As Kornilov grew in popularity with one group he became unpopular with the other. Whatever confidence and trust Kornilov and Kerenski had in each other before August 1 disappeared before September 1. It was a great pity, for both were ardent patriots and wished only the good of their country.

We have not as yet and may never have all the details of the so-called Kornilov plot. We are not even sure whether it was a plot or a misunderstanding. For the time being we can do no better than give the two versions of the affair, the one of the "Izvestiia," organ of the revolutionists, and the other of General Lukomski, right-hand man of Kornilov.

I. KORNILOV AND THE JULY OFFENSIVE

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTHWEST FRONT ¹

In view of the exceptionally serious time which we are passing through, when all thoughts should be concentrated solely on the question how, with arms in hand, to save the country from the Austrians and Germans, I order:

1. That there should be no meetings of any kind in the war zone, and any that take place are to be regarded as against the law

¹"Izvestiia," No. 120, July 31, 1917. Kornilov, Lavr Georgievich (1870-1918).

and broken up by force of arms; 2. That this is a military order and not subject to debate, not even by the committees.

GENERAL KORNILOV

[July 30, 1917.]

ARMY APPOINTMENTS ²

July 31, 1917

The Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest front, General Kornilov, is made Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

War Commissar of the Southwest front, Savinkov, is made Assistant-Minister of War, with the duty of replacing Kerenski during his absence from Petrograd.

TELEGRAM OF GENERAL KORNILOV ³

Having received a report from the commander of the XI Army that the soldiers under him, in retreating from Tarnopol, robbed the inhabitants, violated women and children, killed peaceful citizens, and murdered one another, I gave orders to shoot such scoundrels without trial. In obedience to this order, fourteen caught in the act were shot. In announcing this to the armies on the front entrusted to me, I wish to add that I have given orders to shoot without trial all those who rob, use force on, or kill peaceful citizens or fellow soldiers, and all those who refuse to carry out war orders at this minute when the very existence of the country, freedom, and the revolution is at stake. I will stop at nothing to save the country from destruction due to the despicable behavior of traitors, betrayers, and cowards. This order is to be read in all companies, etc.

GENERAL KORNILOV

GENERAL KORNILOV ACCEPTS SUPREME COMMAND ⁴

On August 9, Minister Tereschenko returned from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. At two o'clock Tereschenko called on Kerenski to report the results of his conversations with Kornilov. An agreement seems to have been reached and the conditions laid down by Kornilov for taking command accepted. Tereschenko said that Kornilov would like to have a conference in the very near future at Headquarters, with the participation

² "Riech," No. 168, August 2, 1917.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 170, August 4, 1917.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 175, August 10, 1917.

of the ministers of food and transportation, to take up questions relating to army supplies.

GENERAL KORNILOV MAKES DEMANDS ⁵

On the morning of August 16, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, arrived at Petrograd. From the station he went to the Winter Palace, where he was received by the Prime Minister, Kerenski. At noon, at the home of Kerenski, he met Savinkov, Nekrasov, and Tereschenko, and reported on the situation at the front. Later, Kornilov attended a session of the Provisional Government at the Winter Palace. . . .

To the journalists Kornilov gave out the following interview:

"Thanks to the decisive measures of the Government, the condition of the army is satisfactory . . . but this does not mean that everything has been done to put the army in a healthy state. There is still much to be done to bring the army up to the point where it should be."

General Kornilov proposed certain measures for the improvement of the army. He is convinced, and feels that the Provisional Government is of the same mind, that without these measures, the publication of which he expects in the next few days, it is impossible to restore the fighting ability of the army. . . . It is very necessary that the Provisional Government should confirm these measures. . . . In regard to the relation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the elected soldiers' committees, General Kornilov remarked that he did not care for the present to go into details on the subject, other than to say that he recognized these organizations, but had proposed to the Provisional Government that they be reformed on a different basis. . . .

At three o'clock in the morning, General Kornilov returned to Headquarters.

GENERAL KORNILOV AND THE DEMOCRACY ⁶

The demands of General Kornilov, in the form of an ultimatum, supported by the possibility of a new attack by the enemy, puts the Provisional Government in a very difficult position, and the future alone knows how it will act. This, however, may be said now, that the sympathy of the democracy is not on the side of General Kornilov.

⁵ "Riech," No. 181, August 17, 1917.

⁶ "Izvestia," No. 135, August 17, 1917.

DEMANDS OF GENERAL KORNILOV ⁷

We learn from a reliable source that at the meeting of the Provisional Government on August 16, General Kornilov made a detailed report of the situation at the front. . . . [He pointed out] that the severe penalties, including capital punishment, that are administered in the active army should also be put into force in the rear wherever soldiers are found guilty of crimes that require severe punishment. . . .

General Kornilov's report made a deep impression on the members of the Government. Some of his recommendations, especially the one about capital punishment in the rear, met determined opposition from a majority of the ministers. The questions will be acted upon in the near future. . . .

RUMORS ABOUT KORNILOV'S RESIGNATION ⁸

All rumors of a change in the Supreme Command are without foundation. General Kornilov has the confidence of the Provisional Government, and the recommendations he has made for raising the fighting power of the army did not meet with serious opposition.

GENERAL KORNILOV'S DEMANDS ⁹

General Kornilov arrived at Petrograd on August 23. He was immediately received by the acting War Minister B. V. Savinkov, and together they went to the meeting of the Provisional Government. The coming of the General was closely bound up with the conference at Moscow. At this meeting of the Provisional Government, military questions were discussed, bearing on the propositions made by General Kornilov in his report, which he, with B. V. Savinkov, submitted to the Provisional Government. Both Kornilov and Savinkov insisted that the institution of commissars be considerably developed and its power increased in the strengthening of the army. General Kornilov came out in favor of greatly weakening the influence of the army committees on military life. He thought that it was necessary to take out of the hands of these organizations all questions that had any bearing, direct or indirect, on military operations. Savinkov, in his report, insisted that the authority of the commissars should be raised to the point where they, only, would be the voice of the Provisional Government. General Kornilov agreed that the revolu-

⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 136, August 18, 1917.

⁸ "Riech," No. 183, August 19, 1917.

⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 141, August 24, 1917.

tionary democracy could not wholly trust the high command, but thought that the commissars were quite capable of taking the place of the committees in their work of controlling the command. Some of the other measures of Kornilov and Savinkov touched not only the life at the front, but even more so the rear. In his report, General Kornilov strongly emphasized the fact that the chaos in the rear, the complete disorganization of the regiments in the rear, the total unpreparedness of those who are sent to fill up the gaps at the front, and, what is even more serious, their lack of discipline, demoralizes the active army. . . . General Kornilov insisted that definite measures be taken at once against this chaos in the rear. He categorically demanded that the revolutionary courts, which are at work at the front, should be set up in the rear, with authority to inflict the same punishments as at the front, including the death penalty. On this point General Kornilov was supported by acting War Minister Savinkov.

General Kornilov's report had to do, also, with food at the front and the necessity of taking steps to regulate transportation. Owing to the lawless acts of the soldier masses, the railways have completely broken down. He thought that the railways and factories working for the army should be militarized. If this were not done, he feared that the army and navy would be left without food and artillery supplies.

Attention has already been called to the fact that General Kornilov's propositions, especially those relating to decisive measures in the rear, are meeting with bitter opposition from the left wing of the Provisional Government.

In any case, the Provisional Government thinks that it must come to a decision on these questions before the opening of the Moscow Conference, otherwise there might be a split between the Government and the representatives of the front.

We may assume that the Government will reach some half-way decision which will make it possible for those at the head of the war ministry to carry out the measures necessary for strengthening our front.

At 10:30 P. M., the members of the Government met with General Kornilov in Kerenski's office. After an exchange of opinions, it was decided that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should lay before the Moscow Conference such measures as he thinks are needed for strengthening the front.

At 1 A. M., General Kornilov left the capital for Headquarters.

SAVINKOV RESIGNS ¹⁰

As we have already indicated, owing to differences of opinion with Prime Minister Kerenski on the question of strong authority, the acting Minister of War, B. V. Savinkov, has handed in his resignation. At the meeting of the Government on August 24, the resignation was accepted. How this will affect the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, and the acting Minister of the Navy, V. E. Lebedev, who agree with the point of view of Savinkov, is not clear.

INTERVIEW WITH SAVINKOV ¹¹

"I may say to you that I am to continue as Acting-Minister of War. I am happy to say that, according to the announcement of Kerenski, I can again work with him in fullest agreement to carry out the program which he touched upon in different places in his speech at the Moscow Conference, and which is also the program of the Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, and mine. I may also say to you that in the near future the Ministries of War and Navy will submit to the Provisional Government a law for bringing about order in the rear.

"I do not foresee changes in the personnel of the ministry. All the commissars will remain in their present places, among them commissar M. M. Filonenko, attached to the Supreme Commander. The institution of commissar will undergo no changes."

On the soldier organizations Savinkov expressed himself as follows: "The accounts which appeared in the papers that I contemplate reducing the proportions of these organizations is both untrue and misleading. Neither General Kornilov nor I has ever proposed such a plan. Both Kerenski and we have stood for preserving and strengthening the soldiers' organizations, but they should not have the right to change war orders and to interfere in the appointment of the command.

"I shall continue to defend the war organizations against all encroachments in so far as the organizations keep within their sphere.

"Again I must confirm that I am very happy that there are no differences of opinion between Kerenski, General Kornilov, and myself."

¹⁰ "Riech," No. 188, August 25, 1917. Savinkov, Boris Victorovich (1879-1925).

¹¹ "Izvestiia," No. 147, August 31, 1917.

PLOT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ¹²

In reply to the question whether rumors which are circulating, that the object of the plot is to free the former Emperor from Tobolsk, prosecuting attorney A. F. Staal said that there was no truth in the report. The aim of the plot is purely political. It began before the Emperor's departure for Tobolsk, and it set for itself the task of overturning the existing Government and restoring the old régime.

Grand Dukes Michael Alexandrovich and Paul Alexandrovich were placed under domestic arrest on the night of September 3.

2. KERENSKI'S EXPLANATION OF THE KORNILOV AFFAIR ¹³

RADIO-TELEGRAM SENT OUT

On September 8, General Kornilov sent to me Vladimir Lvov, member of the Duma, with a demand that the Provisional Government hand over to General Kornilov all civil and military power so that he may, according to his own judgment, form a new Government. I called up General Kornilov on long distance, and he confirmed that he had authorized Lvov to deliver said message.

This demand on the Provisional Government, through me, is an attempt of certain circles of the Russian public to take advantage of the difficult situation in the State to establish a régime opposed to the conquests of the revolution.

In view of this the Provisional Government, in order to save the country, freedom, and the republican form of government, has found it necessary to authorize me to take quick and sure steps to cut at the roots all attempts against the supreme power in the State and the rights of the citizens won by the revolution.

All necessary measures to safeguard liberty and order in the country are being taken, and the people will be informed about them in due time.

In addition to this, I order:

1. That General Kornilov give up his office of Supreme Commander to General Klembovski, commander of the armies of the Northern front, which bars the way to Petrograd. General Klem-

¹² "Izvestiia," No. 151, September 5, 1917.

¹³ "Riech," No. 202, September 11, 1917.

bovski is to assume the Supreme Command temporarily and to remain at Pskov.

2. That Petrograd and Petrograd uiezd be placed under martial law, subject to all war regulations. . . .

I call upon all citizens to preserve the order and quiet necessary to save the country.

I call upon the army and navy to carry out in a cool and self-sacrificing manner their duty in defending the country from the foreign foe.

A. F. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister, Minister of War and Navy.

September 9, 1917.

KERENSKI'S CALL TO THE RAILWAY MEN ¹⁴

Kerenski sent the following appeal:

"Railway men, the fate of Russia is in large part in your hands. You helped to overturn the old régime. You should protect the conquests of revolutionary Russia from the dark attempts of a military dictatorship. You should not carry out a single order issued by General Kornilov.

"Be on your guard. Obey only the will of the Provisional Government, which is the will of the Russian people."

3. PROCLAMATIONS OF GENERAL KORNILOV ¹⁵

Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief:

For Petrograd, to be transmitted to the Minister of War, all railway lines, all railway officials, railway committees, the "Russkoe Slovo," other newspapers, and as circulars for Russian cities, office holders, and as copy for newspapers:

The entire first part of the telegram, Number 4663, of the Prime Minister is a lie from beginning to end. It is not I who sent Vl. N. Lvov, member of the Duma, to the Provisional Government, but it was the Prime Minister who sent him to me as his emissary. Al. Aladin, member of the Duma, can testify to this.

In this way there came about a great provocation which threatens the fate of the country.

People of Russia, our great country is dying. Her end is near.

Forced to speak openly, I, General Kornilov, declare that the

¹⁴ "Riech," No. 202, September 11, 1917.

¹⁵ "Novoe Vremia," No. 14866, September 11, 1917.

Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, is acting in complete harmony with the German General Staff and, simultaneously with the expected landing of the enemy troops near Riga, is killing the army and shaking the country.

The terrible conviction of the inevitable ruin of the country compels me in these frightful times to call upon all Russians to save their dying land. All in whose breast a Russian heart beats, all who believe in God, in the Church, pray to Him for the greatest miracle—the saving of our native land.

I, General Kornilov, son of a Cossack peasant, declare to one and all that I desire nothing for myself other than the salvation of our Great Russia, and vow to lead the people, through victory over our enemies, to the Constituent Assembly, where it can determine its future destiny and the form of its future political life.

I cannot betray Russia into the hands of her ancient enemy, the Germans, who would make slaves of the Russian people. I prefer to die honorably on the field of battle so that I may not see the shame and degradation of our Russian land.

People of Russia, the life of your native land is in your hands.

GENERAL KORNILOV

*No. 6442, September 10, Headquarters*¹⁸

(Appeal to the People to Be Circularized in All Cities and Railways)

I, General Kornilov, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declare before the whole nation that my duty as a soldier, as a self-sacrificing citizen of free Russia, and my boundless love for my country oblige me at this critical hour of Russia's existence to disobey the orders of the Provisional Government and to retain the Supreme Command over the Army and Navy. I am supported in this decision by all the commanders-in-chief of the fronts, and declare to the Russian people that I prefer to die rather than give up my post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. A true son of Russia remains at his place to the end and is always ready to make for his country the greatest of all sacrifices, which is his life.

In these terrible moments through which our country is passing, when the approaches to both capitals are almost open to the victorious advance of the triumphant foe, the Provisional Government forgets the great question of the independence and the very existence of the land and frightens the people with phantoms of counter-revolution,

¹⁸ "Novoe Vremia," No. 14866, September 11, 1917.

which it is calling forth by its inability to govern, by its weakness and indecision.

Is it not for me, son of the people, who has devoted himself, heart and soul, to the services of the people, to stand guard over the great liberties and great future of Russia? But at the present moment this future is in weak and hesitating hands. The arrogant foe, by using bribery and treachery, has made himself master here as if he were at home, and carries destruction not only to liberty but to the very existence of the Russian nation.

Russian people, shake off your madness and blindness and look into the bottomless pit into which our country is rushing.

Desiring to avoid all collision, all shedding of Russian blood in civil war, and forgetting all insults and injuries, I, in the presence of the whole nation, say to the Provisional Government: Come to Headquarters where your safety and freedom are guaranteed by my word of honor, and together we will work out and form such a government of national defense as will assure liberty and will lead the Russian people to its great future, worthy of a free and mighty people.

GENERAL KORNILOV

4. "IZVESTIIA" ACCOUNT OF THE KORNILOV AFFAIR ¹⁷

September 8-9.

At 4:00 P. M., there was to be a meeting of the Provisional Government. Before it began, the Prime Minister was called out to talk with Headquarters by long distance telephone. From this conversation he got the impression that all was not as well as it should be and asked his adjutant to find V. N. Lvov. He was found and brought to the home of Kerenski. . . .

Lvov said that General Kornilov authorized him to demand that Kerenski, as Prime Minister, hand over his power to General Kornilov to form a new Government.

Lvov did not conceal the fact that this was the wish not only of Kornilov, but of a certain group of public men who were just then at Headquarters. This group had nothing against Kerenski's occupying the post of Minister of Justice in the new Cabinet. The Ministry of War was, however, to be in the hands of Savinkov.

If Kerenski agrees to this combination, then the public men invite

¹⁷ "Izvestiia," Extra, September 9, 1917.

him and Savinkov to come at once to Headquarters for further and final discussion. Lvov gave his word of honor that the Prime Minister would not be arrested at Headquarters; and if no agreement should be reached, then he could freely depart.

After listening to Lvov's propositions, Kerenski said that they were quite unexpected and that he was astonished at the boldness of General Kornilov. . . . It did not seem possible that General Kornilov would make such a demand, and therefore Lvov was asked to wait a little while Kerenski called up General Kornilov.

General Kornilov confirmed Lvov. When Kerenski came back into the room, he told Lvov that he could not accept the propositions of General Kornilov and that he would take measures to crush this new plot against the free country and republic. . . .

About 8:00 P. M., the Provisional Government met. It discussed until late in the night this unexpected question. . . . In the end, the text for the call to the people was prepared and accepted. It removed Kornilov from command and declared Petrograd in a state of war.

In the course of the night a telegram was received from General Lukomski, the inspirer and ringleader of this plot. . . .

When the Government, after its discussion with Lvov, telegraphed to Lukomski to take over the command, he wired back his refusal. According to the contents of the telegram, General Lukomski will, it would seem, not stop even at the point of betraying his country. He threatened that a failure of the Government to carry out the demand of Kornilov would lead to civil war at the front, the opening of the front, and a shameful separate peace. All this would tend to show that there is a determination to come to an agreement with the Germans in order to succeed with the plot. . . .

At 4:00 A. M., September 9, Kerenski got Headquarters by long distance. Generals Kornilov and Lukomski would not give a straight answer to the question whether they would lay down their command, but said that they had not been understood and that Lvov had misled them.

Kerenski insisted that Kornilov should immediately lay down his command and come at once to Petrograd.

But General Kornilov refused to take orders from the Prime Minister. . . .

Kerenski thought that in view of the critical position, the Government should select from its number a small group of men and endow them with full power for the purpose of quickly and definitely paralyzing the plot of Kornilov. Kerenski was of the opinion that

such a group, in order to get quick results, must be made up of men who see eye to eye in current matters.

This project of Kerenski aroused a strong protest from members of the Government belonging to the Cadet Party. They said that they would remain in the Ministry only if all measures to crush the uprising and all important political questions be decided by the Cabinet as a whole. As the majority of the Ministers did not agree with the Cadets, they handed in their resignation. . . .

During Kerenski's discussions with representatives of the revolutionary democracy, it was suggested that it would be well to call a special conference, similar to the one at Moscow, where there would come together the live forces of the country, with the exception of the . . . Four Dumas and organizations (like the St. George Knights and others compromised in the plot).

After this conference the Government, as such, will be responsible to this body until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

Until the calling of this conference, the representatives of the revolutionary democracy that enter the Directory will not be formally connected with the central organs of the revolutionary democracy. . . . In connection with this counter-revolutionary plot, eighty people have been arrested, among them members of the Duma.

September 9¹⁸

On this day uprisings were expected from the Right and Left . . . but, fortunately, nothing happened.

September 10¹⁹

Early on the morning of the 10th, word was received at Pavlovsk station that nine units of rebellious troops left the station Dno. An order was sent at once by telegraph to tear up the track. This was done in three different places between the stations Semrino and Susanino, which are about forty-two versts from Petrograd. . . .

At 4:00 P. M., word was received that two units of rebellious troops passed Viritsa. These troops were mainly native Mohammedans from the Caucasus. [To talk with them, men of their own kind were sent from Petrograd. At 6:00 P. M., near Semrino, they met officers of the Caucasus division who would not permit the Petrograd delegation to talk with the troops.]

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," Extra, September 10, 1917.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 156, September 11, 1917.

*September 11*²⁰

The Government has taken the necessary measures to put an end to the rebellion. General Denikin, who announced that he joined Kornilov, has been arrested with all his staff. General Erdeli was also arrested because he refused to obey the orders of the Provisional Government.

Contact between Kornilov and his army is broken. The troops under his command have come to a standstill. Among his troops there is a great deal of disagreement. Some of the Cossacks have gone over to the side of the Government. The Wild Division is also divided in opinion. Judging from the attitude of some of the Kornilov troops, it may be said that they were drawn into the rebellion by deceit. They were led to believe that they were being taken to Petrograd to save the Provisional Government from a new Bolshevik attempt. . . . The Provisional Government hopes that civil war will be avoided.

The Government has issued an order to the commissars of all the guberniias not to allow the publication of the proclamations of Kornilov or of others in agreement with him. Nothing is to be published about Kornilov except official reports.

The "Novoe Vremia" published in full the Kornilov proclamations, but only extracts of the orders of the Government and appeals of those organizations fighting counter-revolution. Because of this, orders have been given to close the "Novoe Vremia." . . . For similar reasons the "Russkoe Slovo" is also closed. . . .

In the course of the day, it was learned that Kornilov's Headquarters are surrounded from all sides. . . . Streets are quiet. . . . People are waiting in line for the evening papers. . . . People are nervous because they know not what to expect. . . . All kinds of wild rumors spread. . . .

*September 12*²¹

Generals Kornilov and Lukomski have announced that they were ready to appear before a revolutionary court to answer the charge of organizing the rebellion.

According to the latest information, Generals Kornilov and Lukomski have surrendered and are on the way to Petrograd.

²⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 157, September 12, 1917.

²¹ *Ibid.*, No. 158, September 13, 1917.

5. GENERAL LUKOMSKI'S ACCOUNT OF THE KORNILOV AFFAIR ²²

During his [Kornilov's] sojourn in Moscow he had several times met with the Ataman of the Don, Kaledin, with the President of the State Duma, Rodzianko; and the representatives of different public organizations and political parties. His intercourse with them had given him the impression that all his requests would be supported, and had fortified his belief in the justice of his decisions.

After his return to Mohilev, General Kornilov waited impatiently for the final solution of the questions he had raised at the Conference, and before Kerenski and Savinkov wired to say that they were working out a plan of the necessary measures for restoring discipline in the Army; that Savinkov would arrive in a few days at Mohilev in order to discuss them finally with Kornilov and come to an agreement with him, after which these measures would immediately be ratified by the Provisional Government.

Meanwhile, information from Petrograd confirmed the rumors of an intended rising of the Bolsheviks which was to take place at the beginning of the next month.

Some time before this a secret society had been formed in Petrograd, which had for its object the organization of detachments for self-defense in case of a rising of the Bolsheviks. Colonel Lebedev, of the General Staff, who was in touch with the heads of this organization, asked General Kornilov to enter into immediate intercourse with them and to invite them to Mohilev.

General Kornilov consented, and two engineers, belonging to the organization in question, arrived at Mohilev.

They informed General Kornilov that they had about two thousand men at their disposal, perfectly well armed, but were short of officers. They did not risk enrolling them from among the officers of the Petrograd garrison for fear they should be indiscreet and betray the organization. They begged General Kornilov to send about one hundred officers to Petrograd at the end of August, and vowed that they would play an important rôle in case of a rising of the Bolsheviks.

General Kornilov consented to this, saying that he would send officers from the front, under the pretext of giving them leave of

²² Loukomsky, "Memoirs of the Russian Revolution," 103-5, 108-13.

absence. The necessary dispositions would be taken by the "Officers' Union."

It was agreed among them that everything must be ready by September 8, and that, in case of a rising of the Bolsheviks, at the approach of General Krymov on Petrograd, this organization should step forward, occupy the Smolny Institute (Headquarters of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies), and try to arrest the Bolshevik leaders.

After the Conference in Moscow, Kornilov unfortunately spoke to many people who came to the Stavka of his intention to deal a decisive blow to the Bolsheviks, and to the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies. This intention had, in fact, ceased to be a secret, and part, if not all, of his plan had got to be known in Petrograd. I am deeply persuaded that these rumors, which had evidently reached the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, made them postpone the proposed rising of the Bolsheviks and insist on putting Kornilov out of the way.

Kerenski, on the other hand, who looked upon Kornilov as a dangerous rival, was only too glad to seize this opportunity for provoking what he called "a revolt" on the part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and then getting rid of him. . . .

On the morning of September 7, when I came to make my daily report to General Kornilov, he told me the following:

In the evening of September 6, Mr. Lvov (formerly Procurator of the Holy Synod) had arrived at Mohilev and demanded to see the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at once. The latter, being occupied, could not receive him, and he presented himself to General Kornilov on the following morning.

Mr. Lvov informed Kornilov that he had come as delegate of the Minister-President, Kerenski, in order to learn the point of view of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the best and most expedient way of creating a strong authority.

The Minister-President, it appeared, considered the three following courses as possible:

1. Kerenski himself as Dictator, at the head of a new Government.
2. A Government of three or four members (one of which must be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov) invested with unlimited powers.
3. General Kornilov as Dictator and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, at the head of a new Government.

Mr. Lvov inquired whether General Kornilov considered it

desirable—in the latter case—for Kerenski and Savinkov to form part of the new Government.

General Kornilov voted for the latter of these three variants, saying that Kerenski and Savinkov must be members of the new Government, and charged Mr. Lvov to inform them that he invited them both urgently to the Stavka, as he feared for their personal safety in case of a rising in the capital; and it would, moreover, be necessary to discuss a whole series of questions which would, naturally, arise in connection with the expected events.

I inquired whether Mr. Lvov had brought any written proof of his mission.

"No," replied Kornilov, "he had no letter with him. The questions he put were written down in his notebook, and he entered my answers in the same. Mr. Lvov is an irreproachably honest man and a gentleman, and I had no reason to distrust him."

"I know him for a perfect gentleman," said I, "but I also know that he has the reputation of a blunderer, and is quite capable of making a mess of things. The very fact of Kerenski's charging a third person with this mission seems suspicious to me. I am afraid he is hatching some plot against you. All this is very, very strange. Why did not Savinkov say anything about it? Why is Lvov entrusted with this mission at the very moment of Savinkov's arrival at the Stavka? God grant I may be mistaken, but I do not like the look of it all, and I profoundly distrust Kerenski."

Kornilov said that I was too suspicious, that Lvov had left Petrograd after Savinkov, which explains why the latter knew nothing about the subject of this mission. He believed that Kerenski was sincere in this case, as the question of Dictatorship had been discussed by him before. . . .

On September 8, Kerenski called General Kornilov to the direct cable and begged him to confirm whether "he had actually charged Mr. Lvov to inform him, Kerenski, of his plans and purposes."

General Kornilov replied: "Yes, I have charged Mr. Lvov to inform you of my plans and purposes."

Kerenski then inquired whether General Kornilov still considered it urgent for him and Savinkov to come to the Stavka.

Kornilov replied affirmatively, after which Kerenski said: "It is too late to start today, Saturday, but we shall leave for the Stavka on Sunday."

General Kornilov said that he would expect them on Monday, September 10.

I must note here what General Kornilov himself owned later on—that the latter acted most thoughtlessly in this case, for, in speaking by direct cable with Kerenski, he omitted to ask him *what* it was that Lvov had said to him.

Now this was most advantageous for Kerenski, and helped him to play his treacherous game. He denied that it was he who had despatched Lvov on a mission to Kornilov; he declared, at the sittings of the Provisional Government, that Kornilov had insolently claimed to be invested with the rights and powers of a Dictator, and ended by requesting the Provisional Government to dismiss him from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Meanwhile, Kornilov was sure that everything was going on well and that he was acting in full accordance with the Provisional Government. When I entered his study, late on the evening of September 8, to report on something, I found him poring over the project of a new list of Ministers.

"I am elaborating the project of a new Cabinet," said he. "I want to have it ready for the arrival of Kerenski and Savinkov and come to a full agreement with them. I will be glad, however, if I am freed from the necessity of being Dictator. It will be best, after all, to form a strong Government of three or four members, in which I must, of course, take part, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Army."

On that same evening, Kornilov sent a telegram to Moscow, to the President of the State Duma, Rodzianko, begging him and other public leaders to come to the Stavka on the morning of September 10. When the subsequent events took place, however, neither Rodzianko nor any other of the public leaders who had so warmly supported Kornilov at the State Conference in Moscow put in an appearance at the Stavka.

At seven of the morning, on September 9, General Romanovski, Quartermaster-General at the Stavka, brought me a telegram addressed both to General Kornilov and me.

This telegram informed us that General Kornilov was dismissed from his post and ordered to start at once for Petrograd. I was invited to take over temporarily the duties of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The telegram was simply signed "Kerenski," and did not bear any number.

I took it to General Kornilov.

This was a terrible blow to him. All hope of saving the Army and saving Russia was now lost. It was clear that Kerenski was bent on setting Kornilov aside and on going further towards conciliating the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies; it was clear that the Bolsheviks would get the uppermost hand, and that all that remained yet of the Army and the mechanism of the State, would irretrievably crumble away.

After reading the telegram, General Kornilov asked what I intended to do.

I replied that I considered it impossible to take over the duties of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and that I would immediately draft an answer in that sense.

Kornilov then said to me:

"Yes, under the existing conditions, it is my duty to remain at my post to the end. I must have my own way, and force the Provisional Government to carry out my requests. Please wire at once to General Krymov and tell him to hasten with the concentration of the troops near Petrograd."

I sent a long telegram to the President of the Provisional Government. All who were acquainted with military questions, I said, realized perfectly that, under the existing conditions, when home policy was directed, *de facto*, by irresponsible organizations which had the most depraving influence on the Army, it would not be possible to regenerate it. The Army, as such, would inevitably and definitely go to pieces in two or three months' time, and Russia would be obliged to sign a shameful separate peace with Germany and Austro-Hungary, the consequences of which would be terrible for Russia. The Government had taken half-measures which did not actually relieve the situation, and only prolonged the agony and "saved the revolution," but did not save Russia. It was necessary, I said, in order to save her, to create a really strong authority and restore order in the rear.

I further went on to say that General Kornilov had put forward a whole series of requests which had never been fulfilled. Kornilov had no personal ambitions and designs but considered it indispensable to take energetic measures in view of restoring order in the Army and in the whole of the country. The arrival of Savinkov and Lvov—who has made a proposal in the same sense to Kornilov in Kerenski's name—had only obliged the former to take a definite decision, which it was now too late to renounce. My telegram ended as follows:

"Having only the welfare of my country in view, I consider it my duty to declare most decisively, and with a clear conscience, that it is now too late to stop the enterprise begun with your consent. This would only lead to a civil war, to the definitive ruin and decomposition of the Army, and to an ignominious separate peace. . . .

"For the sake of the salvation of Russia, you must enter into General Kornilov's views, instead of dismissing him. . . .

"As for me, I cannot take upon myself the responsibility for the Army, if even for a short time, and do not consider it possible to take over the duties of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. . . ."

On September 10 the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was offered to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front, General Klembovski, who was invited to remain at Pskov.

General Klembovski took advantage of this to refuse the offer, saying that it was impossible to direct the movements of the Army from Pskov.

All the Commanders-in-Chief and many of the Army Commanders sent telegrams to Kerenski, and to the Stavka, expressing their solidarity with General Kornilov.

6. PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE KORNILOV AFFAIR ²³

This is the question every one is asking. It is generally agreed that the Bolsheviks will make use of it for their own ends. They have already come out with a declaration that Kornilov's undertaking was not his own doing but of the whole bourgeoisie. In connection with this, the Bolsheviks have called on the workmen to wage war against the enemies of the proletariat and the revolution. On the streets one may see crowds of armed workmen frightening peaceful inhabitants. At the Soviet meetings the Bolsheviks insistently demand that their comrades be let out of prison.

In this connection it is generally assumed that just as soon as the Kornilov affair has been liquidated, the Bolsheviks, whom the majority of the Soviet no longer regards as betrayers of the revolution, will make every effort to force the Soviet to accept at least a part of their program.

Both Kokoshkin and Nekrasov are fully convinced that the Bolsheviks will do their best to bring pressure to bear on the Government, but the latter believes that they will have little influence. . . .

²³ "Riech," No. 204, September 13, 1917.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

DIRECTORY OF FIVE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

One of the results of the Kornilov affair was to force public opinion to the Left. Before the trouble was quite over there came a demand from the Soviet group that the Cadets, who were accused of being implicated in the plot, should leave the Ministry. Kerenski insisted on a free hand, "on having a Government of a few men who are of one mind, with full power to act strongly and quickly against Kornilov. . . . If, however, the democracy will not agree to this proposition, he can no longer assume responsibility. . . ."

Kerenski apparently wished to get rid of some of his colleagues in order to get others with whom he could work more in harmony. Since March, and during these months of carrying great responsibilities on his shoulders, a change had come over Kerenski. He was drifting farther and farther away from the Soviet without, however, quite approaching the Duma. He was nowhere at home. At this time the moderate Socialists had abandoned the idea of a coalition with the bourgeoisie, but Kerenski still clung to it. Unable to come to an understanding, his supporters in the Soviet began to leave him. This parting of company weakened both and strengthened the Bolsheviks.

For the time being a make-shift government was formed. It was composed of five men, with Kerenski at the head, and all the other Ministers remained at their posts as directors of their departments.

I. FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF FIVE

MEETING OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ¹*September 9.*

Chairman Dan, having approved the text of the appeal of the Provisional Government, said . . . that all the revolutionary democracy should gather around one center. . . .

Comrade Richter spoke in the name of the Socialist-Revolutionists. He suggested that a delegation should be sent to Comrade Kerenski to propose to him the best way out of the present situation, to keep the Provisional Government as it is, but to put in the place of the Cadets such other men as may seem best to Kerenski. If a Directory or some other form of Government is necessary, his party will support it, provided that this new Government will fight counter-revolution and will stand by the program of July 21. . . .

Comrade Weinstein spoke in the name of the Mensheviks. . . . He was of the opinion that the Provisional Government should be elastic. The Mensheviks fully agreed with the Socialist-Revolutionists that the Cabinet should continue as before, but that democratic elements should replace the Cadets. . . .

Comrade Sokolnikov spoke for the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks. He said that the Bolsheviks had already taken the necessary measures to explain to the masses the threatening danger . . . which his party had foreseen and had warned against. The Government which you recognize or form without the proletariat will not have the support of the proletariat. It is not a question of tomorrow but of killing counter-revolution at the roots. . . . As soon as Kerenski learned of the plot of Kornilov, he asked the Bolsheviks to use their influence with the revolutionary soldiers to defend the revolution. In conclusion, the speaker said that only the carrying out of a definite program can inspire the masses with confidence in the Government. This program consists of: republic, peace, and bread. . . .

Comrade Dan, speaking for the Mensheviks, took the position that the members of the Party [in the democratic government] should be responsible to the Party, and that the Government should call a conference similar to the Moscow Conference, leaving out, however, members of the four Dumas, that this conference should continue in existence until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, and that

¹ "Izvestiia," Extra, September 10, 1917.

the Provisional Government should be responsible to this conference. He went on to say that the Mensheviks would continue to agitate with the Government to come out for a democratic republic, immediate dismissal of the Duma, the carrying out of the agrarian reforms, and an appeal to the workers and peasants to stand by the revolution. . . .

[After many others had made speeches] Tseretelli proposed that the meeting proceed with the discussion of practical measures. . . . After many such were proposed, the chairman brought them together under three points: 1. the composition of the ministry; 2. the relation between the democracy and the Government; 3. the future activity of the Government.

The vote was unanimous (the Bolsheviks not participating) to accept the recommendations of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Mensheviks to have a government similar to the one in existence, but to replace the Cadets with such democratic elements as might seem best to the Government.

A large majority voted against the second point, that is, a Directory. . . .

In regard to the third point, a democratic conference (a democratic parliament) which is proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, Lunacharski announced that the Bolsheviks would vote for it if the composition of this conference was to be revolutionary. A vote was taken, and a majority was in favor of point three.

After this vote the chairman announced that the meeting would temporarily adjourn to give the presidium time to take up these questions with the Provisional Government. At 2:00 A. M., the presidium departed for the Winter Palace. . . .

September 10²

At 3:45 A. M., the Central Executive Committee was again in session. It was reported that Kerenski insisted on a government of six persons with full power to act. . . .

Lunacharski was opposed to a government of six . . . and proposed that the Soviet should form a government. Martov in a long speech came out against the idea of Lunacharski but said that he did not see how a Directory would save the situation. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists were in favor of standing by the Government, according to the formula "in so far as" [it stood by the program].

After a long discussion without coming to an agreement, it was
**"Izvestiia,"* No. 156, September 11, 1917.

decided to appeal once more to Kerenski to accept the first point, a government along the line of the old one. Just then word came from Kerenski that Tseretelli and Gotz should at once come to the session of the Provisional Government. A little later Chernov also was asked to come to the Winter Palace. Under the circumstances, the Central Executive Committee adjourned the meeting. . . .

At 7 A. M. it was renewed. . . . The first to appear was Chernov . . . followed by Tseretelli, Gotz, and Skobelev.

[The latter took the floor to give an account of the plot, the measures the Government was taking to crush it, and the difficulty of doing anything, owing to the crisis in the Government. This crisis cannot go on another minute.] He was followed by Tseretelli, who said . . . that Kerenski insisted on having a Government of a few men who are of one mind, with full power to act strongly and quickly against Kornilov. Such a Government should have the fullest support of the revolutionary democracy. If, however, the democracy will not agree to this proposition, he can no longer assume responsibility. . . . In reply to Tseretelli's question whether the proposed Government would . . . fight with all its might against counter-revolution, Kerenski replied that it was just that very thing that he had in mind. Under the circumstances, declared Tseretelli, we should support the Government unconditionally. . . .

Chernov announced that he resigned as Minister of Agriculture to make it easier for Kerenski to form a new ministry. . . .

A representative of the Bolsheviks said that his group was against the proposition of Tseretelli, but if the Government will really fight counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks will coöperate with it and will conclude with it a technical military alliance. . . .

The following resolution moved by Tseretelli was passed:

"We leave it to Comrade Kerenski to form a government, the main object of which should be a most determined fight against the plot of General Kornilov. In this fight he is promised the vigorous support of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies."

September 11³

The report that the Provisional Government does not exist is not true. It does exist. For the time being it has handed over all its power to Kerenski, but all the ministers are at their posts. . . .

³ "Izvestiia," No. 157, September 12, 1917.

September 12, 13⁴

The question of appointing Kerenski Supreme Commander, and General M. V. Alexeev Chief of Staff, was settled at last night's meeting of the Provisional Government. It is said that the idea of Kerenski's becoming Supreme Commander came from the Soviet, but it has the approval of other circles. Members of the Provisional Government have come to the conclusion that under the present circumstances there is little confidence in a General as Supreme Commander, and therefore the appointment of Kerenski is necessary. Then, again, the appointment of Kerenski makes impossible the repetition of a Kornilov affair. . . .

From an exchange of opinion which took place at the meeting of the Provisional Government and from private conversations with Ministers belonging to the Cadet Party, it was evident that the Cadets are not opposed to entering the Government. But Iurenev announced at the conference of the Government that if he entered he would lay down three conditions:

1. That military men should occupy military posts in the Government.
2. That the Government should have in it representatives of commerce and industry.
3. That the crushing of the Kornilov uprising should not be carried to the point of breaking up the unity of the army.

2. THE NEW CABINET⁵

From the very beginning, Kerenski was of the opinion that the new Cabinet should be constructed on a coalition basis. By this he means that it should contain not only socialist but bourgeois elements . . . such as Cadets and representatives of commerce and industry.

In conversation with Ministers and other political leaders he said that he did not agree with certain revolutionary organs which insisted that no Cadets should enter the new Cabinet. Of course, the leaders of that party should not be taken in because their very position would compel them to assume a sharp partizan attitude. . . .

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND THE CADETS⁶

Late in the evening of September 14, members of the Executive Committee, Tseretelli, Dan, Gotz, and others came to the Winter

⁴ "Riech," No. 204, September 13, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 205, September 14, 1917.

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 160, September 15, 1917.

Palace and told Kerenski the decision of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists: that their representatives would leave the Ministry if the Cadets entered it. Kerenski pointed out that if the Cadets were kept out, the representatives of other bourgeois classes would not stay in. Under the circumstances Kerenski raised the question whether it was worth his while to remain in power. The situation is exceedingly critical. . . . What adds to the difficulty is the report that General Alexeev would not accept the post of Chief of Staff if Cadets were not in the ministry.

THE COUNCIL OF FIVE ⁷

When it became clear that it was impossible to come to an understanding, the members of the Central Executive Committee left the Winter Palace for Smolny.

After they had departed, Skobelev announced that in view of the fact that a majority of the Government did not accept the point of view of the revolutionary organs, he could no longer remain in the Government. . . . A little later Ministers Zarudni and Avksentiev made similar statements.

The resignation of these three men brought up the question of organizing a Government of Five: A. F. Kerenski, M. I. Terechenko, A. M. Nikitin, General Verkhovski, and Admiral Verderevski. All the other Ministers, outside of this group of five, are to remain at their posts as directors of their departments. It was thought that in this way the crisis would be solved and a directory formed. This plan was approved.

The Directory of Five ⁸

[At its meeting on September 14] the Provisional Government resolved that until the final formation of the cabinet, and in view of the present extraordinary circumstances, the government of the State should be entrusted directly to Prime Minister A. F. Kerenski, Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. I. Tereschenko, Minister of War; General Verkhovski, Minister of the Navy; Rear Admiral Verderevski; and Minister of Posts and Telegraph, A. M. Nikitin.

⁷ "Riech," No. 206, September 15, 1917.

⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16, 1917.

3. PROCLAMATION OF REPUBLIC⁹

The rebellion of General Kornilov is suppressed, but the turmoil which it has brought into the army and to the country is great. Again the danger threatening the country and its freedom is grave. Thinking it necessary to terminate the outward vagueness of the form of government, and mindful of the whole-hearted and enthusiastic acceptance of the republican idea that was shown at the Moscow State Conference, the Provisional Government declares that the political form under which the Russian State is governed is a republican form, and it proclaims the Russian Republic.

The urgent necessity of taking immediate and decisive measures to restore the impaired order of the State has induced the Provisional Government to transfer the fullness of its power of government to five of its members, headed by the Prime Minister.

The Provisional Government regards its main task to be the restoration of order in the State and the fighting power of the army. Convinced that only a rallying of all the vital forces of the country can lead the country out of the difficult situation in which it now finds itself, the Provisional Government will strive to enlarge its membership by taking in the representatives of all those elements who place the lasting and common interests of our country above the transitory and private interests of separate classes or parties. The Provisional Government has no doubt that it will bring this about in the course of the next few days.

A. F. KERENSKI,
Prime Minister

ZARUDNI,
Minister of Justice

September 14, 1917.

DURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT¹⁰

With the formation of the Government of Five, we may consider the Government crisis at an end. . . . However, it is not likely that this Government will be long-lived. No doubt the democratic conference which is being called will organize a more enduring and a more uniform ministry. . . .

⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16, 1917.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

PART XI

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TRIES TO LEAN ON THE DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

After each blow the country grew weaker and her steps more unsteady. By the middle of September men like Avksentiev and Chkheidze had lost hope of coöperation with the propertied classes and turned to the "democracy for salvation." A Democratic Conference was summoned to meet at Petrograd on September 27,

" . . . to help with the internal organization and to say the decisive word on the formation of a strong government, capable of uniting all of revolutionary Russia to drive off the foreign foes and to crush every attempt against the freedom won."

The Conference opened on the day named with a speech by Kerenski. He was heckled by the Bolsheviks, lost his temper, put himself in a bad light, and ended by making threats. The Bolsheviks were not frightened and told those present that they had "lost all confidence in the policies which Kerenski now recommends."

One of these policies was a coalition with the bourgeoisie. Kerenski and some of his friends were in favor of it as the only possible way to conduct the Government; the Bolsheviks were opposed to it and urged "all power to the Soviets." Debate on this question dragged on for several days and when it came to a vote on October 2, there was a good deal of confusion in the minds of those present. The first vote was for coalition in general, the second was against coalition with the Cadets, and the third, on the motion as a whole, was against coalition. The Conference adjourned for a time to clear up the mess and while doing so it got into a snarl which caused the Bolsheviks to leave the meeting.

When the Conference met again on October 4, it resolved to

form a Government in which the democratic element should predominate. The question of ministerial responsibility came up and it was decided to create a new organ before which the Ministers should be held responsible. This new organ was named Provisional Council of the Republic, and its members were drawn from the Democratic Conference.

The next problem was the formation of a Government. Kerenski invited the bourgeoisie to join him but they declined on the ground that they were not willing to be responsible to the Council of the Republic. A counter-proposal was made to give the bourgeoisie representation in the Council of the Republic and to limit the power of that body to asking questions. Though worded somewhat differently to make possible different interpretations, the agreement as reached was practically the same as the counter-proposal. On October 8 the new coalition ministry was formed and issued a declaration on the same day. It took a few days longer to organize the Council of the Republic.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE AND THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC

I. COMPOSITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ¹

In these sad days through which the country is passing, when treachery and betrayal threaten the State with military defeat and internal trouble, revolutionary Russia must look to democracy for her salvation.

It is necessary to gather all the forces of the country to prepare the defense, to help with the internal organization and to say the decisive word on the formation of a strong government, capable of uniting all of revolutionary Russia, to drive off the foreign foe, and to crush every attempt against the freedom won.

With this in mind, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies have resolved to have a meeting at Petrograd on September 25 and to invite all democratic organizations of Russia to send their representatives.

N. S. CHKHEIDZE, *Chairman of the Executive Committee
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*

N. D. AVKSENTIEV, *Chairman of Executive Committee,
All-Russian Peasants' Deputies*

<i>List of Organizations</i>	<i>No. of Delegates</i>
1. Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.....	100
2. Regional Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.....	50
3. Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies..	100
4. Regional Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies....	50
5. Coöperatives	150
6. Trade Unions.....	100
7. War Organizations.....	84

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16, 1917.

<i>List of Organizations</i>	<i>No. of Delegates</i>
8. Railway Men's Union.....	20
9. Commerce-Industry Union.	20
10. Post-Telegraph	10
11. Teachers' Union.	15
12. Workers in City and Zemstvo Unions.....	3
13. Workers in Provisional Government Committee.....	2
14. Pharmacists.	1
15. Assistants to Doctors.....	2
16. Doctors.	2
17. Journalists.	2
18. Lawyers.	2
19. Engineers.	2
20. Architects.	1
21. Zemstvo.	50
22. Nationality Groups.	59
23. Peasants' Union.	10

ATTEMPTS TO BREAK UP THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ²

Many organs of the press, as well as separate political groups, have set for themselves the task of breaking up the Democratic Congress. When this is done by the Central Committee of the Cadets and by their paper "Riech," there is nothing to be wondered at, but when democratic, even socialist, organs are busy with the same kind of thing, we are bound to ask, "Do they know what they are doing?"

DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE POSTPONED TO SEPTEMBER 27 ³

Taking into consideration the numerous notices received from delegations invited to the All-Russian Democratic Conference, of their inability to reach Petrograd on September 25, the presidiums of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies have resolved to open the session promptly at 4:00 P. M. on September 27, at the Alexander Theater.

OPENING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 27 ⁴

The Democratic Conference opened at 5:25 P. M., with Chkheidze in the chair. . . .

² "Izvestiia," No. 165, September 21, 1917.

³ "Riech," No. 214, September 25, 1917.

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 171, September 28, 1917.

KERENSKI'S SPEECH

[He began by reviewing the Kornilov affair and then continued:] "The Provisional Government, in welcoming this conference, authorized me to say that today, more than ever before, it is necessary to bring to bear all the strength and all the brains of the country. The Provisional Government receives telegrams from all corners that anarchy is spreading all over the land. . . .

"No matter what is said on the Right or Left, the Provisional Government is still of the same mind. Let them call us dreamers and visionaries, but we feel and know that in the moment of danger all will come and unite and give us the strength to save the revolution and the country, to save the life of the people, who are deserving of a bright future.

"As Supreme Commander, I would bear witness that, with an insignificant exception, the army from top to bottom has shown itself true to the new fatherland which it is serving.

"All of us leaders of the army are in favor of the army organizations, based on good sense and harmonious work of all elements."

"How about the death penalty, Marat?" somebody on the left shouted.

Kerenski paused for a second, then in a quiet and restrained voice proceeded.

"Yes, in the beginning of the revolution the death penalty was done away with; later, not only at the demand of the commanders, but also of the public organizations at the front, it was brought back."

Cries—"Shame!"

"The Front curses and calls to shame those who, notwithstanding warnings, have demoralized ignorant people to such a point that young children and nurses were violated by the dozen.

"But I say to you, to you who shout from over there, that when I sign even one death penalty, then you may curse me. . . .

"Do not forget that the army has others besides soldiers. It has brave officers who are giving their lives for their country. . . . I ought to say that no matter what tomorrow may bring forth, what the future has in store for us, we shall remain the same defenders of freedom, native land, and the happiness of the people as heretofore."

"What native land?" came a call from the left.

"Silence! Down with the friend of William! Down with the Germanophile!"

"It is you who are the curse of the native land!" some one called from a box.

From all sides came shouts and protests, so that the chairman had difficulty in restoring order.

When the noise had died down somewhat, Kerenski continued. "It is an unbearably heavy cross which I carry and which forces me to be always away from you. When I am in your midst, I forget the conditions and the position which I occupy, and I speak to you as a private man. But there are those who do not understand this. I must therefore speak as one having authority. Any one who dares to attack the free republic, to stick his knife in the back of the Russian army, will learn the power of the revolutionary Government. . . ."

KAMENEV'S SPEECH

"Comrades: The Prime Minister and Supreme Commander asked that the truth be spoken here. It is true that he accompanied this with a threat. We shall pay no attention to the threat, but shall speak the truth.

"The first true word of the Party which I have the honor to represent is that after six months of labor of the different Governments, we have lost all confidence in the policies which Kerenski now recommends. . . . Kerenski makes a mistake in assuming that lack of confidence in him means lack of confidence in the Russian republic. I am of the opinion that we should decline to settle the question of government by loud declamations, but on the basis of the real experience of the last six months of coalition government. . . . These months show us how a certain political party signs the programs of democracy in order not to live up to them. It is no longer a question of long-winded programs. Democracy has no time to bargain.

"Look facts in the face. If you desire a coalition with the bourgeoisie, make an honest coalition with the Cadets; but if the Kornilov plot has taught you what the proletariat has tried to tell you from the very beginning, then you should realize that the only way to save Russia, to reëstablish confidence in the army, confidence of the soldiers in the officers, of the peasant in the promise that he will receive the land, of the workmen that they are living in a republic, is to take all the power into the hands of the workers', soldiers', and peasants' organizations. . . .

"Can there be a new coalition? I say, no. And this is my reason. If we stick by the program of the Moscow Conference, what political

groups, what power will carry out the said program? Among the bourgeoisie there is just one such party—the Cadet—but it will not accept the program. We can make no coalition with the Cadets on this platform, and if we turn away from them, there is no other group with whom we can form a coalition. Let's not fool ourselves. Neither Kishkin, Tereschenko, nor Nekrasov can take the place of a large political party, the only one that represents the propertied elements in Russia. . . .”

SKOBELEV'S SPEECH ⁵

The fundamental question which we have to decide is whether we should keep the bourgeoisie in the Government. It is said that in the past they not only did no creative work, not only were they merely passive, but they even sabotaged. . . .

The elimination of the representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie does not mean that the Provisional Government will have no more difficulties. What we call revolutionary democracy in the broad sense of the word is by no means of uniform social composition. It is true that it is easier to come to an agreement within the group, but there is yet much to do to coördinate the various interests in the democracy itself. During the four months which I was at the head of the Ministry of Labor I had to face this very problem. I should like to say this to the workmen: If you remove the industrial bourgeoisie from the Government, you will have on your hands no fewer difficulties in harmonizing your interests with those of the peasants. . . .

When we speak of coalition we do not, of course, mean coalition with the nobility, with the large landowners, but with the industrial bourgeoisie. I should like to say it here and now, that without putting upon them the responsibility for the running of our economic machinery, we shall not be able to make it run at all. Those who say that the bourgeoisie in the Government sabotages, and should therefore be removed, forget that if it had no responsibility it would sabotage still more. There are those who say that the way to bring them to terms . . . is to imprison some of the representatives of the financial bourgeois class and to hang a few landholders. . . . The old régime imprisoned a great many but by so doing did not settle any State problem, and we, the representatives of Labor in the Duma, were the first to denounce these methods of solving problems. . . .

⁵ “Izvestiia,” No. 173, September 30, 1917.

A government of the democracy without the bourgeoisie means a socialistic government of Socialists only, perhaps also of Bolsheviks. But the experience of the last four months justifies me in saying that in the field of economics this new Socialistic Government will have no more brilliant success than the old type of Provisional Government. . . .

2. COALITION OR NO COALITION ⁶

October 2, 1917

Yesterday morning [October 2] the different factions met to discuss how to formulate the question of organizing a Government. This was followed by a special meeting of the presidium on the same topic. This body decided on the following order of voting:

1. General question of coalition;
2. If this should be voted on favorably, then the second question for voting would be—coalition with or without the Cadets [as a party?];
3. If this should be voted down, then the third question would be whether [practical and useful] Cadets should be taken into the Government. . . .

The next question was whether to have a *viva voce* vote or secret ballot. The vote was 660 for *viva voce* and 575 for secret ballot. . . . At 4:30 P. M., the voting began on the question for or against a coalition.

Groups	Not		
	For	Against	voting
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies..	83	192	4
Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.....	102	70	12
Economic and Food Organizations.....	34	16	1
Trade Unions.....	32	139	2
Coöperatives.	140	23	1
Army Organizations.....	64	54	7
Nationalities.	15	40	..
Municipalities	114	101	8
Zemstvo & Guberniia Exec. Comm.....	98	23	2
Other Organizations.	84	30	1
TOTAL...	766	688	38
MAJORITY	78		

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 176, October 3, 1917.

Recess was taken. When the meeting resumed, Avksentiev was in the chair. He proposed two amendments: (1) To exclude from the coalition those who were mixed up in the Kornilov affair, whether Cadets or others; and (2) to exclude the Cadet Party from the coalition. The chairman said that the amendments would be voted on in the order indicated. Cries came from the Bolsheviks and others that the amendments should be voted on in the reverse order. This question aroused so much excitement that a vote was necessary, which sustained the chairman. . . .

The vote on the first amendment was 798 for exclusion, 139 against, and 196 not voting. . . . On the second amendment the vote was 595 for, 493 against, and 72 not voting. . . . The next was a vote on the motion as a whole. . . .

GOTZ'S DECLARATION

"Comrades, in view of the fact that the second amendment makes a coalition impossible, I announce that we, partizans of coalition, will vote against the motion as a whole and disclaim responsibility for the political situation that is created."

KAMENEV'S DECLARATION

". . . When the Democratic Conference met, we predicted that you would not be able to settle the question of the Government, which question should be determined by the All-Russian Congress. You have now voted to have a coalition without the Cadets, but we wish to say that we are still of the same mind, that the Government should belong to the Soviets, and we shall therefore vote against the motion and in favor of the Soviets. . . ."

On the motion as a whole [coalition or no coalition] the vote stood 183 for coalition, 813 against, and 80 not voting.

After this a recess was taken . . . [during which the] presidium was busy trying to find a way out of the difficulty. . . . When the meeting was again called to order, Chairman Avksentiev announced that the presidium had worked out a plan for further procedure and asked Tseretelli to explain it. [Tseretelli said that in view of the difficulty of coming to an agreement, the presidium proposed that representatives of the different groups that had as yet no representation on the presidium should meet with that body the following day at Smolny and try to come to an understanding. This proposal was adopted.]

BOLSHEVIK DECLARATION AT THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ⁷*October 3, 1917*

The revolution has reached its most critical point. After this, it will go either forward with new enthusiasm or backward to destruction. The people is exhausted by the war, but perhaps even more so by the indecision, by the vacillations of the leading political parties. It is a little more than six months since the overthrow of tsarism, and after a series of attempts to form a revolutionary Government upon a basis of a coalition of the representatives of the democracy with the representatives of the propertied bourgeoisie, after the miserable performances of the personal rule that led directly to the Kornilov affair, the revolution is once more face to face with the urgent question of forming a Government.

Every new governmental combination began with the publication of a program of things to be done, but within a few weeks it showed its utter incapacity to move forward even a single step. Repeated bargains with the bourgeoisie, even after the ruinous effects of coalition have been made clear, fill the consciousness of all laboring and oppressed classes in the country with consternation, alarm, and unrest. Not only the city worker, not only the soldier, already languishing three years in the trenches, but even the peasant of the most remote and backward village cannot help understanding that the land question cannot be settled by compromise with the Lvovs and the Rodziankos. It is impossible to entrust the democratization of the army to the generals of the old régime—the Kornilovs and the Alexeevs; to exercise control over industry through industrialist ministers; to carry out financial reforms through bankers and war profiteers or their direct agents—the Konovalovs, Palchinskis, Tretiakovs, or Buryshkins. Lastly, it is impossible to inaugurate a single serious measure to regulate the food supply and transportation, a single reform in the realm of justice, education, and so on, while retaining, in a period of greatest upheavals, both locally and at the center, the old organization of officials and administrative personnel, with its lack of confidence in the people and its dull bureaucratism.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Government to push aside and weaken the Soviets, and in spite of the suicidal policy of the official Soviet [war] defeatists, the Soviets demonstrated the full force of the invincible revolutionary power and popular mass initia-

⁷ Piontkovski; "Khrestomatiia," 193-6.

tive represented by them during the Kornilov revolt. At the same time, the Provisional Government forever compromised itself in the judgment of the people and of history, partly by direct abetment of the Kornilov movement, and partly by a readiness to place in Kornilov's hands the conquests of the revolution. After this new tribulation, which nothing will ever erase from the consciousness of the workers, soldiers, and peasants, the battle cry raised at the very start of the revolution by our party—"All Power to the Soviets, both at the center and locally!"—became the cry of the entire revolutionary country.

Only a Government that relies directly upon the proletariat and poorest peasants, that keeps account of all material resources of the country and of its economic possibilities, that does not stop in its measures at the threshold because of the selfish interests of propertied groups, that mobilizes all the scientific and technically valuable forces for the good of the national economy, is capable of introducing a maximum of whatever systematic work may be possible at this moment in the tottering economic life; can help the peasantry and farm laborers to utilize to best advantage the available means of agricultural production, restrict profits, fix wages, and, in keeping with regulated production, assure genuine labor discipline based upon the self-government of the workers and their centralized control over industry, and assure a demobilization of all business with the least disturbance.

In view of the fact that the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party, which fears most of all a transfer of power to the Soviets, constantly scares the less enlightened elements of the democracy with the specter of an armed uprising of the Bolsheviks, we deemed it necessary here once more to declare in the hearing of the entire country that, while fighting for power in order to realize our program, our Party never strove and is not now striving to gain power against the organized will of a majority of the laboring masses of the country. Transfer of all power to the Soviets would not eliminate the class struggle nor the struggle of the Party within the camp of the democracy. But, *given the condition of absolute and unlimited freedom of agitation*, and a constant renewal of the Soviet membership from below, the struggle for influence and power would unfold itself within the framework of the Soviet organizations. On the other hand, a continuation of the present policy of violence and repression against the working class and the revolutionary elements of the

army and peasantry, with the object of stemming the further progress of the revolution, is inevitably bound—quite independently of any deliberate will on the part of revolutionary organizations—to lead to a colossal clash, such as was rarely seen in history.

Under the existing circumstances, a coalition Government becomes inevitably a government of violence and oppression by those on the top against those at the bottom. Only he who wants to foment a civil war at any cost, so as to put the responsibility for it, afterwards, upon the laboring masses and our party, could recommend, after all the experiences we have had, that the democracy should conclude another alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The people thirst for peace. Coalition government means a continuation of the imperialistic war. Until now the Provisional Government has fallen in with the demands of the Allied imperialists, who are the deadly foes of the Russian revolutionary democracy. The fatal offensive of July 1, against which our party persistently warned; the Kornilov methods of keeping the army in check, which had the sanction of the coalition ministers, were either directly or indirectly suggested by the Allied imperialists. On this path the Russian revolution has already managed to squander an immense amount of its moral authority, without in the slightest degree strengthening its physical power. It becomes increasingly clear that, having sapped the inner strength of the Russian revolution, the Allied imperialists will not stop at concluding peace at the expense of the Russian people. At the same time a continued, helpless prolongation of the war, without any popular faith in the war aims and in the Provisional Government that is conducting it, affords an immense advantage to the counter-revolutionists, who may attempt to play their game for separate peace with the German robber-imperialists. The establishment of the Soviet power means, first of all, a straightforward, open, definite offer of an immediate, honorable, just, and democratic peace to all nations. If such a peace were rejected, a revolutionary army could accept the inevitableness of war. But everything speaks for the likelihood that such a proposal by the revolutionary government would meet with such a powerful response by the exhausted laboring masses, by all the fighting masses, that a continuation of the war would become impossible. A Soviet government means peace.

Enough vacillation! Enough of this policy of indecision and timidity! It is impossible with impunity to torment and torture the peasantry for half a year, promising them land and liberty, but

refusing, in actual practice, to abolish private ownership of landlords' estates without compensation and to turn them over at once to the control of the local peasant committees until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

Enough wavering! Enough of that policy of ambiguity that has until now been followed by the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks. Enough delay! Enough words! The last hour to decide has struck.

The revolutionary Government should take as a basis for its action the following measures, which are urged by numerous influential revolutionary organizations, led by the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

1. Abolition of the right of private property in land belonging to the large landowners, without compensation, and the handing it [land] over to the peasant committees pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly. The poorest peasants to be supplied with equipment.

2. Introduction of workers' control over production and distribution on a nation-wide scale; the centralization of the banking business, control over banks, and nationalization of the most important branches of industry, such as: oil, coal, iron, and steel; general labor conscription; immediate steps to demobilize industry and to supply the peasantry with industrial products at fixed prices. Drastic taxation of big capital and property, and the confiscation of war profits in order to save the country from economic ruin.

3. Proclamation of the invalidity of the secret treaties, and the immediate offer of a general, democratic peace to all the peoples of the belligerent States.

4. Guarantee of self-determination for the nationalities inhabiting Russia. Immediate abolition of all repression against Finland and the Ukraine.

As urgent, immediate measures, there should be decreed at once:

1. Cessation of all repression aimed at the working class and its organizations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front, restoration of complete liberty of agitation, and the reestablishment of all democratic organizations in the army. Purging the army of counter-revolutionary elements.

2. Allow local organizations to elect commissars and other officials.

3. General arming of the workers and the organization of a red guard.

4. Dissolution of the State Council and State Duma. Immediate summoning of the Constituent Assembly.

5. Abolition of all class (nobility, etc.) privileges, and absolute equality of rights for the citizens.

6. Establishment of the eight-hour day and introduction of all kinds of social insurance.

As an emergency measure, needed for the purifying of the political atmosphere and showing up the sores of the judiciary, we demand the immediate appointment of an investigating commission, acceptable to the democracy, for a thorough study of the events of July 16-18, and for the review of the acts of all judiciary authorities, agents of the old régime, who now concentrate in their hands the cases against the proletariat.

The immediate release of all arrested revolutionists, and the setting of an early public trial for all cases that have been started.

MEETING OF THE PRESIDIUM WITH DELEGATES OF ALL FACTIONS ⁸

[October 3]

In the course of yesterday there was a meeting at Smolny of the presidium of the democratic conference, supplemented by delegates from those groups that are not represented on the presidium. . . . At this meeting Kerenski appeared. He said that he favored coalition, that the economic and financial condition of the country was very bad . . . which is in part responsible for anarchistic outbreaks . . . pogroms. The demobilization of the army will require the coöperation of all organized forces. . . . Under these conditions, to assume the exclusive responsibility for the fate of the State would be suicidal. . . . He went on to say that he was not opposed to a pre-parliament, provided it did not make the Constituent Assembly a myth and provided it was organized on an all-national basis. By a Coalition Government he meant the inviting of liberal bourgeoisie and commerce-industry groups to join the democracy. Although a homogeneous ministry might seem ruinous for the cause of the revolution, Comrade Kerenski thought that if the Democratic Conference would decide on such a ministry, it would not meet with opposition. But so far as he was concerned, he would not wish to be a member of such a homogeneous government. . . .

⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 177, October 4, 1917.

RENEWAL OF THE MEETING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ⁹

[October 3]

At 11:15 P. M., the Democratic Conference was called to order by Avksentiev. [After Tseretelli, Trotski, Gotz, and others had spoken] Tseretelli introduced the following resolution:

The Democratic Conference resolves: (1) That in settling the question of the formation of a strong revolutionary government, it is necessary to demand the carrying out of the program of August 27, an active foreign policy having for its object the attainment of universal peace, and the responsibility of the Government to the representative institutions which reflect the will of the country until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

(2) In appointing a permanent representative organ from among its members, the Conference instructs it to assist in the formation of a government upon the above mentioned principles. In case the bourgeois elements also are invited to share in the Government, this organ may and shall be augmented by delegates from the bourgeois groups.

(3) In this organ the democratic elements should predominate.

(4) The Government must be accountable and responsible to that organ.

(5) The Conference instructs the presidium to submit to the Conference by tomorrow a plan for the selection of a permanent body from among the members of the Conference, and to appoint five of its own members to take at once the necessary practical steps to aid in forming a government on the above indicated principles. These representatives shall render an account of their work to the representative organ just mentioned and submit their decisions to its approval.

The vote on point:

1	was	1150	for,	171	against,	24	not	voting
2	was	774	"	383	"	84	"	"
3	was	941	"	8	"	274	"	"
4	was	1064	"	1	"	123	"	"
5	was	922	"	5	"	233	"	"

[While the vote was being taken, the Bolsheviks protested on the wording of some of the points.¹⁰ These protests obliged Tseretelli to

⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 177, October 4, 1917.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 178, October 5, 1917.

make explanations. He was followed by numerous other speakers. The debate between the Bolsheviks and opponents became warm and personal. Finally Tseretelli said:] "It would seem that whenever one makes a political agreement with the Bolsheviks, he should call a notary public and witnesses." This remark called out strong protests from the Bolsheviks. Nagin declared that if the presidium did not reprimand Tseretelli, the Bolsheviks would leave the hall. [The presidium did not see fit to make the reprimand, and consequently the Bolsheviks left the meeting.]

A recess followed. About 4:00 A. M., the meeting was again called to order to vote on the resolution as a whole.

For the resolution there were 829 votes, against it 106, not voting 69.^{10a}

3. FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

[October 4-7, 1917]

Between 10:00 and 11:00 of the morning of October 4, Kerenski received, at the Winter Palace, Avksentiev, Gotz, Tseretelli, and Chkheidze.

These members of the presidium of the Democratic Conference informed Kerenski of the decision reached by the Democratic Conference during the night. From the conversation that took place, it would seem that the organs of the democracy recognized that the initiative in the matter of forming a cabinet belonged to the Provisional Government. . . .

At 11:00 A. M., there was a meeting of the Directory. . . .

Kerenski made a report on his conversation with Avksentiev, Gotz, Tseretelli, and Chkheidze. He said that the Democratic Conference, in the persons of the presidium, has apparently taken a more moderate stand and will not place obstacles in the way of a coalition government. As to a pre-parliament, the idea is quite acceptable, provided the bourgeois elements are admitted into it. . . .

After this report, it was decided to hasten to form a coalition government with the persons already in mind: Kishkin, Buryshkin, Tretiakov, Kononov, and Smirnov. . . . [It was decided] to call on the Moscow group to come to Petrograd at once. At the same time, Kerenski called Moscow by long distance. Late at night, after considerable telephoning, it became evident that the Moscow industrialists

^{10a} "Izvestiia," No. 178, October 5, 1917.

have categorically declined to enter the Ministry . . . on the ground that they refused to be responsible to the pre-parliament. In their conversation with Kerenski, the industrialists made it clear that they would join the ministry if war were made on anarchy, the army made more fit for war, etc. But in view of the fact that the pre-parliament would be purely democratic (the bourgeois elements in the minority), it would stand in the way of carrying out the above platform. According to the industrialists, it is impossible for the Provisional Government to be responsible to the pre-parliament and at the same time keep its promise to the industrialists.¹¹

On October 5 there was a meeting of the Provisional Government at the Winter Palace. There were present representatives of the Democratic Conference, public men of Moscow, and several members of the Central Committee of the Cadets. The question for discussion was the organization of a government. . . .

In his speech Kerenski said that the Provisional Government should be guided only by its own program, which combines the interests of all elements which strive to support a republican government. With this in mind, the Provisional Government, in coming out in favor of a provisional conference, does not think that it [conference] should anticipate the will of the Constituent Assembly, or that it can have the functions of a regularly organized parliament. The Provisional Government cannot be responsible to the Conference but should keep in touch and work in agreement with it. We are convinced of the necessity of a coalition government. It is not a question of what persons, but of the relative strength of the groups that enter into it.¹² . . .

At 1:00 P. M. on October 6 there was another meeting of representatives of the Socialists and the bourgeoisie. Members of the Provisional Government appeared from time to time to give information. . . .

The program proposed by Chkheidze on August 27 at the Moscow Conference was taken up. . . .

The next topic was the pre-parliament. Without much discussion, it was agreed that the democracy should hold as many places as was decided upon at the Democratic Conference, and that the bourgeois elements should have from 120 to 150 representatives. . . . The

¹¹ "Izvestiia," No. 178, October 5, 1917.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 179, October 6, 1917.

pre-parliament is to have the right to ask questions of the Government but not to interpellate, to work on legislation and deliberate on questions submitted to it by the Government. It was not considered possible to make the Government responsible to the pre-parliament. It was agreed that if the pre-parliament proves itself really strong, the Government would in any case have to take it into consideration. In regard to the Duma, it was recognized that the dissolution of this institution was not a political necessity. From the very beginning of the revolution, the Duma has not pretended to play an active part and is not attempting to bring any pressure to bear on the revolution. In any case its term is soon to expire anyway.

In regard to the question of the democracy's sending a representative to the interallied conference at Paris, it was indicated that the democracy could suggest some one to the Government, but he would represent the Government and not the democracy.

At the end of the meeting the representatives of democracy announced that they would give a definite reply next Sunday noon, October 7, whether or not there would be a coalition government.¹³

AGREEMENT REACHED¹⁴

On October 7, there was another meeting at the Winter Palace between the representatives of the democracy and representatives of non-socialist groups, when an agreement was reached on all disputed points.

At the very beginning of the meeting, the question was raised in regard to the resolution adopted by the Soviet on the night of October 6-7. This resolution can be taken in two different senses. It says in one place that "the Democratic Council thinks it necessary to establish a formal responsibility of the Government before the pre-parliament," and in another place "that under present conditions the agreement reached by the delegation is acceptable. . . ."

Tseretelli replied . . . that the Soviet approved the terms of the agreement as concluded by both parties on October 6 at the Winter Palace. At the same time, the Democratic Council is a believer in the formal responsibility of the Government before the pre-parliament but does not insist on this point now. It hopes, however, to succeed in its object later, in the pre-parliament. . . .

¹³ "Izvestiia," No. 180, October 7, 1917.

¹⁴ "Riech," No. 226, October 9, 1917.

THE NEW MINISTRY¹⁵

October 8, 1917

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Ministers</i>	<i>Portfolios</i>
	S. R. A. F. KERENSKI	<i>Prime Minister</i>
.....	A. I. VERKHOVSKI	<i>Minister of War</i>
.....	D. V. VERDEREVSKI	<i>Minister of Marine</i>
S. D.	A. M. NIKITIN	<i>Minister of Interior, Post, and Telegraph</i>
.....	M. I. TERESCHENKO	<i>Minister of Foreign Affairs</i>
S. D.	S. N. PROKOPOVICH	<i>Minister of Food</i>
R. D.	M. V. BERNATSKI	<i>Minister of Finance</i>
.....	S. S. SALAZKIN	<i>Minister of Education</i>
S. R.	A. V. LIVEROVSKI	<i>Minister of Transportation</i>
K. D.	A. I. KONOVALOV	<i>Minister of Commerce and Industry</i>
K. D.	N. M. KISHKIN	<i>Minister of Social Welfare</i>
K. D.	S. A. SMIRNOV	<i>State Comptroller</i>
K. D.	A. V. KARTASHEV	<i>Minister of Religious Affairs</i>
S. D.	P. N. MALIANTOVICH	<i>Minister of Justice</i>
S. D.	K. A. GVOZDEV	<i>Minister of Labor</i>
S. R.	S. L. MASLOV	<i>Minister of Agriculture</i>
.....	S. N. TRETIKOV	<i>Chairman of Economic Council</i>

In this ministry there are 3 Socialist-Revolutionists, 4 Social Democrats, 4 Cadets. Verkhovski, Verderevski, and Salazkin are Socialists, but not members of any group. Bernatski is a member of the Radical-Democratic Party. Tereschenko and Tretiakov do not belong to any party.

DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT¹⁶

October 8, 1917

Great trouble has come once more into the life of our country. Notwithstanding the swift suppression of the revolt of General Kornilov, the shocks caused by it are threatening the very existence of the Russian Republic.

Waves of anarchy are sweeping over the land, pressure from the foreign foe is increasing, counter-revolution is raising its head, hoping that the prolonged governmental crisis, coupled with the

¹⁵ "Riech," No. 226, October 9, 1917.

¹⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 182, October 10, 1917.

weariness which has seized the entire nation, will enable it to crush the freedom of the Russian people.

The Provisional Government has a great and unusual responsibility before the people. History has laid upon it the obligation to lead Russia to the Constituent Assembly. This responsibility is made bearable by the sincere belief that, united in the general desire to save the country and guard the conquests of the revolution, the representatives of all classes of the Russian people will understand the common task of coöperating with the Provisional Government in establishing a strong authority, capable of solving the State problems as they come up, and leading the country, without more shocks, to the Constituent Assembly, the summoning of which, according to the deep conviction of the Provisional Government, cannot be postponed a single day.

Leaving to the Constituent Assembly, as the sovereign of Russia, the final determination of all important questions on which the welfare of the Russian people depends, the Provisional Government, as now completed, is of the opinion that only by carrying on with energy a series of measures in different spheres of State activity can it fulfil its duty and satisfy the pressing national needs.

The Provisional Government believes firmly that only a universal peace will enable our great country to develop its creative forces. It will continue, therefore, its active foreign policy in the spirit of the democratic principles proclaimed by the Russian revolution, which has made them a national possession and which has for its object the attainment of universal peace, peace without violence on either side.

The Provisional Government, working in full harmony with the Allies, will, in the near future, take part in the interallied conference. At this gathering the Government will have among its plenipotentiaries some one who has the special confidence of democratic organizations.

At this conference, where general war questions common to all the Allies will be decided, our delegates will also strive to come to an understanding with the Allies on the basic principles laid down by the Russian revolution.

While eager for peace, the Provisional Government will, nevertheless, with all its might defend the common Allied cause, protect the country, resist all attempts to take national territory and impose a foreign yoke, and will drive the enemy's troops from the borders of our native land.

In its efforts to raise the fighting efficiency of the army, the Provisional Government will follow the democratic way, which is the only one that can give successful results and which has already been announced in the order of the Supreme Commander and proclaimed by the Minister of War, in the name of the Provisional Government. The selection of the commanding officers will be based on technical preparation to handle the problems of the present war, as well as loyalty to the republican form of government and ability to coöperate closely with the commissars, and army and navy organizations in the rear and at the front.

By these measures the necessary way to military discipline will be found, without which a mighty army is not to be thought of. In a special law that is to follow, the status, the rights, and obligations of army and navy organizations will be laid down with definiteness. Among the necessary measures that are most essential for raising the fighting efficiency of the army is the reduction in size of the various units in the rear, which have increased out of proportion, by demobilizing at first the older soldiers. To keep them longer in service would throw an additional load on the army, a heavy burden on the State treasury, and would be a loss to the national economy.

In order to keep firm the bond between the rear and front, to guard the national economy from further disorganization, to reduce the poverty which lies so heavily on the shoulders of the laboring masses, the Provisional Government has been moved to undertake without delay the carrying out of the following measures, supplementing and developing what has already been done by the Provisional Government.

National Economy

The Provisional Government will strive to set a fixed price on the basic articles of industry, and at the same time regulate the mutual relations of capital and labor, wages and hours of work. It will make wide use of the coöperatives, under general State control, both in the preparation [production] and the distribution of agricultural and all kinds of industrial products. It will also make wide use of private trade, under direct State supervision. It will pass special legislation relative to State control over industry, with the participation of the laboring and industrial classes, and active interference in the management of enterprises, with the object of raising their productivity. It will further increase the number of labor bureaus

and arbitration boards. It will defend the right of all kinds of labor to organize, and will protect the technical personnel from all lawless attacks. It will prepare measures for the gradual and painless demobilization of the national economy and will reduce the misery due to the unavoidable unemployment. It will, in particular, work out a plan for public works, having for its object the reconstruction of regions devastated by the war. . . .

Finance

Reform the assessment of the inheritance tax, introduce a tax on surplus profits, on luxuries, and on property; increase in the necessary proportion the indirect taxes; and introduce new indirect taxes in the form of financial monopolies, with the participation of coöperatives and other public organizations in the distribution of monopolistic goods.

Reform the taxation machinery and introduce a system of inspection, so that no one shall escape the proper payment of tax. Strict economy in the expenditure of the State treasury and the elimination of all useless expenses. Attract deposits into the State bank through mutual loan and savings banks and other coöperative institutions and have State supervision over private credit institutions.

Local Government

Put into force and further develop the democratic laws on local self-government, with the view of gradually handing over all the functions of local government to the organs of local self-government, while preserving for the Government commissars the right to watch over the legality of the acts of the local self-government, and bring to an end the authority of the executive committees of public organizations, at the moment of the election of the local organs of self-government.

Nationality Question

Recognize for all nationalities the right of self-determination on such principles as the Constituent Assembly shall determine. Work out and issue laws that will give minorities, in places of their permanent residence, the right to use their native languages in schools, courts, institutions of self-government, and in their dealings with the local State organs. Establish, in connection with the Provisional Government, a council on nationality affairs, in which all the na-

tionalities of Russia will be represented for the purpose of preparing material on the nationality question for the Constituent Assembly.

In undertaking these tasks, the Provisional Government realizes that not all of them can be carried out in the short time that still remains before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. But the very attempt to carry them out will facilitate the work of the Constituent Assembly and will give the Government solid support in the field of national defense and reconstruction of national economy, as well as in its energetic, determined, and systematic struggle with all attempts of counter-revolution and anarchy, which ruin the country and the revolution.

In this struggle, as in all its activities, the Provisional Government, being the spokesman of the will of the revolutionary people, will closely collaborate with the organizations of that people. It sees in this collaboration the best means for solving some of the problems before the country.

In order that the revolutionary government may be closely in contact with the organized public forces and thereby gain the necessary stability and strength, the Provisional Government will, in the very near future, work out and publish a decree about a Provisional Council of the Republic, which should function until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. This Council, made up of representatives of all classes of the population, *including those delegates already chosen at the Democratic Conference*, will have the right to ask questions of the Government and to receive answers by a certain time, to work out legislative measures, and to deliberate on all questions that may be laid before it by the Provisional Government, or that may arise from its own initiative.

Drawing strength from such a council, the Government, preserving in accordance with its oath the inviolable unity and succession of State power created by the revolution, regards it as its duty in all its activities to take into consideration the important public significance of the Council, until the Constituent Assembly shall give full and complete representation to all classes of the population of Russia.

Standing firmly on this program which expresses the hope of the people, and calling on all for active and immediate participation in the preparation for the calling of the Constituent Assembly in the shortest possible time, the Provisional Government trusts that all Russian citizens will rally around it in the spirit of friendly coöperation in the name of the fundamental and dominant problems of our day—defense of our native land against the foreign foe,

restoration of law and order, and guidance of the country to the sovereign Constituent Assembly.

A. F. KERENSKI,
Prime Minister.

October 8, 1917, Petrograd.

4. CREATION OF A PROVISIONAL COUNCIL¹⁷ OF THE REPUBLIC¹⁸

October 4, 1917.

Chairman Avksentiev opened the meeting at 7:00 P. M. The Bolshevik seats were unoccupied. Question for discussion was the organization of a democratic council. The committee appointed to take up this topic had prepared a report, which had been approved by the presidium. Comrade Voitinski made a report and introduced the following resolutions:

1. The All-Russian Democratic Conference is to select from its own body an All-Russian Democratic Council, which is to have all the rights of the Conference.

2. The All-Russian Democratic Council will work out its own program of activity.

3. The selection from the Conference is to be made on the basis of proportional representation of all those groups invited to attend the Conference.

4. Each group selects for the council 15 per cent of its representatives in the Conference.

5. The factions in the different groups may be represented separately, and in that case each faction retains whatever rights to which its proportional representation in the group entitles it.

6. Every organization has the right to change its representatives in the All-Russian Democratic Council. The person recalled loses his rights the moment his successor is appointed. . . .

<i>Organizations</i>	<i>Number of Representatives</i>
Cities	45
Zemstvos	45
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies	38
Soviets of Peasants' Deputies	38
Coöperatives	23

¹⁷ Also known as Pre-Parliament, Democratic Council.

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 178, October 5, 1917.

<i>Organizations (Continued)</i>	<i>Number of Representatives (Continued)</i>
War Organizations	26
Fleet	3
Economic Organizations	6
Trade Unions	21
Commerce-Industry Workers	5
Railway men	5
Post-telegraph Workers	2
Cossacks	6
Nationalities	25
Land Committees	7
Peasants' Union	2
Teachers' Union	2
Lawyers	1
Women's Organizations	1
Other Organizations	12
	<hr/>
TOTAL	313

It was decided that the various groups should elect their representatives on the following day.

BOLSHEVIKS AND PRE-PARLIAMENT ¹⁹

At a closed meeting of the Bolshevik faction, the question of taking part in the Democratic Council was discussed. By a vote of 77 to 50 it was decided to send representatives to the Council.

ALL-RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL ²⁰

The first meeting of the All-Russian Democratic Council took place yesterday [October 6] . . . in the municipal duma. At 3:00 o'clock, the session was to have opened, but the hall was half empty. . . .

The following named men were elected to the presidium: Chkhaidze, Dan, and Mandelberg from the Mensheviks; Trotsky and Kamenev from the Bolsheviks; and Minor, Kamkov, Avksentiev, and Gotz from the Socialist-Revolutionists. . . .

[Tseretelli made a report on the negotiations of his delegation with the Provisional Government and representatives of the bour-

¹⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 179, October 6, 1917.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 180, October 7, 1917.

geoisie.] He said that the point on which it was most difficult to come to an agreement was the pre-parliament and its relation to the Provisional Government. After long and warm discussions, the following agreement was reached: The Democratic Council is officially summoned and organized by the Government and is to contain between 100 and 120 representatives of the bourgeoisie. Both the bourgeoisie and the democracy select, each in its own way, its representatives. The Council has the right to ask questions of the Government, which is obliged to answer them. But the Government is not by legal formality responsible before this body, although it is, of course, self-evident that no government can exist which has not the confidence of the pre-parliament. . . .

Trotsky, speaking for the Bolsheviks, declared that the Tseretelli delegation had exceeded its powers in coming to an agreement with the Cadets and in giving up the idea of government responsibility. He went on to say that the agreement with the Cadets is a provocation to civil war, and therefore the Bolsheviks, together with overwhelming majorities of all the soviets, recommend that all discussions be broken off and that a popular government be formed drawing its strength from the soviets. . . .

Dan, representing the Mensheviks, said that his party was never in favor of coalition at all costs, that it was far from satisfied with the agreement, but that he did not see any way out of the difficulty except through coalition. The democracy alone has not the strength to save the country. Dan introduced the following resolution: ". . . The Democratic Council thinks it necessary to establish a formal responsibility of the Government before the pre-parliament and, believing that under the present conditions the agreement reached by the delegation is acceptable, declares that [only] that government can enjoy power which has the confidence of the pre-parliament." The resolution was adopted.

October 9²¹

Yesterday [October 9] at 9:00 P. M., there was a joint meeting of the presidium and the council of elders [leaders of political groups] of the All-Russian Democratic Council. . . . It was decided to postpone the reconstruction of the present presidium until the democratic council was made over into a pre-parliament. . . . It was also decided that the council of elders in the democratic council should be made up of representatives of various groups and

²¹ "Izvestiia," No. 182, October 10, 1917.

should contain no less than ten persons. . . . It was resolved to call the pre-parliament as soon as possible, so that it should meet not later than October 14. . . .

October 13²²

On October 13, the Provisional Government decided to keep the name of the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic for the new State institution about to be created. It is to have 555 members, of whom 388 are to represent the democracy and 167 the bourgeoisie, Cossacks, nationalities, and others. . . . It is to be opened formally by a member of the Provisional Government. . . .

The Council is to be opened on October 20 and close a week before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. . . . The Council selects its own officers. Members of the Council are to receive fifteen rubles a day.²³ . . .

FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC²⁴

October 20—*Mariinski Palace*

[Kerenski formally opened the meeting by welcoming the delegates and explaining the general policy of the Government. He was followed by the oldest delegate present, who was "Grandmother of the Revolution," Breshko-Breshkovskaia. After making a short speech, she called for the election of a permanent chairman. N. D. Avksentiev (Socialist-Revolutionist) was chosen. He made a short address and called for the election of a presidium. V. N. Krokhmal (Social-Democrat), A. V. Peshekhonov (National-Socialist), and V. D. Nabokov (Cadet), were elected. The fourth place was to go to the Bolsheviks, but in view of the fact that they had decided to leave the meeting, the place was not filled.

After the election Trotski got the floor and in a fiery speech denounced the personal régime of Kerenski, the part that the Cadets and other bourgeois elements have in the Council, and accused the bourgeoisie of trying to break up the Constituent Assembly and provoking the peasants to revolt, so as to crush them. He bitterly criticized the policy of the Government in not making peace, but continuing the war. He concluded with these words: "We . . . Bolsheviks, declare that with this traitorous Government we have nothing in common." After having read his declaration Trotski and

²² "Riech," No. 231, October 14, 1917.

²³ *Ibid.*, No. 232, October 16, 1917.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 237, October 21, 1917.

the other Bolsheviks walked out of the hall, followed by jeers, hoots, and shouts ("Get into German railway cars").

COUNCIL OF ELDERS ²⁵

. . . After the meeting of the presidium of the Provisional Council on October 21, there was a meeting of the Council of Elders, which decided that the Council of Elders should contain four representatives from each of the three parties, Socialist-Revolutionists, Mensheviks, and Cadets, and one or two from the other political groups, depending on their numbers . . . that the Provisional Council should appoint twelve different committees, dealing with defense, foreign affairs, etc. . . . that the Council of Elders should meet three times a week, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, from 11:00 until 7:00. . . .

5. RESOLUTION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ON DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE ²⁶

"The Petrograd Soviet declares that after the Kornilov experience, which has shown that all bourgeois Russia occupies a counter-revolutionary position, any attempt at coalition means nothing else than the utter capitulation of the democracy to the Kornilov men. As evidence of this capitulation is the composition of the Ministry now being formed, where the leading places are given to the merchants and manufacturers, the inveterate foes of the workers', soldiers', and peasants' democracy. The so-called democratic Ministers, responsible to no one and to nothing, are unable either to offset or extenuate the anti-popular character of the new Government, which will go down in the history of the revolution as the Government of civil war.

"The Petrograd Soviet declares that the workers and garrison of Petrograd will not support a Government of bourgeois omnipotence and of counter-revolutionary oppression. It is firmly convinced that the news of the newly formed Government will meet with one answer from the entire revolutionary democracy: 'Retire!' And relying upon this unanimous vote of the democracy, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets will form a real revolutionary government. At the same time, the Petrograd Soviet urges the proletarian and soldier organizations to increased activity in rallying around their Soviets, but to refrain from separate action."

²⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 193, October 23, 1917.

²⁶ "Riech," No. 226, October 8, 1917.

PART XII

HOW THE BOLSHEVIKS CAME INTO POWER

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the time of the outbreak of the revolution in March the Bolsheviks were hardly in evidence. They were never very numerous and at this time some of their ablest men were in exile. Lenin and associates came to Russia in April and began to organize their forces. The first days after his arrival Lenin made a rather poor impression and a number of men who now worship his memory then denounced and ridiculed both him and his theories. Lenin had a theory, a plan of action, and the ability to organize. As Socialists he and his associates had a right to be heard at the meetings of the Soviet. From the rostrum of the Soviet hall he and his followers flayed the capitalists and the moderate Socialists. To Lenin the enemy to fight was not Germany but capitalism. He painted the propertied classes in blackest colors and aroused the masses against them. To get a larger audience the Bolsheviks published several papers which were read at the front and in the rear and made converts in both places. They urged the Russian workers and soldiers to stop killing their German brother toilers, to seize the machinery of government, the land, the instruments of production, and offer peace to the world. They assured their readers and hearers that if the Russians were to do these things the proletariat of the world would follow in their footsteps.

These words were uttered with earnestness and conviction and fell on the ears of a war-weary, suffering people ready to grasp at anything that promised peace and bread. The opponents of the Bolsheviks had no constructive program, no unity and little enthusiasm. They held up before the ignorant and crying peasants the cloak of patriotism which had been worn thin by three years

of hard usage and was full of imperialistic grease spots which neither the fine words of Miliukov and Kerenski, nor those of the Allied statesmen could remove. Under the circumstances the Bolsheviks carried the masses with them and brought on the revolution of November 1917.

In the following pages are shown some of the steps that led up to this world event.

In June the Bolsheviks planned to attract attention in a public demonstration against the action of the Government and Congress of Soviets in putting the anarchists out of the Durnovo place. As soon as the Provisional Government and the Congress heard of this plan they tried to stop it. The Bolsheviks, not feeling strong enough to cross swords with their opponents and having gained a certain amount of publicity, called off the demonstration. In order not to disappoint the demonstration-loving public the Congress of Soviets called for a demonstration of its own. The Bolsheviks heartily approved, took part in it, displayed their banners, and waved their slogans in sight of all.

The Bolsheviks got a great deal of notoriety in connection with the July Uprising, which has been discussed elsewhere. Lenin had to go in hiding for a time but from his place of concealment he watched the course of events and directed his associates at liberty. They carried on a vigorous and successful propaganda campaign. The first visible fruits of their efforts were the gains in the Petrograd elections. Their next move was to capture the Petrograd Soviet and make Trotski its chairman. Having now a base of operation, a definite plan of action, and an aim in view, they made rapid progress.

They realized that they would not attain their object by words alone and they therefore proceeded to organize a fighting force. At the time of the Kornilov affair Kerenski appealed to all revolutionary elements, including the Bolsheviks, to take up arms in the defense of the freedom won. At Moscow, Petrograd and, no doubt, other industrial centers, Red Guards were formed. When the Kornilov storm had passed, Kerenski gave orders to disband these committees and to put a stop to the "unauthorized formation of detachments under the pretext of fighting counter-revolutionary outbreaks," but no attention was paid to this order. The Bolshe-

viks saw to it that more and more of their followers armed, and vigorous efforts were made to win over army units.

Early in September, Riga fell and Petrograd was threatened. The Petrograd Soviet took the stand that Kerenski and his bourgeois associates in the Ministry could not be depended upon, that in case of danger they would abandon the capital and run to Moscow. To protect the city and the country the Soviets were called upon "to mobilize their forces so as not to be caught unprepared and to be ready to meet the new counter-revolutionary wave. . . . The revolutionary committees which they formed at the time of the Kornilov affair should have ready their whole machinery. Wherever the Soviets have not full power they should gradually strengthen their positions, have their organizations in readiness to create, as the need may arise, special organs to keep watch on the organized strength of the enemy and to fight counter-revolution."

On October 22 the Petrograd Soviet proposed a War-Revolutionary Committee "to make a question of the defense of Petrograd and its approach and work out a plan for the protection of the city with the active support of the laboring class." A few days later such a committee was created and gradually got control of the Petrograd garrison. This body of troops was ordered to go to the front, where it could best defend the city, but it preferred to stay at the capital and support the Bolsheviks. By November 7, when the uprising took place, Kerenski had few troops he could depend upon.

Force was only a means to get control of the Government. The Bolsheviks were disgusted with Kerenski, his Ministers, Council of the Republic and all these other outer evidences of power that did not exist. They proceeded to undermine the Provisional Government and build up a Government of their own. One of the first steps was to call a Regional Congress, made up of the Petrograd district, Finland, Esthonia, Novgorod, Pskov, etc., where the Bolsheviks had a dependable following. The Key-note of the Congress of the Northern Region was: "All Power to the Soviets, Down with the Existing Provisional Government." Before breaking up, the Congress called for a Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets "to propose immediately an armistice on all

fronts, to transfer the land to all peasants. . . ." The Executive Committees protested, the Provisional Government threatened, but the Bolsheviks went their way.

By the end of October it became evident that the Bolsheviks were serious and meant to get control, but the "Riech" reported that "In Government circles no attention is paid to the rumors of a Bolshevik uprising on November 2. In any case the Government is prepared to keep order." On the night of November 6 the offensive began and in less than twenty-four hours the Provisional Government fell and the Bolsheviks were in power. They organized quickly and on November 8 issued their Peace and Land Decrees.

CHAPTER XL

SPREAD OF BOLSHEVIK IDEAS—MARCH, SEPTEMBER

I. SEIZURE OF THE DURNOVO PLACE BY THE ANARCHISTS¹

REPORT BY GOTZ

Comrade Anisimov and I have just had a conversation at the Durnovo place with representatives of the anarchistic organization which has taken possession of it. They announced that it is not merely a question of the said place, but of other things. They made certain demands, in addition to the place itself. They demanded: (1) the release from prison of all Socialists and Anarchists arrested during the revolution, regardless of the charges against them; (2) the confiscation of the printing offices of the "Novoe Vremia," "Russkaia Volia," and "Riech," and their transfer to Socialist and Anarchist organizations.

I think that in view of these demands the All-Russian Congress should speak out strongly on this subject. . . .

DEMONSTRATION BY THE BOLSHEVIKS²

. . . Tomorrow [June 24] the Bolsheviks plan to organize a demonstration as a protest against the action of the Presidium of the All-Russian Congress and the action of the Minister of Justice, Pereverzev, in putting the anarchists out of the Durnovo place. Comrade Kamenev says the demonstration is to be peaceful in character.

DEMONSTRATIONS FORBIDDEN BY FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS³

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved that during the three days, June 23, 24, and 25, all kinds of demonstrations are forbidden in the streets of Pet-

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 88, June 23, 1917.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

rograd. Violation of this resolution is a blow to the revolution. He who incites to its violation is an enemy of the revolution.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR ORDER ⁴

In view of the alarming rumors that are spreading throughout the city, the Provisional Government calls on the population to preserve order, and warns that all attempts to use force will be put down.

June 23, 1917

2. DO NOT LISTEN TO PROVOCATIVE CALLS ⁵

Comrade-Soldiers and Workmen:

The Bolshevik Party is calling you to come out on the street. This appeal is made without the knowledge of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, without the knowledge of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, or any of the Socialist parties. It is made at the very alarming time when the All-Russian Congress reminds the workers of the Wiborg district that demonstrations now are likely to harm the revolution.

Comrades, we appeal to you, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and soldiers at the front and rear, *not to do what you are called out to do.*

You are called out to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, whose importance the All-Russian Congress has just recognized. Those who call on you cannot help knowing that your peaceful demonstration may lead to bloody encounters.

Knowing your devotion to the cause of the revolution, we tell you: You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the revolution, but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take advantage of your demonstration. We know that the counter-revolutionists are eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks of the revolutionary democracy and will enable them to crush the revolution.

Comrades! In the name of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, in the name of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, in the name of the active army and the Socialist parties, we tell you: Not a single division, not a regiment, not a group of workers must go out into the street. Not a single demonstration should be held. . . .

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 88, June 23, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*

When Russian freedom is really threatened by counter-revolution, we will call on you. Disorganized demonstrations are the ruin of the revolution. *Save your strength. Keep friendly contact with all revolutionary Russia.*

Signed by: THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS,
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD
SOVIETS,
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-RUS-
SIAN SOVIET OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES,
[AND NUMEROUS OTHER REVOLUTION-
ARY ORGANIZATIONS].

THE BOLSHEVIKS CALL OFF THE DEMONSTRATION ⁶

Taking into consideration the fact that the Congress of Soviets and the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Soviets, in view of special circumstances, have resolved to prohibit all kinds of demonstrations, even peaceful, for three days, the Central Committee has resolved to call off the demonstration set for two o'clock on Saturday afternoon.

The Central Committee asks all members and sympathizers to carry out this decision.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMO-
CRATIC LABOR PARTY.

ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS CALLS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS

[At the session of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on June 25] the Presidium proposed that on some Sunday in the near future a demonstration should be organized at Petrograd and other cities.⁷

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets has set aside July 1 as the day for laying wreaths on the graves of those who fought for the revolution. On that day political demonstrations by the revolutionary democracy should be organized at Petrograd and other important Russian cities. . . . Let the counter-revolutionists [of all colors] realize on July 1 that the fight for a universal peace without annexation and indemnity and on the basis of self-determination will go on. Let both the friends and enemies of democratic Russia, at home and abroad, take note.

Counter-revolutionists have not given up hope of preventing the

⁶ "Izvestia," No. 88, June 23, 1917. . . . This notice was received by the "Izvestia" at 3:15 A.M., June 23.

⁷ "Riech," No. 136, June 26, 1917.

establishment in Russia of a democratic republic which will give the land to the peasants and will satisfy the immediate demands of the workmen. . . .

Comrades! If we wish to inflict a deadly blow to all these dark plans of the counter-revolutionists, let us on July 1 put them face to face with their deadly enemy,—the united strength of the whole revolutionary democracy of Russia.⁸

Every Person Taking Part in Today's Demonstration Should Remember

1. That the demonstration has for its object to show that the
REVOLUTIONARY FORCES ARE UNITED.
2. That the demonstration indicates the striving of the revolutionary democracy for a UNIVERSAL PEACE.
3. That the slogan should be THROUGH THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.
4. That the demonstration should be a PEACEFUL ONE.
5. That on this day every citizen should KEEP ORDER.
6. That all, without exception, who come to demonstrate should do so WITHOUT ARMS.⁹

3. BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS ¹⁰

On August 8 there was an All-Russian Congress of the Bolshevik and Internationalist organizations of the Social-Democratic Party. One hundred delegates were present. The Congress elected as honorary chairmen Lenin and Zinoviev (who are sought by the police and whose whereabouts are unknown), as well as Kamenev, Trotski, Lunacharski, and Kollontai (who are under arrest and charged with State treason).

A majority of the delegates from the provinces said in their speeches that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party took into consideration merely the views of the Petrograd workers, and consequently there were differences between the Central Committee and the provincial organizations. Nevertheless, the provincial delegates fully approved the tactics of the Central Committee at Petrograd on July 16-18 and pointed out that the Central Committee had to participate in the events in order to give a peaceful character to the acts of the Petrograd workers.

⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 91, June 27, 1917.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 95, July 1, 1917.

¹⁰ "Riech," No. 175, August 10, 1917.

The announcement that Lenin and Zinoviev have not gone abroad, as the papers say, but are in Russia and in contact with the Central Committee, made a deep impression. Among other things, our speaker said that Lenin, under the name of Iliin, had an article in the "Rabochii i Soldat," which paper appears in the place of the suppressed "Pravda."

THE SOVIET MOVES TO THE SMOLNY INSTITUTE ¹¹

All the bureaus of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies have been moved from the Taurida palace to the Smolny Institute.

¹¹ "Riech," No. 178, August 14, 1917.

CHAPTER XLI

CONTROL OF PETROGRAD SOVIET

I. RESULT OF PETROGRAD ELECTIONS TO THE CITY DUMA

(September 2, 1917)

<i>Principal Parties</i>	<i>Representatives¹ in Old Duma</i>	<i>Representatives¹ in New Duma</i>	<i>Total Vote² Cast</i>
Socialist-Revolutionists	54	75	205,666
Bolsheviks	37	67	183,694
Cadets	47	42	114,485
Mensheviks	40	8	23,552
Others	22	7	21,982

"IZVESTIYA" EDITORIAL ON THE CITY ELECTION³

At this election about fifty per cent of the electors voted, as against seventy-four per cent at the last election. The difference shows the decline in interest in public-political questions among large masses of the city population.

The failure of many people to vote is explained, first of all, by the present tragic condition of our revolution. The large masses of the population demand immediate results from the revolution and from their participation in public life, and when the revolution is unable to make daily conquests, these people become greatly disillusioned with the revolution. They reason that if their words and votes do not bring about a noticeable change in their lives, there is no use in voting.

Another manifestation of the same truth [disillusionment] is the growing strength of the two extreme wings—the Cadets and the Bolsheviks. Large circles of the revolutionary democracy are drifting toward the left.

The further development of the revolution meets with more and more opposition from the masses of the bourgeoisie. This explains

¹ "Riech," No. 200, September 8, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, No. 198, September 6, 1917.

³ "Izvestiia," No. 152, September 6, 1917.

why the right wing is growing stronger. It places new obstacles in the further development of the revolution and stands in the way of carrying out the present tasks which are forced upon us by life itself. Naturally, every delay will create discontent among the masses and will throw them into the camp of those who promise to satisfy at once their daily needs, even if the promises cannot be kept, even if the revolutionary democracy should be isolated from the rest of the country . . . even if the immediate battle [attempt] should mean a defeat for democracy.

Just the same, the right and left wings are growing and will continue to grow until the revolution is able to remove the obstacles in its way, if by that time the revolutionary democracy is not defeated in hopeless fight. . . .

2. THE PRESIDIUM OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET RESIGNS ⁴

At the last general meeting of the Petrograd Soviet there was adopted the resolution of the Bolsheviks on the policy of the Soviet.

It is true that the meeting was not fully attended and that the resolution passed by a vote of only 279 against 115, 51 not voting, yet the adopted resolution stands and obligates the carrying out of said policy for which the present composition of the presidium is unwilling to assume responsibility.

Under the circumstances, the presidium, in the persons of the president, Chkheidze, and vice-presidents Anisimov, Gotz, Dan, Skobelev, Tsereteli, and Chernov, have laid down their offices.

At the next meeting of the Soviet, which, let us hope, will be better attended, a new election will take place, and it will be possible to determine whether the last vote on the resolution was accidental or whether the point of view of the majority of the Petrograd Soviet has really changed. In order that the question may be decided on its merits, all the seven members of the old presidium are coming up as a unit for the election.

MEETING OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ⁵

September 21

. . . Kamenev introduced the following resolution: "That the presidium be reformed on the basis of proportional representation; that

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 163, September 19, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 167, September 23, 1917.

is to say, that to the present presidium there be added representatives of those factions that are not fully represented." This motion was carried by a vote of 519 against 44, 67 not voting.

In announcing the result, Chkheidze declared that under these circumstances there was no presidium. . . . Saying this, he left the chairman's seat and went out of the hall. He was followed by Tsere-telli, Dan, and others.

CHAPTER XLII

FORMATION OF A RED GUARD AND WAR- REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

I. THE RED GUARD

At Kronstadt a Red Guard has been organized. All the workmen of the fortress have been supplied with arms. . . . They are being drilled daily in the use of rifles. . . . At Schlüsselburg the former convicts have formed a "Battalion of Death to all Kornilovs."¹

There was a meeting today [at Moscow] of the inter-ward Soviet to discuss the question of a Red Guard. It was decided to arm the workers just as soon as possible.² . . .

2. TO THE ARMY AND NAVY³

In connection with the action of General Kornilov, the normal life of the army has been completely upset. To restore order, I command:

1. The army shall cease political strife and devote all efforts to the war, upon which alone the salvation of the country depends.

2. All army organizations and commissars shall limit themselves strictly to activities within their competence, without political intolerance and suspicion. They should not interfere in the strategic and directive work of commanding officers.

3. The commanding personnel should not be hindered in the transportation of troops.

4. The arrest of officers shall cease immediately. This right belongs exclusively to the legal authorities, the State attorneys, and the extraordinary investigation commission which I have appointed and which is already at work.

5. The dismissal and appointment of commanding officers shall stop entirely. This right belongs only to the properly authorized organs of the Government and by no means to the organizations.

¹ "Riech," No. 206, September 15, 1917.

² "Izvestiia," No. 161, September 16, 1917.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 160, September 15, 1917.

6. The unauthorized formation of detachments under the pretext of fighting counter-revolutionary outbreaks shall stop at once.

7. The supervision established by the army organizations over telephones and telegraphs shall be removed at once.

The army, which has in these difficult, troubled days expressed its absolute confidence in the Provisional Government and in me, as Prime Minister, responsible for the fate of the country, has the good sense to understand that the salvation of the country lies solely in proper organization, preservation of perfect order, discipline, and solidarity. Therefore, I, clothed with the confidence of the army, appeal to all. Let each one's conscience awaken and let it guide him in his great duty to the country at this terrible hour, when its fate is to be decided. As Commander-in-Chief, I demand of all commanding officers, commissars, and army organizations the unswerving execution of all that has been ordered here, and I serve warning that those shirking or failing to comply with my orders will be prosecuted with all the might of the Government and severely punished.

A. KERENSKI,

Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

ALEXEEV,

Chief of Staff, General of Infantry.

DISBANDMENT OF SELF-APPOINTED COMMITTEES ⁴

At the time of the Kornilov plot, there were organized in cities, villages, railway stations, at the front and in the rear, voluntary citizens' committees with the object of saving and protecting the revolution. They, together with the local organs loyal to the revolution, became the centers of government. These committees succeeded in defending and strengthening the conquests of the revolution against the attempts of the rebels, and rendered real assistance to the Government in liquidating the crisis in a peaceful and bloodless manner.

Now that the rebels have surrendered, have been arrested and handed over to the courts, now that order is restored and the Government organs have come out of the crisis with increased strength, the object for which the committees to save the revolution have been formed has been attained.

In making acknowledgment, in the name of the whole nation, of the extraordinary services rendered by the committees, the Provi-

⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 162, September 18, 1917.

sional Government asks that now, when the Government organs are reëstablished, all citizens resume the normal course of life.

The courts of the Russian Republic are occupied with the cases of all those guilty of taking part in the rebellion. Everything relating to the plot should be brought to their attention.

From now on self-appointed administrators of justice will not be tolerated, and the Government will fight against them as against any other high-handed acts harmful to the Republic.

Only by a careful division of the rights and obligations of the citizens and the State can the revolutionary order strengthen the republican form of government in Russia.

A. F. KERENSKI,

Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

September 17, 1917

"IZVESTIIA" EDITORIAL ON DISBANDMENT OF COMMITTEES ⁵

What shall we say to yesterday's order by Kerenski to disband at once all the committees that waged war on counter-revolution, the same committees that came to life in those terrible days and became at once the center of all the public forces that were loyal to the revolution? . . .

To disband them now, when there is yet so much to do to quiet the soldier and to inspire him with confidence that no one will cover up counter-revolutionary plots . . . to disband them now, when only thanks to them the revolutionary masses are organized and disciplined; to disband them now shows little understanding of conditions.

3. RESOLUTION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET *

[October 4, 1917]

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, having deliberated in special session on the state of affairs which has developed, believes:

1. That the country is in danger of an attempt by the counter-revolutionists. International imperialism, working closely together with the Russian bourgeoisie, is preparing measures to crush the revolution of the workers, soldiers, and peasants.

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 163, September 19, 1917.

^{*} *Ibid.*, No. 178, October 5, 1917.

The counter-revolutionary organizations of the capitalists are still alive and are in session at this very moment at Moscow in the so-called Conference of Public Men, which was the center of the Kornilov movement. The Provisional Government by its decrees is striving to disorganize the revolution. All these facts have brought about a very strained situation and bring the proletariat, soldiers, and peasants face to face with the question of preparing for a possible counter-revolutionary attempt in the near future.

2. The confused situation was not improved by the artificial Democratic Conference. This body was incapable of settling the question of a revolutionary government because of the very artificial selection of its members and gives the impression of a helpless revolutionary democracy. At the same time, anti-democratic elements have gathered around the Democratic Conference and are forcing it by their demands to move more and more to the right, and they are making ready to go over openly to the counter-revolutionary camp.

The so-called pre-parliament is becoming in fact an organization where the more conservative portions of the democracy are to have the final voice at the expense of the revolutionary organizations of the workers, soldiers, and peasants. Such a pre-parliament threatens to become a cover for new bourgeois schemes, for new delays of the Constituent Assembly, for the prolongation of imperialistic policies, which means the further economic disorganization of the country.

3. The only power that can strike back at counter-revolution is the organized centers of the revolutionary democracy—the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies and their affiliated organizations.

4. The soviets should immediately mobilize their forces so as not to be caught unprepared, and to be ready to meet the new counter-revolutionary wave. Wherever they have all the power in their hands, they should under no consideration let it go. The revolutionary committees which they formed at the time of the Kornilov affair should have ready their whole machinery. Wherever the soviets have not full power they should gradually strengthen their positions, have their organizations in readiness to create, as the need may arise, special organs to keep a watch on the organized strength of the enemy and to fight counter-revolution.

5. For the purpose of uniting and harmonizing the acts of the soviets in their fight against the approaching danger and in order

to decide questions in relation to the organization of a revolutionary government, it is important to call at once a Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

4. TROTSKI ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ⁷

The meeting of the Soviet on October 8 opened with a report on the reflections to the Executive Committee of the Soviet and its presidium. A great many of the members of the Soviet did not vote. Out of the 400 votes cast, 230 were for the Bolsheviks, 102 for the Socialist-Revolutionists, 54 for the Mensheviks, and 10 for the Menshevik-Internationalists. According to this vote, the Bolsheviks get 13, the Socialist-Revolutionists 6, and the Mensheviks 3 places on the Executive Committee. . . . In the new presidium are 4 Bolsheviks, 2 Socialist-Revolutionists, and 1 Menshevik. . . . Trotski was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. . . .

Kamenev proposed that no confidence should be placed in the new Government, which, in his opinion, is a coalition against the workers, soldiers, and peasants. . . .

The . . . resolution proposed by Trotski was adopted.

"IZVESTIIA" CHANGES ITS NAME ⁸

Petrograd, October 13

The official organ of the revolution is singing its last song. This does not mean that the "Izvestiia" is going out of existence. For the time being the revolutionary democracy closes only "bourgeois" papers. But Trotski [Chairman of Petrograd Soviet] demanded from the "Izvestiia" that it should remove the words "Petrograd Soviet" from its name, and not only was this demand immediately complied with, but one of the editors felt obliged to resign.

5. LOSS OF RIGA ⁹

The meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of September 3 opened with the reading of telegrams from the commissars of the Northern Front [Riga]. At the request of Chkheidze, all present stood up in honor of those who gave their lives for the revolution and the freedom of Russia.

⁷ "Riech," No. 226, October 8, 1917.

⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 230, October 13, 1917, Editorial.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 196, September 4, 1917.

Following this, the Soviet listened to Bogdanov's report on the telegrams read.

"These telegrams," said B. O. Bogdanov, "show clearly the serious dangers which are added to the numerous other difficulties which beset the Russian revolution. I need not tell you how difficult it is for us, who are unable either to fight or to make peace.

"I am sure there is no one here who can remain unmoved while reading these telegrams. The enemies of the revolution will not miss a chance to utilize the misfortune at the front, for political purposes. We should, therefore, do all that we can to spoil their game. From the telegrams it is clear that the revolutionary army, with its army committees at the head, are doing everything that they can to save revolutionary Russia. In the evening papers it is said that regiments have of their own free will abandoned their positions. Even if this were true even in part, it should be remembered that this also happened in the days of the Tsar. . . .

"The defeat on the Northern Front threatens to bring forth many new complications. A panic may begin tomorrow, if the population decides to run from Petrograd. Such a move may call forth an uprising against the revolution. . . .

"Rumors are circulating today that on the streets of Petrograd are pasted posters that 'The Fourth Duma can save the situation.' On investigation it was found that no such posters exist. But the fact that such reports are heard, shows that those who shout that the country is in danger are trying to utilize the misfortunes of the revolution in the interest of reaction." . . .

LOSS OF RIGA ¹⁰

According to official reports Russia has to live through a new national misfortune—the loss of Riga. One cannot say, however, that it has taken us unprepared. On the contrary, everything that is happening at the front should prepare us for the worst. The Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, in his speech at Moscow, predicted it. . . .

One of the leading questions at Moscow was the means to be employed to reestablish the national defense. The question came to the front of itself, by the force of necessity, against the wish of those who put "the salvation of the revolution" before "the salvation of the country." It is around this question that the two camps were so sharply divided. It was particularly noticeable when some represent-

* "Riech," No. 196, September 4, 1917, Editorial.

atives of the Army remained seated as the Supreme Commander was given an ovation. Those who are united on this question, so important for Russia, are sneeringly referred to by the Left as "counter-revolutionists." . . .

The Government has no choice. . . . It must finally and definitely cut loose from the soviets and accept the proposition of General Kornilov. It was not in vain that the Supreme Commander said that if his recommendation was not accepted then, it would have to be put into force later—after the fall of Riga. . . .

6. EVACUATION OF PETROGRAD ¹¹

Petrograd, October 19

Petrograd is again passing through alarming days. The news of German operations in the Baltic and the appearance of zeppelins have given rise to many rumors of the danger threatening Petrograd and have created a panicky atmosphere. The news that the Government is taking definite measures to evacuate State institutions in the near future and is considering whether it should move the central organs of government and even the pre-parliament to Moscow have added strength to these alarming rumors.¹¹ . . .

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND EVACUATION ¹²

The leaders of the Bolsheviks find that the removal of the Government to Moscow will produce a situation in Petrograd similar to the one in Paris in 1871, when "the enemy was at the gates and there was no government." At that time, there will grow up a desire among the masses, so say the Bolsheviks, to form a commune. The Bolshevik leaders say that they are opposed to a commune at the present, but if it should appear, the Bolsheviks would participate in it.¹²

RESOLUTION OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ON EVACUATION ¹³

[October 19]

The Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies vehemently protests against the idea of moving the Government from Petrograd to Moscow. Such an act would leave the revolutionary capital unprotected.

¹¹ "Riech," No. 235, October 19, 1917, Editorial.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "Izvestiia," No. 191, October 20, 1917.

If the Provisional Government cannot defend Petrograd, it should either make peace or step down to make room for another government.

To move to Moscow means desertion from a responsible post.

PETROGRAD GARRISON REFUSES TO OBEY ORDERS ¹⁴

On October 22 there was a meeting of the soldiers of the Finland Guard Regiment. They were called together to deliberate on the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in regard to the reorganization of parts of the Petrograd garrison. . . . The meeting passed a sharp resolution, in true Bolshevik spirit, against the Provisional Government and in particular against Kerenski, and demanded that all power be handed over to the Soviets, and recommended the calling of a meeting of representatives of regimental committees to work out practical measures for the defense of Petrograd.

7. WAR-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND DEFENSE OF PETROGRAD ¹⁵

Yesterday [October 22] there was a meeting of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet. The question of the protection of the capital and the need of taking part of the garrison out of the city to defend its approach called forth a warm debate. Though admitting the strategic value of such a move, the Bolsheviks claimed that they had no confidence in the Government and its military leaders, and therefore proposed the organization of a revolutionary staff of their own. . . . They introduced a resolution in which they said that the Soviet could assume no responsibility for the strategy of the Provisional Government and that the only way to save Petrograd was to hand over the government to the Soviets, to declare an armistice immediately, etc. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists pointed out that to form a military staff alongside the Government's meant dual authority and a serious menace to the defense of the city. . . . The following resolution was adopted:

1. To appeal to the garrison to strengthen its war activity . . . to make energetic preparations, in case it should be necessary, to call out a part of the garrison from the capital to defend its approach.
2. To form a college of representatives of the Petrograd Soviet,

¹⁴ "Riech," No. 238, October 23, 1917.

¹⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 193, October 23, 1917.

Central Committee, and "Tsentroflot" [revolutionary naval organization] to function alongside the commander of troops of the Petrograd Military Zone. No part of the garrison is to be moved without first notifying this college.

3. To take steps to reorganize the militia.

4. To take extra measures to clean out the commanding personnel.

5. In addition, the Petrograd Soviet authorizes the Executive Committee, together with the presidium of the soldiers' section [of Soviet] and representatives of the Petrograd garrison to organize a committee of revolutionary defense. This body is to make a study of the question of the defense of Petrograd and its approach and work out a plan for the protection of the city with the active support of the laboring class.

ORGANIZATION OF A WAR-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE¹⁶

There was a closed session yesterday [October 25-26] of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to discuss the question of organizing a war-revolutionary committee. After some debate a scheme for the organization of a temporary revolutionary committee and a garrison council was accepted. . . . This committee is organized in connection with the Petrograd Soviet and is its organ. This body is to be made up of members of the presidium and the soldiers' section of the Soviet, representatives of the Tsentroflot, of the Finland regional committee, railway men's union, post and telegraph union, soviets of factory and mills committees, soviet of labor unions, representatives of party military organizations, Union of Socialists in the national army, representatives of the military section of the Petrograd Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, military section of the Central Executive Committee, workmen's militia, and such others as may be needed.

Among the more immediate tasks of the war-revolutionary committee are: To determine the minimum of troops and resources necessary to protect Petrograd and which can not be removed; to keep up contact with the commissars, with the commander-in-chief of the Northern front, with the Baltic fleet, garrison of Finland, and staff of the commander-in-chief of the war area; to keep an accurate account of every one in the garrison of Petrograd and neighborhood, and of the war materials and food supplies; to work out a plan for the defense of Petrograd; to take measures to protect Petrograd from

¹⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 197, October 27, 1917.

pogroms and desertions; to uphold discipline among the masses and soldiers of Petrograd.

The war-revolutionary committee is divided in sections: (1) defense, (2) supplies, (3) contact, (4) information bureau, (5) workmen's militia, (6) denunciation, and (7) buildings, etc.

The military section and the provisional revolutionary committee are to organize garrison conferences. . . . The immediate task of the garrison conference is to get information on the condition of the garrison and an account of all the resources necessary to raise its fighting efficiency. Members of the Menshevik Party in the Executive Committee asked to be placed on record as voting against this motion.

WAR-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE ¹⁷

Meeting of the Petrograd Soviet under the Chairmanship of Kamenev, October 29, 1917.

Broido, speaking in the name of the Mensheviks, announced that the question under discussion was bound up with the defense of the capital. None of us, he said, "question that the taking of Petrograd by the Germans is a death blow to the revolution. But we should do nothing which would interfere with unity of effort directed toward the defense of Petrograd. This is a task for the military authorities of the Petrograd War Area. The revolutionary committee is a Bolshevik idea, but the Bolsheviks have not the men capable of taking charge of the defense of the city. Comrades, we are passing through an unusually serious time. Petrograd is threatened not only from the outside, but from the inside. Agitation is being carried on, inciting the masses to come out in the streets under the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets." Under these circumstances, the revolutionary committee may become something else, something dangerous and threatening.

"Until now the Bolsheviks have failed to answer the question put to them by Dan: Whether they are going to take part in the uprising and whether they regard such a movement as beneficial, whether they are calling on the masses to come on the street to seize power.

"Your refusal to answer may be explained in one of two ways. Either you are cowardly afraid or uncertain of your strength. If the latter, then I bless you for your doubts. . . . Such an uprising, we are convinced, would ring the death knell of the revolution. Your scheme for a revolutionary committee is nothing else than an organiza-

¹⁷ "Izvestiia," No. 199, October 30, 1917.

tion of a revolutionary staff to seize power. We are against it and will not join it. . . . We have information showing that the masses are not in favor of an uprising. . . ."

Trotsky followed Broido: "In answering the question of Comrade Broido, whether the Bolsheviks are preparing an armed uprising, I should like to know in whose name he is asking it. Is it in the name of Kerenski, the intelligence service, secret police, or other such institutions? . . ." In concluding his speech, Trotsky insisted that it was necessary to take the power out of the hands of the irresponsible leaders by a unanimous demonstration of the power of the democracy, and demanded an expression against the removal of the troops from Petrograd. . . .

EVACUATION OF PETROGRAD¹⁸

On the night of October 25 there was a meeting of the Commission of Defense of the Provisional Council of the Republic, and after a lively debate, the following resolution was adopted:

Having heard the statement of the Provisional Government on the military situation on the Northern Front in relation to the evacuation of the capital, the Commission declares:

1. That the Provisional Government has announced its purpose to defend Petrograd to the last;
2. That, under the present condition of the country, the Provisional Government thinks it necessary to remain in Petrograd until there is immediate danger;
3. That not only will the Provisional Government remain in Petrograd, but the Constituent Assembly will also be asked to meet there. . . .

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE PETROGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT¹⁹

Preparations are being made for another armed demonstration on the streets of Petrograd. Such an act will bring with it anarchy, and useless sacrifices, and will put the country on the brink of ruin. He who at the present hour calls the masses to civil war is either mad, blind, or works in the interests of Emperor William.

I call on all officers and soldiers under me not to listen to this call to come out. Soldiers and officers, think of the great responsibility that lies on you, before the democracy and free Russia.

COLONEL POLKOVNIKOV

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 196, October 26, 1917.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 199, October 30, 1917.

SESSION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ²⁰

[October 27, 1917]

Meeting opened at 9:00 P. M., under the chairmanship of Gotz. The questions of the day were as follows: (1) Defense of Petrograd; (2) The All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

A number of representatives from the front addressed the meeting. All, without exception, declared that to continue the war, under conditions as they now exist, is impossible. The front is thinking only of peace. Some of the units demand peace, any kind of peace, even a separate peace. As one of the orators put it: "If it is an indecent peace, let's have that."

The soldier masses are so bent on peace that their own army committees and regimental organizations will not be able to do anything with them, for the soldiers have announced most emphatically that they will not remain at the front when cold weather comes.

DECLARATION OF GOTZ ²¹

"The representatives from the front have painted a very gloomy picture. We understand the difficult position of the soldiers at the front, and we are doing everything that we can to bring about an early peace. But it is not possible to conclude a shameful peace which will ruin the revolution. I cannot believe that there are units in the Russian revolutionary army that would agree to a shameful, separate peace, and I am convinced that in case of need, this army will do its duty before the country and the revolution."

DAN'S SPEECH ²²

Dan made a report on the question of the defense of Petrograd. . . . Petrograd is the center of the Russian revolution . . . and its defense is the duty of every revolutionist. . . . In this time of danger the reactionaries are raising their heads. Russian monarchism is the true ally of German imperialism. Under the protection of the counter-revolutionists there is growing up a restless movement among the masses, which manifests itself in pogroms against the Jews and against the bourgeoisie.

It would seem as if at such a time all quarrels and misunderstandings among the revolutionary democracy would be forgotten; that

²⁰ "Izvestia," No. 199, October 30, 1917.

²¹ *Ibid.*, No. 198, October 28, 1917.

²² *Ibid.*

every shade of democracy would realize the threatening danger and defend revolutionary Petrograd, would try to produce the necessary materials for the defense which are lacking.

Instead of that, the Bolsheviks are carrying on agitation which arouses the masses of workers and soldiers. We should straightforwardly ask our comrades what is their object in all this. ("Peace and land," shouted Riazanov.)

Peace and land (continued Dan), but we think that demonstration on the streets and the failure to fill war orders will not give peace and land, but will destroy the revolution.

Do the Bolsheviks realize the effect of their agitation on the workers and soldiers? Do they assume the responsibility for the consequences of their agitation? The Bolsheviks should on this platform answer whether the revolutionary proletariat understands their point of view or not. Are the Bolsheviks calling on the proletariat to rise, or are they not? We believe that such an uprising, should it take place, would kill the revolution and would lead to pogroms and counter-revolution.

I demand that the Bolshevik Party answer this question with an honest and straightforward "Yes" or "No." No other kind of answer is possible.

We should at the same time appeal to the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and say to them that at this dangerous time they should give up the idea of demonstration. . . .

RIAZANOV'S SPEECH ²³

"The question of the defense [Petrograd] . . . we discussed in the Petrograd [Soviet] Executive Committee, and it was decided to organize a War Revolutionary Committee. We were led to this action by the deepest conviction that as long as the defense was in the hands of the coalition government . . . it would be no better than it is now. . . ."

THE PETROGRAD SOVIET AND THE STAFF OF THE PETROGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT ²⁴

The organization of the War-Revolutionary Committee by the Petrograd Soviet to control the action of the Staff of the Petrograd Military District has brought on a serious conflict between the Petrograd Soviet and the Staff.

²³ "Izvestiia," No. 198, October 28, 1917.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 205, November 6, 1917.

As it stands today, alongside the Staff there exists a special council made up of members of the war section of the Central Executive Committee and the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet. The Petrograd Soviet proposed the organization of a War-Revolutionary Committee with the right to control, and even to change, orders of the Staff. On November 3 the Petrograd Soviet recognized the War-Revolutionary Committee as the real commander of the troops of the capital. On the night of November 4, members of this Committee presented themselves at the Staff and demanded the right to participate, with a deciding voice, in the command. Col. Polkovnikov, the commander of the troops, emphatically refused to admit their claim. The Petrograd Soviet then called together at Smolny representatives of the regiments, who telephoned to all the units that the Staff refused to recognize the War-Revolutionary Committee and by so doing broke with the revolutionary garrison and the Petrograd Soviet and became a tool of the counter-revolution.

"Soldiers of Petrograd," the telephone message goes on to say, "the safeguarding of the revolutionary order from counter-revolutionary attacks falls on you, under the direction of the War-Revolutionary Committee. Orders not countersigned by the Committee are void. All the orders of the Petrograd Soviet for today, the day of the Petrograd Soviet, remain in force. Every soldier of the garrison should be on the watch, and keep in strict discipline. The revolution is in danger. Long live the revolutionary garrison."

The Commander of the Petrograd Military District called a meeting which included representatives of the Central Committee and the Commissar attached to his Staff. Members of the Petrograd garrison at Smolny were also asked to come. They came headed by Sergeant Dashkevich. He announced that he was authorized by the garrison to inform the Staff of the District that from now on all orders issued by the Staff must be countersigned by the War-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. He ended there by declaring that he was not authorized to say anything more, and then departed with his delegation.

This conflict brought General Cheremisov, the Commander of the Northern Front, to Petrograd yesterday. He talked over with the Prime Minister both the situation at the front and the local conflict.

Without commenting on the conflict, General Cheremisov insisted that all measures should be taken to have the garrison ready to meet the enemy that is preparing to strike on the Northern Front. . . .

He supported the resolutions of his troops that the Petrograd garrison should relieve some of the regiments at the front. "If," said the General, "the War-Revolutionary Committee should take the stand that the garrison troops should not be moved, then he would categorically protest in the name of the armies."

Kerenski had conferences with some members of the Central Executive Committee, who told him that in this conflict the members of the Central Executive Committee were whole-heartedly with him, but asked him to withhold action temporarily, for they hoped to settle the trouble in a peaceful manner by discussions between the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet.

It is reported that the Commissars attached to the Petrograd garrison and elected by the Petrograd Soviet intercept every telephone message that is sent from the Staff to the units of the Petrograd garrison. . . .

8. MEETING OF PETROGRAD SOVIET ²⁵

[*October 22*]

Comrade Karakhan made a report on the Regional Congress. The idea of such a congress belongs to the workmen and sailors of Finland. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet has decided to take part and to send thirty delegates, of whom fifteen are Bolsheviks, ten Socialist-Revolutionists, and five Mensheviks. . . . In the program of the Congress there was to be at first just one question—government, but later it was decided by the Executive Committee that the question of government should be bound up with the question of the defense of the northern region.

WORD FROM THE THIRTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS

One of the delegates greeted the Soviet on behalf of the Thirty-third Corps, which he called the advance guard of the revolutionary democracy, and said that his delegation, composed of thirty-six men, demands that the Petrograd Soviet should take energetic measures to start peace negotiations at once, to take over all power by the Soviets, and to do away with capital punishment.

The next question was the relation with the pre-parliament. Comrade Trotsky had this to say on the subject. . . . The Bolsheviks

²⁵ "Izvestia," No. 193, October 23, 1917.

left because the pre-parliament could not accomplish the object which the defensists had in mind at the time of the Democratic Conference. He pointed out that while it was the main purpose of the Democratic Conference to limit the personal power of Kerenski, the pre-parliament actually legalized this irresponsible government. For that reason the pre-parliament is of no use. It serves merely as a cover to conceal the actual handing over of the power to the imperialists.

In criticizing the pre-parliament Trotsky declared that the Bolsheviks could not remain in such a body, where representatives of the bourgeoisie are present and possibly getting ready to hand over to the Germans the citadel of the revolution—Petrograd.

"We left the pre-parliament," continued Trotsky, "to make it clear that only a government of the Soviets can raise the slogan of peace, and to announce it to the democracies of other countries over the heads of the imperialists.

"Long live the direct and open struggle for a revolutionary government in Russia. Long live peace for all nations."

LIEBER'S SPEECH

Lieber, Social-Democrat, took the floor. "I am sure that from the tone assumed by Trotsky one could hardly believe that the Bolsheviks' departure from the pre-parliament was determined by an insignificant majority.

"The situation is not quite as simple as some try to make believe. We should remember what is going on in the country. We are told here that the revolutionary spirit is on a high plane, but when you leave this building and see the endless lines [bread, etc.], when you hear of the troubles in the factories about wages, and the way the whole country is becoming demoralized, there is some doubt as to the ability of this revolutionary spirit to allay discontent.

"It is proposed that the democracy should take all power. Remember how recently it was that you cheered Kerenski. Let us suppose for a minute that Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Lenin are in power. It is one thing to seize power and quite another to hold it. Our conscience and our responsibility before the country did not allow us to take power. We were never demagogues; we realized that every promise should be carried out. And when we convinced ourselves that in the bourgeois countries it was impossible to bring about socialistic governments, we made up our minds to let the people

have at least something of that for which they strived. It is only with this idea in mind that we take part in the Provisional Council of the Republic. . . .

"Trotsky said that he did not wish to take part in the Council because the bourgeoisie was there. I should like to ask him whether he will take part in the Constituent Assembly. . . ."

KOLLONTAI'S SPEECH

A. M. Kollontai (Bolshevik) was the next speaker: "Comrades! Citizen Lieber said that the question of leaving the pre-parliament was passed by an insignificant majority. That's not true. The Bolshevik faction was, as a whole, in favor of leaving, but there was some difference of opinion as to how and when. Some were of the opinion that we should not leave until after we had expressed ourselves on political questions, others said not to wait for that, for the proletariat and the soldiers were already sufficiently enlightened as to the way they should go." . . . After her speech she read a resolution . . . and ended with: "Down with the Bonapartists, down with the counterfeit pre-parliament! Long live the struggle against the usurpers for the transfer of power to the Soviets."

MARTOV'S SPEECH

"The explanations of the Bolsheviks did not explain to me why it was necessary for them to leave the pre-parliament. If it is really true, as they say, that the pre-parliament strengthens irresponsible government and bourgeois domination, then the thing to do is to disperse it and not merely leave it. But I do not agree with the opinion of the Bolsheviks.

"We, Menshevik-Internationalists, did not leave and do not intend to do so. We shall continue to fight, even if unsuccessful, to the end. The future alone can say who is in the right. . . ."

KAMENEV'S SPEECH ²⁶

Kamenev read the following leaflet which was being passed around in the factories:

"Citizens, the cowardly and dastardly traitorous ministers have betrayed the Russian people. They have ruined the army, filled the fleet with German agents, and now they are the first to fly for safety from Petrograd. With them goes the pre-parliament, a gang of

²⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 193, October 23, 1917.

impostors planning to crowd out the Constituent Assembly, which they do not intend to call.

"Citizens, you are threatened with hunger, cold, and German slavery. Let the guilty ones share it with you, don't let them go. Arm yourselves and stand at the stations, to prevent by force the escape of the ministers, pre-parliament, and the hired German murderers who are meeting at Smolny."

Kamenev denounced this leaflet as provocation and asked the workers to catch the people who scattered them.

The next question was the removal of the troops from the capital. . . . The Bolshevik, Pavlunovski, said that the army cannot obey the orders of the Government, in which it has no confidence. . . . [Two resolutions were introduced, one by the majority of the Executive Committee and one by the Bolsheviks. The latter was adopted. The meeting ended almost in a fight.]

CHAPTER XLIII

CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE NORTHERN REGION ¹

At the initiative of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy, and Workers of Finland, there has been organized, by representatives of this committee, a congress of soviets and army organizations of the Northern Region.

This congress is called to meet at Helsingfors on October 21. Invitations have been sent to Archangel, Petrozavodsk, Tikhvin, Novgorod, Dorpat, Luga, Chudovo, Schlüsselburg, Sestroretsk, Kronstadt, Peterhof, Krasnoe Selo, Tsarskoe Selo, Pavlovsk, Pskov, Reval, Narva, Pernau, Walk, Weimar, Wenden, Hapsal, Gatchina, Oranienbaum, Wiborg, Abo, Helsingfors, and Tammerfors. There will be one deputy for every 15,000 persons. . . .

Beginning with October 19, all matters relating to the Congress should be addressed to Comrade Baranov . . . Smolny Institute, Petrograd.¹

Last evening [October 23] at Smolny there was a preliminary conference of the delegates of the regional congress of soviets. Those present debated the problem of organization, and it was decided to take up the questions in the following order:

(1) Local reports, (2) current questions, (3) land, (4) war-political situation, (5) All-Russian Congress of Soviets, (6) Constituent Assembly, (7) organization. . . . It was agreed to open the congress today at 3:00 P. M. . . .²

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMES OUT AGAINST NORTHERN REGION CONGRESS ³

[October 24]

The Bureau of the Central Executive Committee, having heard the report of the Outside City Section on the Northern Region Congress, called by the Helsingfors Soviet to meet at Petrograd, found that:

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 191, October 20, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, No. 194, October 24, 1917.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 195, October 25, 1917.

(1) A regional congress can be made up only of the soviets of said region, the area of which was determined by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

(2) Notwithstanding the instruction of the Central Executive Committee that it be notified of all congresses called by regional committees, no notice was received of the Congress of the Northern Region.

(3) From the information at hand, it is evident that while some places in the Northern Region did not receive any invitation, others, outside (Moscow), did.

Taking all these facts into consideration, the Bureau of the Executive Committee resolves that the above-called assembly of delegates is not a fully authorized regional congress of the Northern Region, but an informal conference of separate soviets.

OPENING OF THE CONGRESS OF THE NORTHERN REGION ⁴

On October 24 the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region was opened. There were 103 delegates, among them a delegate from Moscow. . . . Lieutenant Krylenko (Comrade Abram), recently freed from prison [political reasons] was unanimously elected chairman.⁵ . . .

The meeting, set for 3:00 P. M., was very late in getting started. Comrade Antonov made a report, pointing out that the idea of the congress originated with the Regional Committee of Finland, that it had been planned to have it meet at Helsingfors on October 21, but the military situation made it necessary to transfer it to the capital. The Petrograd Soviet had taken active part in the organization of the congress and had sent thirty delegates. . . .

The congress elected Krylenko (Bolshevik) as chairman. . . .

Trotsky greeted the assembly in the name of the Petrograd Soviet. "You know," he said, "that lately the Petrograd Soviet has changed its composition and its politics. The defensists' policy has been changed to a merciless struggle against class enemies and against the Provisional Government, which is betraying the revolution.

"At the present, only the Petrograd Soviet has the right to speak in the name of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. . . . Just now there is no institution, other than the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, that can stand at the head of the country. Only the transfer of power to the soviets can save the revolution."

⁴ "Ricsh," No. 240, October 25, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*

[Trotsky was followed by a number of other delegates, who spoke along the same line, after which] Krylenko read the following resolution: . . .

All who spoke here, with the exception of those from Novgorod, are in full agreement. The keynote of all the speeches, the fundamental slogan is: *All Power to the Soviets, Down with the Existing Provisional Government*. This is the unanimous opinion of the country at the present time. We should justify the hope of the country and fight energetically for power.⁶

THE REGIONAL CONGRESS ⁷

[October 25]

Declaration by Bogdanov (Menshevik)

"Comrades, the present congress was called by the Helsingfors Soviet and cannot, therefore, be called the regional congress of northern soviets. It is our opinion that the right to call a regional, or an All-Russian, congress of soviets belongs to the Central Executive Committee. By calling this meeting, the Helsingfors Soviet, or the Regional Committee of Finland, has encroached upon the rights of the Central Executive Committee. Many cities were not invited. It would seem that this is a hand-picked body—only those soviets were asked where the Bolsheviks were in the majority. The Central Executive Committee was not even officially notified of this assembly. At its yesterday's meeting the Central Executive Committee declared this congress an informal conference.

"In view of this state of affairs, the Mensheviks declare that: . . .

(1) This meeting cannot be called a Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, but an informal conference, and

(2) If our declaration is not acceptable, then the Mensheviks decline to take part in the work of the meeting, but will attend for the purpose of getting information. . . ."

[Trotsky denied the charges of picking the assembly.] "We consider this assembly as the Congress of the Northern Region. As regards the charge that the Central Executive Committee has not been officially notified, it should be recalled that on October 20, at the meeting of the Petrograd Executive Committee, in which the Mensheviks participated, it was unanimously voted to take part in the Congress of the Northern Region. . . ." [He went on to say]

⁶ "Izvestiia," No. 195, October 25, 1917.

⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 196, October 26, 1917.

that at the present time, notwithstanding all the obstacles, the people are sufficiently ripe to take the Government in their own hands. This, according to Trotski, is the only way to save the country and the revolution. . . . Our congress ought to show that we have the material forces on which we can rely. He asked for a unanimous vote on the resolution which declares that the politics of the Provisional Government disorganize the army, that the way to save the country is to take over all power by the soviets, that the soviet government would immediately propose an armistice on all fronts, with an honest democratic peace, that it would hand over immediately, without compensation, the land of the landholders to the peasants, would requisition all concealed supplies, and unmercifully tax the propertied classes. The Provisional Government should quit. The soviets have both right and might on their side. Time for talking is past. Only a determined and whole-hearted coming out of the soviets can save the country and the revolution.

This resolution was almost unanimously adopted; three refrained from voting.

The next question for discussion was the war-political situation. Lashevich (Bolshevik) announced that there existed in the capital a special soldier revolutionary committee which had all kinds of weapons and would be able, in the near future, to command the soldiers. . . .

RADIO-TELEGRAM OF THE CONGRESS OF THE NORTHERN REGION ⁸

[October 29]

To all, to all. . . . All regimental and divisional committees of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. All sailors, workers, and peasants.

November 2 is the day for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The purpose is to propose immediately an armistice on all fronts, to transfer the land to all peasants, and to provide for the calling of the Constituent Assembly on the time set. All the bourgeoisie, the Provisional Government and all subject to them are doing everything that they can to break up the Congress. They try to frighten people by saying that the Congress will kill the Constituent Assembly. It is a lie! The Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, made up of the most powerful organizations—the Soviets of Petrograd, Moscow, Finland, the Baltic Fleet, Kronstadt, Reval, and others—declare that the killing of the Constituent Assembly is being done

⁸ "Izvestia," No. 201, November 1, 1917.

by the counter-revolutionists, who prolong the war, and crush the peasant revolt.

The Congress of Soviets will provide for the calling of the Constituent Assembly and will immediately propose peace. Those who stand in the way of the Congress ruin the army and the revolution. Individual organizations which have come out against the Congress have violated the resolutions of the All-Russian Congress, have exceeded their powers, and new elections should be held at once. Soldiers, sailors, peasants, workers, your duty is to overcome all obstacles through your regimental, divisional, and corps committees and to send your representatives to the Congress on November 2. We suggest that you bring this notice to the immediate attention of all who are connected with your organization.

CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF SOLDIERS',
PEASANTS', AND WORKERS' OF THE
NORTHERN REGION.

REPLY OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE⁹

. . . The Congress of Soviets has to be called by the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee. It is being prepared by a special commission, made up of representatives of all factions that have delegates in the Central Executive Committee. Its first meeting is set for November 7, and on the 5th and 6th there will take place the preliminary conferences of the factions. No other committee is authorized or has the right to take upon itself the calling of a congress. Least of all has the Congress of the Northern Region such a right. This body is called together in violation of all regulations for assembling regional congresses and is made up of representatives of specially selected soviets. . . .

BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

⁹ "Izvestiia," No. 201, November 1, 1917.

CHAPTER XLIV

SECOND ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES ¹

I. CALL FOR THE CONGRESS

On October 6, there was a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies with the participation of the representatives of the provincial soviets who took part in the Democratic Conference.

The question for discussion was the calling of an All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. . . .

After a long debate the date for the Congress was set for November 2.

ARMY UNITS AGAINST CALLING AN ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ²

The Committee finds that at the time of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, which is not far off, the calling of a Congress and the work connected with the election and representation will use up a great deal of energy and will thereby weaken, if not make altogether impossible, the campaign preceding the election to the Constituent Assembly; therefore, the Committee is strongly against calling such a Congress.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED ARMY AND REAR ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NORTHERN FRONT

* * * *

The Executive Committee of the Southwest Front is of the opinion that the calling of a Congress of Soviet Deputies on November 2 is both untimely and harmful, and therefore appeals to all democratic army organizations to insist that the Congress be postponed for a time, [at least] until after the end of the elections of the Constituent Assembly.

CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONT

* * * *

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 180, October 7, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, No. 192, October 21, 1917.

The calling of the Congress before the Constituent Assembly has for its object the seizure by the former of powers that belong to the latter. . . . The Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies of the Twelfth Army regards the calling of the Congress on November 2 as untimely and exceedingly dangerous, and for that reason and in fulfilment of its duty to all the people, protests against a Congress at such a time. . . .³

SOVIET OF SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES OF THE TWELFTH ARMY

AGAINST THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIET ⁴

Having learned of the calling for November 22 of an All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which is to demand that all power go to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies feels that it should categorically declare that such a step at the present time might have very sad consequences for the country and the revolution, might bring on civil war, which would be very advantageous to the foreign foe. . . .

2. SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ⁵

In view of the impossibility of assembling a Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on November 2, also in view of the hostile attitude of the committees of the army and the front toward such a Congress, the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee has decided to take all measures to notify all army and local organizations of the necessity of taking part in the Congress, and that the opening of the Congress is to be postponed to November 7, and the meetings of the factions to November 5 and 6.

Realizing that it is not possible to interrupt for any considerable length of time the labor of the local party workers in connection with the election campaign for the Constituent Assembly, the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee finds it necessary that the Congress shall not be prolonged beyond three days. The three following topics will come up for consideration:

³ "Izvestiia," No. 192, October 21, 1917.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 197, October 27, 1917.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 200, October 31, 1917.

- 1) Current questions;
- 2) Preparation for the Constituent Assembly;
- 3) Election for the Central Executive Committee.

3. SCHISM*

EDITORIAL IN "IZVESTIIA"

[October 31]

One can no longer close his eyes to the fact that the Bolshevik party has brought about a deep schism in our democratic organization. From the moment that the Bolsheviks got a controlling voice in the Petrograd Soviet, they have turned it into a party organization and made use of it to get control of all the Soviet organizations throughout Russia.

No one can object to having the Bolsheviks spread their ideas in all the organizations of which they are members. It is a right that belongs to every party. But if this is done in a violent manner, it inevitably leads to a split and a breaking up of the organization. No matter how numerous the Bolsheviks may be in Petrograd, they are by no means the only party of the laboring masses; they cannot compel every one in Russia, not even every one in Petrograd, to become a Bolshevik. Such an idea is Utopian and, like all such ideas, will end in failure. Unfortunately, however, this failure will affect not only our enthusiastic comrades, but the whole organization of the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies.

There were always different parties in the Petrograd Soviet and its executive committee; there were always differences and quarrels among them, but there was also friendly coöperation. Fundamental differences at the beginning of the revolution never, or hardly ever, led to violent attacks on one party by another. But now this has become the usual thing, and coöperation is no longer possible.

In addition to this, the Petrograd Executive Committee, displeased with the policy of the Central Executive Committee, has carried on a bitter campaign against it. The Bolsheviks are trying to force out the Central Executive Committee and put in their own men. This, too, they have a right to do, and the present members of this body are not going to fight against holding a new election. Quite the contrary. They will gladly hand over their heavy burdens

* "Izvestiia," No. 200, October 31, 1917.

to their comrades who desire to take them on. Such a change, if necessary, should be carried out in a legal manner, with an eye to the interests of all army and provincial organizations, and not by means of lawless grabbing and struggling, which would undermine all faith in Soviet organizations. The Bolshevik Petrograd paper refers to the Central Executive Committee in an extremely vicious and hateful manner. The invitation by the Bolshevik Congress of the Northern Region to regimental and divisional committees to the Congress of Soviets is a violation of the regulations of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This was done after the Central Executive Committee and a majority of the army organizations came out (in view of the elections for the Constituent Assembly) against such a congress.

The Central Executive Committee has as yet taken no stand in regard to the time of the Congress and does not undertake to do so; but the Bolsheviks have already taken a hand in the matter, without consulting or even notifying the Central Executive Committee. . . .

The Bolsheviks are trying to overthrow the Provisional Government, the Central Executive Committee, and the Council of the Republic, which has just begun to function; to anticipate the Constituent Assembly with the congress of soviets (this too means to overthrow, but in a concealed form); and to overthrow the Congress of Soviets itself by calling it illegally. This is a bit too much overthrowing, and may it not end in their own overthrow?

CHAPTER XLV

PREPARATION FOR THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

1. LENIN TO SMILGA¹

Wiborg [Finland, October 10, 1917]

To Comrade [Smilga]

I make use of a good opportunity to take up a few questions in more detail.

I.

The general political situation is troubling me a great deal. The Petrograd Soviet and Bolsheviks have declared war on the Government. But the Government has the army and is *systematically* preparing. (Kerenski is at the General Headquarters. It is obvious that he is considering with the Kornilov men [reactionaries] practical measures for crushing the Bolsheviks by the army.)

What are we doing? Are we passing resolutions and nothing more? We lose time, we set "dates" (Congress of Soviet, Nov. 2—is it not ridiculous to delay in this manner? Is it not ridiculous to depend on this?) The Bolsheviks are *not* carrying on systematic work to prepare *THEIR* military forces to overthrow Kerenski.

Events have fully justified the stand I took at the time of the Democratic Conference, that the party *must* work toward an armed uprising. Events *force* this on us. The question of *arms* is now the fundamental *political* question. I fear that the Bolsheviks forget this. They are carried away by "the topics of the day," by details, and by the "*hope*" that "a wave will carry away Kerenski." Such a hope is quite naïve. It is working "at random." Such an attitude on the part of a revolutionary proletariat party may prove to be criminal.

My opinion is that we should carry on agitation in the party to consider seriously an armed uprising, and therefore this letter should be written on a machine and sent [to our party men] in Petrograd and Moscow.

2.

Now as to your rôle. It seems to me that the only thing which we can *completely* have in our hands and which is of military *importance*

¹ "Leninski Sbornik," IV, 335-9.

is the army in Finland and the Baltic fleet. It seems to me that you should make use of your high position to throw off on your assistants and secretaries all the petty details and routine work, not waste any time on "resolutions," but give *all* your *attention* to preparing the army in Finland and the fleet for the overthrow of Kerenski. Form a *secret* committee of MOST DEPENDABLE military men; examine with them the question from *all sides*; collect (and *you personally* verify) accurate information about the composition and disposition of the troops near and in Petrograd, about the possibility of bringing the army in Finland to Petrograd, and regarding the movements of the fleet, etc.

Beautifully worded resolutions and Soviets *without power* make us ridiculous losers. I think that you are in a position to bring together reliable and able military men. Go to Ino [fortress] and other important points; make a really careful and *serious* study of the situation; do not be carried away by the boastful phrases which we are *too much in the habit* of making.

It is quite clear that we must UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES permit the removal of the troops from Finland. It is better to risk EVERYTHING on an uprising, the seizure of power—to be handed over to the Congress of Soviets. I read in today's paper that in two weeks all danger of a [German] landing will be over. It means that you have very little time to get ready.

3.

Furthermore, it is necessary to make use of [your] "authority" in Finland to carry on a systematic propaganda among the Cossacks who are now in Finland. Some of these Kerenski and Company purposely removed from Wiborg, for fear they would become tainted with "Bolshevism," and stationed at Usikirko and Perkiarvi, which are between Wiborg and Terioki, where they would be safely isolated from the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to get full information about these Cossacks and to send among them some of our best soldier and sailor *agitators* that can be found in Finland. This is most urgent. The same is true in regard to printed matter.

4.

Furthermore, soldiers and sailors are given leave of absence. Organize those who have leave, to go to the country into propaganda units for systematic agitation. Let them visit villages and counties to agitate in general and for the Constituent Assembly. You are in

an exceptionally good position. You can *begin* at once to form a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionists of the left wing. Only this move can put real power in our hands in Russia and secure for us a majority in the Constituent Assembly. In the meantime, form such a *bloc* where you are; make arrangements about publishing leaflets; (let me know what technical problems you may have in printing them and getting them into Russia). And then it is necessary that in each group of village propagandists there should be at least *two* men: one Bolshevik and one Left Socialist-Revolutionist. At the present moment the "firm" of Socialist-Revolutionists is doing a thriving business, and you should take advantage of your good luck (for you have Left Socialist-Revolutionists) to form in the village in the NAME OF THIS firm a bloc of Bolsheviks and LEFT Socialist-Revolutionists, peasants with workmen, but not with the capitalists.

In my opinion, in order to prepare people's minds properly, there should be circulated at once this slogan: The power should immediately be placed in the hands of the Petrograd Soviet, which should *hand it over* to the Congress of Soviets. Why endure three more weeks of war and the "Kornilov preparations" of Kerenski? The *spreading* of such a slogan by the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionists in Finland can bring nothing but good results.

* * * *

6.

Now that you are at the head of the "government" in Finland, there falls to you one very important, though simple problem. To work out a plan for bringing printed material illegally into Russia FROM Sweden. Without it, all this talk of "International" is just *words*. It can be done in the following manner:

1. Have your own *soldier* organization on the frontier. 2. If that is not possible, send *regularly* at least ONE trustworthy man to one place, where I began to arrange about transport with the help of *that person in whose home I spent one day* before going to Helsingfors. (Rovio knows him.) It is possible that it may take a little money. Be sure to do that!

7.

I think that we should meet to talk over these matters. You could come and thereby lose less than one day. But if you can come *only* to see me, request Rovio to telephone to Khutunen [Finnish Socialist] whether it is possible for Rovio's "wife's sister" ("wife's sister" = you) to see Khutunen's "sister" ("sister" = I), for [otherwise]

it is possible that I may go away unexpectedly. Be sure to reply to this letter (*burn it*) by the same comrade who hands it to Rovio and WHO RETURNS SOON.

In case I should remain here for some time, we must arrange about getting mail. YOU CAN HELP in this by handing the railway men envelopes addressed to the Wiborg SOVIET (and inside of these envelopes have others for Khutunen).

8.

Send me by the same comrade an identification paper (the more formal the better, on the stationery of the Regional Committee, signed by the chairman, with the seal; have it typed on the machine or written in a *very clear hand*) made out to Konstantine Petrovich Ivanov. Have the certificate read that the chairman of the Regional Committee vouches for this comrade and asks *all Soviets*, WIBORG Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, as well as others, to have *full confidence* in him and help him in every possible way. I need it in case ANYTHING should happen, a "conflict" or "meeting."

9.

Do you happen to have the book, published in Moscow, "Reëxamination of the Programs"? Make a search for it in Helsingfors, and send it to me by the same comrade.

10.

Please keep in mind that Rovio is a first-rate man but LAZY. One has to keep after him, to REMIND him twice a day, otherwise he does not do anything,

Greetings!

K[ONSTANTINE] IVA[NOV]

CHAPTER XLVI

THE BOLSHEVIK UPRISING ¹

1. RUMORS

In Government circles no attention is paid to the rumors of a Bolshevik uprising on November 2. In any case, the Government is prepared to keep order.

2. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE UPRISING ²

In view of the fact that some of the Ministers have gone to Moscow, there was no formal meeting on October 27. In the morning, however, a number of the Ministers met in the office of the Prime Minister to take up current questions. Much of the discussion was over the rumors of the coming uprising of the Bolsheviks. It would seem that there really is foundation for these reports. Recently certain individuals, claiming to be representatives of Bolshevik organizations, have visited factories, mills, and barracks, calling on the workers and soldiers to come out with the slogan "All Power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." Until now it has not been possible to ascertain definitely whether these persons are really authorized to act in the name of the Bolshevik organizations. On the contrary, in Government circles it is taken for granted that the very radical agitation is carried on vigorously by dark forces, among them the former agents of the old régime, and a few with criminal records.

In any case, the Provisional Government has decided to take most energetic steps to prevent uprisings or excesses.

3. ANNOUNCEMENT BY MAYOR OF PETROGRAD ON THE FOOD SITUATION ³

Citizens: Having been elected by you, I would be false to my trust and unworthy of your confidence if I were to conceal the

¹ "Riech," No. 240, October 25, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, No. 243, October 28, 1917.

³ "Izvestia," No. 199, October 30, 1917.

truth from you. I feel in duty bound to tell you of the food situation in the capital.

The city дума, the city administration, and the special food commissions are doing everything in their power to supply the needs of the population. Unfortunately the regions that produce food refuse, for one reason or another, to sell it to Petrograd. Even the little that is with difficulty secured cannot easily be brought here, owing to the disorganization of the railway service and the fact that it is held up en route and stolen. That portion which finally reaches Petrograd can only with difficulty be unloaded, due to lack of hands and teams.

At the present time hardly any flour comes to the city. We get nothing but grain. Our mills are forced to the limit to grind sufficient flour for the needs of the capital. Part of the flour we must give up for the use of the Petrograd garrison.

Citizens, our condition is such that if a freight train should be late, if unloading should be delayed, if the mills should stop working for a few hours, then the food situation of the capital would be critical.

Citizens, this situation will become terrible if, in addition, there should be disorders in the city. Disorders will inevitably delay and even stop the work of supplying the inhabitants with food. The least stoppage of this work, in view of the lack of food reserves, will throw us, your wives, and children into a state of famine. He who brings about such a serious condition commits a terrible crime.

4. ARMING FOR THE UPRISING*

. . . The Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies brings to the attention of factory committees and other organizations that, in accordance with the resolution of the commission of the Central Executive Committee to fight counter-revolution, no arms, ammunition, or explosives should be given out to any organization without the authorization of the Provisional Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. . . .

* "Izvestiia," No. 200, October 31, 1917.

5. MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET ⁵

[October 31]

Meeting opened at 7 P. M., with Trotski in the chair. At the beginning there were reports by representatives from the front. A majority of them said that the front desired just one thing and that is an end of the war at all costs. The next question was the Congress [of Soviets]. Karakhan reported that . . . it was postponed until November 7. . . . In connection with the rumors of a Bolshevik uprising, Trotski said:

Comrades, during the last days the press has been full of rumors and articles on the supposed uprising, which is credited sometimes to the Bolsheviks and sometimes to the Petrograd Soviet. I should like to make a statement on the subject, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet.

The decisions of the Petrograd Soviet are published for the information of all. The Soviet is an elective body; each deputy is responsible to his constituency. This revolutionary parliament cannot take a decision without its being known to all workmen and soldiers.

And those of the bourgeoisie who think they have a right to question us about our political plans we refer to our political decisions, which are known to all. If the Petrograd Soviet should find it necessary to set a date for an uprising, it would do so. But I do not know when and where such an uprising was decided upon. The bourgeois press says it was set for November 4. This is "Petrograd Soviet Day," which was set aside by the Executive Committee for the purpose of propaganda and money collection.

It was also pointed out that I, as chairman of the Soviet, have signed an order for 5,000 rifles. In accordance with the decision of the committee to fight counter-revolution, at the time of Kornilov, to organize and equip a workers' militia, I, in fulfilment of this resolution gave orders for 5,000 rifles. . . .

In regard to the other question—the calling of the Congress. At this time there is a desire to separate Petrograd from the garrison. This is very clear, for it is understood that the Congress will certainly pass a resolution that the power should be handed over to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and for an immediate armistice on all fronts, and the transfer of all land to the peasants. The bourgeoisie knows all this and therefore desires to arm against us all those who are subject to them. . . .

⁵ "Izvestiia," No. 201, November 1, 1917.

6. MAD ADVENTURE *

Apparently all pleadings are in vain, and the Bolshevik uprising, which we have warned against as a terrible trial for the country, is being organized and started. It is only three weeks to the Constituent Assembly, only a few days to the Congress of Soviets, and yet the Bolsheviks have decided to bring about a new coup d'état. They are making use of the wide discontent and the great ignorance that exists among the masses of soldiers and workers. They have taken upon themselves the boldness to promise the people bread, peace, and land. We have no doubt whatsoever that they are unable to keep a single one of their promises, even if they succeed in their attempt.

They can not provide the city population with bread because little of it is or can be brought in, due to the breakdown of the railways. If anarchy increases, still less will be brought in. One of the first consequences of the Bolshevik attempt will be to lower the food supplies of the city and army. If the Bolsheviks should really seize power, a state of famine would be reached. A Bolshevik government would never be recognized in the far southern steppes, and the grain which comes from there for the whole of Russia would be held back. The question of food is bound up with the question of organization, and who can doubt that organization suffers in time of civil war and that it will break down completely if the power falls into hands which have never had any practical experience in State affairs, who have not even a conception of the problems? They can confiscate the supplies in warehouses and stores and with this they can feed the population of the capital for a day or two, but no more. After that there will be famine, riots and pogroms. This is the only solution to the food problem that the Bolsheviks have, and they cannot do anything more, no matter how hard they try.

As regards the land question. The land can be transferred to the toilers in one of two ways. By passing the necessary legislation and proper organization of land distribution, or by the simple method of grabbing by peasants. The first method means not only working out the necessary legislation, but the forming of local land committees, working according to a definite plan, on the basis of population and the amount of land. How can the Bolsheviks carry on such a work, when they never had a village organization, when they never had,

* "Izvestiia," No. 206, November 7, 1917, Editorial.

and do not now have, a majority either in the zemstvos or volosts? The best they can possibly do is to issue an order in two words: grab land! Such an order would lead to agrarian disorders, destruction, which they, to save their face, call agrarian revolts, but under no circumstances can it be called handing over the land to the toilers. Under this system the land goes not to the man who needs it, but to the one who desires it.

Destruction of estates does not mean a division of the land. To a very large extent the landless peasants will be as landless as before. In any case, the very people, that is to say the soldiers, who have the most right to expect a distribution of the land, will be left out in the cold. After the general land grabbing, the soldiers may be obliged to make use of their guns to get some land for themselves, either in their own or neighboring village, or in some distant place. Land grabbing is not the kind of agrarian legislation that a revolutionary army, above all, has a right to expect. It is a barbarous system which impoverishes, at least at first, the country as a whole.

In regard to the question of peace, it is no better. By disorganized fraternization the firing may cease on certain points along the front. One can abandon these points and make it possible for the enemy to surround those who remain at their posts, to kill them or take them prisoners. One can open the front and give the foe a chance to occupy new territory. In this way, however, peace is not to be had. Only a State can conclude peace. In order to have a peace with some degree of success, it is necessary that the State should be united and strong, should have the respect of allies and enemies. No one will make peace with a country in the throes of civil war, for there is no sense in concluding a treaty with a State that is not recognized. Under such circumstances it is advantageous for the enemy, even if he desires peace, to go on with the war, in order to improve his situation still more and put himself in a still more advantageous position. The experience of this summer shows that with each military success of the Germans the reactionary party in Germany became stronger and the position of William improved, and thereby the chances of a democratic peace decreased. The Bolsheviks promise an immediate peace, but all that they can do is to hand Russia over immediately to William, even though they may not wish to do that, even though they may fight against it with all their might. The logic of events, which is stronger than man's, will lead to that.

But worst of all is the fact that the Bolshevik uprising, if successful, will bring on a series of civil wars between different regions

of the country, as well as in the interior of each region. We would have a régime of fist-right. In one place there would be a white terror and in another a red terror. All constructive work for any length of time would be impossible. One of the outcomes of the anarchy would be that the first adventurer that came along would seize power, and the ignorant masses (of whom our country has so many) would turn to Nicholas II to save them from the revolution, which was not able to give the people what it had promised.

The Bolshevik uprising can lead only to that. Is it possible that people do not understand that dictatorship and terror are not the way to organize a country? Is it not clear that the dictatorship of one party, no matter how radical, will be as hateful to the great majority of the people as the autocracy? Is it not clear that an attempted uprising, at the time of the preparation for the election to the Constituent Assembly, can be regarded as a non-criminal act only because it is a mad act?

7. MEETING OF PETROGRAD SOVIET¹

[*November 7*]

The meeting was opened at 7 P. M. by Trotski, who said: We learned in the course of the night that the Provisional Government has called for a battalion of picked men from Tsarskoe Selo, the officers' school from Oranienbaum, and artillery from Pavlovsk. Early in the morning we received information that two papers, "Soldat" and "Rabochi Put," have been closed.

But the War-Revolutionary Committee was not a passive onlooker, and, as a result, all the troops called out by the Government, with the exception of a small group of cadets, have refused to obey orders. In addition to this, the War-Revolutionary Committee proposed to the Litovski regiment to take upon itself the protection of our papers, which was done immediately, and the printing presses are working regularly. No attention was paid to the order of the Provisional Government to the cruiser Aurora to weigh anchor and leave Petrograd. The cruiser is just where she was yesterday, which is in accordance with the instructions of the War-Revolutionary Committee. . . .

We were asked whether we planned to have an uprising. I replied that the Petrograd Soviet stood for a transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets, and at the present time, today or tomorrow,

¹ "Izvestiia," No. 206, November 7, 1917.

when the All-Russian Congress of Soviets opens, this slogan will be put into force. Whether this will lead to an uprising depends not on us but on those who oppose us.

We regard the Provisional Government as nothing more than a pitiful, helpless half-government, which waits the motion of a historical broom to sweep it off, to make room for a real, popular government. The present government has lost everything—support, authority, right, and morale.

But a conflict in the form of an uprising is not in our plan for today or tomorrow, when the All-Russian Congress of Soviets is about to meet. We believe that the Congress will carry through our slogan with considerable force and authority. But if the Government wishes to make use of the hours—24, 48 or 72—which it still has to live, and comes out against us, then we will meet it with a counter-attack, blow for blow, steel for iron. . . .

THE END OF THE KERENSKI RÉGIME ⁸

[November 7]

Kerenski remained at the office of the Staff from 2 until 7 A. M. . . . At 7 he set out for the front. . . . He is expected back any minute. . . . At 8:30 P. M., the Provisional Government at the Winter Palace received an ultimatum signed by the Petrograd Soviet. Members of the government were given 20 minutes in which to surrender, and in case of refusal they were threatened with having the guns of the Peter and Paul Fortress and the cruiser Aurora turned on the Winter Palace. The Government refused to discuss matters and to accept the ultimatum. . . .

News reached us at 2 A. M. that the Winter Palace was taken, that the members of the Government were arrested . . . and locked up at the Peter and Paul Fortress.

MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET ⁹

The meeting opened at 2:35 P. M. with Trotski in the chair. He said: "In the name of the War-Revolutionary Committee, I announce that the Provisional Government no longer exists. (Applause.) Some of the Ministers are already under arrest. (Bravo.) Others soon will be. (Applause.) The revolutionary garrison, under the control of the War-Revolutionary Committee, has dismissed the Assembly of the Pre-Parliament [Council of the Republic]. (Loud applause. "Long

⁸ "Izvestia," No. 207, November 8, 1917.

⁹ *Ibid.*

live the War-Revolutionary Committee") . . . The railway stations, post and telegraph offices, the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, and State Bank are occupied." . . .

Trotsky continued by saying: "In our midst is Vladimir Ilich Lenin, who, by force of circumstances, had not been able to be with us all this time. . . . Hail the return of Lenin!" The audience gave him a noisy ovation. . . .

*Lenin's Speech*¹⁰

Comrades, the workmen's and peasants' revolution, the need of which the Bolsheviks have emphasized many times, has come to pass.

What is the significance of this revolution? Its significance is, in the first place, that we shall have a soviet government, without the participation of bourgeoisie of any kind. The oppressed masses will of themselves form a government. The old 'state machinery will be smashed into bits and in its place will be created a new machinery of government by the soviet organizations. From now on there is a new page in the history of Russia, and the present, third Russian revolution shall in its final result lead to the victory of Socialism.

One of our immediate tasks is to put an end to the war at once. But in order to end the war, which is closely bound up with the present capitalistic system, it is necessary to overthrow capitalism itself. In this work we shall have the aid of the world labor movement, which has already begun to develop in Italy, England, and Germany.

A just and immediate offer of peace by us to the international democracy will find everywhere a warm response among the international proletariat masses. In order to secure the confidence of the proletariat, it is necessary to publish at once all secret treaties.

In the interior of Russia a very large part of the peasantry has said: Enough playing with the capitalists; we will go with the workers. We shall secure the confidence of the peasants by one decree, which will wipe out the private property of the landowners. The peasants will understand that their only salvation is in union with the workers.

We will establish a real labor control on production.

We have now learned to work together in a friendly manner, as is evident from this revolution. We have the force of mass organization which has conquered all and which will lead the proletariat to world revolution.

¹⁰ "Izvestiia," No. 207, November 8, 1917.

We should now occupy ourselves in Russia in building up a proletarian socialist state.

Long live the world-wide socialistic revolution.

8. BOLSHEVIKS IN POWER ¹¹

Yesterday we said that the Bolshevik uprising is a mad adventure and today, when their attempt is crowned with success, we are of the same mind. We repeat: that which is before us is not a transfer of power to the Soviets, but a seizure of power by one party—the Bolsheviks. Yesterday we said that a successful attempt meant the breaking up of the greatest conquest of the revolution—the Constituent Assembly. Today we add that it means, also, the breaking up of the Congress of Soviets, and perhaps the whole soviet organization. These are the facts: The Socialist-Revolutionists and the Social-Democrat Mensheviks (the defensists and the internationalists) have found it impossible under present circumstances to take part in the congress. This is also the point of view of the men from the front. With the departure of these groups from the Congress, there are left . . . the Bolsheviks. They can call themselves what they please; the fact remains that the Bolsheviks alone took part in the uprising. All the other socialistic and democratic parties protest against it.

How the situation may develop we do not know, but little good is to be expected. We are quite confident that the Bolsheviks can not organize a state government. As yesterday, so today, we repeat that what is happening will react worst of all on the question of peace. . . . Today the Council of the Republic was to vote a special resolution on the question of peace. But the Mariinski Palace was occupied by the Revolutionary Committee, and the Council did not meet. . . .

9. FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ¹²

At the meeting [of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets] on November 8, Kamenev read the following decree:

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies resolves to form a provisional workers' and

¹¹ "Izvestia," No. 207, November 8, 1917, Editorial. This was the last number of the "Izvestia" published by the Central Executive Committee. On the day following it was already in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

¹² Trotsky, L.; "Sochineniia," III, Part 2, 1917, 392.

peasants' government, to be known as the Soviet of People's Commissars, to govern the country until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The control over the acts of the People's Commissars and the right to change them belongs to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies and its Central Executive Committee.

For the present the Soviet of People's Commissars is made up of the following persons:

<i>President of the Soviet:</i>	VLADIMIR ULIANOV (Lenin)
<i>Commissar of the Interior:</i>	A. I. RYKOV
<i>Commissar of Agriculture:</i>	V. P. MILIUTIN
<i>Commissar of Labor:</i>	A. G. SHLIAPNIKOV
<i>Commissar of War and Navy:</i>	Committee made up of V. A. OVSEENKO (Antonov) N. V. KRYLENKO and DYBENKO
<i>Commissars of</i>	
<i>Commerce and Industry:</i>	V. P. NOGIN
<i>Commissar of Education:</i>	A. V. LUNACHARSKI
<i>Commissar of Finance:</i>	I. I. SKVORTSOV
<i>Commissar of Foreign Affairs:</i>	L. D. BRONSTEIN (Trotsky)
<i>Commissar of Justice:</i>	G. I. OPPOKOV (Lomov)
<i>Commissar of Food:</i>	I. A. TEODOROVICH
<i>Commissar of Post and</i>	
<i>Telegraph:</i>	N. P. AVILOV (Glebov)
<i>Chairman for Nationalities:</i>	I. V. DZHUGASHVILI (Stalin)
<i>Commissar of Railways:</i>	Not named for the time being.

10. DECREE OF PEACE PASSED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', SOLDIERS', AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES ON NOVEMBER 8, 1917¹⁸

The Workers' and Peasants' Government, created by the revolution of November 6-7, and drawing its strength from the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, proposes to all warring people and their governments that negotiations leading to a just peace begin at once.

The just and democratic peace for which the great majority of war-exhausted, tormented toilers and laboring classes of all bel-

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 208, November 9, 1917.

ligerent countries are thirsting; the peace for which the Russian workers and peasants are so insistently and loudly clamoring since the overthrow of the tsarist régime is, in the opinion of the Government, an immediate peace without annexation (*i. e.*, without the seizure of foreign lands and the forcible taking over of other nationalities) and without indemnity.

The Russian Government proposes that this kind of peace be concluded immediately between all the warring nations. It offers to take decisive steps at once, without the least delay, without waiting for a final confirmation of all the terms of such a peace by conferences of popular representatives of all countries and all nations.

The Government interprets the term annexation or seizure of foreign lands, in the light in which it is understood by the democracy in general, and the working classes in particular, that is to say, every annexation by a large and strong state of a small and weak nationality, without a clear and voluntary expression of agreement to that act by the said nationality; regardless of the time when such forcible annexation took place; regardless of the cultural development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed or forcibly detained within the frontiers of a certain state; regardless, finally, of the fact whether said nation is in Europe or far away across the ocean.

If any nation whatsoever is detained by force within the boundaries of another state; if it is detained against its will—whether expressed in the press, national assemblies, party decisions, or restlessness and uprising against national oppression—and is not able to vote freely, owing to the presence of troops of the annexing or stronger nation, and to determine, without the least pressure, its form of state life; then such an acquisition is annexation, that is to say, seizure by force.

To prolong this war because the rich and strong nations cannot agree how to divide the small and weak nationalities which they have seized is, in the opinion of the Government, a most criminal act against humanity, and it [government] solemnly announces its decision to sign at once terms of peace bringing this war to an end on the indicated conditions, which are equally just to all nationalities without exception.

Moreover, the Government declares that it does not regard the above mentioned terms of peace in the light of an ultimatum. It will agree to examine all other terms. It will insist only that whatever belligerent nation has anything to propose, it should do so quickly, in the clearest terms, leaving out all double meanings and all secrets

in making the proposal. The Government does away with all secret diplomacy and is determined to carry on all negotiations quite openly in the view of all people. It will proceed at once to publish all secret treaties, ratified or concluded by the government of landowners and capitalists, from March until November 7, 1917.

The Government annuls, immediately and unconditionally, the secret treaties, in so far as they have for their object, which was true in a majority of cases, to give benefits and privileges to the Russian landowners and capitalists, to maintain or to increase annexation by the Great Russians.

In proposing to the Governments and peoples of all countries to begin open peace negotiations at once, the Government, on its part, expresses its readiness to carry on these negotiations in writing, by telegraph, by discussions between representatives of different countries, or at a conference of such representatives. To facilitate these negotiations, the Government appoints its authorized agents in neutral countries.

The Government proposes to all governments and peoples of all belligerent countries to conclude at once an armistice of no less than three months, *i. e.*, for a period long enough not only to negotiate peace with the participation of representatives of all nations or nationalities, without exception, that were drawn into the war or forced to take part in it, but also to permit the calling together in all countries of assemblies of national representatives for the final ratification of the peace terms. In making these peace proposals to the governments and peoples of all warring countries, the Provisional Government of Workers and Peasants of Russia appeals in particular to the intelligent workers of the three foremost nations of mankind, and the leading participators in this war, England, France, and Germany. The toilers of these countries have rendered the greatest service to the cause of progress and Socialism by their great examples, such as the Chartist movement in England, the series of revolutions of historical and world importance brought on by the French proletariat, and, finally, the heroic struggle against the Exemption Laws in Germany, and the example for the workers of all the world given by the German toilers in their stubborn, prolonged, and disciplined efforts to organize the proletarian masses. All these examples of proletarian heroism and historical development lead us to believe that the workers of the named countries will understand the task before them to free humanity from the horrors of war and its consequences. By decisive, energetic, and self-sacrificing efforts in

various directions, these workers will help us not only to bring the peace negotiations to a successful end, but to free the toiling and exploited masses from all forms of slavery and all exploitation.

II. THE LAND DECREE¹⁴

The final settlement of the land question belongs to the national Constituent Assembly.

The most equitable settlement is as follows:

1. The right of private ownership of land is abolished forever. Land cannot be sold, bought, leased, mortgaged, or alienated in any manner whatsoever. All lands—state, appanage, cabinet, monastery, church, entail, private, communal, peasant, and any other lands—pass to the nation without indemnification and are turned over for the use of those who till them.

Persons who have suffered from the loss of property will be entitled to public aid only during the time necessary for their readjustment to the changed conditions of existence.

2. All the underground resources, such as ores, petroleum, coal, salt, etc., as well as forests and waters which have national importance, are transferred for the exclusive use of the State. All small streams, lakes, forests, etc., are transferred for the use of the land communities, on condition that they be administered by the organs of local self-government.

3. Holdings under intensive agriculture—orchards, gardens, plantations, nurseries, etc., are not to be divided, but turned into model farms and handed over to the State or the community, depending upon size and importance.

Small private estates, city and village land in fruit or truck gardens, are to be left in possession of their present owners, but the size of these holdings and the amount of tax to be paid on them shall be determined by law.

4. Stud farms, State and private farms for breeding thoroughbred stock, poultry, etc., shall be confiscated, nationalized, and turned over either for the exclusive use of the State, or the land community, depending upon their size and importance. The question of indemnification is to be settled by the Constituent Assembly.

5. The entire livestock, tools, etc., of confiscated lands shall be

¹⁴ "Izvestiia," No. 209, November 10, 1917. This Land Decree is practically the same as the Land Mandate of the Peasants, which was published in the "Izvestiia Vserossiiskogo Sovieta Krestianskikh Deputatov," No. 88, September 19, 1917.

turned over for the exclusive use of the State or land community, depending upon size and importance, without indemnification, but this does not apply to the small landholding peasants.

6. All Russian citizens (male and female) who are willing to till the land, either by themselves or with the assistance of their families or in collective groups, are entitled to the use of the land, as long as they are able to cultivate it. Hired labor is not permitted. In case a member of a rural community is incapacitated for a period of two years, it becomes the duty of the community to help him until he recovers, by collectively tilling his land. Farmers who are too old or physically unable to till the soil, lose the right to it, but receive instead a State pension.

7. The land is to be divided equally among the toilers, according to needs or labor capacity, depending on local conditions. Each community is to decide for itself how its land is to be apportioned, whether it is to be held collectively or as homesteads or artels.

8. All the alienated land goes into one national fund. Its distribution among the toilers is carried out by local and central self-governing bodies, beginning with the democratic organization in villages and cities and ending with the central regional institutions. This fund is subject to periodical redistribution, based on the rise in population, the increase in production, and the methods of cultivation.

In changing the boundaries of land allotments, the original nuclei of the allotments [made after the emancipation of the serfs] shall not be disturbed.

The land of members passing out of the community reverts to the land fund, but the preferential right to it goes to the nearest relatives and persons designated by those who held it last.

At the time that the land reverts to the fund, there shall be compensation for the fertilization and improvements (fundamental improvements) made on it to the amount that these ameliorations had not yet yielded returns.

Should the supply of land in certain localities be inadequate for the needs of the inhabitants, the surplus population shall be settled elsewhere at the expense of the State, which shall organize the undertaking and provide the settlers with the necessary equipment. The settlers shall be taken in the following order: landless peasants willing to go, undesirable citizens, army deserters *et al*, and lastly, those drawn by lot or who voluntarily offer to go.

All that has been stated in this mandate is an expression of the strong wish of an overwhelming majority of politically conscious

peasants and is proclaimed as a provisional law to be put into force before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Some portions of it are to go into effect as soon as possible, and other portions gradually, as may seem best to the Uezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

The lands of peasants and Cossacks of average means shall not be confiscated.

President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars

VLADIMIR ULIANOV LENIN

November 8, 1917.

APPENDICES

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The appendices contain a few important documents and some valuable information not easily found elsewhere.

MANIFESTO TO IMPROVE THE STATE ORDER¹

October 17 [30] 1905

The rioting and agitation in the capitals and in many localities of OUR Empire fills OUR heart with great and deep grief. The welfare of the Russian Emperor is bound up with the welfare of the people, and its sorrows are HIS sorrows. The turbulence which has broken out may confound the people and threaten the integrity and unity of OUR Empire.

The great vow of service by the Tsar obligates US to endeavor, with all OUR strength, wisdom, and power, to put an end as quickly as possible to the disturbance so dangerous to the Empire. In commanding the responsible authorities to take measures to stop disorders, lawlessness, and violence, and to protect peaceful citizens in the quiet performance of their duties, WE have found it necessary to unite the activities of the Supreme Government, so as to insure the successful carrying out of the general measures laid down by US for the peaceful life of the state.

We lay upon the Government the execution of OUR unchangeable will:

1. To grant to the population the inviolable right of free citizenship, based on the principles of the freedom of person, conscience, speech, assembly, and union.

2. Without postponing the intended elections for the State Duma and in so far as possible, in view of the short time that remains before the assembling of that body, to include in the participation of the work of the Duma those classes of the population that have been until now entirely deprived of the right to vote, and to extend

¹ "Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii," XXV, 1905, 754.

in the future, by the newly created legislative way, the principles of the general right of election.

3. To establish as an unbreakable rule that no law shall go into force without its confirmation by the State Duma and that the persons elected by the people shall have the opportunity for actual participation in supervising the legality of the acts of authorities appointed by US.

We call on all the true sons of Russia to remember their duties toward their country, to assist in combating these unheard-of disturbances, and to join US with all their might in reestablishing quiet and peace in the country.

Given in Peterhof, on the seventeenth [thirtieth] day of October in the year of our Lord 1905, and the eleventh year of OUR reign.

NICHOLAS

MANIFESTO TO BETTER CONDITIONS AND IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEASANT POPULATION *

November 3 [16] 1905

WE declare to all OUR loyal subjects:

The troubles that have broken out in villages of certain uiezds, where the peasants have resorted to violence on large estates, fills OUR heart with deep sorrow. Taking the law into one's hands and acting in a high-handed manner can not be tolerated, and OUR military and civil authorities have been instructed to use every means to prevent and put an end to disorder and to punish the guilty.

The needs of the peasant are close to OUR heart and are not ignored. Violence and crime do not, however, help the peasant and may bring much sorrow and misery to the country. The only way to better permanently the welfare of the peasant is by peaceful and legal means; and to improve his condition has always been one of OUR first cares. We have lately given orders to collect and place before US information relating to the measures that might be taken immediately for the benefit of the peasants. Having considered it, we have decided:

1. To reduce by half, from January 1, 1906, and to discontinue

* "Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii," XXV, 1905, 790.

altogether after January 1, 1907, payments due [to the State] from peasants for land which before emancipation belonged to large land-owners, State, and Crown.

2. To make it easier for the Peasant Land Bank, by increasing its resources, and by offering better terms for loans, to help the peasant with little land to buy more.

WE have given special orders to bring these measures to pass. WE are convinced that by uniting OUR efforts with those of the best men elected in Russia, who should be freely elected by OUR loyal subjects, including the peasants, WE shall succeed in satisfying the other needs of the peasants without causing any harm to other landowners.

WE trust that the peasant population so dear to OUR heart, will give heed to the Christian teaching of love and good, and will listen to OUR Tsar call, to preserve peace and order, and not to violate the laws and rights of others.

Given at Tsarskoe Selo, on the third [sixteenth] day of November in the year of Our Lord 1905, and the twelfth of OUR reign.

NICHOLAS

TSARIST MINISTERS: 1914-1917

PRIME MINISTERS

Goremykin, Ivan Loginovich, February 12, 1914-February 2, 1916.

Sturmer, Boris Vladimirovich, February 2, 1916-November 23, 1916.

Trepov, Alexander Fedorovich, November 23, 1916-January 9, 1917.

Prince Golitsyn, Nikolai Dmitrievich, January 10, 1917-March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR

Maklakov, Nikolai Alekseevich, 1913-June 18, 1915.

Prince Shcherbatov, Nikolai Borisovich, June 18, 1915-October 9, 1915.

Khvostov, Aleksei Nikolaevich, October 9, 1915-March 16, 1916.

Sturmer, Boris Vladimirovich, March 16, 1916-July 22, 1916.

Khvostov, Alexander Alekseevich, July 22, 1916-September 29, 1916.

Protopopov, Alexander Dmitrievich, September 29, 1916-March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sazonov, Sergei Dmitrievich, 1910–July 20, 1916.

Sturmer, Boris Vladimirovich, July 29, 1916–November 23, 1916.

Pokrovski, Nikolai Nikolaevich, December 13, 1916–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF WAR

Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Alexandrovich, March 24, 1909–June 26, 1915.

Polivanov, Aleksei Andreevich, June 26, 1915–March 28, 1916.

Shuvaev, Dmitri Savelievich, March 28, 1916–January 16, 1917.

Beliaev, Mikhail Alekseevich, January 16, 1917–March 12, 1917.

MINISTER OF MARINE

Grigorovich, Ivan Konstantinovich, April 1911–March 12, 1917.

MINISTER OF FINANCE

Bark, Peter Lvovich, February 12, 1914–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Timashev, Sergei Ivanovich, 1909–March 2, 1915.

Prince Shakhovskoi, Vsevolod Nikolaevich, March 3, 1915–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF TRANSPORTATION

Rukhlov, Sergei Vasilievich, 1909–November 9, 1915.

Trepov, Alexander Fedorovich, November 12, 1915–January 9, 1917.

Voinovski-Kruger, E. B., January 10, 1917–March 13, 1917.

STATE COMPTROLLERS

Kharitonov, Peter Alekseevich, 1907–February 7, 1916.

Pokrovski, Nikolai Nikolaevich, February 7, 1916–December 13, 1916.

Feodosiev, Sergei Grigorievich, December 15, 1916–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE

Krivoshein, Alexander Vasilievich, 1908–November 8, 1915.

Naumov, Alexander Nikolaevich, November 23, 1915–August 3, 1916.

Count Bobrinski, Aleksei Alexandrovich, August 3, 1916–November 27, 1916.

Rittikh, Alexander Alexandrovich, November 27, 1916–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF JUSTICE

Scheglovitov, Ivan Grigorievich, 1906–July 19, 1915.

Khvostov, Alexander Alekseevich, July 19, 1915–July 22, 1916.

Makarov, Alexander Alexandrovich, July 22, 1916–January 2, 1917.

Dobrovolski, Nikolai Alexandrovich, January 2, 1917–March 12, 1917.

OBERPROCURATORS OF THE HOLY SYNOD

Sabler, Vladimir Karlovich, May 15, 1911–July 17, 1915.

Samarin, Alexander Dmitrievich, July 17, 1915–October 9, 1915.

Volzhin, Alexander Nikolaevich, October 13, 1915–August 20, 1916.

Raev, Nikolai Pavlovich, September 12, 1916–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF EDUCATION

Kasso, Lev Aristidovich, 1910–December 9, 1914.

Count Ignatiev, Pavel Nikolaevich, January 22, 1915–January 9, 1917.

Kulchitski, Nikolai Konstantinovich, January 9, 1917–March 13, 1917.

MINISTER OF IMPERIAL COURT AND APPANAGE

Count Fredericks, Vladimir Borisovich, 1897–March 13, 1917.

MINISTER OF HEALTH

[This ministry was created on October 5, 1916.]

Rein, Georgi Ermolaevich, October 6, 1916–March 12, 1917.

MINISTERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

March 15, 1917–November 8, 1917

PRIME MINISTERS

Prince Lvov, Georgi Evgenievich, March 15, 1917–July 20, 1917.

Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, July 20, 1917–November 7, 1917.

ASSISTANT PRIME MINISTERS

Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, July 20, 1917–September 13, 1917.

Tereschenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, September 17, 1917–October 8, 1917.

Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovich, October 8, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Miliukov, Paul Nikolaevich, March 15, 1917–May 15, 1917.

Tereschenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, May 18, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF INTERIOR

Prince Lvov, Georgi Evgenievich, March 15, 1917–July 20, 1917.

Tseretelli, Irakli Georgievich, July 23, 1917–August 6, 1917.

Avksentiev, Nikolai Dmitrievich, August 7, 1917–September 18, 1917.

Nikitin, Aleksei Maksimovich, September 21, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF WAR

Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich, March 15, 1917–May 18, 1917.

Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, May 18, 1917–September 12, 1917.

Col. Verkhovski, A. I., September 12, 1917–November 6, 1917.

Gen. Manikovski, A. A. (acting minister of war), November 6, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF MARINE

Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich, March 15, 1917–May 18, 1917.

Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, May 18, 1917–September 12, 1917.

Rear Admiral Verderevski, Dmitri V., September 12, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF JUSTICE

Kerenski, Alexander Fedorovich, March 15, 1917–May 18, 1917.

Pereverzev, Paul Nikolaevich, May 18, 1917–July 19, 1917.

Efremov, Ivan Nikolaevich, July 23, 1917–August 6, 1917.

Zarudni, Alexander Sergeevich, August 6, 1917–September 18, 1917.

Maliantovich, Paul Nikolaevich, October 8, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF TRANSPORTATION

- Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, March 15, 1917–July 17, 1917.
Takhtamyshev, Georgi Stefanovich (acting minister), July 24, 1917–August 7, 1917.
Iurenev, Peter Petrovich, August 7, 1917–September 13, 1917.
Liverovski, Alexander V. (acting minister), September 11, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

- Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovich, March 15, 1917–June 2, 1917.
Stepanov, Vasili Alexandrovich (acting minister), June 3, 1917–July 17, 1917.
Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolaevich, August 7, 1917–September 29, 1917.
Konovalov, Alexander Ivanovich, October 8, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF EDUCATION

- Manuilov, Alexander Apollonovich, March 15, 1917–July 17, 1917.
Oldenburg, Sergei Fedorovich, August 7, 1917–September 13, 1917.
Salazkin, Sergei Sergeevich, September 17, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE

- Shingarev, Andrei Ivanovich, March 15, 1917–May 18, 1917.
Chernov, Victor Mikhailovich, May 18, 1917–September 10, 1917.
Maslov, Semen Leontievich, October 16, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF FINANCE

- Tereschenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, March 15, 1917–May 18, 1917.
Shingarev, Andrei Ivanovich, May 18, 1917–July 17, 1917.
Nekrasov, Nikolai Vissarionovich, August 7, 1917–September 13, 1917.
Bernatski, Mikhail Vladimirovich, September 15, 1917–November 7, 1917.

STATE COMPTROLLERS

- Godnev, Ivan Vasilievich, March 15, 1917–August 7, 1917.
Kokoshkin, Fedor Fedorovich, August 7, 1917–September 13, 1917.
Smirnov, Sergei A., October 8, 1917–November 7, 1917.

OBERPROCURATORS OF THE HOLY SYNOD

Lvov, Vladimir Nikolaevich, March 15, 1917–August 7, 1917.
Kartashev, Anton V., August 7, 1917–August 18, 1917.

MINISTERS OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

Kartashev, Anton V., August 18, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF FOOD

(Ministry created May 18, 1917.)

Peshekhonov, Aleksei Vasilievich, May 18, 1917–September 13, 1917.

Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolaevich, September 29, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF LABOR

(Ministry created May 18, 1917.)

Skobelev, Matvei Ivanovich, May 18, 1917–September 15, 1917.

Gvozdev, Kozma Antonovich, October 8, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF POST AND TELEGRAPH

(Ministry created May 18, 1917.)

Tseretelli, Irakli Georgievich, May 18, 1917–August 7, 1917.

Nikitin, Aleksei Maksimovich, August 7, 1917–November 7, 1917.

MINISTERS OF SOCIAL WELFARE

(Ministry created May 8, 1917.)

Prince Shakhovskoi, Dmitri Ivanovich, May 18, 1917–July 17, 1917.

Baryshnikov, Alexander Alexandrovich (acting minister), July 13, 1917–August 7, 1917.

Efremov, Ivan Nikolaevich, August 7, 1917–October 7, 1917.

Kishkin, Nikolai Mikhailovich, October 8, 1917–November 7, 1917.

ARMY LEADERS 1914–1917

SUPREME COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF

Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, August 2, 1914–September 5, 1915.

Tsar Nicholas II, September 5, 1915–March 15, 1917.

did not spend much time listening to reports. During the day I took a walk along the highway towards Orsha. The weather was sunny. After dinner I decided to go quickly to Tsarskoe Selo, and at 1 o'clock in the morning [March 13] boarded the train.

March 13, Tuesday

I went to bed at 3:15 as I had a long talk with [General] N. I. Ivanov, whom I am despatching to Petrograd with troops to restore order. We left Mogilev at five in the morning. I slept till 10 o'clock. The weather was cold and sunny. During the day we passed through Viazma, Rzhev, and Likhoslavl at 9 o'clock.

March 14, Wednesday

During the night we turned back from Malaia Vishera, as Liuban and Tosno seemed to be occupied by the rebels. We went to Valdai, Dno, and Pskov, where I stopped for the day. Saw Ruzski.* He, with Danilov and Savich, dined. Gatchina and Luga, too, reported to be in possession [of the rebels]. Shame and disgrace. Failed to reach Tsarskoe, [Selo] but my thoughts and feelings are always there. How hard it must be for poor Alix [Empress] to go through all these events alone. Lord help us.

March 15, Thursday

In the morning Ruzski came and read his very long direct-wire talk with Rodzianko. According to this, the situation in Petrograd is such that a Ministry of the Duma would now be powerless to do anything, for it has to contend with the Social-Democratic Party, represented by the workers' committee. My abdication is required. Ruzski transmitted this talk to Headquarters, and Alexeev sent it on to all the commanders-in-chief. By 2 o'clock replies were received from them. The gist of them is that in order to save Russia and keep the army at the front quiet, such a step must be taken. I have agreed. From Headquarters has been sent a draft of a manifesto. In the evening Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, with whom I discussed the matter, and I handed them the signed and altered manifesto. At 1 o'clock in the morning [16th] I left Pskov, with a heavy heart because of the things gone through. All around me there is treachery, cowardice, and deceit.

March 16, Friday

I slept long and well. Awoke far beyond Dvinsk. The day was sunny and cold. Talked with those near me about yesterday. Read

* General N. V. Ruzski, Commander of the Northern Army.

a great deal about Julius Caesar. Arrived at 8:20 at Mogilev. All ranks of the Staff were on the platform. Received Alexeev in the car. At 9:30 I went over to the house. Alexeev came with the latest news from Rodzianko. It transpires that Misha [Grand Duke Michael] has abdicated. His manifesto ends with a four-tail formula⁵ for the election of a constituent assembly within 6 months.⁶ God knows who put it into his head to sign such stuff. In Petrograd, the disturbances have ceased—if it would only remain that way.

March 17, Saturday

Slept well. At 10 o'clock came the good Aleck.⁶ Then I went to listen to the reports. At 12 I drove to the platform, to meet dear Mother, who has arrived from Kiev. I took her to my own place and lunched with her and our own family. We sat and talked a long time. Today, at last, I received two telegrams from dear Alix. I took a walk. The weather was very bad—cold, with a snowstorm. After tea I received Alexeev and Fredericks. Toward 8 o'clock I drove to dine with Mother and remained with her till 11.

March 18, Sunday

It blew hard during the night. The day was clear and frosty. At 10 I drove to mass. Mother arrived later. She lunched with me and stayed until 3:15. I walked about the little garden. After tea I received N. I. Ivanov, who has returned from his mission. He was at Tsarskoe Selo and saw Alix. I took leave of poor Count Fredericks and Voeikov, whose presence, for some reason, has been irritating everybody. They have gone to his estate in Penza province. At 8 o'clock I went to dine with Mother.

March 19, Monday

Last day at Mogilev. At 10:15 I signed the farewell order to the armies. At 10:30 I went into the guard-house to say good-bye to all ranks of the Staff and bureau. At my own house I bade farewell to the officers and Cossacks, of my guard, cavalry and infantry. It nearly broke my heart. At 12 o'clock I went to Mother's and lunched with her and her suite. At 4:30 I left her, Sandro,⁷ Sergei,⁷ Boris,⁷ and Aleck. Poor Nilov was not permitted to go with me. At 4:45 I left Mogilev; a crowd that was greatly moved came to

⁵ Universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. There was no definite time set for the Constituent Assembly.

⁶ Prince A. P. Oldenburg.

⁷ Grand Dukes Alexander and Sergei Mikhailovich, and Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich.

see me off. Four members of the Duma accompanied me. Went by way of Orsha and Vitebsk. The weather is cold and windy. It is hard, painful, and sad.

March 22, Thursday

Arrived quickly and safely at Tsarskoe Selo at 11:30. But, God, what a difference! On the street, around the palace, inside the park, wherever you turn there are sentries. Went upstairs and saw dear Alix and the precious children. She looked cheerful and well. The children were lying in a darkened room, but were in good spirits except Maria, who recently came down with the measles. We lunched and dined in the playroom with Alexei. I saw good Benckendorff. Walked with Valia Dolg^{*}. . . and worked with him in the little garden, as we cannot go beyond. . . . After tea I played a game of Solitaire. In the evening we visited all the occupants of the other wing and found them in their places.

March 23, Friday

We slept well. In spite of the present circumstances, the thought that we are all together cheers and consoles. In the morning I received Benckendorff. Later I looked through, arranged, and burned papers. Sat with the children till 2:30. Walked with Valia Dolg . . . accompanied by the same guard, who were today more agreeable. Had some good exercise working in the snow. Sunny weather. We spent the evening together.

March 24, Saturday

In the morning I received Benckendorff. Learned through him that we must remain here for some time. This is a pleasant thought. Continued burning letters and papers. Anastasia has earache just as the others had. From 3 till 4:30 I walked with Valia Dolg . . . and worked in the garden. The weather was unpleasant, windy, with 2 degrees of frost. At 6:45, we went to evening service at the field chapel. Alexei took his first bath. Called on Ania,⁹ Lilly D., and the others.

April 5, Thursday

After 2 o'clock it cleared and thawed. Walked for a short time in the morning. Sorted my belongings and books, and sorted the things I want to take with me in case I go to England. After luncheon I took a walk with Olga and Tatiana, and worked in the garden. Spent the evening as usual.

^{*} Dolgoruki.

⁹ Anna Vyubova and Lili Dehn.

April 9, Monday

We began to prepare for holy communion, but it has not started well. After mass Kerenski arrived and requested that we confine our meetings to mealtimes, and that we sit apart from the children. This, he claimed, was necessary in order to placate the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. I had to submit so as to avoid the possibility of violence. Took a walk with Tatiana. Olga has again taken to bed with a sore throat. The others feel well. At 9:45 I went down to my rooms. Tatiana sat with me till 10:30. Afterwards I did some reading, drank tea, and went to bed. . . .

April 12, Thursday

During the day a strong wind scattered the clouds. At 10 we went to mass, where many of our people took communion. Walked for a short time with Tatiana. Today was the funeral of the "victims of the revolution" in our park, opposite the central part of Alexandrovski Palace, not far from the Chinese Palace. We could hear the strains of the Funeral March and the Marseillaise. It was over by 5:30. At 6 o'clock we went to the service of the Twelve Apostles; Father Bieliaiev, all alone, bravely read all of them. The evening I spent like all recent ones.

April 20, Friday

The weather has improved and it has grown warmer. Was out of doors a long time this fine morning. During the day I was occupied with Tatiana and Alexei. The appearance of the soldiers, and their slovenly bearing have made a disgusting impression on all of us. Read a great deal. From 10:15 on I was in my own rooms, downstairs.

April 21, Saturday

Celebrated the 23d anniversary of our engagement quietly. Weather was springlike and warm. In the morning spent a long time with Alexei. Found out why yesterday's guard was so disagreeable: it was made up from among the Soldiers' Deputies. Today it has been a good guard, from the reserve battalion of the Fourth Rifles. Worked at the landing stage, on account of the mob, and we enjoyed the warm sunshine. Spent the evening as usual.

May 1, Tuesday

This is the first of May abroad, therefore our blockheads have decided to celebrate the day by parading in the streets with bands of music and red flags. They had evidently come into our park to

place wreaths on the grave, but the weather turned bad. Dense, wet snow fell. At 3:15, when everything was finished, I came out for a walk and the sun peeped out. Worked an hour and a half with Tatiana. In the evening I began to read aloud to the children.

May 14, Monday

Wonderful, warm day. In the morning I had a nice walk. From 12 o'clock I gave Alexei a geography lesson. During the day I worked again in our vegetable garden. The sun was scorching hot, but the work is progressing. Read till dinner, and in the evening, aloud. Yesterday we learned that General Kornilov has given up his post of Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military District, and this evening that Guchkov has resigned. Both of them give the same reason: the irresponsible interference of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and certain other organizations that are far more radical, with military authorities. What is Providence holding in store for poor Russia? God's will be done.

June 16, Saturday

After breakfast Kerenski arrived unexpectedly from the city by motor. He did not remain with me long. He asked me to send to the Investigation Commission any papers or letters that have any bearing on internal politics. After my walk and until luncheon I helped Korovichenko¹⁰ to sort these papers. The rest of the day he had the assistance of Kobylinski.¹¹ I finished sawing the trees on the first spot. At this time the incident of Alexei's rifle occurred. He had been playing with it on the little island and the soldiers, who walked in the garden, saw it and requested the officer to be allowed to take it away, and carried it off to the guard-house. Later, it transpired that the rifle, for some reason or other, was sent over to the common hall. Fine officers these, who dare not deny the requests of their soldiers! Attended the evening service. Spent the evening as usual.

June 22, Friday

Exactly three months since I came from Mogilev and here we are confined like prisoners. It is hard to be without news of dear Mother, but as for other matters, I am indifferent. Today the weather is still better—20 degrees in the shade, and 36 in the sun. There was the smell of fire in the air. After my walk, I took Alexei into my study, where it is cooler, went over his history lesson and

¹⁰ Korovichenko, Commandant of the Palace.

¹¹ Kobylinski succeeded him between the 10th and 15th.

accomplished something. Alix did not go outside. Until dinner, the five of us were together. The weather was comparatively cool. The day passed as usual. Just before dinner came the good news of the launching of an offensive on the southwest front. In the direction of Zolochov our troops, after two days of artillery action, broke through the enemy's positions and captured about 170 officers and 10,000 men, 6 cannon and 24 machine guns. The Lord be praised! God grant that this may be an auspicious hour. I felt altogether different after this cheering news.

July 9, Monday

It was a glorious day. Our good commandant, Colonel Kobylinski, has asked me not to shake hands with the officers in the presence of outsiders, and not to greet the soldiers. There have already been several occasions when they refused to answer. Worked with Alexei in geography. We sawed up an enormous pine not far from the green-houses. The soldiers, themselves, volunteered their help. The evening ended with reading.

July 18, Wednesday

It rained all morning; by 2 o'clock the weather improved; and toward evening it grew cooler. Spent the day as usual. In Petrograd there are disorders these days, accompanied by shooting. Many soldiers and sailors arrived there yesterday from Kronstadt to oppose the Provisional Government. Absolute chaos. Where are those people who could take this movement in hand and put a stop to strife and bloodshed? The seed of all this evil is in Petrograd and not everywhere in Russia.

July 19, Thursday

Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of troops at Petrograd remained loyal to their duty and order is again restored in the streets. The weather has been wonderful. Took a nice walk with Tatiana and Valia. During the day we worked successfully in the forest grove chopping down and sawing up four trees. In the evening I began . . .

July 21, Saturday

A fine, hot day. Walked all around the park with Tatiana and Maria. During the day we worked in the same places. Yesterday and today the guards from the Fourth and First Rifles acted properly in the discharge of their duties, and did not shadow us during our walk. There have been changes in the composition of the Government. Prince Lvov has gone. Kerenski is to be Prime Minister, re-

maining Minister of War and Navy at the same time, and also directing the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This man is certainly in the right place at the present moment: the more power he has the better.

July 24, Tuesday

In the morning I took a walk with Alexei, and when I returned learned that Kerenski had arrived. In our conversation he referred to the probability of our going south, in view of the proximity of Tsarskoe Selo to the turbulent capital. As it was Olga's name day, we attended church. After luncheon we chopped down two more trees in the same place, making altogether almost seventy trees that have been sawed up. Finished reading the third part of Merezhkovski's trilogy, PETER. It is well written, but makes a painful impression.

July 26, Thursday

The last few days bad news has been coming in from the southwest front. Following our offensive at Galich, many units, thoroughly infected by the contemptible defeatist propaganda, not only refused to advance, but in some sectors even left their position though they were not pressed by the enemy. Taking advantage of this favorable opportunity, the Germans and Austrians, with small forces, broke our lines in southern Galicia, which may compel the entire southwest front to retreat in an easterly direction. This is dishonorable and heartbreaking. Today, at last, there has been a proclamation from the Provisional Government that the death penalty is in force in the theater of military operations for persons found guilty of treason. I trust that this measure may not be too late. The day was muggy and warm. We worked at the same place, along the edges of the clearing. We chopped down three trees and sawed up two. Am beginning gradually to collect my things and books.

[TOBOLSK]

November 2, Friday

Warm day. About 4 o'clock it rained a little. Now all our people who wish to take a walk are forced to pass through the city escorted by the soldiers.

November 3, Saturday

From our window we saw the funeral of a soldier from the Fourth Rifles. At the head of the procession marched a band made up of high school students which played very poorly. At 11 mass

was said at our house. Sat till tea time with Kostritski. At 9 o'clock, there was a vesper service and then we made confession to Father Alexei. Went to bed early.

November 17, Saturday

In the morning I was made happy by a letter from Xenia. Much snow had fallen; I cleared a place for walking, and during the day we carried wood to the barn. It is already two days since any agency telegrams have been received. During the last two days there has been no telegraphic news, which may be due to unfortunate events in the big cities.

November 23, Friday

Another warm day—it went to zero. During the day I sawed wood. Finished the first volume of “1793.” In the evening I read Turgenev’s “Memoirs of a Hunter” aloud.

November 24, Saturday

Much snow has fallen. No newspapers or telegrams have come from Petrograd for a long time. At such a grave time this is serious. The girls were occupied with the swings, jumping from them into a pile of snow. At 9 o'clock there was a vesper service.

November 27, Tuesday

Birthday of dear Mother and 23d anniversary of our wedding. At 12, there was a religious service. The choir got things mixed up and sang out of tune, probably because it had not been rehearsing. The weather was sunny and warm, with gusty winds. After afternoon tea, I re-read my earlier diaries—pleasant occupation.

November 30, Friday

The same disagreeable weather, with a penetrating wind. Heart-breaking to learn from the papers descriptions of what happened two weeks ago at Petrograd and Moscow. It is much worse and more dishonorable than before.

December 1, Saturday

There has come to attention a most incredible report that three delegates of our Fifth Army went to the Germans before Dvinsk and signed the preliminary conditions of an armistice. Such a nightmare I never expected. How could these Bolshevik scoundrels stoop so low as to carry into effect their cherished dream of proposing peace without asking the opinion of the people, and at a time when the enemy is occupying large tracts of our country?

December 3, Monday

The frost increased and the day was clear. There was disaffection among the soliders because they had not received their pay from P'etrograd for three months. This was quickly settled by a temporary loan of the necessary sum from the bank. During the day I busied myself with the firewood. At 9, there was a vesper service.

December 4, Tuesday

This day of the Feast of the Presentation we had to go without church service because Pankratov¹² did not deign to permit it. The weather was warm. Everybody worked in the yard.

December 9, Sunday

At 8 o'clock we went to mass. This is a holiday in honor of those decorated with the St. George Cross. The city gave a dinner and other entertainments in the Community House in honor of them. Among the members of our guard were several knights whom their comrades, not members of the Order, would not relieve even on a day like this. Freedom. . . . Walked long and much; weather moderate.

December 14-15, Friday-Saturday

Both days passed exactly alike. There has been a biting frost with sunshine. After our daily walk, we gather every day at . . . for rehearsal. At 9, there were vespers.

December 16, Sunday

Alix and Alexei did not go with us to mass, on account of the cold—it was 16 degrees. All morning we rehearsed our parts in the drawing-room, where, with the aid of numerous screens and all manner of furniture, we set up something like a stage. In the evening it was all put back in place. We walked as long as there was daylight. While bezique is being played, I am now reading aloud Turgenev's "On the Eve."

December 19, Wednesday

My name day was passed quietly, and not as in former years. At noon there was a religious service. The men of the Fourth Rifles, on guard duty in the garden, congratulated me, and I them, on the occasion of their regimental holiday. I received three Saint's Day pies and sent one of them to the guard. In the evening, Maria, Alexei, and . . . carried off our parts in the play very nicely, and there was much laughter.

¹² V. S. Pankratov was a Commissar sent from the Capital.

January 10, Thursday

Wonderful, sunny, warm day, with 2 degrees of frost. Remained long in the open air, both morning and evening. Learned with indignation that our good Father Alexei is being examined by the authorities and held under arrest in his house. This happened because at the Christmas service in the church the deacon referred to us by our title in the presence of the soldiers of the Second Rifles. Pankratov and his crowd probably had a hand in this, as they always do.

January 13, Sunday

Not a cold day, with a gusty wind. Toward evening, Alexei got up. He was able to put on his boot. After tea we separated, till the arrival of the New Year.

Lord, save Russia.

PEACE TERMS¹⁸

The Central Executive Committee has accepted the following outline of instructions, which is to guide its delegate on his mission [Interallied Conference at Paris].

The new agreement should come out clearly and openly on war aims. It should be based on the principle "peace without annexation, without indemnity, and on the basis of the right of national self-determination."

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

1. As an unfailing condition to peace, the Germans must evacuate Russian territory occupied by them. Russia offers full self-determination to Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.

2. Turkish Armenia to receive full autonomy and later, when it has a local government and international guarantees, the right of self-determination.

3. The Alsace-Lorraine question should be settled by the inhabitants of that country, under conditions that would give them full freedom of voting. The election should be organized by the local self-government after the troops of both belligerents have been removed.

4. Belgium to have her old frontiers and compensation for damages, to be made from an international fund.

5. Serbia and Montenegro to be restored and to have ma-

¹⁸ "Izvestiia," No. 191, October 20, 1917.

terial aid from the international assistance fund. Serbia should have access to the Adriatic. Bosnia and Herzegovina to be autonomous.

6. Disputed areas in the Balkans to have temporary autonomy to be followed by plebiscites.

7. Rumania to have back her old frontiers, with the obligation to give Dobrudja temporary autonomy at once and the right of self-determination later. Rumania to bind herself to put into force immediately the clauses in the Berlin Treaty about the Jews and to give them equal rights with citizens of Rumania.

8. To have autonomy in the Italian parts of Austria, to be followed by plebiscites to determine to what State they should belong.

9. To give back to Germany her colonies.

10. To reëstablish Greece and Persia.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

To neutralize all straits which give access to inland seas; also the Suez and Panama Canals. Merchant marine to be free. Privateering to be prohibited. Torpedoing merchant ships to be prohibited.

INDEMNITIES

All belligerents to renounce war indemnities, either in open or hidden form (such as for taking care of prisoners). All levied contributions during the period of the war to be paid back.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Commercial treaties not to be made a part of peace conditions. Each country to be free to follow out its own commercial policy, and the peace treaty is not to dictate to any State whether it should or should not conclude this or that treaty. All States to bind themselves not to carry on economic blockades after the war, not to make separate tariff unions, and to grant the most favored nation terms to all States without distinction.

GUARANTEES OF PEACE

Peace is to be made at the peace congress by the plenipotentiaries selected by the organs of popular representation. The terms of peace are to be confirmed by the parliaments. Secret diplomacy is to be done away with. All States to obligate themselves not to make secret treaties. Such treaties are to be declared as against the law of nations and void. Without legality, also, are all treaties not ratified by parliaments.

Gradual disarmament on land and sea, and the going over to a system of [citizen] militia.

The proposition of Wilson's "League of Nations" could become a precious conquest for international law only under the following conditions: 1. That all States participate on an equal footing; 2. that foreign affairs be democratized as indicated above.

THE WAY TO PEACE

No matter how concretely the war aims may be formulated, the Allies should make it clear and publish in the agreement, that they are ready to begin peace negotiations just as soon as their opponents will agree to it on the basis of all parties renouncing all [territorial] seizures by force.

The Allies bind themselves not to begin secret peace negotiations and to conclude peace only at a congress and with the participation of all neutral countries.

In addition to the above, the delegate is given, also, the following instructions:

All obstacles placed in the way of the Stockholm Conference to be removed and, in particular, passports to be given to delegates of all parties and factions who agree to take part.

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OF THIS BOOK

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